Sinceits founding by Jacques Waardenburg in 1971, Religion and Reason has been a leading forum for contributions on theories, theoretical issues and agendas related to the phenomenon and the study of religion. Topics include (among others) category formation, comparison, ethnophilosophy, hermeneutics, methodology, myth, phenomenology, philosophy of science, scientific atheism, structuralism, and theories of religion. From time to time the series publishes volumes that map the state of the art and the history of the discipline.

Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. Joaquín Pérez-Remón. Mouton Publishers, The Hague 1980. xii, 412 pp. DM 110.

This book is an enquiry into the concept of the 'self', transcending the barriers of 'non-self' and realizing the non-dual Consciousness within and without.

This article problematizes the way of thinking schooling in discourse of sign system, which involves opposition, and double gesture of inclusion/exclusion. Drawing on two fundamental texts of Taoism, the Tao Te Ching and Chuang Tzu, this article puts forward the seemingly passive Non-Word and Non-Self to resist the hierarchy ordering of conceptions and man, and to undo duality of binary opposition. It links the history of assessment and PISA to the rethinking of evidence and sign in contemporary movements. The (...) second section proposes teaching as wandering (you, 游), the transcendence into Non-Self with response to men’s natural inquiry, but not artificially manipulating and shaping man by privileging certain knowledge, value, and thoughts over other. Instead of making categories of race, gender, and normal/abnormal, Taoist provides a way of reconsider the self operating on assessing, standardizing, normalizing, correcting and predicting others in school accountability. It is built on the ontology of considering individual as belonging to an ultimate sameness, the oneness. The article concludes with underlying assumption that students are subjected to change, and their difference must be eliminated through standard test. It further questions tactics of reason that educational reform face in the current regime of school accountability. (shrink)

The commentator’s motivation for accompanying Varela in a foray into immunology lay in the clear-cut, value-laden contrast between traditional immunology and the new organism-centred view pioneered by Vaz and Coutinho. In the twenty years that have elapsed, models have become increasingly complicated so that this clear-cut contrast has been obscured. In immunology as in cognitive science, the radicality of Varela’s views is disturbing for the mainstream community.

In “Non-self, Agency, and Women: Buddhism’s Modern Transformation,” Ann A. Pang-White argues that “non-self (anātman 無我)” and “emptiness (śūnyatā 空)” necessarily entail nonduality. Buddha nature is neither male nor female. Nonetheless, conflicting teachings are found in various Theravada and Mahayana texts. The more conservative texts have historically resulted in long-standing patriarchal practices: Buddhist nuns receive much less respect and financial support than monks, often facing the possibility of extinction. In Taiwan, however, in a complete reversal, Buddhist nuns outnumber (...) male monks in an astonishing 75 percent to 25 percent ratio, with the largest number of Buddhist nuns in the world. Many Taiwanese nuns are highly educated and socially engaged activists. Nonetheless, to assert one’s autonomy to become a nun is extremely difficult in a Confucian society. How do Taiwanese women, society, and Buddhism mutually transform each other? In addition to an analysis of selected essential Buddhist texts, Pang-White investigates two Buddhist communities of women to shed light on Buddhism’s modern transformation. She concludes that to reform Buddhism from within is not only theoretically possible but also practically achievable. (shrink)

The self-visitation paradox is one paradox of time travel. As Ted Sider puts it, “Suppose I travel back in time and stand in a room with my sitting 10-year-old self. I seem to be both sitting and standing, but how can that be?” (2001, 101). So as not to beg any questions, let us label what is sitting B and what is standing C. The worry is about how B can be C in light of the looming contradiction (...) that this one person would be sitting and standing. Sider’s own approach is perdurantist, and holds that B is not C. My concern, though, is with solutions offered by, or on behalf of, endurantists–more 1 specifically, with solutions holding that B is C. The endurantist answer I shall criticize is a relativizer position maintaining that the sitting and the standing need to be relativized to the personal time or proper time of the time traveler. This manner of solution has been offered by Paul Horwich (1975, 433-435 ; 1987, 114-115) and also by Simon Keller and Michael Nelson (2001, 344). I will show that such a view has a linguistically suspect element and that there are three further reasons why relativizing only in this way falls short of solving the paradox. This will be enough to squash the relativizer position because it will not be clear how additional relativization could help, and furthermore any additional relativization would only make the linguistic matter worse. I will also present some considerations in favor of a non-contradiction endurantist alternative; this view eliminates the need for any relativization by denying that sitting and standing are contradictory properties. (shrink)

Self-regulation, or the ability to effectively manage emotions and behavior, is a critical skill to develop in early childhood. Children living in a context of economic hardship are at an increased risk for developing self-regulation difficulties. However, few studies have comprehensively examined how multiple aspects of the caregiving environment, including fathers’ parenting and coparenting quality, may contribute to child self-regulation. Thus, this study applied a family systems perspective to examine whether coparenting and resident and non-resident fathers’ reports (...) of parenting quantity and quality were associated with observations of children’s self-regulation. Participants were drawn from the Embedded Developmental Study of the Three-City Study, a longitudinal study of children and families facing economic hardship. At Wave 1, when children were 2–4 years old, reports of parenting and coparenting were obtained. At Wave 2, when children were 3–6 years old, children participated in a snack delay and gift wrap task, which assessed their self-regulation. Multi-group path analyses indicated that resident fathers’ harsh parenting at Wave 1 predicted decreased levels of self-regulation at Wave 2. Non-resident fathers’ reported hours of involvement at Wave 1 predicted greater levels of self-regulation at Wave 2. Additionally, supportive coparenting among families with a non-resident father predicted greater self-regulation. Supportive coparenting was not associated with child self-regulation in families with a resident father. The implications for research focused on facilitating positive father–child relationships in diverse family contexts are discussed. (shrink)

The non‐self theory is one of the cornerstones of Buddhist philosophy. This chapter examines this theory and discusses some of the issues it raises for Western philosophy of mind, in particular for the problem of free will. In the first part, it traces the non‐self theory through several formulations, focusing on different Buddhist texts. In the second part, it analyzes some of the similarities and dissimilarities of the non‐self theory with discussions of the mind‐body problem and the (...) free will problem in Western philosophy. (shrink)

Independently of whether an object of experience becomes a candidate for being a part of the self or a part of the external world, it is always given to us as just an object of experience. The observer-observed relation can be seen as a type of relation with many instances, both between the self and different objects of experience and between any given object of experience and different selves. The self is situated in a spatial grid, where (...) the latter can be characterised as an array of relations, of which the relata include both observers and observed. The world, understood as independent existence, including the self, is empty. However, Paolo Bozzi’s method for identifying the self and delimiting its independent existence from the external world has taught us just the opposite lesson. Bozzi’s project is to teach us how to use them, and to recognise that they allow a self to be situated in a world of objects. (shrink)

In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that (...) such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity of the self or the person. Searle claims that the self functions as a unified point of view from which episodes of mental events are presented as a coherent picture. Here the Two Truths position in Buddhism differs from Searle's here. The "point of view" that Searle mentions exists only at the conventional level, but not the ultimate one. (shrink)

Left and right libertarians alike are attracted to the thesis of self-ownership because, as Eric Mack says, they ‘believe that it best captures our common perception of the moral inviolability of persons’. Further, most libertarians, left and right, accept that some version of the Lockean Proviso restricts agents’ ability to acquire worldly resources. The inviolability of SO purports to make libertarianism more appealing than its egalitarian counterparts, since traditional egalitarian theories cannot straightforwardly explain why, e.g. forced organ donation and (...) forced labor are serious wrongs even when they generate more equitable outcomes or benefit the greater good. I argue that, when SO is coupled with LP, this appeal is unfounded. SO, as usually construed, allows for the possibility of justified incursions of non-culpable agents up to and including forced organ donation. I conclude by considering a few possible responses on behalf of the libertarian, assessing each one’s plausibility. (shrink)

In the light of the modern idea of a sovereign and self-transparent subject, the paper evaluates the philosophical and ethical relevance of Bildung. As a first step, (the early) Nietzsche's and Adorno's criticism of Bildung is explicated, a criticism based upon the thinkers' critical stance towards the modern epistemological relation of subject and object. However, neither thinker abandons the concept of Bildung. The second part of the paper accordingly reconstructs Nietzsche's and Adorno's adherence to Bildung understood as a different (...) relationship of subject and object within Bildung. In the paper's concluding reflections there is an attempt to assess the systematic educational consequences, and to shed light on the ethical relevance, of a non-transparent subject of Bildung. (shrink)

In what is portrayed as Buddha's first sermon, the Dhamma‐cakka‐ppavatana Sutta (DCPS), the Buddha highlighted four key aspects or dimensions of existence to which one needs to become attuned so as to become deeply spiritually transformed and end dukkha. Though the DCPS emphasizes dukkha, this is in fact only one of three related characteristics or “marks” of the five khandhas. These “three marks” of all conditioned phenomena are that they are impermanent, painful, and non‐Self. Buddhism emphasizes that change and (...) impermanence are fundamental features of everything. The Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled and statements which point to these realities, such as “This is dukkha,” form the structural framework for all higher teachings of early Buddhism. (shrink)

English summary: Taking into account the relevant and mostly contemporary ango-american debates concering collective intentionality, the author eximanes what it means to share reasons and other intentional states such as thoughts and emotions. The guiding question of the dissertation is in what way and to what extent morality and therefore self-consciousness can be understood as conditions of possibility for the sharing of mental states, especially reasons. The dissertation is a contribution mainly to fields of research in practical philosophy (normative (...) ethics and moral psychology) and in social philosophy (collective intentionality analysis) and rational choice theory. German description: Juliette Gloors Monographie fragt aus hauptsachlich analytischer Perspektive und unter spezieller Berucksichtigung der einschlagigen anglo-amerikanischen Debatten, was es bedeutet, Grunde und andere intentionale Einstellungen zu teilen. Die Leitfrage der Untersuchung lautet, inwiefern Moral und damit Selbstbewusstsein als Bedingungen der Moglichkeit solchen Teilens begriffen werden konnen. Die Dissertation ist ein Beitrag zur Forschung innerhalb des Gebiets der Praktischen Philosophie (insbesondere der normativen Ethik) und der Sozialphilosophie (speziell im Bereich der Kollektiven Intentionalitat). (shrink)

The concept of the self and its relation to moral action is complex and subject to varying interpretations, not only between different academic disciplines but also across time and space. This paper presents empirical evidence from a cross-cultural study on the Buddhist and Confucian notions of self in SMEs in Vietnam and Taiwan. The study employs Hwang’s Mandala Model of the Self, and its extension into Shiah’s non-self-model, to interpret how these two Eastern philosophical representations of (...) the self, the Confucian relational self and Buddhist non-self, can lead to moral action. By demonstrating the strengths of the model, emphasizing how social and cultural influences constrain the individual self and promote the social person leading to moral action, the paper extends understanding of the self with empirical evidence of the mechanisms involved in organizational contexts. (shrink)

This study examined psychopathological correlates of implicit and explicit shame and guilt in 30 clinical and 129 non-clinical youths aged 8–17 years. Shame and guilt were measured explicitly via two self-reports and a parent report, and implicitly by means of an Implicit Association Test (IAT), while a wide range of psychopathological symptoms were assessed with questionnaires completed by children, parents, and teachers. The results showed no differences of implicit and explicit shame and guilt between the clinical and non-clinical group, (...) implying that dysregulation of these self-conscious emotions is not per definition associated with psychopathology. Correlational analyses indicated that self-reported explicit shame was positively associated with a broad range of internalizing psychopathology, while self-reported explicit guilt was associated with higher levels of anxiety and to some extent lower levels of externalizing psychopathology. Correlations with parent-rated shame and guilt revealed the same pattern of results but were in general weaker. Furthermore, implicit shame and guilt did not show significant correlations with the various measures of psychopathology. It can be concluded that the link between shame and guilt and psychopathology is complex, and partly dependent on the disorder under study and context-related factors defining the maladaptive nature of these self-conscious emotions. (shrink)

The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller’s argument is not (...) sound. I argue that a coherent non-factualist way of formulating the conditions of correct use of meaning ascriptions may be performed by rejecting the closure principle of assertibility of meaning ascriptions. On this basis, I demonstrate that argument formulated against non-factualist interpretation by Miller may be refuted. What is more, I argue that rejection of the closure principle should be regarded as the central aspect of Kripke’s skeptical solution. (shrink)

Central to Robert Kane’s libertarian free will is the distinction between two kinds of action: undetermined self-forming actions by means of which we shape our characters, and actions that are determined by our freely formed characters. Daniel Dennett challenges the coherence of this distinction, but I argue that his arguments rely on highly controversial assumptions. In an effort to improve on Dennett’s criticism, I argue that some considerations about non-self-forming actions, when coupled with Kane’s naturalistic framework, imply that (...) all choices are undetermined, which undercuts the distinction between his two categories of action. I then show that this conclusion threatens to undermine the very idea of self-formation Kane seeks to develop. (shrink)

인도 철학에 나타난 독특한 개념인 비지각(non-perception)은 특정대상의 부재를 알아차리는 인식을 가리킨다. 인도 학파들 간에는 이 비지각적 인식에 대한 다양한 철학적, 개념적 논쟁들이 있어 왔지만, 비지각적 앎이 의식의 진화와 성숙, 최후의 깨어남을 유도하는 중요한 인식 작용이라는 점은 아직 충분히 강조되지 않았다. 인식 주체, 인식 대상, 인식 작용이라는 인식의 3요소가 출현하는 현상 세계에서 인식은 감각 기관을 통한 특정 대상의 형질이나 형체를 알아차리는 감각 인식과 심상들을 상대하는 사유 인식으로 나눌 수 있다. 현상 세계에서 의식은 감각되는 대상들과 그 감각의 주체를 모두 실체인 것으로 본다. (...) 그런데 의식의 궁극적 차원에서는 이 대상 지향적 인식은 착각이라고 할 만한 강력한 의식의 조작이라고 말한다. 즉 인식되므로 당연히 존재한다고 생각되던 개체 의식들, 대상들은 단지 실제로 존재하는 것처럼 경험된다는 것이다. 주체와 대상이라는 존재들은 경험되는 현상, 인식되는 현상 안에서만 그 존재성이 드러난다고 하겠다. 이 사실을 증명하고 확인하는 방법은 대상 없이 일어나는 비지각적 앎을 통해서이다. 주체와 대상들의 비실체성을 완전하게 깨치는 자각 현상이 일어나기 전까지 비지각은 의식의 전환과 성숙을 이끄는 결정적인 앎으로 작용한다. 자각은 의식이 존재와 세계의 실상을 깨닫고, 의식 자체의 본성을 직증하는 현상이다. 이는 곧 궁극의 진리인 불이일원(advaita)을 깨닫는 현상이기도 하다. 우빠니샤드를 비롯한 여러 인도 고대 문헌들에서는 지각과 비지각적 앎을 거쳐 자각에 이르는 과정을 일상에서 경험하는 의식의 상태인 깨어있는 상태, 꿈꾸는 상태, 깊은 잠의 상태의 과정으로 설명하고 있다. 개체 의식내면에서 비지각적 앎이 의식의 실제 경험으로 알려지기 시작할 때, 그 내면 의식의 성숙과 전환이 일어난다. (shrink)

This article addresses relations between concepts of ‘self’, ‘other(s)’ and ‘othering’ through a reading of the revolutionary psychiatrist Frantz Fanon’s psychoaffective phenomenological and pedagogical narrative approach, reading his work as phenomenological and educational as well as critiquing phenomenology, psychology, education and (of course) psychiatry. While most—especially educational—commentators base their engagement with Fanon’s revolutionary materialist phenomenology of racialised embodiment and consciousness on his first book, Black Skin White Masks and attend to his final book, Wretched of the Earth as expressing (...) his core political and philosophical analyses, this article focuses in particular on Fanon’s second and middle book, A Dying Colonialism, evaluating the political possibilities of the specific narrative temporalities elaborated there. Notwithstanding its rather dismissive reception, it is argued that this, middle, book—written during, and as a document of, the Algerian liberation struggle—expresses and develops Fanon’s psychopolitical and performative philosophy of subjective and objective transformation from alienation to emancipation. This philosophy works pedagogically, in imagining the transformation of relations between others, as well as between self and others, including relations between coloniser and colonized, as also between and within selves. (shrink)

AbstractSpirituality continues to exert a strong influence in people’s lives both in work and beyond. However, given that spirituality is often non-formalized and personal, we continue to know little about how moral reasoning is strategized. In this paper, we examine how Buddhist leader-practitioners interpret and operationalize a process of self-decentralization based upon Buddhist emptiness theory as a form of moral reasoning. We find that Buddhist leader-practitioners share a common understanding of a self-decentralized identity and operationalize self-decentralization through (...) two practices in Buddhist philosophy—skillful means and the middle way—to foreground social outcomes. However, we also find that practitioners face tensions and challenges in moral reasoning relates to agency—the ‘re-centering’ of the self as an enlightened self and the use of karmic reasoning to justify (un)ethical behavior—and contextual constraints that lead to feelings of vulnerability and exclusion. We present a model that elaborates these processes and invite further research that examines novel approaches and dynamic interpretations of the self in moral reasoning. (shrink)

“Non-Self from the perspective of the Gene” September 2021, Buddhism and Culture (a Korean-language Buddhist magazine sponsored by the Foundation for the Promotion of Korean Buddhism), Korea.

Objectives: Self-compassion functions as a psychological buffer in the face of negative life experiences. Considering that suicidal thoughts and behaviors and non-suicidal self-injury are often accompanied by intense negative feelings about the self, self-compassion may have the potential to alleviate these negative attitudes and feelings toward oneself. This meta-analysis investigated the associations of self-compassion with STBs and NSSI.Methods: A literature search finalized in August 2020 identified 18 eligible studies, including 8,058 participants. Two studies were longitudinal (...) studies, and the remainder were cross-sectional studies. A random-effects meta-analysis was conducted using CMA 3.0. Subgroup analyses, meta-regression, and publication bias analyses were conducted to probe potential sources of heterogeneity.Results: With regard to STBs, a moderate effect size was found for self-compassion. Positively worded subscales exhibited statistically significant effect sizes: self-kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness. For NSSI, a small effect size was found for self-compassion. There was a large heterogeneity, and publication bias was minimal. Subgroup analysis results showed that sample characteristic was a moderator, such that a larger effect size was witnessed in clinical patients than sexually/racially marginalized individuals, college students, and healthy-functioning community adolescents.Conclusions: Self-compassion was negatively associated with STBs and NSSI, and the effect size of self-compassion was larger for STBs than NSSI. More evidence is necessary to gauge a clinically significant protective role that self-compassion may play by soliciting results from future longitudinal studies or intervention studies. (shrink)

Traditionally the intentionality of consciousness has been understood as the idea that many conscious states are about something, that they have objects in a broad sense - including states of affairs - which they represent, and it is on account of being representational that they are said to have contents. It has also been claimed, more controversially, that conscious intentional contents must be available to the subject as reasons for her judgments or actions, and that they are therefore necessarily conceptual. (...) This paper challenges the assumptions that all conscious intentional contents are representations of objects, and that they are essentially conceptual. Both assumptions will be shown to be intimately connected. The first main part of the paper offers an account of conscious intentionality that is not prejudicial on the issue of whether all intentional contents of conscious mental states represent objects which the mental state can be said to be about. The author then shows that many personal-level perceptual contents, including those involved in our evaluative stance towards aspects of the world, have non-conceptual components even on a wide construal of the conceptual sphere , allowing for demonstrative concepts. In the second main part of the paper it is argued that experiences themselves, as contrasted with what they are experiences of, are non-conceptual contents. To this purpose the author reconstructs and develops some suggestive observations found in the phenomenology of Husserl to the effect that experiences as directly presented or 'lived through' are not objects of consciousness. It is argued that this thesis, properly understood, is true and that it entails that experiences as directly presented in consciousness are themselves non-conceptual intentional contents. Husserl's thesis is illuminating and important, allowing among other things a more satisfactory account of the elusive phenomenon of depth we normally attribute to the conscious self - the idea that there is always more to our experienced selves at any moment than what we are capable of articulating at the time. (shrink)

At the heart of Kant’s legal-political philosophy lies a liberal, republican ideal of justice understood in terms of private independence (non-domination) and subjection to public laws securing freedom for all citizens as equals. Given this basic commitment of Kant’s, it is puzzling to many that he does not consider democracy a minimal condition on a legitimate state. In addition, many find Kant ideas of reform or improvement of the historical states we have inherited vague and confusing. The aim of this (...) paper is to untangle both puzzles by exploring Kant’s idea of self-governance. I argue that Kant’s idea of self-governance gives us a very good starting point for thinking about how to leave room for a variety of political systems—different ideals—that have grown out of and responding to different contingent historical and cultural circumstances. It also helps us identify those areas where we want to take extra care to build in safeguards to secure stability and to take sufficiently seriously humankind’s truly nasty sides. (shrink)

This paper considers the controversy surrounding the Buddhist doctrine of “no-self”, and especially the question of whether the Buddha himself meant by it unequivocally the ontological denial of the self. The emergence of this doctrine is connected with the Buddha’s attempt to forge a “middle way” that avoids the extreme views of “eternalism” in regards to the soul and “annihilationism” of the soul at bodily death. By looking at the earliest works of the Pāli canon, three of the (...) five Nikāyas along with later Abhidharmist developments, my discussion shows that its original intent was not explicitly ontological. The intent was more practical than theoretical, with the aim of bringing about a freedom from attachment to such theories as eternalism and annihilationism. The Buddha’s “middle” position was, hence, a praxis towards freedom rather than a theoria about the existence or non-existence of the self. (shrink)

After distinguishing between a metaphysical and a contemplative strategy interpretation of the no-self doctrine, I argue that the latter allows for the illumination of significant and under-discussed Kantian affinities with Buddhist views of the self and moral psychology. Unlike its metaphysical counterpart, the contemplative strategy interpretation, understands the doctrine of no-self as a technique of perception, undertaken from the practical standpoint of action. I argue that if we think of the contemplative strategy version of the no-self (...) doctrine as a process engaged in, in order to free oneself from delusion and to see things more objectively in order to promote right action, then we find a clear parallel in Kant’s duty of self-knowledge which demands that we rid ourselves of deluded moral self-descriptions. While in Buddhism the aim is a selflessness that liberates one from suffering, for Kant the aim is an agency free of the conceit that interferes with clear moral vision, sound judgement, and dutiful action. I conclude by responding to objections advanced by Charles Goodman which aim to show that the Kantian position is deeply at odds with Buddhist thinking, arguing that neither Kantian agency nor Kantian self-legislation is undermined by the doctrine of no-self. (shrink)

This article summarizes the theory of federalism as non-domination Iris Marion Young began to develop in her final years, a theory of self-government that tried to recognize interconnectedness. Levy also poses an objection to that theory: non-domination cannot do the work Young needed of it, because it is a theory about the merits of decisions not about jurisdiction over them. The article concludes with an attempt to give Young the last word.

ABSTRACTGrounded in Emotional Cascade Theory, we explored whether rumination and multisensory imagery-based cognitions moderated the relationships between affect and both odds of non-suicidal self-injury, and frequency of the behaviour. A sample of 393 university students completed self-report questionnaires assessing the constructs of interest. Contrary to expectations, rumination did not emerge as a significant moderator of the affect-NSSI relationship. However, the relationship between affect and frequency of NSSI was moderated by the use of imagery. Further, the relationship between negative (...) affect and NSSI was moderated by positive affect, underscoring the need to consider both negative and positive affect in models of NSSI. Most youth who self-injured reported thinking in images while the urge to self-injure was strong, with 53% thinking in images at least half the time. Future work is needed to explore how positive and negative affect work in concert to govern NSSI, and how imagery might eit... (shrink)

Scholars have pointed out that the arguments for not-self recurring in the Buddhist texts are meant to refute the “self” in the Upani?ads. The Buddha’s denial of the self, however, was not only pointed at Brahmanism, but also confronted various?rama?ic trends of thought against Brahmanism. This paper investigates the extant three versions of a Buddhist text which records a debate between the Buddha and Saccaka, an adherent of a certain?rama?ic sect, over the relationship of the self (...) and the five aggregates. There exist divergences among the three versions in regard to the account of this debate. The account in sutta 35 of the Majjhima Nik?ya is generally consistent with that in s?tra 110 of the Sa?yukta?gama in Chinese translation, whereas s?tra 10 of Chapter 37 of the Ekottarika?gama in Chinese translation tells a very different story. Judging from Saccaka’s title, Niga??haputta, and his background as given in the Pali commentary, he was an adherent of Jainism. This paper demonstrates that Saccaka’s view, which was refuted by the Buddha, as stated in the two similar versions has nothing to do with Jainism, but rather it is an “invention” created by distorting Brahmanical thought. This “invention” has led the Pali commentaries and contemporary scholars to interpret the ‘self’ denied by the Buddha as what comes under one’s mastery or control, and to understand the statement “Each of the five aggregates is not self” in the Buddhist texts as denying the idea that each of the five aggregates can be seen as what comes under control. This, however, misses the point. The mainstream thought in India at that time conceived the ‘self’ or the essence of the individual or of the universe as a ‘controller’, and it is this concept that the Buddha exerted all his energy to overturn. Therefore, the account in those two versions of the text apparently has some mistake. As to the Ekottarika?gama version of the text, Saccaka’s view as stated therein is very different from what is found in the above two versions. An examination of this version shows that the views rebutted by the Buddha are very similar to those of the?j?vikas. Since the Buddhist texts frequently confuse the?j?vikas with the Jains, it is very likely that Saccaka was actually an adherent of the?j?vika faith and that this discourse is meant to criticize the?j?vika doctrines. Since the Ekottarika?gama version seems to make better sense, this version may be fairly close to the original account, while the other two versions have considerably deviated from the original. By comparing these three versions of the text, I also attempt to explore some important issues regarding the sectarian development of Buddhism, and to shed some light on the unique values of the Chinese Ekottarika?gama, which is, in terms of sectarian affiliation, significantly distant from the Pali Majjhima Nik?ya and the Chinese Sa?yukta?gama that belong to two closely related schools. (shrink)

This essay argues that Hélène Cixous's writings on theatre demonstrate an ongoing concern with the non-theorizable as a fundamental element of her experience of theatre. This creates a tension between Cixous's role as a theorist and her role as a creative writer, and this essay explores how this tension manifests itself in her reflections on theatre. It looks at the strategies Cixous adopts to allow the non-theoretical to inflect her critical and creative writing, focusing on her denial of specialist knowledge (...) about theatre, her conception of the theatre text in opposition to meditation and philosophical reflection, and on her attempts to model her own playwriting process on the practical work of actors and director Ariane Mnouchkine. Cixous's attraction to the non-theorizable, it is suggested, leads to a more poetic mode of criticism about the medium that draws both on embodied theatrical practice and the self/other relationships that structure theatre making. (shrink)

The present study investigated the mediating role of negative emotion in the relationship between cybervictimization and non-suicidal self-injury, and the moderating role of friendship quality in the indirect relationship. This model was tested with 1,326 Chinese adolescents who suffered from cyberbullying in the last 1 year; 727 were boys and 591 were girls, and their mean age was 13.67 years. Participants filled out questionnaires regarding cybervictimization, negative emotion, friendship quality, and non-suicidal self-injury. After demographic variables were controlled, cybervictimization (...) was significantly positively associated with non-suicidal self-injury. Mediation analysis revealed that negative emotion partially mediated the association between cybervictimization and non-suicidal self-injury. Moderated mediation analysis further indicated that the mediated path was weaker for adolescents with higher levels of friendship quality. These findings underscore the importance of identifying the mechanisms that moderate the mediated path between cybervictimization and non-suicidal self-injury among adolescents. (shrink)

A traditional distinction is made in scholarship on Japanese Buddhism between two means for attaining enlightenment: jiriki 自力, or "self power," and tariki 他力, or "other power." Dōgen's Sōtō Zen is the paradigmatic example of a jiriki school: according to Dōgen, one attains enlightenment through strenuous zazen and rigorous ascetic practices. Shinran's Jōdo Shin Buddhism is the paradigmatic example of a tariki school: according to Shinran, human beings are incapable of self-salvation, but by chanting the nembutsu they can (...) invoke the compassionate power of Amida to save them. But the jiriki-tariki distinction is arguably a false one, with no place within Buddhism's nondualistic framework. If the basic Buddhist intuition toward nondualism is correct, then jiriki and tariki cannot be opposed at all, but must rather be two sides of the same coin. In fact, both Dōgen and Shinran are fully in agreement on abandoning the ego (ātman), and on abandoning the artificial self-other distinction that accompanies the ātman. Dōgen had deep faith in the path of the Buddhist patriarchs, and in the power of the sangha; hetaught that both were necessary means for attaining enlightenment. And Shinran firmly believed in incorporating the nembutsu in every facet of one's life, a feat for which supreme self-cultivation is required. Thus Dōgen and Shinran both preach tariki and jiriki; moreover, this is to be expected, for unless jiriki and tariki are one, their approaches to Buddhism would be dualistic. Dōgen and Shinran should be taken as model cases for understanding the unity of jiriki and tariki in all of Japanese Buddhism. (shrink)

On some occasions of self-reference there can be two equally viable forms available to speakers: individual self-reference and collective self-reference. This means that selection of one or the other in talk-in-interaction can — akin to the selection of terms for reference to non-present persons — be guided by such considerations as recipient design and action formation. As a strategy for investigating the selection of self-reference terms, this article examines repairs to self-reference that change the form (...) of reference from individual to collective and vice versa. We first identify two repair operations found in the domain of self-reference: aggregation and extraction and then we track the use of both operations across a range of positions in the repair initiation opportunity space. Finally we consider some of the interactional uses of aggregation and extraction repairs in resolving sources of troubles associated with speaker epistemic authority and responsibility for described actions. (shrink)

Why should we think that there is such a thing as pre-reflective self-awareness? And how is this kind of self-awareness to be characterized? This paper traces a theoretical and a phenomenological line of argument in favor of the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness and explores how this notion can be further illuminated by appealing to recent work in the analytical philosophy of language and mind. In particular, it argues that the self is not represented in the (nonconceptual) (...) content of experience, but is rather implicit in the mode. Further, it argues that pre-reflective self-consciousness is best understood as a form of knowledge-how. Finally, it will be argued that our sense of self is thoroughly social, even at the basic, pre-reflective level. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Duality and Non-Duality in Christian Practice:Reflections on the Benefits of Buddhist-Christian Dialogue for Constructive TheologyWendy FarleyThe question before us is the desirability of Buddhist-Christian dialogue in the work of (what Christians call) constructive theology. As a feminist theologian whose work is ever more deeply shaped by such a dialogue, my immediate answer is an unequivocal yes.1 This dialogue fits a general pattern over two thousand years in which theologians (...) have drawn from the wisdom of other traditions or cultures to better understand the mysteries of human experience. Without neo-Platonism and Aristotle there could hardly have been anything we recognize as Christian theology. Without pre-Christian Irish religion, there would be no Saint Brigit or Celtic Christianity. Without phenomenology, process, and Marxist philosophy the greatest works of twentieth-century Christian thought would not exist. Christianity, like all religions, is a moving river changed by time and culture and nearly as interiorly diverse as its members. The dialogue with Buddhism might be seen as a contemporary example of Christianity's openness to exchange with other ways of thinking that broadens and deepens its best insights. It is perhaps analogous to Origen's reliance on neo-Platonism or Thomas Aquinas's inspiration by the rediscovery of Aristotle.2The porous boundaries between Christianity and its culture open it to wisdom beyond itself but they also open it to cruelty and ignorance. Nothing protects religions from participating in the human condition and thus the prejudices and power structures that mutilate human society. Consumer culture and oppressions by class, ethnicity, and gender are seamlessly incorporated into Christian identity. The tacit synthesis of a culture's values with those of a religion neutralizes possible critique and can elevate a society's oppressions to a sacred duty. For this reason, too, dialogue with Buddhism is important to call Christianity back to its ethical moorings in the ideal of universal love and compassion.Religions are porous to the world around them, but they tend to conceal this from themselves and often imagine themselves to be not only untainted but also uniquely [End Page 135] qualified to mediate salvation. Religions provide human beings with language and practice through which dimensions of reality that cannot simply be read off of nature or experience are (in some sense) encountered. This is their great gift. The difficulty of religions is that tradition can become an end in itself. Because a tradition really does offer meaning and tools for transformation it is easy to slip into the existential posture of so idealizing a tradition that it seems in some direct and exclusive way to correlate to ultimate truth. The curvature of the ego onto itself, so attached to its own pain and pleasure that everything else seems a mere shadow, moves from the microcosm of the self to the macrocosm of religious tradition. The particular religion—or that element within it with which I identify—becomes identical with sacred reality. In the hostility to other religions characteristic of many Christians we see the illusion of egocentrism in its religious form. Paul Tillich described this tendency to absolutize itself as the demonic distortion of religion.3 Religious dialogue is a potent medicine against this overattachment to one's own tradition.These different senses in which a religion integrates into itself the wisdom and illusions of its time and place create enormous diversity within a religious tradition. Root concepts within Christianity concerning soteriology, divinity, and suffering do not have any agreed upon meaning. That is, there is no "Christian" view of salvation. Gregory of Nyssa's ideal of theosis, Luther's emphasis on salvation by grace through faith, an evangelical's experience of being born again, a liberal Protestant's commitment to social justice are so diverse that they seem to represent almost different religions.In light of the malleability and interior diversity of traditions, dialogue may not be between two self-sufficient religions but between participants who inhabit their tradition in a variety of ways.4 With this in mind, I would like to experiment with practice as a basis for some kinds of dialogue. Practice is concretely located in a religious tradition and yet reflects... (shrink)

Who am I? What is my true identity? What is the nature of self? Deepest self? What is the nature of the world? How are self and world related? What is the highest goal of life? These are the questions that Indian philosophy has wrestled with for millennia. Many of the answers it has produced are intimately involved with spirituality, both mystical and theistic. This work, called Self and World: Major Aspects of Indian Philosophy, by Ramesh (...) N. Patel, explores these time-tested answers that are deeply interesting, engrossing and enlightening. Yoga and Vedanta are two of the well-known philosophies of India that have attempted answers to the above questions about self and world. The classical Indian philosophy’s answers to questions about self and world span no less than three distinct religions and their spiritualities: Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. Besides yoga and vedanta, Hinduism has four other answers that have conversed with yoga and vedanta for centuries. Buddhism has four distinct answers that too have conversed with these philosophical and spiritual answers. These conversations have led to very productive exchanges by enriching the resulting development and evolution of each system’s answers. The exchange has made the philosophies stronger and diverse. The present work explores and describes these systems in their mature form which preserves their accumulated wisdom.Another feature of this work is its treatment of the philosophy of the ancient texts called the Vedas. Pandit Madhusudan Ojha has unearthed the lost philosophy contained in the Vedas. This Vedic philosophy sports a highly comprehensive yet coherent and relevant system of thought that is also important for its tremendous influence on all later Indian systems including yoga, vedanta and Buddhist systems. This book articulates Vedic philosophy and its historic influence on the thought on self and world in Indian philosophy. The deeply spiritual embedding of Indian philosophy’s thought about self and world is particularly relevant to today’s strife-torn and polarized world. We need themes of unity in diversity for healing current maladies. The spiritual thought systems of Indian philosophy narrated in the present work provide an array of choices which have great potential for this healing. For example, Buddhism is celebrated for its universal compassion, Jainism for its legendary non-violence and Hinduism for its tolerance of differences and respect for other faiths. This book shows how these positions are intellectually strengthened and secured by the Buddhist, Jain and Hindu thinkers. (shrink)

This study investigates global properties of three categories of English text: canonical fiction, non-canonical fiction, and non-fictional texts. The central hypothesis of the study is that there are systematic differences with respect to structural design features between canonical and non-canonical fiction, and between fictional and non-fictional texts. To investigate these differences, we compiled a corpus containing texts of the three categories of interest, the Jena Corpus of Expository and Fictional Prose. Two aspects of global structure are investigated, variability and (...) class='Hi'>self-similar patterns, which reflect long-range correlations along texts. We use four types of basic observations, the frequency of POS-tags per sentence, sentence length, lexical diversity, and the distribution of topic probabilities in segments of texts. These basic observations are grouped into two more general categories, the lower-level properties and, which are observed at the level of the sentence, and the higher-level properties and, which are observed at the textual level. The observations for each property are transformed into series, which are analyzed in terms of variance and subjected to Multi-Fractal Detrended Fluctuation Analysis, giving rise to three statistics: the degree of fractality () of the fractal spectrum. The statistics thus obtained are compared individually across text categories and jointly fed into a classification model. Our results show that there are in fact differences between the three text categories of interest. In general, lower-level text properties are better discriminators than higher-level text properties. Canonical fictional texts differ from non-canonical ones primarily in terms of variability in lower-level text properties. Fractality seems to be a universal feature of text, slightly more pronounced in non-fictional than in fictional texts. On the basis of our results obtained on the basis of corpus data we point out some avenues for future research leading toward a more comprehensive analysis of textual aesthetics, e.g., using experimental methodologies. (shrink)

The Hispanic masculinity style may be “machismo” or “caballeros”, but is unknown among Hispanic clergy. Using a U.S. on-line survey database, Hispanic and non-Hispanic Catholic deacons self-reported religiosity and personality traits. Hispanic and non-Hispanic deacons reported similar depth on religious beliefs, but non-Hispanic, compared to Hispanic, deacons claimed higher interpersonal religious commitment and a spiritual transcendence of connectedness to others. On the HEXACO-60, Hispanic, compared to non-Hispanic, deacons reported significantly higher emotional traits and lower extraversion traits. Furthermore, Hispanic deacons (...) reported higher fearfulness and sociability and lower boldness facets, compared to non-Hispanic deacons. These results were independent of the ethnic composition of the parish community. Results suggest that Hispanic deacons may reflect “caballeros” masculinity-caring for others and sensitive to their emotional needs while socially outgoing. (shrink)

This essay is a plea for the view that philosophers should analyze the concept of self-deception more with the aim of having useful applications for empirical research. This is especially desirable because psychologists often use different, even incompat-ible conceptions of self-deception when investigating the factual conditions and con-sequences, as well as the very existence, of the phenomenon. At the same time, philosophers who exploit psychological research on human cognition and reasoning in order to better understand self-deception fail (...) to realize that these theories and data are loaded with problematic assumptions. More specifically, I discuss what conceptions of rationality are assumed when we describe cases of self-deception as either irra-tional or as adaptively rational, and how competing ontological models of the self ap-pear in different accounts of self-deception. I argue, first, that although the self typically is an object of such deception, it is not always so. Secondly, while it is the subject of deception, it is so only in a moderate way: We need neither assume multi-ple selves, nor is self-deception typically brought about or sustained intentionally. However, the avoidance of self-deception is at least sometimes under the subject’s ra-tional control. This account does not take for granted the existence of the phenomenon of self-deception. It is a serious task of empirical research to figure out whether self-deception really occurs. This issue also depends on the question ignored until now of what normative conception of rationality is assumed when one views certain beliefs as self-deceptive. (shrink)

Research suggests that the ability to understand one’s own and others’ minds, or mentalizing, is a key factor for mental health. Most studies have focused the attention on the association between global measures of mentalizing and specific disorders. In contrast, very few studies have analyzed the association between specific mentalizing polarities and global measures of mental health. This study aimed to evaluate whether self and other polarities of mentalizing are associated with a multidimensional notion of mental health, which considers (...) symptoms, functioning, and well-being. Additionally, the level or depth of mentalizing within each polarity was also analyzed. A sample of 214 adolescents was evaluated on measures of self- and other- mentalizing, multi-informed measures of psychopathology and functioning based on Achenbach’s system, and measures of psychological well-being. Results revealed no association between mentalizing polarities and higher-order symptom factors. Self-mentalizing was associated with self-esteem and motivation to life goals, and other-mentalizing was associated to general, social and role functioning. This association between aspects of self-other mentalizing and self-other function has important implications for treatment and prevention. Deeper mentalizing within each polarity revealed stronger associations with functioning and well-being. Because mentalizing polarities are associated with functioning and well-being but not with symptoms, a new hypothesis is developed: mentalizing does not contribute to resiliency by preventing symptoms, but by helping to deal with them, thus improving functioning and well-being independently of psychopathology. These findings support that promoting mentalizing across development may improve mental health, even in non-clinical population. (shrink)

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self-deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross-cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315-326] that examining self-deception from the perspective of non-Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover-sial (...) and perhaps even self-evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self-deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self-deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self-deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self-deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self-deception than it is about comparative philosophy. (shrink)