I begin by arguing that a consistent general naturalism must be understood in terms of methodological maxims rather than metaphysical doctrines. Some specific maxims are proposed. I then defend a generalized naturalism from the common objection that it is incapable of accounting for the normative aspects of human life, including those of scientific practice itself. Evolutionary naturalism, however, is criticized as being incapable of providing a sufficient explanation of categorical moral norms. Turning to the epistemological norms of science itself, particularly (...) those governing the empirical testing of specific models, I argue that these should be regarded as conditional rather than categorical and that, as such, can be given a naturalistic justification. The justification, however, is more cognitive than evolutionary. The historical development of science is found to be a better place for applying evolutionary ideas. After briefly considering the possibility of a naturalistic understanding of mathematics and logic, I turn to the problem of reconciling scientific realism with an evolutionary picture of scientific development. The solution, I suggest, is to understand scientific knowledge as being “perspectival” rather than absolutely objective. I first argue that scientific observation, whether by humans or instruments, is perspectival. This argument is extended to scientific theorizing which is regarded not as the formulation of universal laws of nature but as the construction of principles to be used in the construction of models to be applied to specific natural systems. The application of models, however, is argued to be not merely opportunistic but constrained by the methodological presumption that we live in a world with a definite causal structure even though we can understand it only from various perspectives. (shrink)

In this paper, I will develop a nontrivial interpretation of Feyerabend's concept of a hidden anomalous fact. Feyerabend's claim is that some anomalous facts will remain hidden in the absence of alternatives to the theories to be tested. The case of Brownian motion is given by Feyerabend to support this claim. The essential scientific difficulty in this case was the justification of correct and relevant descriptions of Brownian motion. These descriptions could not be simply determined from the available observational data. (...) An examination, however, of this case shows that no alternative theory is or historically was thought to be necessary in order to justify descriptions of Brownian motion that "directly" refute thermodynamics. While Feyerabend's appraisal of this case therefore is incorrect, a sense is developed in which successful alternatives lend inductive support to the correctness of refuting experimental descriptions. Crucial though to the explanation of this support is the notion of arguments that show the possibilities for improving experimental fit. (shrink)

Abstract:Companies have a share in our common responsibility to future generations. Hitherto, this responsibility has been all but neglected in the business ethics literature. This paper intends to make up for that omission. A strong case for our moral responsibility to future generations can be established on the grounds of moral rights theory, utilitarianism and justice theory. The paper analyses two practical cases in environmental policy, in order to come to grips with the complicated ethical issues involved in the responsibility (...) to future generations. The cases deal with the management of finite energy sources and of vulnerable resources of biodiversity. The ethical issues involved in these cases have an important bearing on business ethics: future generations should be included among the stakeholders of the firm. The paper concludes with a plea to institutionalize a “third arena” for debate and deliberation on the protection of the interests of future generations, next to the arenas of the government and the market. Companies should participate in this third arena, led by a participatory ethics. (shrink)

The central question in this paper is whether anthropogenic mass extinction is ethically problematic above and beyond the sum of extinctions involved. The point of asking this question is not to determine the ethical status of anthropogenic massive extinction, which is clearly ethical horrendous. It is to see if - as is the case with interrogating the wrongness and badness of extinction - answering it illuminates something about the value of what is being lost and sharpens the considerations that substantiate (...) the view; and, if so, whether that might be useful in the context of evaluating mooted approaches to mitigating or adapting to it. The view defended is that massive extinction driven by undermining the conditions that make life forms possible for diverse and higher taxonomic groups constitutes a planetary shift, a phase change, different in kind from merely accelerated anthropogenic change. Justified partiality to the current assemblages of species and biomes is grounded in human relationships, dependencies, histories, and connections with this particular planetary state. This partiality warrants recognizing the loss of this state of the planet - these biospheric conditions, species assemblages, and biomes - as bad, above and beyond the individual harms and species losses involved. This account explains and substantiates why a mass extinction is worse than an equal number of extinctions spread over multiple systems or planets, all other things being equal. This account also provides reason not to embrace the anthropocene or embark on a synthetic age. (shrink)

This paper constitutes my first attempt publicly to comment on Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science. That I have not done this earlier is primarily due to the great similarities in our views on topics where our interests overlap.2 But Cartwright’s work also covers topics I have never seriously considered, such as the use of linear models in economics and the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Even the subject of probabilistic causation, to which I once contributed, is not one I now (...) feel confident in examining in any detail. I will concentrate, therefore, on her views regarding the nature of scientific theories, laws, models, and causality in general – topics at the forefront of my own current thinking. More specifically still, I will focus on the picture of classical mechanics she presents in The Dappled World (1999). (shrink)

The discovery of induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells in 2006 was heralded as a major breakthrough in stem cell research. Since then, progress in iPS cell technology has paved the way towards clinical application, particularly cell replacement therapy, which has refueled debate on the ethics of stem cell research. However, much of the discourse has focused on questions of moral status and potentiality, overlooking the ethical issues which are introduced by the clinical testing of iPS cell replacement therapy. First-in-human trials, (...) in particular, raise a number of ethical concerns including informed consent, subject recruitment and harm minimisation as well as the inherent uncertainty and risks which are involved in testing medical procedures on humans for the first time. These issues, while a feature of any human research, become more complex in the case of iPS cell therapy, given the seriousness of the potential risks, the unreliability of available animal models, the vulnerability of the target patient group, and the high stakes of such an intensely public area of science. Our paper will present a detailed case study of iPS cell replacement therapy for Parkinson's disease to highlight these broader ethical and epistemological concerns. If we accept that iPS cell technology is fraught with challenges which go far beyond merely refuting the potentiality of the stem cell line, we conclude that iPS cell research should not replace, but proceed alongside embryonic and adult somatic stem cell research to promote cross-fertilisation of knowledge and better clinical outcomes. (shrink)

Disturbed by these acrimonious arguments, the authors - former colleagues and university-press board members - embarked on an ambitious project to reexamine a number of major literary and philosophical works dealing with the liberal arts and education. With their discussions ranging from Plato to Rousseau, from Cicero to Vico, from Erasmus to Matthew Arnold, Sousa and Weinsheimer offer not a history of education philosophy but an examination of the present.

Julia Driver has argued that there is a class of virtues that are compatible with or even require that an agent be ignorant in some respect. In this paper I argue for an alternative conception of the relationship between ignorance and virtue. The dispositions constitutive of virtue must include sensitivity to human limitations and fallibility. In this way the virtues accommodate ignorance, rather than require or promote it. I develop my account by considering two virtues in particular: tolerance (the paradigm (...) for my account) and modesty (which Driver employs as the paradigm for her account). Although several philosophers have offered alternatives to Driver's account of modesty and others have discussed tolerance as a moral virtue, an adequate account of the role of ignorance in the specification of the virtues generally has yet to be provided. I believe that similarities between the two virtues are instructive for defining that role. (shrink)

ExcerptI. Introduction The German political philosopher Carl Schmitt belongs to the class of political theorists, who maintain a tradition of separating the political from the moral.1 Drawing on the standard interpretation of Machiavelli2 and following the thinking of Hobbes,3 Schmitt makes two central claims that define his political theorization. The first claim is that the sovereign should possess “the monopoly to decide” what constitutes public order and security; the second claim is the use of the “friend-enemy” metaphor to characterize the (...) political.4 If the two claims are taken together, the logical corollary is that, on the…. (shrink)

Nurturing Creativity in the Classroom is a groundbreaking collection of essays by leading scholars, who examine and respond to the tension that many educators face in valuing student creativity but believing that they cannot support it given the curricular constraints of the classroom. Is it possible for teachers to nurture creative development and expression without drifting into curricular chaos? Do curricular constraints necessarily lead to choosing conformity over creativity? This book combines the perspectives of top educators and psychologists to generate (...) practical advice for considering and addressing the challenges of supporting creativity within the classroom. It is unique in its balance of practical recommendations for nurturing creativity and thoughtful appreciation of curricular constraints. This approach helps ensure that the insights and advice found in this collection will take root in educators' practice, rather than being construed as yet another demand placed on their overflowing plate of responsibilities. (shrink)

2.4 The Example: Infants and object-(im)permanence : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 17 2.4.1 Why a contentful account is warranted: Perspectival sensitivity : : : 17 2.4.2 The \searching under a cloth" and \AB" data : : : : : : : : : : : : 24 2.4.3 Two constraints on objectuality : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : (...) : 25.. (shrink)

Many solar systems in the universe may be expected to contain rocky planets that have accreted organic compounds. These compounds are likely to be universally found. In addition, the chemistry of sulfur, phosphorus, and iron is likely to dominate energy transductions and monomer activation, leading to the eventual emergence of polymers. Proteins and polynucleotides provide living matter with function, structure, and information. The conceptual puzzle regarding their emergence is discussed. The fitness of various elements to serve various roles is analyzed (...) from the viewpoint of electron orbitals. Elements with d orbitals are of central importance. (shrink)

An extremely important Jewish writer and thinker of the first century AD, Philo of Alexandria exercised through his ideas and language a lasting influence on the development and growth of Christianity in the New Testament period and later. This book provides an introduction to the major themes and ideas in the religious and philosophical thinking of Philo and outlines the importance of his thought by means of introductory treatments and sections of freshly translated text and commentary. Dr Williamson illustrates in (...) his work the place and significance of Philo within Judaism and as part of the background to Christianity, and so provides a valuable resource for scholars and students in this area of study. (shrink)

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