A NewsFusion System is a logic-based system for merging heterogeneous structured news reports. Structured news reports are XML documents, where the textentries are restricted to individual words or simple phrases, such as names and domain-specific terminology, and numbers and units. We assume structured news reports do not require natural language processing. In previous papers, we have presented aspects of a logic-based framework for merging structured news reports based on fusion rules. Fusion rules are a form of scripting language that define (...) how structured news reports should be merged. The antecedent of a fusion rule is a call to investigate the information in the structured news reports and the background knowledge, and the consequent of a fusion rule is a formula specifying an action to be undertaken to form a merged report. It is expected that a set of fusion rules is defined for any given application. In this paper, we present a framework for aggregation predicates that can be used in fusion rules for context-dependent aggregation of structured news reports. We also present a case study that uses aggregation predicates to merge weather reports that have been obtained from a selection of websites. (shrink)

Robert Rupert argues against the view that human cognitive processes comprise elements beyond the boundary of the organism, developing a systems-based conception in place of this extended view. He also argues for a conciliatory understanding of the relation between the computational approach to cognition and the embedded and embodied views.

Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,.

Here, I argue that Dixon et al. have overstated the prevalence of forms of prejudice; many stigmatised groups are currently the targets of overtly hostile evaluation and treatment by others. I also believe that the target article oversimplifies its presentation of prejudice researchers' primary theoretical and policy goals and that it overlooks important work in intergroup emotions.

Die Probleme, die in dieser Arbeit entwickelt werden und deren Losung versucht wird, haben den Autor sowohl durch sein juristisches Studium als auch seine praktische Ausbildung begleitet. Sie sind in ihrer Aktualitat so beharrlich, weil sie gleichwohl bei der juristischen Alltagsarbeit auftauchen wie auch den Hohenflug juristischer Theorienbildung begleiten. rch hoffe, daB die Arbeit beiden Unternehmungen dienlich ist. Dank schul de ich Herrn Prof. Dr. ULRICH KLUG, der in angenehmster Weise durch wertvolle Anregungen sowohl vor Irrtiimern zu bewahren als auch (...) zur Fortfiihrung der Arbeit zu ermuntern wuBte. Herrn Prof. Dr. GERHARD KEGEL verdanke ich die Gelegenheit, meine Konzeption an rechts­ vergleichendem Material priifen zu konnen. Und nicht zuletzt verdanke ich meine Zuversicht allen Wissenschaftlern, die ihre Freude in dem gleichen Wagstiick fanden, der Wahrheit zu dienen. Wer der Wahrheit die nt, dient dem Recht. Und nur wer der Wahrheit dient, kann dem Recht dienen. Koln, Juni 1966 RUPERT SCHREIBER Inhaltsverzeichnis Einleitung........ (shrink)

In this book, Rupert Read offers the first outline of a resolute reading, following the highly influential New Wittgenstein 'school', of the Philosophical Investigations. He argues that the key to understanding Wittgenstein's later philosophy is to understand its liberatory purport. Read contends that a resolute reading coincides in its fundaments with what, building on ideas in the later Gordon Baker, he calls a liberatory reading. Liberatory philosophy is philosophy that can liberate the user from compulsive patterns of thought, freeing (...) one for possibilities that were previously obscured. Such liberation is our prime goal in philosophy. This book consists in a sequential reading, along these lines, of what Read considers the most important and controversial passages in the Philosophical Investigations 1, 16, 43, 95 & 116 & 122, 130-3, 149-151, 186, 198-201, 217, and 284-6. Read claims that this liberatory conception is simultaneously an ethical conception. The PI should be considered a work of ethics in that its central concern becomes our relation with others. Wittgensteinian liberations challenge widespread assumptions about how we allegedly are independent of and separate from others. Wittgenstein's Liberatory Philosophy will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein, and to scholars of the political philosophy of liberation and the ethics of relation. (shrink)

Electricity systems in many parts of Europe and the United States are currently undergoing transformations that have potentially profound implications for managerial practice and the politics of user identities within these systems. After more than a century of “universal service” that provided technical goods and services to all users on essentially equal terms, utility managers are now constructing and exploiting heterogeneity and difference among users. This article explores local managerial practices within Swedish electricity in the mid-1990s, where managers promoted “brand-name” (...) electricity as a strategy for configuring identities for users, their utilities, and electricity itself. These dynamics are analyzed using theoretical perspectives from two bodies of science and technology studies on configuring users’ identities. The article then analyzes the emergent practices and their theoretical and political implications for understanding of how and why artifacts, users, and organizational entities are coconstituted in ongoing technoscientific practice in infrastructural systems. (shrink)

Dialogic: Education for the Digital Age argues that despite rapid advances in communications technology, most educational research still relies on traditional approaches to education, built upon the logic of print, and dependent on the notion that there is a single true representation of reality. In practice, the use of the Internet disrupts this traditional logic of education by offering an experience of knowledge as participatory and multiple. The challenge identified in Wegerif's text is the growing need to develop a new (...) understanding of education that will encourage us to provide new policies, and hold the potential to transform educational pedagogy and meet the realities of the digital age. This new logic of education is dialogic and characterises education as learning to learn, think and thrive in the context of working with multiple perspectives and ultimate uncertainty. The book builds upon the simple contrast between observing dialogue from an outside point of view, and participating in a dialogue from the inside, before pinpointing an essential feature of dialogic: the gap or difference between voices in dialogue which is understood as an irreducible source of meaning. Each chapter of the book applies this dialogic thinking to a specific challenge facing education, re-thinking the challenge and revealing a new theory of education. Areas covered in the book include: - dialogical learning and cognition - dialogical learning and emotional intelligence - educational technology, dialogic 'spaces' and consciousness - global dialogue and global citizenship - dialogic theories of science and maths education. (shrink)

This paper -distinguishes between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition, characterizing them as competitors (both motivated by situated, interactive cognitive processing, with the latter being the more conservative of the two interpretations of the data) -clarifies the relation between content externalism and extended cognition -introduces the problem of cognitive bloat, as part of a critical discussion of Clark and Chalmers's "past-endorsement criterion" (if the criterion is embraced, we privilege the internal, endorsing process -- which looks (...) more like an embedded view -- and if the criterion is rejected, bloat follows) and as a problem for extended views more generally -develops a dilemma critical of Clark and Chalmers's "explanatory kinds" argument for extended mind and cognition (arguing that their reasoning faces serious problems regardless of whether one individuates the kinds in question in a fine-grained or a coarse-grained way) -argues that an appeal to functionalism doesn't resolve the issue -argues for the priority, in debates about extended cognition, of the identification of cognitive systems (e.g., because a functionalist approach can't be applied unless we already know what count as inputs and outputs, which requires having already identified the boundaries of the cognitive system). (shrink)

For the purpose of this discussion, I am taking it for granted that the sense of being stared at is real. The weight of available evidence seems to support its factual existence, as discussed in my earlier article in this issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Some people will dispute this conclusion, and there is as yet no universal consensus. But it is not necessary for everyone to agree that a phenomenon exists before discussing its possible implications. A discussion (...) of the implications of evolution began long before everyone agreed that evolution had occurred, and there are still people who deny its reality. (shrink)

Combining anthropological descriptions with historical criticism, Cox situates the Zen arts within contemporary critical discourses.

Although its subject is the relationship between philosophy and comedy, this essay is neither flippant nor nihilistic. It instead approaches philosophy through themes borrowed from comedy, including chapters on inversion, paradox, madness, nonsense, and the distinction between appearance and reality. Beyond his authorship of two previous books on theories of comedy (Madness, Masks, and Laughter and Split Down the Sides), Glasgow's credentials are not stated. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

In this survey we discuss work of Levin and V’yugin on collections of sequences that are non-negligible in the sense that they can be computed by a probabilistic algorithm with positive probability. More precisely, Levin and V’yugin introduced an ordering on collections of sequences that are closed under Turing equivalence. Roughly speaking, given two such collections $\mathcal {A}$ and $\mathcal {B}$, $\mathcal {A}$ is below $\mathcal {B}$ in this ordering if $\mathcal {A}\setminus \mathcal {B}$ is negligible. The degree structure associated (...) with this ordering, the Levin–V’yugin degrees, can be shown to be a Boolean algebra, and in fact a measure algebra. We demonstrate the interactions of this work with recent results in computability theory and algorithmic randomness: First, we recall the definition of the Levin–V’yugin algebra and identify connections between its properties and classical properties from computability theory. In particular, we apply results on the interactions between notions of randomness and Turing reducibility to establish new facts about specific LV-degrees, such as the LV-degree of the collection of 1-generic sequences, that of the collection of sequences of hyperimmune degree, and those collections corresponding to various notions of effective randomness. Next, we provide a detailed explanation of a complex technique developed by V’yugin that allows the construction of semi-measures into which computability-theoretic properties can be encoded. We provide two examples of the use of this technique by explicating a result of V’yugin’s about the LV-degree of the collection of Martin-Löf random sequences and extending the result to the LV-degree of the collection of sequences of DNC degree. (shrink)

First Published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In einer unterhaltsamen wie anspruchsvollen und packenden Zeitreise entlang der diversen Theorien zur Entwicklung des Lebendigen, führt uns der Altmeister der Systemtheorie des Erkennens von der "heroischen Phase" über die "ideologische" bis hin zur heutigen "systemischen Phase". Seine Auseinandersetzung mit zahllosen Biologen und ihren Theorien gründet auf die beiden Ansichten, dass man den Zustand von Theorien am besten aus deren Geschichte heraus versteht und dass ein wechselseitiger Zusammenhang zwischen Zeitgeist und biologischen Theorien besteht. Professor Riedl legt uns mit diesem Buch (...) eine Kulturgeschichte der Evolutionstheorie vor mit dem Ziel, den Wandel von Einsichten im Laufe unserer kulturellen Entwicklung zu sehen und zu erkennen. Ein Muss für jeden Biologen und Philosophen. (shrink)

An age-old dilemma in philosophy—think of Socrates and the Sophists—concerns the taking of money in return for wisdom. Or rather in return for a shared search; in return, that is, for philo-sophia. The core of this same dilemma re-emerges in psychotherapy. Can it be right to take money for providing the kind of love, support, wisdom etc. which therapists and counselors attempt to provide?

If one is impressed with Wittgenstein's philosophizing, then it is a deep mistake to think that the terms that he made famous-philosophical terms like 'form of life', 'language-game', 'everyday', 'bedrock'-are the key to his philosophy. On the contrary, they are in the end an obstacle to be overcome. The last temptation of the Wittgensteinian philosopher is to treat these terms as providing a kind of ersatz foundation. They are rather a ladder that takes one... to where one already is, only (...) now undeluded. Provided, that is, that one throws them away, at the first sign that one feels oneself to be securely grounded by-or holding onto-them. (shrink)

Dewey's pragmatism rejected ‘truth’ as indicative of an underlying reality, instead ascribing it to valuable connections between aims and ends. Surprisingly, his argument mirrors Bishop Berkeley's Idealism, summarised as ‘esse est percepi’ (to be is to be perceived), whose thinking is shown to be highly pragmatist—but who retained a foundationalist ontology by naming God as the guarantor of all things. I argue that while this position is unsustainable, pragmatism could nonetheless be strengthened through an ontological foundation. Koopman's charges of foundationalist (...) ‘givenism’ in Dewey's work, and in his promotion of the scientific method, are not proven. However, Koopman's ‘genealogical pragmatism’ may develop Deweyan educational theory by addressing dilemmas around curricular study. Koopman's arguments also point towards a missing ontological piece in Dewey's theory of knowledge. In the final section of the article I offer a dialogic ontology as compatible with pragmatism. This dialogical ontology provides both an ethical foundation through interrelatedness, and a generative theory of meaning and experience, as emergent from the encounter with difference. In this framework, to be is to respond—or be responded to. I offer the metaphor of ‘realisation’ to capture the human experience implied by this ontological stance. (shrink)

Baumeister and colleagues argue for the indispensability of groups in human life. Yet, in positing individual differentiation as the key to effective group functioning, they adopt a Western-centric view of the relationship of the individual to the group and overlook an alternativesocialidentity account in which depersonalisation, not individuation, is central to understanding many group phenomena.

This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms (...) of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were differentially related to orientations toward the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions to outgroup orientation. (shrink)

Abstract“[…︁] mein Recht muss mir werden!” Hermann Bahr’s Tragicomedy­ Der Querulant­ (1914). At the end of the eighteenth century, people who became notorious for their excessive engagement in legal proceedings started being labeled as “querulents” or “paranoid litigants”. The term “querulents” first appeared in the General Order of the Court for the Prussian States (Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung für die Preußischen Staaten) from July 6, 1793. From there on, the spectrum of juridical measures undertaken against the so‐labeled litigators included classifying these persons (...) as ineligible for legal action and psychiatric hospitalization. The paper discusses to what extent Hermann Bahr rearranges psychiatric and legal knowledge about this special type of the complainer in his tragicomedy Der Querulant, premiered in 1914. This concerns, first, the theatricality of the body and speech, secondly, the use of cultural techniques of writing and, thirdly, conflicting notions of justice. Therefore, the paper analyzes the aesthetic function of querulous behavior in the dramatic structure of the play from the point of view of both media theory and literary theory. (shrink)

We prove that the continuous function${\rm{\hat \Omega }}:2^\omega \to $ that is defined via$X \mapsto \mathop \sum \limits_n 2^{ - K\left} $ for all $X \in {2^\omega }$ is differentiable exactly at the Martin-Löf random reals with the derivative having value 0; that it is nowhere monotonic; and that $\mathop \smallint \nolimits _0^1{\rm{\hat{\Omega }}}\left\,{\rm{d}}X$ is a left-c.e. $wtt$-complete real having effective Hausdorff dimension ${1 / 2}$.We further investigate the algorithmic properties of ${\rm{\hat{\Omega }}}$. For example, we show that the maximal (...) value of ${\rm{\hat{\Omega }}}$ must be random, the minimal value must be Turing complete, and that ${\rm{\hat{\Omega }}}\left \oplus X{ \ge _T}\emptyset \prime$ for every X. We also obtain some machine-dependent results, including that for every $\varepsilon > 0$, there is a universal machine V such that ${{\rm{\hat{\Omega }}}_V}$ maps every real X having effective Hausdorff dimension greater than ε to a real of effective Hausdorff dimension 0 with the property that $X{ \le _{tt}}{{\rm{\hat{\Omega }}}_V}\left$; and that there is a real X and a universal machine V such that ${{\rm{\Omega }}_V}\left$ is rational. (shrink)

‘Political liberalism’ claims to manifest the real meaning of democracy, including crucially the toleration of religion – it is through the history of this toleration that it acquired its current form and power. Political liberalism is however, I argue, more hostile to religion than was ever dreamt possible in the philosophy of avowedly anti-clerical Enlightenment Liberalism. For it refuses point-blank ever to engage in serious debate with religion. It considers it of no consequence. It allows religion only to be ‘outward (...) forms’, meaningless ceremony. Political liberalism annihilates religion. The time has come for Western intellectuals to re-assess their allegiance to a tacit secularism, and to overturn the annihilation of religion. Religion or spirituality that brings forth the best of humanity may well in fact be essential to addressing the cultural crisis of our times. Political liberalism is the most extreme fundamentalism of them all, in its insistence upon every political claim being purely political, and not at all religious. Political liberalism considers genuine religion seditious. The way beyond the clash of fundamentalisms must be genuinely open to religion. Such openness to religion requires openness to the possibility that – far from reducing religion to a ‘lowest common denominator’ if it is to enter into public affairs at all , and neutering it otherwise to being an entirely private and inconsequential merely ritualistic matter – we might seek a ‘highest common factor’ approach to affirmative religions that escape the narrow constraints laid down by liberalism. Such a ‘common faith’ may even be vital to human survival. (shrink)

Those of us contemplating jetting off to a philosophy conference abroad really do need to ask ourselves how much good we would really be doing by going and whether we can justify the harm that we are certainly responsible for if we go.

Buber’s distinction between the ‘I-It’ mode and the ‘I-Thou’ mode is seminal for dialogic education. While Buber introduces the idea of dialogic space, an idea which has proved useful for the analysis of dialogic education with technology, his account fails to engage adequately with the role of technology. This paper offers an introduction to the significance of the I-It/I-Thou duality of technology in relation with opening dialogic space. This is followed by a short schematic history of educational technology which reveals (...) the role technology plays, not only in opening dialogic space, but also in expanding dialogic space. The expansion of dialogic space is an expansion of what it means to be ‘us’ as dialogic engagement facilitates the incorporation, into our shared sense of identity, of aspects of reality that are initially experienced as alien or ‘other’. Augmenting Buber with an alternative understanding of dialogic space enables us to see how dialogue mediated by technology, as well as dialogue with monologised fragments of technology, can, through education, lead to an expansion of what it means to be human. (shrink)

Louis Sass disputes that schizophrenia can be understood successfully according to the hitherto dominant models--for much of what schizophrenics say and do is neither regressive (as psychoanalysis claims) nor just faulty reasoning (as "cognitivists" claim). Sass argues instead that schizophrenics frequently exhibit hyper-rationality, much as philosophers do. He holds that schizophrenic language can after all be interpreted--if we hear it as Wittgenstein hears solipsistic language. I counter first that broadly Winchian considerations undermine both the hermeneutic conception of interpreting other humans (...) in general and Sass's hope of interpreting schizophrenics in particular. I then go on to argue that even if these Winchian considerations are not accepted, Sass in any case doesn't take sufficiently seriously Wittgenstein's use of nonsense as a term of criticism. Solipsism is not something we can understand so as to be able to understand analogically the schizophrenic's "world"--for there is no such thing as understanding it. Solipsism is nonsense, is nothing--there is no "world" there, in solipsists (as I show by reference to Cora Diamond's reading of Wittgenstein). Nor in any actually analogous cases of schizophrenia. Their "alienness" is the alienness of nothingness; roughly, of the fantasy of "logically alien thought". (shrink)

A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy's Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper's first section explores aspects of Talmy's view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer -- the conditional probability of co-contribution account (CPC) -- a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to (...) this approach is the idea of an integrated system. A formal characterization of integration is laid out in the form of a conditional-probabilitybased measure of the clustering of causal contributors to the production of intelligent behavior. I relate the view to the debate over extended and embodied cognition and respond to objections that have been raised in print by Andy Clark, Colin Klein, and Felipe de Brigard. (shrink)