Embodiment theories have proposed a reciprocal relationship between emotional state and bodily reactions. Besides large body postures, recent studies have found emotions to affect rather subtle bodily expressions, such as slumped or upright sitting posture. This study investigated back muscle activity as an indication of an effect of positive and negative emotions on the sitting position. The electromyography activity of six back muscles was recorded in 31 healthy subjects during exposure to positive and negative affective pictures. A resting period was (...) used as a control condition. Increased muscle activity patterns in the back were found during the exposure to negative emotional stimuli, which was mainly measured in the lumbar and thorax regions. The positive emotion condition caused no elevated activity. The findings show that negative emotions lead to increased differential muscle activity in the back and thus corroborate those of previous research that emotion affects subtle bodily expressions. (shrink)

Part 1. Husserl: the outlines of the transcendental-phenomenological system -- 1. Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude -- 2. Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction: between lifeworld and Cartesianism -- 3. Some methodological problems arising in Husserl's late reflections on the phenomenological reduction -- 4. Facticity and historicity as constituents of the lifeworld in Husserl's late philosophy -- 5. Husserl's concept of the "transcendental person": another look at the Husserl-Heidegger relationship -- 6. Dialectics of the absolute: the systematics of (...) the phenomenological system in Husserl's last period -- Part 2. Husserl, Kant, and neo-Kantianism: from subjectivity to lifeworld as a world of culture -- 7. From being to givenness and back: some remarks on the meaning of transcendental idealism in Kant and Husserl -- 8. Reconstruction and reduction: Natorp and Husserl on method and the question of subjectivity -- 9. A hermeneutic phenomenology of subjective and objective spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and Cassirer -- 10. Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms: between reason and relativism: a critical appraisal -- Part 3. Toward a Husserlian hermeneutics -- 11. The subjectivity of effective history and the suppressed husserlian elements in Gadamer's hermeneutics -- 12. Husserl's "hermeneutical phenomenology" as a philosophy of culture. (shrink)

I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. (...) We are left with three options: denying that there are any reasons for attitudes, opting for pragmatism about reasons for attitudes, or arguing that the challenge rests on a misunderstanding of the normative force of reasons for attitudes. I finally suggest a version of the last strategy. We can understand the normative force of reasons for attitudes, and thereby solve the problem of mental responsibility, by acknowledging that the way we blame each other for failing to respond correctly to our reasons for attitudes is different from the way we blame each other when one failed to respond correctly to reasons for action. (shrink)

Broome takes the debate on rationality to be concerned with the ordinary use of 'rational'. I argue that this is at best misleading. For the object of current theories of rationality is determined by a specific use of 'rational' that is intimately connected to blame and praise. I call the property it refers to 'rationalityRESP'. This focus on rationalityRESP, I argue, has two significant implications for Broome's critique of theories of rationality as reasons-responsiveness. First, rationalityRESP is plausibly conceived of as (...) a kind of reasons-responsiveness. Secondly, Broome's dispute with internalists about normativity as well as his dispute with externalists about rationality both hinge on questions regarding the concept of responsibility. I conclude that philosophers should integrate discussions about responsibility in their debates about rationality. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of ‘saying something’ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘language’, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, ‘ineffability’ is ambiguous, too, (...) and we should make a distinction between weak and strong ineffability. Weak ineffability is rooted in the deficiencies of a particular language while strong ineffability stems from the structure of a particular cognitive system and its capacities for conceptual mental representation. Mental contents are only sayable if we are able to conceptualize them and then create signs to represent them in communication. (shrink)

Although it is an increasingly popular assumption that leader mindfulness may positively affect leader behaviors and, in turn, employee outcomes, to date, little empirical evidence supports this view. Against this backdrop, the present research seeks to develop and test a serial mediation model of leader mindfulness. Specifically, we propose that leader mindfulness enhances employee performance and that this relationship is explained by increased leader procedural justice enactment and, subsequently, reduced employees’ emotional exhaustion. We conducted three studies to test this model. (...) Study 1 involved employees from a wide range of organizations in the USA. Study 2 used a sample of leaders and employees from China and measured our model variables at three different points in time. Both studies provide consistent support for our hypotheses. Finally, Study 3 involved a laboratory experiment in which 62 senior executives were assigned to either a mindfulness induction or to a control condition. Again, results revealed a significant and positive link between leader mindfulness and leader procedural justice enactment. In sum, these findings expand our understanding of mindfulness to the domain of leadership, a key area of organizational research. Moreover, they complement prior studies by showing that mindfulness dynamics go beyond intrapersonal effects but also influence the attitudes and behaviors of others. We discuss our findings in light of their contributions to the mindfulness, ethics, and leadership literatures and point out implications for practice. (shrink)

The Description for this book, Machiavelli in Hell, will be forthcoming.

I show that extant attempts to capture and generalize empirical adequacy in terms of partial structures fail. Indeed, the motivations for the generalizations in the partial structures approach are better met by the generalizations via approximation sets developed in “Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I”. Approximation sets also generalize partial structures.

According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you (...) to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists. (shrink)

This chapter locates our overall approach within the dialectic of contemporary philosophical debates and provides an overall framework for discussion. First, I introduce the problem of mental normativity. I show how this problem poses a prima facie threat to the common assumption in epistemology and metaethics that beliefs and other attitudes are governed by robust normative requirements. Secondly, I motivate philosophical inquiry about an ethics of mind by tracing this field back to recent debates in the ethics of belief. I (...) characterize the ethics of mind as being concerned with two main questions: 1. How can we be responsible for our attitudes? 2. What attitudes should we have? Finally, I give an overview over the structure of the book and summarize the chapters. (shrink)

Perceptual illusions have often served as an important tool in the study of perceptual experience. In this paper I argue that a recently discovered set of visual illusions sheds new light on the nature of time consciousness. I suggest the study of these silencing illusions as a tool kit for any philosopher interested in the experience of time and show how to better understand time consciousness by combining detailed empirical investigations with a detailed philosophical analysis. In addition, and more specifically, (...) I argue against an initially plausible range of views that assume a close match between the temporal content of visual experience and the temporal layout of experience itself. Against such a widely held structural matching thesis I argue that which temporal changes we are experiencing bears no close relation to how our experience itself is changing over time. Explanations of the silencing illusions that are compatible with the structural matching thesis fail. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Die analytische Philosophie hat selbst da, wo sie explizit an Kant anschließt, erhebliche Schwierigkeiten mit dessen Idee eines synthetischen Wissens a priori. Damit verliert sie eine ganze Dimension der philosophischen Tradition. Das vorliegende Buch gewinnt diese Idee zurück, indem es gerade den Anschauungsbezug und damit den Zeitbezug des menschlichen Denkens zum Gegenstand einer logischen Untersuchung macht. Nur wenn man die Zeit als inneres und formbildendes Merkmal des menschlichen Aussagens erkennt, versteht man den Begriff empirischer Wahrheit und sinnlich vermittelter Erkenntnis. In (...) diesem Gedanken, so zeigt sich, liegt die Einheit einer philosophischen Tradition, die Aristoteles mit Kant und beide mit dem späten Wittgenstein verbindet. (shrink)

Most people think indexical thought has special content (_de se_ content). However, it has been acknowledged that classical examples, such as those offered by Perry and Lewis, are insufficient to establish this conclusion. Ongoing discussions typically focus on first-person beliefs and their relationship to the explanation of successful behavior and linguistic practices. Instead, I want to direct attention to the phenomenal content of our conscious experiences and the largely neglected contribution that its comprehension can make to the way in which (...) first-person representation is understood. This paper offers a novel argument for both the existence and a specific interpretation of the essential indexicality thesis based on widely accepted assumptions regarding the relation between phenomenology and representation. Specifically, I will argue that if (i) two different individuals can have token experiences with the same phenomenology and ii) two token experiences of ordinary subjects with the same phenomenology have the same phenomenal content, then phenomenal content is_ de se _content of a particular kind: _perspectival de se_ content. (shrink)

The Received View on scientific theories is a framework for formalizing and analyzing theories mainly developed by Rudolf Carnap and Carl Gustav Hempel within logical empiricism. Its central assumptions are that theories and observations can be formalized in predicate logic, that the language of formalization has a context-dependent observational sub-language or separate observation language, and that the interpretation of the language is restricted only by theories and the interpretation of the observational language. For the observational language as a sub-language, non-observational (...) terms were initially assumed to be explicitly definable in observational terms, and later assumed to have necessary or sufficient conditions in observational terms. In the final version of the Received View, no specific relations between observational terms and theoretical terms were assumed. The Received View also provided the framework for conceptualizations of explanation, confirmation, reduction, criteria of cognitive significance, the analytic-synthetic distinction, and concept formation. Many criticisms of the Received View in the philosophy of science rely on misrepresentations. (shrink)

In this paper we have two aims: first, to draw attention to the close connexion between interpretation and scientific understanding; second, to give a detailed account of how theories without a spacetime can be interpreted, and so of how they can be understood. In order to do so, we of course need an account of what is meant by a theory ‘without a spacetime’: which we also provide in this paper. We describe three tools, used by physicists, aimed at constructing (...) interpretations which are adequate for the goal of understanding. We analyse examples from high-energy physics illustrating how physicists use these tools to construct interpretations and thereby attain understanding. The examples are: the ’t Hooft approximation of gauge theories, random matrix models, causal sets, loop quantum gravity, and group field theory. (shrink)

El estado del avance tecnológico actual permite pensar en formas en las que la humanidad podría tener una mejor vida, pero, por el contrario, las condiciones parecen ser peores cada día. Las propuestas de Nick Srnicek y Alex Williams, y de Franco Berardi, abordan el problema de superar la sujeción de la tecnología al neoliberalismo, para permitir un mejor vivir. Sin embargo, sus propuestas, contrahegemonía y liberación del conocimiento, se separan en la forma, entre un proyecto político y la morfogénesis (...) producto de la comunidad. (shrink)

An introduction to the Buddha's thought in the language of contemporary philosophy. 'The Philosophy of the Buddha' is an intro to Buddhist thinking which doesn't assuming any prior knowledge. This book introduces key concepts of Buddhist philosophy such as suffering, karma, or nirvana, and explains the fundamentals of Buddhist thought using these concepts. It demonstrates that the central ideas of Buddha are understandable in the present day and can be discussed and understood as a philosophy, independent of religious affiliations. Real-life (...) examples and questions for further discussion and reflection provide opportunities for deeper engagement with the text. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs the relationship between critique and theory constitutive for Critical Theory. Based on Max Horkheimer’s 1937 program, the first part shows that “critical behaviour” must, on the one hand, seek proximity to social practice. On the other hand, such behaviour is dependent on the distance from its object that all “theoretical work” entails. Since the inception of a genuinely critical theory in the early works of Karl Marx, the proximity to practice goes hand in hand with the demand (...) to work towards its change, implying a proximity to political movements. The second part shows that, for historical reasons, Horkheimer’s program distances itself from such movements. The third part interprets this dialectical attitude towards social practice as conditioning the peculiar – ideology-critical – capacity of Critical Theory. In conclusion, the fourth part problematises two current tendencies towards dissolving said dialectics: a return to what Horkheimer calls traditional theory on the one hand, and the abandonment of the demanding social-theoretical program in favour of political positioning on the other. (shrink)

Our main objective here is to show the methodological usefulness of philosophical ideas. Concretely, drawing on theoretical analyses related to the concept of social structuring processes (Elder-Vass) and becoming differently (Gilles Deleuze), we argue that the social struggles of Afro-Latin American women can be interrogated in their role of transforming normative identities and fostering innovative communitarian dynamics that enable adaptation and transformation. The central thesis is that embracing a social construction perspective characterised by fluidity, adaptability, and solidarity can offer an (...) alternative philosophically grounded methodological framework capable of addressing the complexities of race, gender, and social justice in Latin America. In the context of the recent necessity to rethink mobilisation and social movements, our findings highlight the significance of structuring processes over identity differentiation and the importance of networked activities in facing systemic challenges. Ultimately, this study contributes to the possibility of moving towards more complex accounts of the plurality communitarian arrangements becoming active in the middle of reality changes and mutual efforts to deal with them. (shrink)

»Somatische Narration« bezeichnet eine Arbeitsweise, die Strukturen des Körperselbst, die durch Traumatisierung desorganisiert sind und den Kontakt zum symbolischen Netzwerk verloren haben, ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit des analytischen Paars stellt. Diese nicht-repräsentierten Zustände werden als »verkapselte Körperengramme« aufgefasst. Sie weisen eine leiblich organisierte Abwehrstruktur auf, zu der neben Desorganisation und Versteinerung auch Wahrnehmungsabwehr, d.h. die systematische Abwendung der Aufmerksamkeit vom eigenen Körper, gehört. Die »somatische Narration« kehrt die Wahrnehmungsabwehr um. Zentral hierfür ist eine spezifische therapeutische Haltung: Die sinnliche Präsenz und (...) das leibliche »Containment« werden ins Zentrum der analytischen Haltung gestellt. Vorschnelle Symbolisierungen werden auf Seiten des Analytikers (Deutung) wie des Analysanden als Abwehr der Wahrnehmung des beschädigten Körperselbst und als Widerstand gegen das Durcharbeiten »verkapselter Körperengramme« aufgefasst. Ein klinisches Beispiel erläutert die Arbeitsweise und zeigt die Veränderung der desorganisierten Körperlandschaft im Verlauf einer vierjährigen Analyse. (shrink)

One argument that has been suggested for conventionalism about personal identity is that it captures that certain disagreements about personal identity seem irresolvable, without being committed to the view that these disagreements are merely verbal. In this paper, I will take the considerations about disagreement used to motivate conventionalism seriously. However, I will use them to motivate a very different, novel, and as yet unexplored view about personal identity. This is the view that personal identity is a non-representational concept, the (...) nature of which isn’t to be accounted for in terms of what entity it represents, but its non-representational role. I highlight that we find structurally very similar concerns about disagreement in another philosophical debate, namely in meta-ethics. But, in meta-ethics, such sorts of considerations are, traditionally, thought to support one distinctive view: meta-ethical expressivism, a non-representational view about normative thought and discourse. This suggests that we should take a similar view seriously for personal identity. I also develop what such an unfamiliar view might look like, using expressivism as a template. On this view, judgements about personal identity are plans that regulate who to hold accountable. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Thomism in John Owen by Christopher ClevelandSebastian RehnmanThomism in John Owen. By Christopher Cleveland. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 2013. Pp. 173. $90.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-4094-5579-0.Renaissance Scholasticism generally falls out of the contemporary philosophical and theological canon, and thus this form of argumentation is, and has for a long time, been a severely neglected area of study. However, a renewed interest in this field is increasingly exposing the philosophical (...) and theological stereotypes of the few earlier studies. Although institutional [End Page 160] philosophy and theology throughout Europe between the Reformation and the Enlightenment continued to identify itself as Scholastic, it is now clear that it was far from homogeneous. One of the diverse currents was the Scholasticism in Evangelical Protestantism. Within the reformed Church, academies aimed explicitly at continuing and contributing to the theological and philosophical tradition of the entire Church. Several studies have in particular suggested continuity between Thomas Aquinas and philosophers and theologians of good standing in the reformed Church. The most recent study is Christopher Cleveland’s Thomism in John Owen.The subject of this study is well chosen. John Owen (1616-83) was an influential pastor, scholar, vice-chancellor of the University of Oxford, and chaplain of Oliver Cromwell. He received a first-rate education at Oxford and maintained a wide-ranging scholarship throughout his life. His complete works comprise twenty-four volumes in the critical edition, and these are often thorough and systematic. From his tutor and friend Thomas Barlow, Owen seems to have gained a deep and lifelong appreciation of Aquinas, Alvarez, Bañez, and other Scholastics.Cleveland rightly aims at a focused investigation. His purpose is to “expand the inquiry into Reformed Thomism” (17) and “examine the role of Thomism in the theology of John Owen” (2). By “Thomism” he means “Aquinas” and sometimes “Diego Alvarez and Domingo Bañez.” In the first chapter Cleveland outlines the book and surveys some of the secondary literature. In the second chapter he contends that Owen was influenced by Aquinas’s concept of actus purus in arguing divine simplicity, divine immutability, and divine concurrence. In the third and fourth chapters he asserts that Aquinas’s understanding of infused “habits” strengthened Owen’s explanation of justification and sanctification. In the fifth chapter Cleveland proposes that Owen’s account of the hypostatic union is greatly indebted to Aquinas. Strangely the author concludes that Owen’s thought represents “a Western Trinitarian Theology” although he does not treat Owen’s doctrine of the Trinity.This book is a laudable and well-needed attempt to determine the particular influence of Aquinas on Owen. However, Cleveland’s work would benefit from a greater methodological rigor. Let us first consider Cleveland’s criteria for tracing Aquinas’s influence. He suggests that there are “four categories into which Thomistic influence falls.” These are: (1) quotations or paraphrases of “Thomas or a Thomist author,” (2) the development of a subject by means of similar theological concepts, (3) the “use of similar but not identical principles,” and (4) a coincidence of thought because of a common source. The second criterion is said to identify the most common type of influence, and the fourth the rarest (3). Now, that Owen was influenced by Aquinas is not in contest; the question is: how was Owen influenced? And there are limitations to what can be drawn from the application of these categories. The first category is not decisive, since any [End Page 161] author may be quoted or paraphrased for widely various reasons, and some influential authors may not be quoted or paraphrased. The fourth criterion is somewhat irrelevant, since the coincidental rarely reveals steady influence.Cleveland identifies “three major areas of Thomistic influence upon Owen’s theology” (4; similarly 154). These are God as actus purus, infused dispositions of grace, and the hypostatic union. Yet, the book contains no argument for that conclusion. Having formulated four criteria for the assessment of influence in the first chapter, Cleveland surprisingly does not return to them in the remainder of the book. The reader is thus left to wonder whether these three major areas of influence were determined by applying... (shrink)

Entrepreneurship has been highlighted as one of the major forces in addressing significant economic, social, and environmental challenges. These challenges have raised new ethical questions, leading to an explosive growth of research at the intersection of ethics and entrepreneurship. This study provides an overview of the evolution of the scientific literature on the interplay between ethics and entrepreneurship to propose a research proposition with standardized protocols and a broad time limit. Specifically, in a hybrid literature review, 516 articles from peer-reviewed (...) journals indexed in Scopus were analyzed. The review revealed that the field mainly comprises six themes. Through the analysis of each theme, gaps are identified and structured and used to build theoretical proposals for future research agendas applied to current societal challenges. Understanding the link between entrepreneurship and ethics guides practices improves decisions, addresses challenges, promotes sustainability, enhances academia, and builds trust, fostering a responsible, beneficial entrepreneurial environment for society and the economy. (shrink)

Confessional Protestant ethics is commonly presented nowadays as opposite to virtue. This article establishes the inaccuracy of this presentation from the centrality of virtue and its compatibility with grace in the ethics of the Protestant Reformer Pietro Martire Vermigli (1499–1562). It argues that the notion of virtue is not only central but also consistent with the notion of grace from the distinction between acquired and infused virtue.

Das Themenfeld "Religion und Pluralismus" hat sich in den letzten Jahren bedeutend weiterentwickelt. Der Band führt deutschsprachige LeserInnen in die bislang vorwiegend auf Englisch geführte Debatte ein und entwickelt grundlegende Fragen und Impulse für die weitere Forschung. Internationale ForscherInnen beleuchten zentrale Fragestellungen der Debatte über Pluralismus und Religion: z.B. die epistemischen Herausforderungen des peer-disagreement, neurotheologische und religionspsychologische Argumente für einen kulturübergreifenden Kern religiöser Erfahrung, oder das Potenzial des religiösen Fiktionalismus als Antwort auf die Unvereinbarkeit religiöser Wahrheitsansprüche und um die Anforderungen (...) der Toleranz angesichts der realen Pluralität von Religionen. (shrink)

Data-sharing among genomic researchers is promoted for its potential to accelerate our understanding of the molecular basis of cancer. However, with genomic data sharing the risks of re-identifying study participants, revealing personal genomic information and data misuse might increase. This study aims at exploring perceptions of patients and physicians in Oncology regarding their assessment of the informational risks resulting from participating in whole genomic research studies in order to improve the informed consent process. For this purpose, we conducted a qualitative (...) focus group study at the National Center for Tumor Diseases (NCT). Patients and oncologists assessed the informational risks either as minimal or as greater than minimal, depending on the context factors of occupational status, age, and patients’ prognosis. Interestingly, even patients who assumed a greater risk did not refrain from participating in genomic research, provided that certain informational and institutional safeguards are implemented. Moreover, they expected comprehensive disclosure of the risks resulting from genomic data sharing. These results suggest (1) comprehensive disclosure of the risks of genomic research to potential study participants in genomic research to facilitate risk assessment and sound decision making, (2) establishing independent governance entities in order to minimize the informational risks of genomic research, and (3) implementing data sharing policies which offer guidance for physicians and researchers involved in genomic research. (shrink)

Recent discussions about the microstructure of materials generally focus on the ontological aspects of the molecular structure. However, there are many types of substances that cannot be studied by means of the concept of molecule, for example, salts. For the quantum treatment of these substances, a new particle, called phonon, is introduced. Phonons are generally conceived as a pseudo-particle, that is, a mathematical device necessary to perform calculations but which does not have a “real” existence. In this context, the aim (...) of this paper will be to analyze the ontological status of phonons. For such purposes we will critically analyze the arguments that would account for the presumed nonexistence of phonons. Finally, having already demonstrated that there are not enough reasons to consider phonons as non-existing entities, we will explore some possibilities that allow us to elucidate their ontological status. (shrink)

A los cristales se los describe como a una red de átomos que puede vibrar alrededor de su posición de equilibrio. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la energía de estas ondas esté cuantificada sugiere una analogía con el campo electromagnético. En analogía con el fotón se define al fonón. Generalmente se concibe al fonón como a una cuasi-partícula, es decir, como a un instrumento matemático útil en los cálculos pero sin una existencia propia. En este trabajo estudiamos el estatuto (...) ontológico del fonón y argumentaremos en favor de la idea de considerarlo como una partícula real. (shrink)

This chapter deals with the main characteristics of natural kinds, and analyzes three approaches to them. The first approach argues that natural kinds are characterized by their essential properties (in a modern, scientific sense), but encounter difficulties even on the physico-chemical level, which is where it seems to be better implemented. On the other hand, the constructivist stance, much more liberal, does not explain why certain kinds are inductively useful and not others. Third, an introduction, with comments, is provided on (...) the approach of Richard Boyd, among others, which understands natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters that accommodate to the causal structure of the world. In this view, natural kinds are usually fuzzy sets with no clear boundaries, subject to time and space limitations, and relative to some perspective. However, it solves the problems of the other approaches mentioned without forgoing a realistic conception of natural kinds. Finally, a proposal is made on how an application of Boyd’s ideas to the analysis of laws of nature can help to solve the old chestnut about the distinction between scientific laws and accidentally true generalizations. (shrink)

This paper argues against Davidson’s claim that there is no distinction between conceptual schemes and their content and derives the implications for the debate on realism and antirealism. Starting from a semantic conception of realism, I discuss Davidson’s argument against conceptual schemes and untranslatable languages. I argue that the idea of an untranslatable language is consistent since language attribution is essentially normative. Untranslatable languages are metaphysically possible, but epistemically unrecognizable. This leads to a Berkeleyan argument against antirealism: if antirealism is (...) conceived of as dependence from a total language (instead of merely some actual language), the distinction between realism and antirealism vanishes: antirealism is realism. (shrink)

This paper aims to counter the recent opinion that there is a peculiar epistemology in the reformed Church which made it negative to natural theology. First, it is shown that there was an early and unanimous adoption of natural theology as the culmination of physics and the beginning of metaphysics by the sixteenth and seventeenth century philosophers of good standing in the reformed Church. Second, it is argued that natural theology cannot be based on revelation, should not assume a peculiar (...) analysis of knowledge and must not pass over demonstration. (shrink)

The following discussion with philosopher and political scientist Wendy Brown seeks to apply her provocative and indispensable ideas to recent political events and problems, in particular focusing on her work in Undoing the Demos (2015) and returning briefly to consider Politics Out of History (2001) in today’s context. The questions were collectively authored and the interview itself was conducted by Sebastian Raza via Skype on 23 May 2017. We would like to thank Wendy Brown for the generous contribution of (...) her time and for answering the questions so directly and clearly. (shrink)

In der ethischen und rechtlichen Debatte um den möglichen Einsatz neuer Techniken zur Genomeditierung spielt der Begriff der genetischen Veränderung eine zentrale Rolle. Während im Bereich der grünen Gentechnik intensive Debatten um seine Bedeutung geführt werden, wird dieser Umstand im Kontext gentechnischer Interventionen am Menschen weitgehend ausgeblendet. Der Aufsatz expliziert drei mögliche Bedeutungen genetischer Veränderung, namentlich: ein prozessuales, ein diachrones sowie ein klassenbezogenes Verständnis. Anhand zweier Szenarien zukünftig erwartbarer Keimbahninterventionen wird anschließend exemplarisch gezeigt, welche Konsequenzen die Begriffe für die Kennzeichnung (...) humaner Embryonen als genetisch veränderte Entitäten haben und was dies jeweils für eine ethische und rechtliche Bewertung von Keimbahninterventionen bedeuten würde. Dabei ergeben sich jedoch für jeden der Begriffe logische, konzeptionelle sowie Anwendungsprobleme, die es problematisch erscheinen lassen, Maßnahmen der Genomeditierung überhaupt unter Verweis auf einen Begriff der genetischen Veränderung rechtlich oder ethisch zu bewerten. Soll dieser Bezugspunkt dennoch aufrechterhalten werden, ist unter pragmatischen Gesichtspunkten letztlich nur ein prozessuales Verständnis genetischer Veränderung plausibel. (shrink)

This thesis deals with the theory of interrogative belief revision, a recent development in the subfield of philosophical logic known as belief revision theory. While classical belief revision theory deals with the dynamics of an agent’s beliefs, interrogative belief revision aims to describe the dynamics of the agent’s questions about the world, or research agenda, as well. Great emphasis is put on the interaction between belief change and changes in the research agenda. I develop both the technical framework for this (...) theory by constructing and investigating modal logics for reasoning about the dynamics of research interests, as well as pursuing further the philosophical foundations and applications of the theory. Among the contributions of the thesis are: - a novel interpretation of the theory founded on a notion of epistemic strategies - a solution to the previously open problem of contraction and revision in this context - several systems of modal logic that can be used to reason about interrogative belief revision - completeness results and decidability results for these logics - a characterization of a class of relevant conditionals based on a notion of agenda relevance. (shrink)

_The implementation of the German energy transition is unclearly framed. The future of the transition depends on more than just technological development or economic feasibility. Rather, a positive attitude and an understanding by the general public are critical to its success. Therefore, communicating the complex, polarized and long-term process in an objective way is essential. We show that despite the alleged clarity of goals, German stakeholders have very diverse reasons for their support of the energy transition. One key reason mentioned (...) is climate protection. Another important goal is the desired independence from energy imports. This diversity is at the heart of the communication challenges. We see a wide variety of goals triggering trade-offs and challenges in understanding the process. Therefore, we suggest an infographic as an approach to communicating the energy transition to the general public with a focus on goals and related future challenges of the transition. We conclude that communication tools should promote an inclusive discussion and debate regarding the goals and challenges of a process, such as the energy transition, to help answer the question: How do we want to live in the future?_ _Keywords_: climate change, energy transition, communication, framing, media. (shrink)

Due to the logical relations between theism and intelligent design (id), there are two challenges to theism that also apply to id. In the falsifiability challenge, it is charged that theism is compatible with every observation statement and thus asserts nothing. I argue that the contentious assumptions of this challenge can be avoided without loss of precision by charging theism (and thus id) directly with the lack of observational assertions. In the translatability challenge, it is charged that theism can be (...) translated into a (non-theistic) set of observation statements without loss of cognitive content. I argue that the contentious assumptions of this challenge are avoided by the related charge that the (non-theistic) evolutionary theory makes all the observational assertions of id, while the converse does not hold. Elliott Sober has argued that id meets the falsifiability challenge, but, since it makes almost no observational assertions, is not testable. I point out two problems with Sober’s argument and show that id is both deductively and probabilistically testable. Sober’s argument, I suggest, inconsistently combines the modified falsifiability challenge with the modified translatability challenge. If his claims about id’s observational assertions are true, however, id succumbs to the modified translatability challenge. (shrink)