Thirteen up-and-coming researchers in the philosophy of mathematics have been invited to write on what they take to be the right philosophical account of mathematics, examining along the way where they think the philosophy of mathematics is and ought to be going. A rich and diverse picture emerges. Some broader tendencies can nevertheless be detected: there is increasing attention to the practice, language and psychology of mathematics, a move to reassess the orthodoxy, as well as inspiration from philosophical logic.

Feinberg and Mallatt, in their presentation of neurobiological naturalism, have suggested that visual consciousness was acquired by early vertebrates and inherited by a wide range of descendants, and that its neural basis has shifted to nonhomologous nervous structures during evolution. However, their evolutionary scenario of visual consciousness relies on the assumption that visual consciousness is closely linked with survival, which is not commonly accepted in current consciousness research. We suggest an alternative idea that visual consciousness is linked to a specific (...) class of agency, consequently justifying their phylogenetic claim. We also examine the implication of their phylogenetic claim: visual consciousness is homologous across vertebrates, but its neural basis is not. This apparent incongruence illustrates a general phenomenon of homology, and that the resulting hierarchical view of visual consciousness and its neural basis can be straightforwardly accommodated by neurobiological naturalism. Throughout these discussions, we aim to address the potential theoretical issues in neurobiological naturalism and refine the picture illustrated by Feinberg and Mallatt regarding phylogenetic distribution and trajectories of visual consciousness. (shrink)

dicates implying a surplus in the background from previous negation) and the other three combinations . The second part of the study in relation to the issue of intersubjectivity summarizes Hegel's unhappy consciousness analysis of figures from the Phenomenology of Spirit and shows that it takes insufficient account of Hegel older authors, which is just Dionysios. In writings on mystical theology can find is the formal structure of intersubjectivity, and Hegel's analysis so they can not be correct.

The thesis investigates Plotinus' concept of beauty. Chapter 1 focuses on two methodological issues: development in Plotinus' thought and topics of the concerned Enneads. Since Plotinus wrote two Enneads directly devoted to this topic which were numbered and named by Porphyry I.6 On beauty and V.8 On intellectual beauty, these two treatises are addressed first in the context of other relevant Enneads. The outcome of these chapters is that beauty is primarily to be found in Intellect and that it is (...) closely linked with unity in multiplicity, so this topic is further investigated in more detail. Five mutually interconnected perspectives Plotinus assumes to describe the unity in multiplicity specific to the Intellect, are outlined. Two of them that are related to the nature of intellection and intelligible objects are discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The one related to Intellect's genesis is analysed throughout the thesis. Therefore, most of chapter 4 focuses on the remaining two perspectives which are connected with Intellect's hierarchical and structural unity in multiplicity. In chapter 5, Ennead VI.7 is analysed in order to deepen the concept of beauty and refine its relation to the Good, life and other predicates. The last chapter presents a systematic... (shrink)

The essay first succinctly points out shortcomings in previous interpretations of Plotinus’ notion of beauty. Beauty is to be connected primarily with Intellect, which is to be understood as a special unity in diversity. The section of the essay devoted to aesthetics is therefore preceded by a short analysis of Intellect’s unity and diversity. The hypothesis about the primary relation of beauty to the Intellect is then corroborated by a reading of Ennead V.8 and further developed. The emphasis is on (...) three basic aspects of beauty: its being a unity of a mixture whose character is shared by all ontological levels; its function of referring to what is above it; and its fundamental accessibility. Though Plotinus opposes the Stoic notion of beauty as symmetry and stresses beauty’s simplicity, it follows for him that beauty has the character of unitas multiplex, albeit a special one. (shrink)

The author criticizes Kelsen's distinction between static and dynamic systems of norms and his theory of legal dynamics. The author moreover presents the institutionalist conception of legal dynamics. Kelsen's concept of static systems is incompatible with normological scepticism: The deduction of rules from a basic principle depends on additional premises; even in static systems there is a kind of dynamics produced by actual facts. Kelsen's conception of legal dynamics is also incompatible with normological scepticism and with Kelsen's demand of purity (...) of jurisprudence. In the institutionalist conception Iegal dynamics is rather conceived as an interplay of legal norms and facts. Empowering relations, the principle of co‐validity, temporal limits of norms, derogation, legal validity and the basic norm are analysed accordingly. Appendices deal with Paulson's empowering theory of legal norm and Lippold's double‐faced reconstruction of the legal order. (shrink)

The moral status of human brain organoids (HBOs) has been debated in view of the future possibility that they may acquire phenomenal consciousness. This study empirically investigates the moral sensitivity in people’s intuitive judgments about actions toward conscious HBOs. The results showed that the presence/absence of pain experience in HBOs affected the judgment about the moral permissibility of actions such as creating and destroying the HBOs; however, the presence/absence of visual experience in HBOs also affected the judgment. These findings suggest (...) that people’s intuitive judgments about the moral status of HBOs are sensitive to the valence-independent value of phenomenal consciousness. We discuss how these observations can have normative implications; particularly, we argue that they put pressure on the theoretical view that the moral status of conscious HBOs is grounded solely in the valence-dependent value of consciousness. We also discuss how our findings can be informative even when such a theoretical view is finally justified or when the future possibility of conscious HBOs is implausible. (shrink)

Neurorights, as “new human rights,” have been increasingly recognized in the literature. In the Neurorights Initiative, these rights are supposed to be directed toward mental privacy, free will, pe...

Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) seem to elicit the intuitive judgment that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternative Possibility (PAP). Recent empirical studies have shown that the inclination toward this intuitive judgment is shared among people, which seems to reinforce the argument against the PAP. However, some scholars have argued for Descriptive Anti-Intuitionism (DAI) — intuitive judgments have never played an evidential role in philosophy — and thus denied (...) the philosophical significance of such empirical findings. I point out that although DAI fails in its literal claim for FSCs, an associated insight remains potent: an intuitive judgment is so fragile that it can be easily defeated by further arguments. Nevertheless, I argue, empirical studies are significant in uncovering the general principles to which we are committed in our practice concerning moral responsibility. I clarify how such findings can play a robust evidential role in philosophical debates concerning moral responsibility by tracing the literature written by Frankfurt and philosophers. (shrink)

Introduction of the philosophy of Pavlos Kalligas.

Though there has been an array of methods to evaluate the extent of sarcoidosis, it is generally difficult to detect central nervous system involvement. Recently it has become accepted that 18F-FDG PET is more sensitive than gallium scintigraphy in finding sarcoid lesions, however its usefulness and limitations for detecting sarcoidosis in the central nervous system, especially in the spinal cord, has rarely been investigated. Two patients with pathologically confirmed sarcoidosis manifested spinal symptoms. We conducted 18F-FDG PET along with conventional imagings (...) before and after treatment. Abnormal FDG uptakes which could not be detected by gallium scintigraphy were shown in the spinal cords in both patients. These abnormal uptakes were diminished in accordance with clinical improvement after treatment. Our findings suggest that 18F-FDG PET is effective in detecting and tracking the activity of spinal sarcoidosis. (shrink)

In Kagaku no Sekai to Kokoro no Tetsugaku, Mr.Michio Kobayashi features on Descartes' theory of minds as "subjecitive-active consciousness", and defends it against the materialist movement. I show that Kobayashi's method has a difficulty for defending existence of our minds because Descartes didn't allow the scientific investigation of our mental experience from outside,and so cannot appropriately grasp the significance of other minds.

The author outlines his views on the essence of philosophical logic. There are two means of philosophical argumentation: intuition and analysis of the problem situation under examination. Logical intuition can be replaced by improved intuition based on new intellectual constructions. Then the author explains—in opposition to von Wright—the main philosophical traits of his conception of norm logic. The structure of the information processing determining action justifies the application of dichotomous semantics in action theory and in practical philosophy. The theory of (...) action and institutions is based on three anthropological features of man: our capacity of acting, our being a zoon politikon, and our capacity to form institutions. These features determine our ontology, our semantics and the logics of practical thinking. The action‐theoretical approach leads to a formal and finalistic theory of action in which action is not only analysed as an element of the norm content, but as the essential basis of the whole field of practical philosophy. In the frame of this action theory a conception of freedom of will is provided which does not contrast with determinism. The formalism of action is applied in two different problem situations: in action deliberation and in motive interpretation. Jørgensen's dilemma is discussed and overcome by the introduction of a generalised notion of inference. Deontic logic is confronted with the idea of a genuine logic of norms. The main principles of norm logic are discussed and a normative conditional is introduced. Von Wright's conception of a genuine norm logic is confronted with the present author's conception. The author shows that norm‐logical skepticism would be detrimental to analytical jurisprudence. (shrink)

We experience evidence, but experienced evidence does not entail objective validity of the evident content. There are different kinds of intuitive evidence: logical and analytical evidence, the presuppositions of realism etc.; there is intuitive evidence in the cognitive field as well as in the practical realm. Intuitive evidence is linked with the basic framework of the respective field. Intuition may be replaced by deeper intuition on the basis of new views that evoke a reconstruction of the framework. Value intuition is (...) characterized as an established opinion which seems undubitable. All persons, all groups and all institutions have actually some practical convictions on which they found their practical evaluation. (shrink)

Der Autor unterscheidet nicht nur Schichten der Semiotik, sondern auch syntaktische, semantische und pragmatische Sprachen. Bei diesen kann durch Interpretation eine Modifikation der Bedeutung von Ausdrücken eintreten. Interpretation ist die Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Ausdrücken einer pragmatischen Sprache. Die hermeneutische Methodik wird der hermeneutischen Philosophie gegenübergestellt. Als bedeutungsbestimmende Momente werden diskutiert: sprachliche Operationen, Wissen und Vorwissen, die gnoseologische Analyse der Problemsituation, die Funktion von Deutungsschemen, die Ich-Perspektive der Deutung, volitive Momente und Zielsetzung der Deutung. Die juristische Interpretation wird als Interpretation (...) unter Zwecken dargestellt. (shrink)

Knowledge is expressed in sentences about states of affairs of the type 'p' not in knowledge-sentences of the type 'W(p)'. Knowledge-sentences are results of a reflexion about a subject of knowledge and a knowledge-system. Objectivization of a knowledgesentence 'W(p)' is defined as the entailment of 'p' from the premis 'W(p)' based on the generally accepted sentence 'W(p)->p'. The author distinguishes three kinds of knowledge-sentences: a) self-reflective knowledge-sentences which are a result of the subject's S reflexion about his own knowledge 'WS*(p)';b) (...) comparative knowledge-sentences which are result of a reflexion of the subject S2 about the knowledge of another subject S1 using the knowledge of S2 as a criterion for judging S1's knowledge; c) the sentence of S2 about the believing of S1, that S1 knows p. In neither of these cases an objectivization is logically justified. (shrink)

Ota Weinberger versucht, die logische Analyse für die theologische Argumentation nutzbar zu machen und Forderungen für eine Moral des friedfertigen Diskurses aufzustellen.Hierzu bestimmt er zunächst eine logische und methodologische Charakteristik des Glaubensoperators der Religionen. Nach einer Diskussion des Begriffes der möglichen Welten wird das Theodizeeproblem skeptisch beleuchtet. Zur Konstitution der Willensfreiheit ist weder die Existenz der ontologischen noch des moralischen Bösen erforderlich. Auch ist die Notwendigkeit des Bösen zum Nutzen der Geschöpfe nicht beweisbar. Es gehört jedoch zur Sichtweise der Theologen, (...) daß moralische Momente als Determinanten der Glückseligkeit angesehen werden.Der Autor stellt der Konzeption des Weltethos eine Theorie gegenüber, derzufolge das politische Geschehen durch das Aufeinanderprallen verschiedener Zivilisationen bestimmt ist. Weinberger setzt der gängigen Moral, die den Einsatz für die eigene Gemeinschaft fordert, eine Moral entgegen, die Wege der diskursiven Brücken zwischen divergierenden Welthaltungen sucht. Am Ende diskutiert er Methoden der friedlichen Koexistenz und Kooperation - trotz unterschiedlicher Einstellungen. (shrink)

The two competing camps of theorists in moral psychology share one common view on the disagreement between their theories: moral foundations theory presupposes basic emotion theory, while dyadic morality theory presupposes constructionist theory of emotion. The paper challenges this common view. First, it reviews the four theories. Second, it clarifies the issue about the relation between the moral contents and emotions on which the two camps of moral-psychological theorists dispute. Third, it identifies the explananda for the moral-psychological theories, and examines (...) the two distinctive types of explanations that each of the two theories offers to them. Finally, it concludes that the deepest disagreement between the two morality theories consists in the role that the theories give to emotions in explaining moral judgments. (shrink)

Across languages, lexical items specific to infant‐directed speech (i.e., ‘baby‐talk words’) are characterized by a preponderance of onomatopoeia (or highly iconic words), diminutives, and reduplication. These lexical characteristics may help infants discover the referential nature of words, identify word referents, and segment fluent speech into words. If so, the amount of lexical input containing these properties should predict infants’ rate of vocabulary growth. To test this prediction, we tracked the vocabulary size in 47 English‐learning infants from 9 to 21 months (...) and examined whether the patterns of growth can be related to measures of iconicity, diminutives, and reduplication in the lexical input at 9 months. Our analyses showed that both diminutives and reduplication in the input were associated with vocabulary growth, although measures of iconicity were not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that phonological properties typical of lexical input in infant‐directed speech play a role in early vocabulary growth. (shrink)

Abstract.The author gives a short survey of the different methods which have been proposed to deal with the logic of norm sentences on the basis of logical systems of descriptive language: deontic logic, logic of norms as an isomorphism of propositional logic, restriction of logical relations to the propositional content of norm sentences, transformation of norms into sanction sentences, preference interpretation of norm sentences, double interpretation of ought‐sentences and the use of the descriptive interpretation as a tool for establishing the (...) logic of norms, proposition about norms in the place of normative logic, the logic of admissible worlds, postulates addressed to the rational lawgiver and technical ought as a substitute for nor‐mological considerations. A critical analysis of these attempts may prove them inappropriate, but it is not sufficient to prove the impossibility of any method of founding normative logic on systems of a descriptive language. Therefore the author adds a general consideration on the chances of such approaches. (shrink)

In this paper the author first presents a critical account of some basic views of Habermas' Discourse Philosophy. He points out some difficulties inherent in notions such as valid justification in argumentation theory, in the notion of ideal form of discourses, and in consensus theory of truth. Secondly, he focuses on Habermas' conceptions of validity, acceptance and legitimacy of law from the perspective of neo‐institutionalism. In particular, (i) the author argues that Habermas' definition of legal validity is unclear and unrealistic; (...) (ii) the author stresses the distinction between acceptance and acceptability; (iii) Habermas presupposes harmony between sovereignty and human rights postulates, but the present author takes into account the possibility of conflicts between autonomous popular decisions and human rights which must be resolved by methods of discursive democracy; (iv) criteria for acceptance of law cannot be fixed by a stipulative definition, but are in social discussion; (v) legitimacy is not an objective feature of valid law and presupposes an evaluation based on our political convictions. (shrink)

. The author conceives rules as action‐determining ideas. They are general and of hypothetical form, and they are of three semantic types: descriptive, technological, and normative rules. The most important categorisation of normative rules is the distinction between rules of behaviour and power‐conferring rules. Both kinds of rules are necessary to establish institutions. Principles are a special kind of normative rules. The social existence of normative rules is connected with their institutionalisation as frames for action. The dynamics of rules is (...) in principle based on two elements: on socially approved habit, and/or on authorised norm creation. (shrink)