In the third of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid devotes the fourth chapter to the concept of‘identity’, and the sixth chapter to Locke’s theory of ‘personal identity’. This latter chapter is widely regarded as a definitive refutation of the thesis that personal identity is no more than memories of a certain sort. It is interesting that the terms ‘identity’ and ‘personal identity’ do not appear as chapter or section titles elsewhere in any of Reid’s works; and (...) Hume is neither mentioned nor his theory of personal identity discussed in the two chapters specifically addressed to the matter. Moreover, while Locke, Reid, and Hume are often anthologized in works on personal identity, Reid is always presented as replying only to Locke. (shrink)

Reviews the books, Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation by Richard Sorabji and Other minds by Anita Avramides . The two works considered here are deeply serious and composed by scholars who have executed their projects with undeviating integrity. In Emotion and Peace of Mind, based on his Gifford Lectures, Richard Sorabji moves the reader through a veritable course of study on a subject as notoriously protean as it is central to the lived life. The (...) twenty-six chapters range over whole realms of thought on the subject of emotion, beginning with ancient philosophy and reaching the research and theory advanced right now in that congeries of specialties dubbed the brain sciences. Between the covers of this truly estimable work one meets not just the subtle and instructive thought of Seneca and Augustine, Iamblichlus and Epictetus, but insightful commentaries on the work of Damasio, Le Doux, Maclean and others. In all, Emotion and Peace of Mind is a benchmark- volume, an outstanding contribution to the philosophy and psychology of emotion; surely a required work for anyone prepared to approach the subject with the seriousness it demands. The second book of this review, Other Minds, is a work of philosophical rigor and originality, composed by an Oxford tutor who has skillfully shaped other minds with the sharp and sharpening instrument of conceptual analysis. Do computers have minds? Do animals have minds? Are there minds other than my own? And if I know of my own mind in that most basic first-person sense, then clearly there is no other mind that I can thus know. If there is something epistemologically amiss about first-person achievements, then there is surely something suspect about claims to the effect that I know of my mind. If there is nothing less than a required first-person account of minds, then there is something epistemologically suspect about any statement of any other mind. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

By the sixth century of the modern era, and after centuries of refinement and skillful application by Roman jurists, the core principles appear in Justinian's Institutes, where it is simply taken for granted, without benefit of analysis or argument, that.

This article will argue that much of Kierkegaard’s authorship is reflective of the characteristics of the Eucharistic liturgy found in the 1830 Forordnet Alter-Bog for Danmark (confession, invitation, preparation/exhortation, consecration, and thanksgiving/praise/blessing), particularly as each of those elements of the liturgy are reflected in his seven Discourses at the Communion on Fridays in Part IV of Christian Discourses. Major components of his authorship function as an indirect invitation to the single individual reader to inwardly experience the prototype-redeemer dialectic as it (...) was enacted in a typical Eucharistic liturgy of Kierkegaard’s day. The readers of Kierkegaard’s work make interpretive decisions not only about Kierkegaard’s texts, but most importantly about themselves, God, and the paradox of Christ, such that by the time they finish the authorship they find themselves inwardly standing at the foot of the altar, either offended by the paradox of Christ and ready to turn and leave, or beating their breasts alongside the tax collector. (shrink)

In his article ‘Professor Bartley's Theory of Rationality and Religious Belief’ Mr W. D. Hudson has brought considerable clarification to the rather confused situation occasioned by Professor W. W. Bartley's book The Retreat to Commitment and its subsequent discussion; but the process can, I think, be carried still further.

Modern ethics has been chiefly concerned with the analysis of the conditions and principles of morality; and, in particular, one of its most important achievements has been the further elucidation of the Kantian dictum that “I ought” implies that I can. On the face of it Kant's contention seems perfectly straightforward, but, on examination, it becomes apparent that the simple word “can” covers a somewhat complicated ambiguity. When it is said that I ought to do act A, it may rightly (...) be taken that I can do act A; but the question arises whether or not this in turn involves that I am aware that I can do act A. There is clearly some significance in the assertion that I can do many acts which, however, never occur to me, either because I am ignorant of certain facts or because I have a mistaken opinion about the facts. On the other hand, it may quite properly be said that I cannot perform any act of the possibility of which I am unaware. The problem then is to determine and examine the sense of the word “can” which is a pre-condition of moral obligation. (shrink)

“FITNESS FOR THE RULE OF LAW” lends itself to a variety of treatments. I should make clear at the outset one treatment that I do not intend to provide under this heading, even if it is implicitly represented here and there in this essay. I will not examine psychological or psychiatric conceptions of “fitness” as these are featured in, for example, the “insanity defense” or in tests of testamentary capacity. A recent book of mine explores these issues in some historical (...) and analytical detail, but this is a vast and complex subject falling beyond the scope of what I hope to clarify here. I shall assume throughout that the minimal conditions by which one becomes fit for the rule of law are satisfied, and will focus then on how one’s potentialities for life within such a context are realized. (shrink)

The Varieties of Religious Experience is not a theological treatise but an inquiry into a ubiquitous feature of the human condition and thus of human nature itself. Its author makes this clear at the outset, claiming competence as a psychologist and promising no more, therefore, than an examination of those “religious propensities of man” which James takes to be “at least as interesting as any other of the facts pertaining to his mental constitution.” The “at least” is clearly ironical for (...) James will argue throughout the work that this aspect of one’s mental constitution is generative of thoughts, sentiments and actions at once new, different, original, and of the greatest consequence. As an enduring feature of our mental constitution, the religious contents are under no special burden of vindication or verification for they are vindicated and verified precisely by their ubiquity and efficacy. This “radical empiricist,” true to the authentic ism, accepts no philosophical a priori that would pass judgment on just which experiences are to count and which are to be rendered otiose. Just in case there are religious thoughts and sentiments widely experienced, abidingly efficacious, central to actually lived lives, it is not for the psychologist to await some “metaphysical” license before including them among subjects of interest. In this independence of inquiry, this openness to realities set before us as indubitable facts of mental life, James records what Louis Dupré discovers in an entire generation of American philosophers. (shrink)

Available for the first time in English, this is the definitive account of the practice of sexual slavery the Japanese military perpetrated during World War II by the researcher principally responsible for exposing the Japanese government's responsibility for these atrocities. The large scale imprisonment and rape of thousands of women, who were euphemistically called "comfort women" by the Japanese military, first seized public attention in 1991 when three Korean women filed suit in a Toyko District Court stating that they had (...) been forced into sexual servitude and demanding compensation. Since then the comfort stations and their significance have been the subject of ongoing debate and intense activism in Japan, much if it inspired by Yoshimi's investigations. How large a role did the military, and by extension the government, play in setting up and administering these camps? What type of compensation, if any, are the victimized women due? These issues figure prominently in the current Japanese focus on public memory and arguments about the teaching and writing of history and are central to efforts to transform Japanese ways of remembering the war. Yoshimi Yoshiaki provides a wealth of documentation and testimony to prove the existence of some 2,000 centers where as many as 200,000 Korean, Filipina, Taiwanese, Indonesian, Burmese, Dutch, Australian, and some Japanese women were restrained for months and forced to engage in sexual activity with Japanese military personnel. Many of the women were teenagers, some as young as fourteen. To date, the Japanese government has neither admitted responsibility for creating the comfort station system nor given compensation directly to former comfort women. This English edition updates the Japanese edition originally published in 1995 and includes introductions by both the author and the translator placing the story in context for American readers. (shrink)

The perils and sometimes macabre consequences of Aristotle-worship have been documented historically and serve as a general warning to scholars in every discipline. The necessary course—I might say the "golden mean"—is to be found between an uncritical praise and a final burial. Aristotle's record can only enjoy the lasting respect of all students, but apart from the matter of his just deserts is the enduring usefulness of his contributions. Nonetheless a certain perspective must be maintained if Psychology is to derive (...) due measure of the benefits, while avoiding what is misleading or confused or idle in the surviving works. That this perspective is hard-won can be seen from the tendency even among seasoned Aristotle scholars to misplace it as they move from topic to topic. And so I offer what I hope is to be the somewhat clearer paths to this perspective, though very sketchily and with a modesty fully earned through years of strenuous attention to Aristotle's writings. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Recent financial fraud legislation such as the Dodd–Frank Act and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (U.S. House of Representatives, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, [H.R. 4173], 2010 ; U.S. House of Representatives, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763], 2002 ) relies heavily on whistleblowers for enforcement, and offers protection and incentives for whistleblowers. However, little is known about many aspects of the whistleblowing decision, especially the effects of contextual and wrongdoing attributes on organizational (...) members’ willingness to report fraud. We extend the ethics literature by experimentally investigating how the nature of the wrongdoing and the awareness of those surrounding the whistleblower can influence whistleblowing. As predicted, we find that employees are less likely to report: (1) financial statement fraud than theft; (2) immaterial than material financial statement fraud; (3) when the wrongdoer is aware that the potential whistleblower has knowledge of the fraud; and (4) when others in addition to the wrongdoer are not aware of the fraud. Our findings extend whistleblowing research in several ways. For instance, prior research provides little evidence concerning the effects of fraud type, wrongdoer awareness, and others’ awareness on whistleblowing intentions. We also provide evidence that whistleblowing settings represent an exception to the well-accepted theory of diffusion of responsibility. Our participants are professionals who represent the likely pool of potential whistleblowers in organizations. (shrink)

Benjamin Libet's influential publications have raised important questions about voluntarist accounts of action. His findings are taken as evidence that the processes in the central nervous system associated with the initiation of an action occur earlier than the decision to act. However, in light of the methods employed and of relevant findings drawn from research addressed to the timing of neurobehavioural processes, Libet's conclusions are untenable.

Studies of Witherspoon's influence as an educator and as a pivotal figure in the American founding tend to neglect his earlier part in controversies among the Scottish Moderates and Evangelicals. By the time he answered the summons from the College of New Jersey, his position on church-state relations was thoroughly developed as was his understanding of the nature and the sources of rights, both alienable and unalienable. Nor were there ‘two Witherspoons’, the earlier one in Scotland opposed to the academic (...) world of intellectuals and a later American version suddenly committed to the progressive ethos of the Enlightenment. There was but one Witherspoon, clear on the several missions required by the times. (shrink)

In recent years the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein have received much attention from philosophers in general and especially from philosophers interested in religion; and there is no doubt that Wittgenstein's legacy of thought is both highly suggestive and highly problematical. It seems likely, however, that the vogue which Wittgenstein now enjoys owes not a little to his peculiar place in the development of modern philosophy and, in particular, of that empiricist tradition in philosophy which stems from what has been called (...) the revolution in philosophy in the early decades of the present century. (shrink)

From the Upanishads to Homer -- Philosophy, did the Greeks invent it -- Pythagoras and the divinity of number -- What is there? -- The Greek tragedians on man's fate -- Herodotus and the lamp of history -- Socrates on the examined life -- Plato's search for truth -- Can virtue be taught? -- Plato's Republic, man writ large -- Hippocrates and the science of life -- Aristotle on the knowable -- Aristotle on friendship -- Aristotle on the perfect life (...) -- Rome, the Stoics, and the rule of law -- The Stoic bridge to Christianity -- Roman law, making a city of the once-wide world -- The light within, Augustine on human nature -- Islam -- Secular knowledge, the idea of university -- The reappearance of experimental science -- Scholasticism and the theory of natural law -- The Renaissance, was there one? -- Let us burn the witches to save them -- Francis Bacon and the authority of experience -- Descartes and the authority of reason -- Newton, the saint of science -- Hobbes and the social machine -- Locke's Newtonian science of the mind -- No matter? The challenge of materialism -- Hume and the pursuit of happiness -- Thomas Reid and the Scottish school -- France and the philosophes -- The federalist papers and the great experiment -- What is enlightenment? Kant on freedom -- Moral science and the natural world -- Phrenology, a science of the mind -- The idea of freedom -- The Hegelians and history -- The aesthetic movement, genius -- Nietzsche at the twilight -- The liberal tradition, J.S. Mill -- Darwin and nature's "purposes" -- Marxism, dead but not forgotten -- The Freudian world -- The radical William James -- William James' pragmatism -- Wittgenstein and the discursive turn -- Alan Turing in the forest of wisdom -- Four theories of the good life -- Ontology, what there "really" is -- Philosophy of science, the last word? -- Philosophy of psychology and related confusions -- Philosophy of mind, if there is one -- What makes a problem "moral" -- Medicine and the value of life -- On the nature of law -- Justice and just wars -- Aesthetics, beauty without observers -- God, really? (shrink)

In his preface to Mental Reality the author cautions that much of what appears in the book has surely been said before, noting that he has probably forgotten some of his own debts. However, the pages that follow turn out to be paradoxically original and unsurprising; original, against the contemporary background of all too many thick-but-thin disquisitions on the same subject, and unsurprising owing to the author's respect for such authority as mind might claim in the matter of self-understanding. The (...) broad perspective, set forth in the first chapter, is something of a common-sense and realist psychology not unlike what one might find in Reid or in William James. It is tested by post-Wittgenstein, post-Ryle philosophies of mind, but is not chastened by them. Gone is the theater of experience, but experience itself suffers neither neurophysiological nor metaphysical impertinences! (shrink)

The sources for this volume are the unpublished papers of Reid contained in the Birkwood Colletion. As the title of the volume indicates, Reid’s teaching as a Regent included Logic, Rhetoric, and the Fine Arts. The regenting system assigned cadres of students to a specific teacher who would pace them through the entire curriculum of study. Broadie cites Reid’s own defenses of this system and the important educational and civic aims achieved by it, at the relatively slight cost of unavoidable (...) superficiality. Today’s academic world might benefit from a consideration of current practices as informed by Reid’s ideas on just this point. (shrink)

With this volume, the third in what will be a total of ten, the scholarly debt to Knud Haakonssen and Penn State University Press continues, as they provide authoritative editions of the works of Thomas Reid. The current volume is based on the one edition of this work that appeared in Reid’s lifetime, and it differs from that edition solely in the correction of typographical errors in the original. Appended to the Essays is Reid’s “Three Lectures on the Nature and (...) Duration of the Soul,” in which the indestructibility of matter grounds Reid’s naturalistic argument for the immortality of the soul. (shrink)

Reviews the book, The cultural psychology of the self by Ciaran Benson . This is a book rich in insight, deep in significance and, inevitably, marked by assumptions and interpretations subject to gentle disagreement. It is precisely because of its manifest assets that points of disagreement need to be highlighted. In this review I will address criticism only to the first half of the book, the criticism being more by way of an introduction to the issue than the suggestion of (...) a settled position on it. I confine criticism to the first half not because of limited space. Rather, the foundational chapters on which the balance of the book's arguments depend are given in Part I. Part II then stands as an elevated and elevating "applied psychology of the self" resting on these very substantive and theoretical foundations. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond. Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central (...) themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness. In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinson's estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging, _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

This book consists of a selection of papers which throw new light on old problems in one of Plato s most difficult dialogues. The first set of papers deals with definitions of sophistry from different perspectives. In the central section E. Hulsz, D. O'Brien, B. Bossi, P. Mesquita and N. Cordero consider the problem of being and relative non-being with regard to Heraclitus and the legacy of Parmenides. The final section with papers by F. Fronterotta, J. de Garay, D. Ambuel (...) and L. Palumbo is devoted to ontology, predication and truth.". (shrink)

"Many theologians, as well as many philosophers, may be heard today asserting that there neither is nor can be any such thing as a uniquely Christian ethical system. On the one hand it is argued that an ethic based on revelation must be inherently static, unable to respond to new demands and situations; but if the ethical code is little more than a refinement of so-called natural law or natural morality, then there is no reason to term it Christian. In (...) consequence, most of the current discussion in the field of ethics addresses itself almost exclusively to a consideration of such specific issues as war, sex, abortion or mercy killing. Professor N. H. G. Robinson, however, turns his attention to the basic question of what Christian ethics really is. Morality, Robinson argues, was not created by Christianity, but exists independently; all men are subject to it, whatever their belief. This fundamental truth about human beings is of profound significance for theology, which must continue to insist upon an objective moral code. We will never understand Christian ethics, Robinson asserts, until we accept the doctrine of natural morality. But there can hardly be two moralities—one natural and the other supernatural—each competing for our obedience. Rejecting both the medieval and the post-Reformation approaches to the relationship of natural and Christian ethics, Robinson looks to the redemptive nature of Christian revelation for his answer. Moral standards are not merely imposed upon us, nor do we invent them; we discover them—their authority depends on their existing independently of us. It is the entry of redemptive revelation into the system of moral philosophy that creates what Robinson describes as "natural morality, judged, reoriented and transformed, and brought under the forgiving and reconciling lordship of Christ, which constitutes the Christian life." Here, then, is no inflexible, static code, incapable of responding to change. Rather, Robinson, describes a creative ethic that is objective, normative, and theocentric, a morality always in the making; it is a way of life, not a closed system. "Moral rules," he overserves, "are yesterday's moral solutions." Teh Groundwork of Christian Ethics is a major contribution to the field of Christian ethics which no serious student can afford to overlook."-Publisher. (shrink)

This paper examines the affective disorders plaguing many young people and the problem of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder in particular. It aims to define the limits of the critique of British educationalist Sir Ken Robinson in terms of his philosophy of ‘creativity’ through a consideration of the ideas of French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, especially the notions of ‘industrial temporal objects’ and stupidity. It makes the case for adopting elements of each distinct research paradigm as a prolegomena to forging a social (...) critique of capitalist-dominated, market-led educational institutions. The former, it will be seen, identifies some of the problems facing teachers in terms of the use and application of technology, the false divide between arts and the humanities, but falls short of explaining the root of the structural and psychic malaise in neo-liberal regimes regarding classroom breakdown in general. The latter, despite the apocalyptic tone of some his pronouncements provides an update and radicalization of Deleuze’s societies of control thesis in terms of what Stiegler designates ‘uncontrollable societies’. Stiegler, it will be seen, presents a critique of technology that is all the more pressing in an age in which the loss of expectation in the lives of young people can lead to a corresponding fall off or destruction in ‘deep attention’. I want to test the hyperbole of Stiegler’s assertion that young people today suffer from a ‘colossal’ attention deficit disorder of unprecedented scale and magnitude. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik)Hoke RobinsonTillmann Pinder, editor. Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik), vols. 8 and 9 of the series Kant-Forschungen, general editors Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998. Vol. 8, pp. lxx + 268; vol. 9, pp. vii + 718. NP.Between 1755, when (...) he received the venia legendi, and 1796, when he ended his teaching activity, Kant taught logic some 30 times. In accordance with the requirements of the Prussian ministry of culture, his course lectures were built around a recognized text, G. F. Meier's 1752 Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Kant did not merely present Meier's views, however, but commented on and criticized these as he thought appropriate; his own copy of Meier was full of marginal notes and interleaved with notes on separate bits of paper. When in 1799 he entrusted G. B. Jäsche with this material for the compiling of a logic text, the thought was presumably of a Kantian logic organized around Meier's framework.Since logic plays such a prominent role in the Critical philosophy, one would expect the Jäsche logic to be viewed as an important tool for the interpretation of the Critical philosophy. But dissatisfaction with it was evident right from its original publication in 1800, and later scholars were even more negative (in 1913 Erich Adickes referred to it [End Page 603] as "the contrivance [Machwerk]... that Jäsche published under the name of Kant's logic," Erich Adickes, quoted in Ak. XXIV.960). And in fact, as Pinder's careful and detailed introduction points out, the nature and origin of the Jäsche logic presented a serious problem for Wilhelm Dilthey's organization of the now-standard Akademie-Ausgabe (Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der königlich preussischen [now: deutschen] Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902- Cited as "Ak.").Dilthey conceived of four divisions of the Akademie-Ausgabe: Kant's published writings, his correspondence, his literary remains ("handschriftlicher Nachlass") and his lectures ("Vorlesungen"). Where, exactly, did the Jäsche logic belong? Kant had himself compiled a similar text from his lecture notes on anthropology, and this text was published in the first division (in volume VII). But did the Jäsche logic count as Kant's work? It was indeed authorized by Kant and based on Kant's own lecture notes; but these notes themselves were to be published in the Nachlass division. Furthermore, as it turned out, Jäsche had also employed manuscripts compiled from the lectures themselves, and these were to be published in the Vorlesungen division. This would not include his own transcription, as Erdmann had conjectured. It turns out Jäsche never heard Kant lecture on logic—he was never in Königsberg when they were being held! (xxvi, n. 29). The resulting controversies delayed the publication of the Jäsche logic in vol. IX from 1908 until 1923, after the 1914 publication in the Nachlass division of the notes on which it was based.Dilthey's projected Vorlesungen division itself was called into question by Benno Erdmann, Dilthey's successor as Akademie-Ausgabe general editor. Erdmann recognized the questionable nature of the Jäsche logic and the other compilations, but considered Dilthey's aim for a "critically secured" edition of the lecture manuscripts as "hopeless." Still, interest in the manuscripts resulted in their piecemeal publication independently of the Akademie-Ausgabe, and when the Nachlass division's publication had been completed in 1955, the Vorlesungen division was resurrected. Vol. XXIV (in two parts) appeared in 1966; it contained the logics Blomberg, Philippi, Pölitz, Busolt, Dohna-Wundlacken and the Vienna logic, the short logic Herder, and fragments of the lost logics Hintz and Hoffmann. The Pinder volumes reviewed here contain the logics Bauch, Hechsel, and the Warsaw logic.What exactly are the manuscripts in question? If Kant had been concerned merely to explicate Meier, his students could perhaps have been content with their marginal notes in the text and a few further ones for elucidation. But... (shrink)

Background Investigative genetic genealogy (IGG) is a technique that involves uploading genotypes developed from perpetrator DNA left at a crime scene, or DNA from unidentified remains, to public genetic genealogy databases to identify genetic relatives and, through the creation of a family tree, the individual who was the source of the DNA. As policymakers demonstrate interest in regulating IGG, it is important to understand public perspectives on IGG to determine whether proposed policies are aligned with public attitudes.Methods We conducted eight (...) focus groups with members of the public (N = 72), sampled from four geographically diverse US regions, to explore general attitudes and perspectives regarding aspects of IGG practices, applications, and policies. Five major topics were explored in each focus group: when IGG should be used; who should perform IGG; how to approach consent for genetic database users; what systems of oversight should govern IGG practitioners; and whether to notify database users if their data are involved in law enforcement (LE) matching.Results Participants were supportive of IGG in most scenarios, especially for cold and violent cases. The favorable attitudes toward IGG were, however, tempered by distrust of law enforcement among some participants. All participants agreed that databases must inform users if IGG is allowed, but they did not agree on how individual database users should be allowed to opt out or whether to notify them if their data are involved in specific investigations. All participants agreed that IGG should be subject to some prescriptive guidelines, regulations, or accountability mechanisms.Conclusions These findings suggest broad public support for IGG, and interest in developing systems of accountability for its practice. Our study provides useful insight for policy makers, genomic database stewards, law enforcement, and other stakeholders in IGG’s practice, and suggests multiple directions for future research. (shrink)

Intellectual humility can be broadly construed as being conscious of the limits of one’s existing knowledge and capable to acquire more knowledge, which makes it a key virtue of the information age. However, the claim “I am (intellectually) humble” seems paradoxical in that someone who has the disposition in question would not typically volunteer it. There is an explanatory gap between the meaning of the sentence and the meaning the speaker ex- presses by uttering it. We therefore suggest analyzing intellectual (...) humility semantically, using a psycholexical approach that focuses on both synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectual humili- ty’. We present a thesaurus-based methodology to map the semantic space of intellectual hu- mility and the vices it opposes as a heuristic to support philosophical and psychological anal- ysis of this disposition. We performed the mapping both in English and German in order to test for possible cultural differences in the understanding of intellectual humility. In both lan- guages, we find basically the same three semantic dimensions of intellectual humility (sensi- bility, discreetness, and knowledge dimensions) as well as three dimensions of its related vic- es (self-overrating, other-underrating and dogmatism dimensions). The resulting semantic clusters were validated in an empirical study with English (n=276) and German (n=406) par- ticipants. We find medium to high correlations (0.54-0.72) between thesaurus similarity and perceived similarity, and we can validate the labels of the three dimensions identified in the study. But we also find indications of the limitations of the thesaurus methodology in terms of cluster plausibility. We conclude by discussing the importance of these findings for construct- ing psychometric scales for intellectual humility. (shrink)

Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver. Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal principle. I suggest (...) that although Direct Realism is in more than one respect implausible, it does not succumb to Robinson’s argument. The causal principle is true only if ‘proximate cause’ means ‘proximate sufficient cause’, and the Direct Realist need not concede that there is a sufficient cerebral cause for direct awareness of independent objects. (shrink)

In a recent article ‘The Problem of Natural Theology’, Professor N. H. G. Robinson has considered the requirements of a ‘genuinely empirical natural theology’. For the first section of it, a very clear sorting-out of recent debates on the ontological argument, I have nothing but admiration. It ends with the question: ‘Granted that if we think of God we must think of him as necessarily existing, why must we think of God at all?’, followed by the comment: ‘We seem (...) thrown, without any prospect of rest, between apriorism and [Barthian] empiricism’. Robinson is rightly dissatisfied with that situation, and in his second section he raises the question whether there cannot be an approach to God which the debates on the ontological arguments have overlooked and which may be properly called an ‘empirical’ one, free from Barthian presuppositions. He finds what seems to be such an approach in Professor E. L. Mascall's Existence and Analogy but concludes that it is in fact after all a form of ‘rationalism’. In the third section he criticises Professor T. F. Torrance's defence of Barth's position in a way which seems to me most satisfactory, and in the fourth he makes his own positive proposals. With these I am in substantial agreement. It is only his account of Mascall's position, in particular at the end of his second section, which seems to call for critical comment. (shrink)