In the ideal case archives are the official places or institutions where all the biographical, bibliographical, published and unpublished material of one or several authors are collected and presented as well as their correspondencies, material belonging to them or their families, secondary literature etc. As there is hardly any ideal archive to be found some archives - more or less related to Austrian Philosophy - and their work are sketched and a rough scheme for the order of the literary estate (...) of some author is suggested. By the example of the Meinong-Gesamtausgabe a fruitful combination of archival and editorial work is presented and finally some problems concerning present philosophical editions (Franz Brentano and Ludwig Wittgenstein) are discussed. (shrink)

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

"Groundbreaking when first published in 1969, this book is now of even greater relevance to make the reader aware of the need to educate the visual sense, a ...

Clear, comprehensive, intermediate introduction to logical languages, applications of symbolic logic to physics, mathematics, biology.

Moving beyond the dialogical approaches found in much of contemporary hermeneutics, this book focuses instead on the diagnostic use of reflective judgment, not only to discern the differentiating features of the phenomena to be understood, but also to the various meaning contexts that can frame their interpretation. It assesses what such thinkers as Kant, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas and others can contribute to the problems of multicultural understanding, and reconceives hermeneutics as a critical inquiry into the appropriate contextual conditions (...) of understanding and interpretation. (shrink)

Carnap wrote a continuation of his reply to Kaplan, which would, however, have made that reply, already by far the longest in the book, too long. So he set aside his projected notes for a continuation to serve as the basis for a separate paper, which he never got around to writing. It is transcribed here from his shorthand and translated into English, with some introductory notes to provide a little context.

In the fall of 1957 the University of California Press expanded Arnheim’s 1933 book _Film_ by four essays and brought that landmark work back into print as _Film as Art._ Now nearly fifty years after that re-edition, the book continues to occupy an important place in the literature of film. Arnheim’s method, provocative in this age of technological wizardry, was to focus on the way art in film was derived from that medium’s early limitations: no sound, no color, no three-dimensional (...) depth. (shrink)

Die philosophische Erkenntnistheorie geht hinsichtlich ihres Verständnisses von Erkenntnis vom heuristischen Kurzschluss des Inhalts mit dem Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Diesem Kurzschluss korrespondiert die Idee von Wahrheit im Sinne einer irgendwie gearteten Übereinstimmung zwischen Inhalt und Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Das Problem das daraus entsteht ist die Frage der Überprüfbarkeit dieser Übereinstimmung, die einen transzendenten Standpunkt voraussetzen würde, der mangels Existenz zu einem reinen Fluchtpunkt der Reflexion wird. Der Standpunkt der Reflexion entspricht der Einnahme eines transzendenten Standpunkts, der dennoch im erkennenden Subjekt (...) verankert ist. Die Frage der Übereinstimmung wird so zu einer Frage der Gewissheit. Diese führt zu einem zweiten, diesmal theoretischen Kurzschluss, nämlich der Verquickung der eigentlichen Frage einer Theorie des Phänomens Erkenntnis, der Frage nach der Genese (bzw. Generierung) des Inhalts der Erkenntnis, mit der Frage der Gewissheit dieses Inhalts. Diese Verquickung führt schließlich zur Frage, welche (per definitionem subjektiven) Elemente des Erkenntnisvorgangs Gewissheit verbürgen können, und somit zu einer weiteren, dritten, nämlich methodischen Kurzschluss durch die Definition der (in Wahrheit holistischen) Erkenntnissituation im Sinne eines Subjekt-Objekt-Gegensatzes und den damit zwingend verbundenen Ausschluss des Wissens der empirischen Naturwissenschaften aus der Erkenntnisreflexion. Ziel dieser kurzen Arbeit (die die Einleitung zu einer kürzlich erschienen Publikation mit dem Titel: 'Rehabilitation der reinen Vernunft' darstellt), ist es, im Wege der Rückabwicklung dieser Kurzschlüsse in umgekehrter Reihenfolge zu einem adäquaten Verständnis des Phänomens Erkenntnis zu finden, also ausgehend von der affirmativen Kenntnisnahme des Holismus der realen Erkenntnissituation, der subjektive Gewissheit als vernünftiges Erkenntnisziel von vornherein ausschließt. (shrink)

Philosophical epistemology bases its understanding of cognition on the heuristic short-circuit of the content with the object of cognition. This short-circuit corresponds to the idea of truth in the sense of some kind of correspondence between the content and the object of knowledge. The problem that arises from this is the question of the verifiability of this correspondence, which would presuppose a transcendent standpoint that, for lack of existence, becomes a mere vanishing point of reflection. The standpoint of reflection corresponds (...) to the adoption of a transcendent standpoint that is nevertheless anchored in the cognizing subject. The question of correspondence thus becomes a question of certainty. This leads to a second, this time theoretical short-circuit, namely the conflation of the actual question of a theory of the phenomenon of cognition, the question of the genesis (or generation) of the content of cognition, with the question of the certainty of this content. This conflation ultimately leads to the question of which (by definition subjective) elements of the cognitive process can guarantee certainty, and thus to a further, third, namely methodological short-circuit through the definition of the (in truth holistic) cognitive situation in terms of a subject-object opposition and the associated exclusion of the knowledge of the empirical natural sciences from cognitive reflection. The aim of this short paper (which is the introduction to a recent publication entitled 'Rehabilitation of Pure Reason') is to find an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of cognition by reversing these short-circuits in reverse order, i.e. by starting from the affirmative acknowledgement of the holism of the real cognitive situation, which excludes subjective certainty as a reasonable goal of cognition from the outset. (shrink)

In the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the term object has an extensive and far-reaching significance, and it can therefore be understood as a theory of objects. This becomes particularly clear when it is observed that all of his guidelines can be traced to different concepts of objects and their combination. With his concept of the object of experience, he attempts to mediate incompatible aspects in this: in relation to the object of experience, we have apodictic claims but at the (...) same time our knowledge of the object develops and contains the possibility of historical progress. This theory of objects was elaborated by Kant with regard to natural science and the claim of its metaphysical foundation. For this reason, Kant’s concept of object is inherently linked with his concept of science. Astronomy is at the core of his investigation, because it represents a perfect example of a so-called proper and rational natural science. (shrink)

Husserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure (...) consciousness and the natural sciences. A phenomenological discussion of naturalism thus cannot limit itself to the task of discrimination, it must attempt to integrate what an eidetic analysis has separated: inside and outside, here and there, first-person and third-person perspective, motivation and causality. Husserl's phenomenology of the body thus shows that dualism is at best a methodological but never an ontological option for the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Das Betreiben von Wissenschaft ist eine spezifische Form von Erkenntnistätigkeit, die bezüglich ihrer methodischen Vorgangsweise von konkreten heuristischen Zielsetzungen und korrespondierenden Maßstäben geleitet ist. Die Wissenschaftstheorie verfolgt das Ziel einer Analyse der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnistätigkeit vor dem Hintergrund der Erkenntnistheorie. Das Kernproblem der traditionellen philosophischen Erkenntnistheorie, und mit ihr der gängigen Wissenschaftstheorie, so meine These, besteht in dem heuristischen Kurzschluss des Inhalts mit dem Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Dieser manifestiert sich auf direkte Weise in ihrem Fokus auf den heuristischen Maßstab der Gewissheit (...) unseres Wissens, gestützt auf die metaphysische Annahme der Bestimmtheit der Dinge an sich (der die Annahme von Deskription als Paradigma von Erkenntnis im allgemeinen korrepondiert). Die Hauptthese dieser Abhandlung wird sein, dass dieser Kurzschluss zu einer Ausblendung der Rolle der Heuristik als grundlegender Erkenntnisfaktor führt, und in seiner Konsequenz zum deskriptiven Missverständnis der dekonstruktiven mathematischen Heuristik der Physik (mit ihrem Fokus auf die dynamnischen Phänomene) im Sinne von bloßer Dekomposition. Die Folgen dieses Missverständnisses sind, der Rolle der Physik als Grundlagenwissenschaft geschuldet, weitreichend. Insbesondere für das wissenschaftliche Selbstverständnis der Biologie, im Sinne des Ziels, biologische Entitäten analytisch in physikalische zu zerlegen und biologische Phänomene auf physikalische Gesetze zu reduzieren. Dieses Ziel widerspricht klar der dekonstruktiven methodischen Vorgangsweise der Physik, deren einziger Maßstab in der Angemessenheit der Rekonstruktion der betreffenden Phänomene besteht. (shrink)

Wittgenstein, possibly the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century, is often labelled a Neopositivist, a New-Kantian, even a Sceptic. _Questions on Wittgenstein_, first published in 1988, presents a selection of nine essays investigating a matter of vital philosophical importance: Wittgenstein’s relationship to his Austrian predecessors and peers. The intention throughout is to determine the precise contours of Wittgenstein’s own thought by situating it within its formative context. Although it remains of particular interest to Anglo-Saxon philosophers, special familiarity with Austrian (...) philosophy is required to appreciate the subtle and profound influence which this cultural and philosophical setting had on Wittgenstein’s intellectual development. Professor Haller has spent his career exploring these themes, and is one of the foremost authorities on both Wittgenstein and contemporary Austrian philosophy. Questions on Wittgenstein thus offers a unique insight into the twentieth-century tradition of Austrian philosophy, and its importance for Wittgenstein’s thought. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to reconcile the disturbing contradiction between the striving for order in nature and in man and the principle of entropy implicit in the second law of thermodynamics - between the tendency toward greater organization and the general trend of the material universe toward death and disorder.

Excerpt from Worterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe, Vol. 1: Historisch-Quellenmassig Bearbeitet; A bis N Die Anordnung des Materials ist so getroffen worden, dafs in erster Linie die Ubersichtlichkeit des Stoffes gesichert wurde. Die logisch - systematische und die chronologisch-genetische Dispositions weise wurden nach Moglichkeit miteinander combiniert. Auf allzu subtile Einteilungen kam es hier, in einem Worterbuchs, nicht so sehr an, verfuhrt doch eine solche, die gewohnlich durch allerhand Voraussetzungen und Annahmen bedingt ist, selbst also den Charakter einer Theorie, einer Hypothese hat, (...) zur Subjectiviernug der Darstellung, wahrend doch dem Herausgeber au moglichster Objectivitat lag; diese ist denn auch von der Kritik anerkannt werden. Den eigenen Standpunkt, den der Fachmann als einen in so mancher Beziehung selbstandigen erkennen wird, hat der Herausgeber in den an der Spitze der einzelnen Artikel stehenden Begriffs. Bestimmungen zwar kurz, pracis, aber, wie er glaubt, nicht nu wissenschaftlich, entwickelt. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

In Matter and Memory, Bergson examines the relationship between perception and memory, the status of consciousness in its relation to the brain, and more generally, a possible conjunction of matter and mind. Our reading focuses in particular on his understanding of the evanescent presence of the present and of its debt vis-à-vis the "unconscious" consciousness of a "virtual" past. We wish to show that the Bergsonian version of a critique of "the metaphysics of presence" is, for all that, an offshoot (...) of a Platonic type of metaphysics. It is true that Bergson departs from traditional standpoints on the side of a self-sufficient and original present and a form of presence to which the transparency of consciousness would confer the character of immediate evidence. All the same, it can hardly be claimed that his rehabilitation of the past and the unconscious opens up new perspectives on how forgetting and death are bound up with the work of memory. (shrink)

From the Introduction: The papers collected in this book are based on the assumption that art, as any other activity of the mind, is subject to psychology, accessible to understanding, and needed for any comprehensive survey of mental functioning. The author believes, furthermore, that the science of psychology is not limited to measurements under controlled laboratory conditions, but must comprise all attempts to obtain generalizations by means of facts as thoroughly established and concepts as well defined as the investigated situation (...) permits. Therefore the psychological findings offered or referred to in these papers range all the way from experiments in the perception of shape or observations on the art work of children to broad deliberations on the nature of images or of inspiration and contemplation. It is also assumed that every area of general psychology calls for applications to art. The study of perception applies to the effects of shape, color, movement, and expression in the visual arts. Motivation raises the question of what needs are fulfilled by the production and reception of art. The psychology of the normal and the disturbed personality searches the work of art for manifestations of individual attitudes. And social psychology relates the artist and his contribution to his fellow men. A systematic book on the psychology of art would have to survey relevant work in all of these areas. My papers undertake nothing of the kind. They are due to one man's outlook and interest, and they report on whatever happened to occur to him. They are presented together because they turn out to be concerned with a limited number of common themes. Often, but unintentionally, a hint in one paper is expanded to full exposition in another, and different applications of one and the same concept are found in different papers. I can only hope that the many overlappings will act as unifying reinforcements rather than as repetitions. These papers represent much of the output of the quarter of a century during which I have been privileged to live, study, and teach in the United States. To me, they are not so much the steps of a development as the gradual spelling-out of a position. For this reason, I have grouped them systematically, not chronologically. For the same reason, I did not hesitate to change the words I wrote years ago wherever I thought I could clarify their meaning. Removed from my original intimacy with the content, I approached the text as an unprepared reader, and when I stumbled, I tried to repair the road. In some instances, I recast whole sections, not in order to bring them up to date, but in the hope of saying better what I meant at the time. Some of the earlier papers led to my book, _Art and Visual Perception_, which was written in 1951 and first published in 1954- Sections of the articles on perceptual abstraction, on the Gestalt theory of expression, and on Henry Moore are incorporated in that book. Others continued where the book left off, for instance, the attempts to describe more explicitly the symbolism conveyed by visual form. The short piece on inspiration provided the substance for the introductory chapter on creativity in my more recent book, Picasso's Guernica. Finally, in rereading the material, I was surprised to find how many passages point to what is shaping up as my next task, namely, a presentation of visual thinking as the common and necessary way of productive problem solving in any human activity. Ten of the papers in this book were first published in the _Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism_. To mention this is to express my indebtedness to the only scholarly periodical in the United States devoted to the theory of art. In particular, Thomas Munro, its first editor, showed a great trust in the contribution of psychology. He made me feel at home among the philosophers, art historians, and literary critics whose lively propositions inhabit the hostel he founded and sustained. To him, as well as to my friends of the University of California Press, who are now publishing my fourth book, I wish to say that much of what I thought about in these years might not have been cast into final writing, had it not been for their sympathy, which encouraged the novice and keeps a critical eye on the more self-assured pro. There are a few scientific papers here, originally written for psychological journals but free, I hope, of the terminological incrustation that would hide their meaning from sight. There are essays for the educated friend of the arts. And there are speeches, intended to suggest practical consequences for art education, for the concerns of the artist, and for the function of art in our time. These public lectures are hardly the products of a missionary temperament. In fact, I marveled why anybody would go to a theorist for counsel, illumination, and reassurance in practical matters. However, when I responded to such requests I noticed, bewildered and delighted, that some of my findings pointed to tangible applications, which were taken to be useful. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qui, chez l'homme, retient ou empeche la fuite en avant d'une pulsion specifique? Une autre pulsion complementaire ou antagoniste? L'instance subjective d'un moi se pliant aux commandements du surmoi? L'ordre du corps vivant, de la raison ou du signifiant? Ou est-il pensable qu'une pulsion humaine se gouverne elle-meme en canalisant son energie excessive et en veillant a sa transformation ou a sa sublimation plutot que de se livrer a l'ivresse d'une repetition sterile?Ce livre aborde ces questions en envisageant les (...) pulsions humaines, en amont, depuis leur ancrage dans les forces de la nature ou les instincts animaux et, en aval, en vue de leur prolongement en desirs symboliquement structures. Dans une telle perspective, le questionnement psychanalytique de Freud et de Lacan rencontre tout naturellement les interrogations d'une philosophie de la nature, de la vie et de la culture. Inversement, une rehabilitation de l'energetique psychanalytique favorise la redecouverte d'une pensee philosophique, pour laquelle la dynamique des forces virtuelles prime sur la presence de substances statiques, et pour laquelle aucun acte effectif n'efface sa dette vis-a-vis d'un pouvoir-etre retenu ou d'un manque d'etre. De cette metaphysique dont le livre suit le cheminement d'Aristote a Husserl en passant par Leibniz et Schopenhauer, Nietzsche et la psychanalyse marquent aussi les limites, en projetant sur elle l'ombre du nihilisme des pulsions de mort. Au croisement des deux approches de la pulsion se dresse, a nouveau mais autrement, la question de la subjectivite. (shrink)

The article sketches an approach to the sociology of the stranger which is based on historical semantics, on comparative studies of social structures of premodern societies and on a reconsideration of the `classical sociology of the stranger' and of marginality (Simmel, 1908; Michels, 1929 and others; Schütz, 1944; Park, 1964). The guiding hypothesis of the article is that there is a discontinuity in the modern experience of the stranger which has not been reflected sufficiently in the classical sociology of the (...) stranger. Whereas in premodern societies membership criteria are binary codes such as `kin' vs. `stranger', `friend' vs. `enemy', and elaborate arrangements were then necessary for institutionalizing a third status (e.g. for internal strangers) between the binary alternatives, the modern experience is wholly different. Modern society is no longer a membership organization. The third status (i.e. being neither `friend' nor `stranger') has become constitutive of our everyday experience of other persons. And this everyday experience is that of indifference as our normal attitude towards most persons living in the world. A modern sociology of the stranger has to explore the facets of indifference. Indifference can be described as an interactional achievement in situations of fleeting contact. And it can be examined in its macrostructural consequences in a modern societal order in which motivations for societal engagements and therefore any willingness to care for the other are unavoidably scarce. (shrink)

Résultat des recherches du philosophe allemand positiviste ayant pour objectif d'établir un système logique de constitution des concepts par dérivation, à partir d'un petit nombre de concepts fondamentaux.