It has been argued that affordances are not meaningful and are thus not useful to be applied in contexts where specifically meaningfulness of experience is at stake (e.g. clinical contexts or discussions of autonomous agency). This paper aims to reconceptualize affordances such as to make them relevant and applicable in such contexts. It starts by investigating the ‘ambiguity’ of (possibilities for) action. In both philosophy of action and affordance research, this ambiguity is typically resolved by adhering to the agents intentions (...) and concerns. I discuss some recent accounts of affordances that highlight these concerns but argue that they tend to adopt an ‘atomistic’ approach where there is no acknowledgement of how these concerns are embedded in the agents wider concerns, values, projects and commitments. An holistic approach that does acknowledge this can be found in psychological research on agents having a sense of what they’re doing. I will discuss this research in the second part of the paper and argue that agents can analogously have a sense of what is afforded. This is deemed the entry point for understanding the meaningfulness of affordances. In the final part of the paper I apply this analysis to recent attempts which seek to make sense of authentic and autonomous agency in terms of affordances. (shrink)

To understand lying, we naturally focus on small scale lies involving one speaker, one listener, one assertion. This methodology confers artificial plausibility upon the requirement that liars intend to deceive. For it excludes principal-agent conflicts that emerge from linguistic division of labor. When an employee lies for her boss, she need not inherit his motive to deceive. She displays loyalty even if her lie does not deceive. Focus on a single lie in isolation also blinds us to tactical deceptions such (...) as telling a lie which is intended to be caught to advance another lie. Many of these complexities arise from situations that approximate common knowledge without quite crystallizing into this uniform transparency. (shrink)

Naiyāyikas are fond of a slogan, which often appears as a kind of motto in their texts: "Whatever exists is knowable and nameable." What does this mean? Is it true? The first part of this essay offers a brief explication of this important Nyāya thesis; the second part argues that, given certain plausible assumptions, the thesis is demonstrably false.

In ‘Epistemic Modals’ (2007), Seth Yalcin proposes Stalnaker-style semantics for epistemic possibility. He is inspired by John MacFarlane’s ingenious defence of relativism, in which claims of epistemic possibility are made rigidly from the perspective of the assessor’s actual stock of information (rather than from the speaker’s knowledge base or that of his audience or community). The innovations of MacFarlane and Yalcin independently reinforce the modal collapse espoused by Jaakko Hintikka in his 1962 epistemic logic (which relied on the implausible KK (...) principle and heavy idealizations). I respond to this new challenge with fresh objections to the underlying S4 equivalence: p p . I also propose counter-analyses of the intriguing data which Yalcin cites in support of his new semantics. A key collateral motivation for this defence of irredundant iterations is to ward off a threat to higher order vagueness. (shrink)

The creeping vole Microtus oregoni exhibits remarkably transformed sex chromosome biology, with complete chromosome drive/drag, X‐Y fusions, sex reversed X complements, biased X inactivation, and X chromosome degradation. Beginning with a selfish X chromosome, I propose a series of adaptations leading to this system, each compensating for deleterious consequences of the preceding adaptation: (1) YY embryonic inviability favored evolution of a selfish feminizing X chromosome; (2) the consequent Y chromosome transmission disadvantage favored X‐Y fusion (“XP”); (3) Xist‐based silencing of Y‐derived (...) XP genes favored a second X‐Y fusion (“XM”); (4) X chromosome dosage‐related costs in XPXM males favored the evolution of XM loss during spermatogenesis; (5) X chromosomal dosage‐related costs in XM0 females favored the evolution of XM drive during oogenesis; and (6) degradation of the non‐recombining XP favored the evolution of biased X chromosome inactivation. I discuss recurrent rodent sex chromosome transformation, and selfish genes as a constructive force in evolution. (shrink)

Study of philosophy of self in Sāṅkhyakārikā by Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa and Essay concerning human understanding by John Locke, 1632-1704.

In this paper, I review a collection of recently published papers that have provided significant new information about the biogenesis and functions of motile cilia. In vertebrates, the activity of motile cilia has been associated with a fascinating diversity of developmental and physiological processes. Despite the importance, much remains to be learned about the genetic control and cellular events that are involved in the differentiation of motile cilia. We also need to better understand the mechanisms by which cilia‐driven fluid flow (...) is able to influence such a variety of developmental and physiological processes. The Foxj1 family of proteins has now been definitively established as master regulators of motile ciliogenesis.1,2 Identification of the Kintoun/PF13 protein has shed light on the assembly of dynein arms,3 whereas live imaging of ciliary motility has led to the discovery of an intriguing new role for motile cilia in otolith formation in the ear.4. (shrink)

The vanishing point is a representational gap that organizes the visual field. Study of this singularity revolutionized art in the fifteenth century. Further reflection on the vanishing point invites the conjecture that the self is an absence. This paper opens with perceptual peculiarities of the vanishing point and closes with the metaphysics of personal identity.

Opinions about cognitive enhancement (CE) are context-dependent. Prior research has demonstrated that factors like peer pressure, the influence of authority figures, competition, moral relevance, familiarity with enhancement devices, expertise, and the domain of CE to be enhanced can influence opinions. The variability and malleability of patient, expert, and public attitudes toward CE is important to describe and predict because these attitudes can influence at-home, clinical, research, and regulatory decisions. If individual preferences vary, they could influence opinions about practices and regulations (...) due to disagreements about the desirable levels of risks and benefits. The study of attitudes about CE would benefit from psychological theories that explain judgments. In particular, we suggest that variability in risk and benefit sensitivity could psychologically mediate judgments about CE in many contexts. Drawing from prospect theory, which originated in behavioral economics, it is likely that framing effects, shifted reference points, and the tendency to weigh losses (risks) more heavily than gains (benefits) predict decisions about CE. We suggest that public policy could benefit from a shared conceptual framework, such as prospect theory, that allows us to describe and predict real-world decisions about CE by patients, experts, and the public. (shrink)

What do you get when you cross a fallacy with a good argument? A fugu, that is, a valid argument that tempts you to reach its conclusion invalidly. You have yielded to the temptation more than you realize. If you are a teacher, you may have served many fugus. They arise systematically through several mechanisms. Fugus are interesting intermediate cases that shed light on the following issues: bare evidentialism, false pleasure, philosophy of education, and the ethics of argument. Normally, a (...) fugu will not yield knowledge from known premises. But if the reasoning is only slightly fallacious, they do yield knowledge. These mild fugus show that we can gain knowledge by invalid reasoning. This is a conservative resource for historians. They want to credit discoveries to Euclid rather than those who made minor corrections to his proofs, such as David Hilbert. We also benefit from this practice of grandfathering in old standards of knowledge attribution. For we can compete spiritedly for priority. We do not need to worry that credit will instead go to future scholars who will make the minor amendments needed to raise present proofs to a future standard of demonstration. (shrink)

Issue is taken with Dawkins and Krebs's (1978) conception of communication as being by nature manipulative and with Cronk's proposals concerning the evolution of morality, both of which are grounded in evolutionary biology. An alternative view, which recognizes that which humanity has in common with other species but which emphasizes humanity's distinctiveness, is offered to account for religion and morality.

First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In theories which contribute to the understanding of uncertainty in entrepreneurial action, scholars have traditionally attributed a negative connotation to uncertainty. This paper seeks to posit an understanding of uncertainty derived from Greek and Indian philosophy, where action of the human agent is not deterred by uncertainty, and rather, occurs despite uncertainty. This idea may be beneficial in making future entrepreneurs less apprehensive about uncertainty, by helping them locate the lessons from philosophy. I look at existing ideas that explore uncertainty (...) in entrepreneurial motivation, and present a multidisciplinary approach which sees uncertainty as a force that increases intent of action, rather than deterring it by drawing on the understanding of consequence and action in Aristotelean thought and Hindu philosophy, and extend the concepts of tuche and karma to posit a theoretical position which sees uncertainty as a factor that encourages entrepreneurial action and motivation. The understanding of uncertainty in management literature has been approached primarily from two disciplinary positions - economics and organisational theory. In economics, the classical understanding of uncertainty which commenced with Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921), was largely abandoned in later years for a more quantifiable approach of calculating risk. Uncertainty, characteristically nebulous and difficult to grapple with, is unquantifiable. It is defined, in fact, by Knight, as something which cannot be predicted and quantified. Thus, in academics, where almost all disciplines try to make sense of the way the world works, uncertainty has always been a problematic concept. (shrink)

Editor's Preface Roy Wood Sellars's contributions to philosophy have been epochal. The originator and persistent elaborator of critical realism, ...

Deliberation is the process through which we decide what do to, or what to believe. When we think about what to do, we are engaged in practical deliberation. Theoretical deliberation is when we think about what to believe, or about which judgement to make.

According to the early Yogācāra, following non-conceptual awareness, the advanced bodhisattva is said to attain a state characterized by a "subsequent awareness". Yogācāra thinkers identify this state with ultimate knowledge of causality and view it as involving a unique kind of conceptual activity and propositional attitudes, which are very different, however, from ordinary conceptual awareness insofar as they do not involve vikalpa. Translated back into the terms of some version of the contemporary debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists, this would amount (...) to something like the claim that we can use concepts in a non-conceptual way. But how can we make sense... (shrink)

A blindspot is a consistent but inaccessible proposition. For instance, I cannot know 'The test is on Friday but I do not know it'. No contradiction follows from the supposition that you know my blindspot. But could you know my blindspot if we are epistemic peers? Epistemic peers have the same evidence and reasoning ability. So either both peers know a proposition or both are ignorant. Since I cannot know my blindspot, neither can my peer. Thus the formal ignorance associated (...) with blindspots spreads to my peers. This contagion is used to improve a solution to the blindspot solution to the surprise test paradox. (shrink)