Major depression is associated with a decrease of 1st person visual perspective in autobiographical memory, even after full remission. This study aimed to examine visual perspective in healthy never-depressed subjects presenting with either genetic or psychological vulnerability for depression. Sixty healthy participants performed the Autobiographical Memory Test with an assessment of visual perspective. Genetic vulnerability was defined by the presence of at least one S or LG allele of the polymorphism of the serotonin-transporter-linked promoter region . Psychological vulnerability was defined (...) by high scores of harm avoidance measured by the Temperament and Character Inventory. Life stress exposure, depressive mood, rumination, and familial history of depression were assessed through standardized procedures. Visual perspective for positive memories was independently predicted by both harm avoidance and a gene by environment interaction between the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and life stress exposure. Visual perspective and vulnerability for depression may share some biological bases. (shrink)

Nancy Jecker’s essay Nothing to be Ashamed of: Sex Robots for Older Adults with Disabilities 1 presents a provocative application of the capabilities approach. Her ethical argument for providing access to sex robots for older adults with disabilities proceeds in five parts: 1. Older adults frequently suffer disabilities that impair sexual functioning. 2. The ability to function sexually is linked to central human capabilities, including: the ability to generate a personally meaningful life narrative; be physically, mentally and emotionally healthy; experience (...) bodily integrity; feel and express a range of human emotions; affiliate deeply with others; and reflect on and choose a plan for their life. 3. Society should take reasonable steps to support these human capabilities at a minimal threshold as part of a broader duty to respect human dignity. 4. Providing access to sex robots comprises part of reasonable efforts to support the six capabilities at a minimal threshold. 5. Therefore, society ought to make reasonable efforts to ensure access to sex robots for older adults with disabilities that impair sexual functioning. I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning, having proposed a series of legal reforms that would facilitate sexual expression among older adults with cognitive impairments as well.2 3 …. (shrink)

This study reviews various discourses around female sexual mutilation from the perspective of the human and social sciences, and also current debates between supporters of the cultural argument and those defending the universality of human rights. An aside about the Dogon myth of world order recorded by Marcel Griaule in Dieu d’eau or Aristotle’s philosophical discourse in the Reproduction of Animals is required in order to widen the debate and see its importance as regards the dignity of the human person. (...) In Aristotle woman is a freak accident, she interrupts the circle that goes from man to man so that he can start off again. Woman is a "catastrophe" necessary to the exercise of the male genitalia; her body is naturally mutilated and incomplete. In the Dogon myth the clitoris rises up like a termite-hill, it is oversized and must be knocked down, that is, excised. Between excessive size, monstrousness and ugliness come discourses which have since time immemorial accompanied and justified wounding the female genitals. But today a medical type of discourse, which is widely accepted, is aiming to repair excised genitalia and give back to women the happiness of a recovered body. Thus we may ask what "woman’s dignity" consists of and whether it is the same as the "dignity of the human person". (shrink)

I'll say first why I write. It intrigues me, I wonder why I write. How it is that I write and why it's so important. I take this as an act of life. One thing that scares me as a writer is a Lari song “ndombi ku ndombi sadidi mukanda komanda diandi Matsoua Ndele.” That can be translated as “even a black can write, hey, things are progressing. “ In the beginning going to school was considered an enormous act, it (...) was civilization, it was the very center of civilization, and writing a letter for a black person, a poor black, was a grandiose thing. It was in Matsoua's time, in the forties, that people sang this song in the pool to make rubber. (shrink)

In contemporary African cultures women are going beyond domestic areas and getting involved in public affairs. They are acting in the social sphere. They are taking an active part in campaigns during the election process. Although in contemporary Africa these new ways of participating in public affairs are still closely associated with the religious domain, women are a major factor of social change in today's Africa.

This Article uses age as an entry point for examining how temporal and methodological issues in egalitarianism make substantive equality an unattractive goal for vulnerability theory. Instead, vulnerability theory should adopt a continuous doctrine of sufficiency, which is a better fit with vulnerability theory’s underlying aims and rhetoric. Instead of evaluating what individuals have in relation to others, sufficiency refocuses the inquiry on whether we have enough throughout the lifecourse. In the context of vulnerability theory, enough should be defined as (...) the capability to be resilient as guaranteed by the responsive state. (shrink)

A leitura do Itinerarium mentis in Deum de S. Boaventura requer que se leve em consideração a diferença que existe entre o pensamento dele e o de outros autores, principalmente Tomás de Aquino. Nesse sentido, o presente artigo aborda, em primeiro lugar, a teologia trinitária de S. Boaventura. Este não possui um tratado sobre a unidade de Deus, anterior ao De trinitate. Nisso ele se aproxima da tradição bíblico-antioquena, bem como da catequese e da liturgia da Igreja primitiva e abre (...) espaço para uma teologia que repense o significado fundamental da Trindade para a fé cristã. Em segundo lugar, a questão do Cristocentrismo. Com efeito, Cristo, como intermediário em todas as coisas, é visto como o médium metaphysicum que explica a produção e a compreensão dos seres, e que se coloca como princípio, meio e término da História. Em terceiro lugar, o artigo reflecte sobre o exemplarismo em S. Boaventura. As coisas são sinais, imagens, símbolos de uma realidade maior, à qual se referem; e o verdadeiro metafísico é aquele que sabe que tudo procede de um exemplar primeiro. Finalmente, a noção de transitus. A saída do Egipto e a peregrinação pelo deserto, rumo à Terra Prometida, são imagem da caminhada da Igreja e de cada um dos cristãos em direcção ao descanso do oitavo dia, o dia da paz sem fim. /// A reading of the Itinerarium mentis in Deum of Saint Bonaventure requires that we take into consideration the difference that exists between his thinking and the thought of other authors, especially Thomas of Aquinas. Taking this into consideration, the article analyses, in the first place, Bonavenrure's Trinitarian theology. He does not have a treatise on the unity of God that antecedes the De trinitate. In this, he is close to the biblical-antiochean tradition, as well as to the catechesis and the liturgy of the Primitive Church and opens space for a theology that restores the fundamental meaning of the Trinity for the Christian faith. Secondly, the question of Christocentrism. As a matter of fact, Christ, as intermediary in all things, is seen as the medium metaphysicum that explains the production and the comprehension of all beings, recognized as principle, median and end of History. In the third place, the article also reflects on the exemplarism in Saint Bonaventure. According to his thought, the things of the world are signs, symbols of a greater reality, to which they refer; therefore, the true metaphysician is the one who knows that everything proceeds from a first exemplar. Finaly, the notion of transitus. The exodus of Egypt and the peregrination through the desert, in the direction of the Promised Land, are for Bonaventure images of the peregrination of the Church and of each and every Christian in direction to the rest of the seventh day, the day of peace without end. (shrink)

Women's alienation seems to cling to their bodies like destiny. But what is a woman? An absurd question if ever there was one, since a man's virility seems so self‐evident that it would never occur to him to wonder what makes him a man. As a man, he is both the positive and the neuter term representing all humanity, while doubt is permitted in the case of woman, the negative pole whose elusive “femininity” we continue to pursue. In fact, the (...) problem comes from elsewhere because “Only the mediation of another can constitute an individual as an Other.” But what is the Other? This is a question we have not gotten beyond. The absolute Other might be the Black woman encountered in Africa, whom Simone de Beauvoir mentions in Letters to Nelson Algren. (shrink)

Comment penser aujourd’hui la place des Africaines dans leurs sociétés dites postcoloniales? Ce texte propose de situer la complexité de la relation entre l’un et l’autre à la croisée des langues et des cultures. La domination d’une langue – le français – est l’un des critères mobilisés en vue de penser les représentations et les imaginaires liées au corps des femmes. Il s’agit d’aller au-delà de la race, de la classe, du genre et d’autres approches proposées par les perspectives intersectionnelles. (...) Les expériences vécues et les quêtes identitaires qui aliènent ou émancipent les corps et les esprits ne doivent pas être perdues de vue. Si l’émancipation peut s’effectuer individuellement, en luttant contre toutes sortes d’obstacles réels ou imaginaires, il importe de souligner la force de ce qu’on pourrait appeler la « solidarité féminine » et qui reste encore à penser. (shrink)

La notion de « relocation » désigne le déplacement historique du visionnage cinématographique vers des milieux et des objets nouveaux. Qu’il s’agisse de regarder une œuvre cinématographique sur une tablette dans un train ou bien d’assister à un match de foot dans la salle domestique d’un home théâtre, la dispersion de l’expérience cinématographique, en cours depuis longtemps, est significativement accélérée par les nouveaux media.

Agricultural engineers’ jobs are especially related to sustainability and earth life issues. They usually work with plants or animals, and the aim of their work is often linked to producing food to allow people to improve their quality of life. Taking into account this dual function, the moral requirements of their day-to-day professional practice are arguably greater than those of other professions.Agricultural engineers can develop their ability to live up to this professional responsibility by receiving ethical training during their university (...) studies, not only by taking courses specifically devoted to ethics, but also by having to deal with moral questions that are integrated into their technical courses through a program of Ethics Across the Curriculum (EAC).The authors feel that a suitable pedagogical technique for achieving this goal is the use of moral dilemmas, following Kohlberg’s theory of levels of morality (1981), with the final objective of attaining a post-conventional level. This paper examines the possibilities and limitations of using moral dilemmas as a pedagogical technique for training agricultural engineers. The cases, discussions, and evaluation used in the Agricultural Engineering Department of the Technical University of Valencia (Spain) are also presented. (shrink)

Agricultural engineers’ jobs are especially related to sustainability and earth life issues. They usually work with plants or animals, and the aim of their work is often linked to producing food to allow people to improve their quality of life. Taking into account this dual function, the moral requirements of their day-to-day professional practice are arguably greater than those of other professions.Agricultural engineers can develop their ability to live up to this professional responsibility by receiving ethical training during their university (...) studies, not only by taking courses specifically devoted to ethics, but also by having to deal with moral questions that are integrated into their technical courses through a program of Ethics Across the Curriculum (EAC).The authors feel that a suitable pedagogical technique for achieving this goal is the use of moral dilemmas, following Kohlberg’s theory of levels of morality (1981), with the final objective of attaining a post-conventional level. This paper examines the possibilities and limitations of using moral dilemmas as a pedagogical technique for training agricultural engineers. The cases, discussions, and evaluation used in the Agricultural Engineering Department of the Technical University of Valencia (Spain) are also presented. (shrink)

This paper argues that Cicero’s critique of Epicureanism in De finibus is motivated by a concern about its degrading effect on the moral sensibility of Rome’s best men. In place of earlier objections to Epicureanism, which centered on its inability to explain or recommend the virtuous conduct of Roman maiores, De finibus focuses on its inability to do so properly and, more prospectively, to assist boni in the work of maintaining the dignity and respectability of Roman civic life. Responding to (...) optimates like Cassius who claimed that Epicureanism was compatible with Roman politics because it treats virtue as being necessary for pleasure, Cicero holds that instrumentalizing virtue in this way is actually a grave corruption of it. Not only do Epicureans debase politics by reducing it to considerations of utility alone: they also introduce deeper forms of civic confusion by distorting and abusing the very idea of honorableness. (shrink)

There is a large body of extant examples from the Imperial period of competitive relationships between a successful general of senatorial rank and the current emperor. An analysis of such cases shows that this type of confrontation tends to result under a particular set of conditions and shared structural characteristics. It would usually occur either when an emperor’s military profile was insufficiently distinctive, or when the emperor’s behaviour did not meet soldiers’ and officers’ expectations to a sufficient degree, i. e. (...) when a leader was unable or unwilling to achieve the charismatic power that resulted from military victory. It was this resource of victoriousness that could elevate a member of the senatorial aristocracy above the ranks of his militarily accomplished peers and invest him with the unique quality that could make him the primus inter pares. (shrink)

The classic ‘privation theory’ of evil defines evil as an absence (or ‘privation’) of a good that ought to obtain. Despite its historical importance, privation theory is faced with a number of serious difficulties. I outline two of these difficulties and argue that they continue to pose a threat. I then present ‘corruption theory’, an alternative theory of evil reconstructed from some of Augustine's writings on the subject. I argue that this theory shares the strengths of privation theory, while evading (...) its problems. (shrink)

On a traditional view of human agency, intentional actions are performed sub specie boni: Agents, in acting intentionally, must see some good in what they are doing. This view has come under heavy criticism, which has partly focussed on several putative counterexamples, and partly on the view’s underlying rationale. In this paper, I defend one version of the sub specie boni view and try to show that it still deserves its old standing as the “default view” about acting with an (...) intention. For, as I argue, this view helps us to make sense of some crucial features of intentions – in particular, that we are sometimes rationally permitted to abandon intentions in the light of obstacles and costs –­, for which an alternative explanation will be hard to find. (shrink)

This article focuses on one of the main authors of medieval philosophy, Peter Abelard. It re-proposes the importance of the moral themes that involve aspects not only of anthropology, but also of ontology, which have not yet been thoroughly studied. For this revaluation of Abelard’s work, the study considers the ethics of relations from two aspects: one objective, God and his will, and the other subjective, man and his consciousness.

Despite the efforts of such notable thinkers as Sartre, Camus, and Ricoeur to affirm philosophically the being of evil, a systematic critique of the traditional metaphysical understanding of evil as privation of being has not yet been fully worked out. The task of this paper is to sketch out just such a critique and to suggest a more adequate philosophical reflection on the being of evil by turning to the thought of Heidegger. Part 1 examines Heidegger’s commentary on Aristotle’s remarks (...) on steresis. Aristotle is our teacher, Heidegger argues, in learning “to hold on to the wonder” of the steresis-dimension of Being (physis), and, thus, to hold on to the wonder that “lack,” “loss,” “absence” - is. Part II considers Heidegger’s recognition that the k-not at the very heart of our existence is yet much more complex. He turns to the fragments of Parmenides and Heraclitus to bring to light a dissembling-dimension of Being. (shrink)

A scholarly dissertation in which the Introduction, Commentary and Indices dwarf the text and translation. Though quite short as Augustine's works go, this text is critically important both as the climax of the anti-Manichean writings and as a summary statement of Augustines' view on the nature of evil.--D. R.

The cause of Paget's disease is still unknown, despite many years of intensive study. During this time, evidence has sporadically emerged to suggest that the disease may result from a slow viral infection by one or more of the Paramyxoviruses. More recently, epidemiologic and molecular studies have suggested that the canine paramyxovirus, canine distemper virus, is the virus responsible for the disease. If true, then along with rabies, this would be a further example of a canine virus causing human disease. (...) Studies in the natural host have now supported these findings. Further investigations have proposed that the bony abnormalities seen in Paget's disease are due to the effects of the virus on osteoclastic interleukin‐6 and c‐FOS production, possibly via the transcription factor NF‐kB. (shrink)

James of Viterbo’s ethical writings focus mostly upon happiness and virtue. His basic approach is Aristotelian. Although he is not a Thomist in the sense that some of his contemporary Dominicans were, he frequently quotes or paraphrases Thomas while arguing for his own positions, especially in response to views defended by such figures as Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Henry of Ghent. James departs from Thomas by arguing that all acquired virtue is based on an ordered self-love. James’s (...) emphasis on self-love is in turn supported by his own understanding of willing and happiness, which involves a Neoplatonic account of the ratio boni as consisting in unity. Consequently, many aspects of James’s Aristotelian moral thought are ultimately based upon an understanding of the good that has roots in Neoplatonic authors. (shrink)

dixerit hoc idem Epicurus, semper beatum esse sapientem … quem quidem, cum summis doloribus conficiatur, ait dicturum: ‘quam suaue est! quam nihil curo!’ non pugnem cum homine, cur tantum †habeat† in natura boni …This text, containing Cicero's oft-repeated canard, is deeply problematic. Both Reynolds and Moreschini resort to daggers here. Madvig's abeat for habeat has failed to convince, since Cicero appears to use abeo metaphorically without specifying the place of origin or destination of movement within a narrowly circumscribed semantic field (...) which does not encompass our passage. C.F.W. Müller, on the other hand, offered aberret, which can appear without such specification in the sense ‘be deceived’ or the like. Editors evidently hesitate, however, because of the difficulty of explaining the corruption. Perhaps one might rather consider the merits of haereat. haereo can mean ‘be stuck in difficulties’, but the usage is uncommon enough that it could easily have been a stumbling block for an inattentive scribe. Moreover, in some scripts where r is written with somewhat elongated hasta and an arc curving down, it can be easily confused with b; and once haebeat appeared, the ‘correction’ to habeat was all but inevitable. (shrink)

Questo saggio si concentra sul tema dell’ordine dell’anima ( _ ordo animae _ ) nell’etica di Alberto Magno (1200 ca.-1280). Ispirandosi a varie _ sententiae _ bibliche e integrandole con la fondamentale idea dell’ _ Etica Nicomachea _ di Aristotele per cui il fine della filosofia morale è diventare buoni ( _ ut boni fiamus _ ), Alberto concepisce l’etica non come mero “discorso filosofico”, per prendere a prestito un’etichetta da Pierre Hadot, ma come un’attività la cui preoccupazione primaria è (...) l’ordinamento – e la trasformazione e liberazione che ne seguono – di sé. Il fatto che Alberto sviluppi tale riflessione sia nei suoi commenti filosofici che in quelli biblici, affidandosi in entrambi i casi sia a fonti aristoteliche che scritturiste, testimonia poi che la sua filosofia e la sua esegesi biblica, solitamente ritratte come radicalmente separate, sono, in realtà, profondamente connesse. _ This essay focuses on the theme of the order of the soul ( _ ordo animae _ ) in the ethics of Albert the Great (1200 ca.-1280). Drawing on several biblical _ sententiae _ and integrating them with the fundamental idea of Aristotle’s _ Nicomachean Ethics _ that the end of moral philosophy is to become good ( _ ut boni fiamus _ ), Albert conceives of ethics not as a mere “philosophical discourse”, to borrow a label from Pierre Hadot, but as an activity whose primary concern is the ordering – and the consequent transformation and liberation – of the self. The fact that Albert develops such a reflection in both his philosophical and biblical commentaries, relying in either case on both Aristotelian and scriptural sources, testifies then that his philosophy and biblical exegesis, which are usually portrayed as radically separate, are, in fact, deeply connected. _. (shrink)

La investigación sobre el trazado intelectual de las rutas latinas europeas hacia la península ibérica con anterioridad al s. XIII está aportando algunos hallazgos particularmente interesantes. En este artículo se aborda un estudio de caso vinculado a la transmisión e intercambio del saber que, muy lejos de haber sido desentrañado, continúa apareciendo como un problema complejo que requiere de nuevas aproximaciones epistemológicas ‒si lo que se pretende es alcanzar un encuadre congruente del problema. El estudio de las rutas de intercambio (...) intelectual en la península ibérica en los siglos IX-XII ‒fundamentalmente, textos doctrinales latinos en circulación dentro del territorio de al-Andalus y entre comunidades de cristianos arabizados‒ nos lleva a pensar que algunas de las conclusiones que se habían propuesto sobre las influencias doctrinales presentes en el Tathlīth al-waḥdāniyyah no pueden constatarse: poner en relación la Theologia Summi boni de Pedro Abelardo con la tríada “poder” (qudrah), “conocimiento” (ʿilm) y “voluntad” (irādah) que el anónimo autor emplea para caracterizar los atributos de las tres personas de la Trinidad. Se han propuesto nuevas hipótesis sobre una vía de influencia que llegaría a través de la tríada empleada por Hugo de san Víctor en el De tribus diebus, cuya línea de influencia habría que situarla en la tríada empleada por Ambrosio de Milán, tal y como ha sido planteado por Dominique Poirel. No obstante, investigaciones más recientes proponen nuevas vías de penetración doctrinal en la Península que, en cierto modo, comparten la tríada de Ambrosio pero que habrían llegado a la Península (al-Andalus en particular) por vías de intercambio textual y doctrinal procedentes de Oriente Próximo y de origen griego. A lo largo de este trabajo se presentan hipótesis y resultados llevados a cabo en investigaciones previas, así como una recapitulación e hipótesis de investigaciones en curso. Se trata de una nota de investigación que no posee un carácter conclusivo, antes bien, pretende aportar nuevas vías de aproximación al problema. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Politics and the Earthly City in Augustine's City of God by Veronica Roberts OgleAaron C. EbertPolitics and the Earthly City in Augustine's City of God by Veronica Roberts Ogle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), x + 201 pp.Politics is not a word in Augustine's lexicon—at least, it's not something he speaks of, in the abstract, in his great work of political theology, the City of God. This curious (...) omission from Augustine's late magnum opus et arduum has given rise to many a divergent reading of his political thought. Lacking an express account of the very term in question, his politics can seem to admit of a wide range of interpretations. On one side of the spectrum, it has been described as anticipating the religious neutrality of modern liberalism. On the other side, it has been interpreted as consolidating politics into religion by transposing political philosophy into the key of ecclesiology and making the Church the new realm of politics.1 In her elegantly written and insightful new book, which builds on the work of her 2014 dissertation at the University of Notre Dame and on a few published articles, Veronica Roberts Ogle charts a new interpretive path for reading Augustine on politics. She does this by means of two principal interventions.The first is by elucidating City of God's rhetorical purpose, what Ogle calls its "psychagogic character" (6). Psychagogy, "the art of leading [agô] souls [psychai] to a state of health," was the rhetorical aim and genre of much ancient philosophy (3). It took its cue from the philosopher's perception that his readers were sick with the disease of unhealthy attachment to the things of the world. Philosophers were physicians of the soul: they applied "the medicinal art of contraries" to their sick patients. This meant that their literary curatives often met patients/readers with the bitter taste of a poison (4). But—and this is the crucial point for Ogle—the poison was given for the purpose of health. What this means for Augustine's City of God, Ogle argues, is that we ought not take the work's biting and at-times-venomous rhetoric as evidence that Augustine is trying to poison his reader's vision of politics. Rather, he is trying to cure them of their attachment to the myths and delusions of politics-according-to-Rome and, instead, "to help us see the world, even the political world, anew: as part of a created order that is good, but that points beyond itself all the same" (4). Augustine's descriptions of Rome—indeed his frequent equations of Rome with the civitas [End Page 1426] terrena—are indeed meant to shock. But, so Ogle argues, they are meant to shock us out of destructive attachments so that we can learn to make the right attachments, first to Christ, and then, through Christ, to our earthly communities as pilgrims. City of God's pessimistic rhetoric is not Augustine simply denouncing the natural project of politics. It is a bitter medicine for a people deathly ill with an addiction to earthly glory.The second intervention of Ogle's book lies in its attention to what she calls City of God's "sacramental ethos" (5). This, I would argue, is the book's most important contribution. It is also the insight on which the heart of the book's argument depends. Sacraments, for Augustine, are signs that point us to God. Understood in this broad sense, the whole created order—that is, everything that is not God—has the quality of a sacrament by virtue of its very existence. This is connected closely to Augustine's understanding of evil as privatio boni: all that exists, to the extent that it exists, is good; and all that exists is, by nature, a sign (signum) pointing beyond itself to the Lord.These are not new insights into Augustine's doctrine of creation, but Ogle's application of them to the question of politics and the earthly city is suggestive. For what emerges is a new account of the relationship between politics and the earthly city. The whole created order... (shrink)

Kant clearly endorses some version of the ‘old formula of the schools’, according to which all volition is sub ratione boni. There has been a debate whether he holds this only for morally good actions. I argue that a closer look at the distinction between the good and the agreeable does not support this conclusion. Considering Kant’s account of the detrimental and the correct use of this thesis, I argue that rational beings always will sub ratione boni, even when they (...) act immorally, because they act on principles. I argue that Kant’s accounts of self-love and self-conceit support this view. (shrink)

The good as the object of wanting. Suárez on the appetitive and cognitive conditions of rational action: This paper discusses Suárez’s characterization of the formal object of wanting, i.e. the good. Wanting, in all its possible forms, is based on cognition, in its various possible forms. But the starting point for wanting something is given in a judgement about its goodness. What is wanted, in its turn, provides the starting point for deliberation. The ratio boni marks the first transtion, the (...) ratio finis the second one. (shrink)

Mr. Bishop's article in C.Q., xlix . 187–92 on Palatine Apollo calls for an answer from me, since I am still alive to give it, though my own study dates from 1910 and was published in J.R.S. for 1914, pp. 193–226. So far away is this publication, and my offprints have for so long been exhausted, that scholars of my generation need to go to university libraries to refer to it, and recent generations do not know it at all. From (...) Lugli's book on Rome they do not gather the details which convinced Boni that I was right, because he omitted some of the most cogent from mention. (shrink)

The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent (...) is conceived as being capable of intentional action—and hence as being an agent—only by virtue of being a pursuer of value. I want to question whether this conception of agency can be correct. Surely, so general a capacity as agency cannot entail so narrow a cast of mind. Our moral psychology has characterized, not the generic agent, but a particular species of agent, and a particularly bland species of agent, at that. It has characterized the earnest agent while ignoring those agents who are disaffected, refractory, silly, satanic, or punk. I hope for a moral psychology that has room for the whole motley crew. I shall begin by examining why some philosophers have thought that the attitudes motivating intentional actions involve judgments of value. I shall then argue that their conception of these attitudes is incorrect. Finally, I shall argue that practical reason should not be conceived as a faculty for pursuing value. (shrink)

One of Albert the Great’s dearest concerns throughout his career was the question of the good; the good which humans naturally desire and which culminates in ultimate happiness. In his earliest work, tellingly entitled De natura boni, Albert’s interest principally concerns epistemological and practical questions: How can we know wherein the good consists? How can we acquire it? Under what circumstances may we lose it and what is necessary to reacquire it? In this initial context, Albert relies on the Augustinian (...) conception that the desired good lies in the “Good of all goods” and that its attainment in this contingent world takes place almost exclusively through moral conduct. With the inception of appropriating Aristotle’s complete Nicomachean Ethics, however, Albert’s conception of the good undergoes a fundamental shift. Based on an intellectualist anthropology according to which the human being is “solely intellect”, Albert advances the intellectual virtues as necessary condition for a... (shrink)

Medical discourse in the contemporary United States is rife with military metaphors. These metaphors have come under vigorous criticism over the last few decades but to no avail; the militaristic tendency has proven tenacious. This essay suggests that its tenacity stems, at least in part, from a dualistic understanding of medicine unaddressed by prior criticisms. For an alternative, this essay turns to Augustine of Hippo, balancing close readings of works that deal explicitly with medical themes—The Catholic Way of Life and (...) the Manichean Way of Life (De moribus) and The Nature of the Good (De natura boni)—with a constructive approach. By adapting Augustine's privative account of evil, we can understand disease as a condition of loss and treatment as a task of restoration. This reconfiguration shifts the focus of our interpretive discourses from malicious invaders to a fuller affirmation of the lived experiences of those who are ill. (shrink)

In this essay I offer a new interpretation of Kant’s discussion of “the old formula of the schools” in the Critique of Practical Reason – “nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur, n...

In Book 9 of his Confessions, Augustine recounts that his mother Monica told him how ‘a weakness for wine gradually got grip upon her’ as a little girl. After some time, so the story goes, God healed her from her bad habit. In this context, Augustine observes: ‘When father and mother and nurses are not there, you are present. You have created us, you call us, you use human authorities set over us to do something for the health of our (...) souls.’ Even though at first sight this passage does not seem to pose any problems, one wonders about the exact meaning of the last part: etiam per praepositos homines boni aliquid agis ad animarum salutem. First, it is to be noted that Henry Chadwick's translation cited here leaves etiam untranslated. Moreover, it is not certain at all that Augustine really wants to say that God heals human souls ‘even by those human beings who are set over us’. As the subsequent lines of this paragraph make clear, God freed Monica from her sin through her servant, who scoffingly called her young mistress ‘a little boozer’. This renders the phrase etiam per praepositos homines problematic, on the one hand, because the meaning of etiam is unclear and, on the other, because it is difficult to regard Monica's servant as one of the ‘human authorities’. Nothing in the text compels us to identify this servant with the old famula of Monica's parents who, according to the preceding paragraph, was ‘vehement with a holy severity in administering correction and soberly prudent in her teaching’. At any rate, the ancilla mentioned here is depicted not as an authoritative person but rather as someone who quarrels with her young domina, not in order to heal or educate her but merely to irritate her. (shrink)

This article seeks to place the theodicy of the Anglican theologian Austin Farrer, as expressed in Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited , within the context of philosophical and theological approaches to the so‐called “problem of evil”. Farrer's work is initially contrasted with the theodicies of John Hick and Richard Swinburne. This comparison reveals some of the rationalist and foundationalist moral assumptions of modern philosophical theodicy of which Hick and Swinburne are representatives. By contrast, it is argued that Farrer's approach is (...) thoroughly theological and begins not with a pre‐conceived ethics, but with God's self‐revelation in Jesus Christ. Farrer is thus deemed to have much in common with pre‐Enlightenment thinkers such as Augustine and Aquinas.Although Farrer's theodicy is seen to be theological , it is argued that he resists trends in recent theological approaches to theodicy that claim that God is passible . This article defends divine impassibility and argues that, although Farrer's later “metaphysical personalism” implies that God may be personal to the point that he could be said to suffer, his Augustinian notion of the nature of evil as privatio boni strongly implies impassibility. This Farrer is seen to avoid two anthropomorphic approaches to theodicy: one that judges God by the standards of a foundational secular morality, and the other that ascribes certain “personal” emotions to the divine.This article defends Farrer's theological approach to theodicy and his emphasis on ecclesiology and soteriology. However, the lack of a convincing and thorough dogmatic theology is seen to render his theodicy uncompelling. Despite this weakness, it is argued that Farrer's work points theodicy towards a theological encounter with particular narratives of evil and suffering and away from the consideration of a single “problem of evil” by means of “rational”, philosophical enquiry. (shrink)

La notion arendtienne de « banalité du mal » est au coeur d’une controverse depuis la parution en 1963 de Eichmann à Jérusalem : Rapport sur la banalité du mal. L’objectif de cet article n’est pas de reprendre l’entièreté du débat, mais de clarifier la pluralité des racines théoriques de Hannah Arendt, et plus particulièrement l’héritage augustinien du mal comme privatio boni. Il s’agit d’une source très peu commentée qui permet pourtant d’analyser le rôle de la volonté dans la banalité (...) du mal et de mettre en lumière la réponse d’Arendt au mal dans l’amor mundi et la formation du caractère. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON THE EVALUATION OF HUMAN ACTIONS WILLIAM H. MARSHNER Christendom College Front Royal, Virginia AMONG THE questions dealt with in the Prima Secundae are those of what moral goodness "is" and on what basis it is attributed to some human actions but denied of others. Aquinas's answers are currently a matter of contention between the proportionalists and their critics, as is his answer to the question of how (...) human actions are classified. The presentation in the Prima Secundae does give rise to problems, thanks in part to Aquinas's pedagogical procedure. That procedure can be described as bit-by-bit exposition. Rather than set forth his whole view of a topic in one place, in a synthesis of some sort, and applying it piecemeal thereafter as subsequent questions may demand, the Common Doctor keeps his whole view back, exposing no more of it than is needed to resolve the particular issue at stake in a given article. The result of this, quite often, is that qualifications crucial to a fair comprehension of what he holds are scattered over places far removed from each other. Because what he holds on the classification and evaluation of human actions consists of several parts, each complicated, and all connected, his solution is unsuited to bit-by-bit exposition. Genuine doubts as to what the parts are, and how they come together, can arise. The purpose of the present paper is to present a synthesis that lets the whole picture emerge; as it emerges, certain attempts to read Aquinas in a manner supportive of the proportionalist position will be shown to conflict with the design of the whole. In his preface to qq. 18-20 in the Prima Secundae, Aquinas 347 348 WILLIAM H. MARSHNER describes their subject matter as the goodness or badness (bonitas vel malitia) of human actions. These abstract nouns are derived from the corresponding adjectives, "good" and "bad," and the very first thing Aquinas tells us (in the first sentence of q. 18, a. 1) is that "good" and "bad" are to be asserted of human actions in the same way as they are asserted of other things.' So how is that? A BACKGROUND TOPIC: 'GOOD' AND 'BAD' IN GENERAL If one should take up any item at all-an apple, a shoe-and say that the item is good, would one be purporting only to describe it as it is, or would one be purporting also to evaluate it in light of how it ought to be? Differently posed, does a proposition of the form "x is good" represent a product of speculative reason alone, or does it include an element, at least, from practical reasoning? Recent analytical philosophy is quite clear that the latter option is correct. "Good" and "bad" are terms which express evaluation rather than some sort of disinterested, theoretical description. 2 Aquinas can be read, at least, as holding the same view. In a text in which he defined a completely general sense of "good" (more general, for example, than just "human good"), he said: ratio boni est quod aliquid sit appetibile.3 To make out what this dictum means, two remarks are in order. First, the ratio of a term "T" is the reason anything is called T. Aquinas identified it as the aspect of things which the mind grasps and signifies through "T."4 He meant the aspect which would be "what it takes" for a thing to merit or verify the term, in case the term is applied to it. Thus the ratio of "good" is what it takes for 1 Respondeo dicendum quod de bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de bono et malo in rebus.... ' The analytical philosophers derive a portion of their clarity on this issue from the celebrated remarks of David Hume on the difference between "is" and "ought": A Treatise on Human Nature, III, i,l. 3 See ST I, q. 5, q. 1. corpus, and many other places. Aquinas often quoted Aristotle's definition of "good" as what all things seek or tend toward (appetunt); the Stagirite's text is in the Nicomachaean Ethics, book I, chapter 1. 4 Ratio enim significata per... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SPECIES AND UNITY OF THE MORAL ACT CHAD RIPPERGER Rome, Italy IN AN ARTICLE written by Gerard Casey in the New Scholasticism,1 the problem of a lack of unity among the constituents of the moral act in St. Thomas's action theory is posed. The question he asks is a valid one: where does the moral act receive its unity? I believe St. Thomas answers that question, but before (...) we take a look at his answer, it is necessary first to discuss what the constituents of the moral act are. This in itself is not without its complications, for what the constituents of the moral act are for Aquinas is likewise open to debate. In order to answer Casey's question, the article will take the following form: first, we will consider what the constituents of the moral act are; then, we shall try to answer Casey's question: "Where does the moral act receive its unity? " I. The Constituen:ts of the Moral Act One of the difficulties with Aquinas's treatment of the species of the moral act is that of understanding precisely what he means by the object of the moral act. Later on we shall see that Aquinas uses the term "object" in a variety of ways referring to a number of different things. However, one of the ways he uses the term "object" is in reference to the end. Therefore, it will be necessary to point out how Aquinas uses this term in reference to the will so that, in considering the object of the moral act, a proper distinction can be made between the end and the object of the moral act in the strict sense. 1 See Gerard Casey, "A Problem of Unity in St. Thomas's Account of Human Action," New Scholasticism, 61, no. 2 (1987) : 146-161. 69 70 CHAD RIPPERGER Aquinas refers many times to the end as the object of the will. However, the main idea he has in mind is in reference to his theory of powers and their objects. For Aquinas, every human power has its proper object,2 and since the will is a power or faculty of man, it has its proper object. Often, Aquinas simply refers to the end as the object of the will: "the good and the end is the proper object of the will." 3 Other times, however, Aquinas refers to the end as that which is under the ratio boni. Those which know the end are always ordered toward the good as to an end: for the will, which is the appetite of the end already known, does not tend toward something except under the aspect of the good (ratio boni), which is its object.4 What Aquinas is saying here is that the intellect apprehends some being and presents it to the will under a certain aspect or concept of the good. Now since the proper object of the will, which is an appetitive power, is the good, then the particular thing must be " seen " in a certain way so that the will will tend toward it. Aquinas is pointing out that, materially, the object for the intellect and the object of the will do not differ. For instance, a piece of candy may be the object of the intellect but it may also be the object of the will once it has been apprehended by the intellect and presented to the will as desirable or under the aspect of the good. However, the ratio boni is more than just a way in which the intellect presents the will with its object. The good by nature has a universal or formal character about it. Because the intellect and will are immaterial powers for Aquinas, the objects of the these respective powers must be universals, forms or essences. The will is presented with a form of the particular thing apprehended and this form is none other than the end. 2 See S.T. I, 77, 3. 3 S.C.G. III, 1. See also Sent., II, 40, 1, 1; Sent. IV, 16, 3, 2; S.T. I, 1, 4, ad 3; S.T. I-II, 11, 1, and... (shrink)