This is an introduction to set theory and logic that starts completely from scratch. The text is accompanied by many methodological remarks and explanations.

Naive set theory, as found in Frege and Russell, is almost universally believed to have been shown to be false by the set-theoretic paradoxes. The standard response has been to rank sets into one or other hierarchy. However it is extremely difficult to characterise the nature of any such hierarchy without falling into antinomies as severe as the set-theoretic paradoxes themselves. Various attempts to surmount this problem are examined and criticised. It is argued that the rejection of naive set (...) theory inevitably leads one into a severe scepticism with regard to the feasibility of giving a systematic semantics for set theory. It is further argued that this is not just a problem for philosophers of mathematics. Semantic scepticism in set theory will almost inevitably spill over into total pessimism regarding the prospects for an explanatory theory of language and meaning in general. The conclusion is that those who wish to avoid such intellectual defeatism need to look seriously at the possibility that it is the logic used in the derivation of the paradoxes, and not the naive set theory itself, which is at fault. (shrink)

Partial functions can be easily represented in set theory as certain sets of ordered pairs. However, classical set theory provides no special machinery for reasoning about partial functions. For instance, there is no direct way of handling the application of a function to an argument outside its domain as in partial logic. There is also no utilization of lambda-notation and sorts or types as in type theory. This paper introduces a version of von-Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory for (...) reasoning about sets, proper classes, and partial functions represented as classes of ordered pairs. The underlying logic of the system is a partial first-order logic, so class-valued terms may be nondenoting. Functions can be specified using lambda-notation, and reasoning about the application of functions to arguments is facilitated using sorts similar to those employed in the logic of the IMPS Interactive Mathematical Proof System. The set theory is intended to serve as a foundation for mechanized mathematics systems. (shrink)

This article introduces finitist set theory (FST) and shows how it can be applied in modeling finite nested structures. Mereology is a straightforward foundation for transitive chains of part-whole relations between individuals but is incapable of modeling antitransitive chains. Traditional set theories are capable of modeling transitive and antitransitive chains of relations, but due to their function as foundations of mathematics they come with features that make them unnecessarily difficult in modeling finite structures. FST has been designed to function (...) as a practical tool in modeling transitive and antitransitive chains of relations without suffering from difficulties of traditional set theories, and a major portion of the functionality of discrete mereology can be incorporated in FST. This makes FST a viable collection theory in ontological modeling. (shrink)

Following the book Algebraic Set Theory from André Joyal and leke Moerdijk [8], we give a characterization of the initial ZF-algebra, for Heyting pretoposes equipped with a class of small maps. Then, an application is considered (the effective topos) to show how to recover an already known model (McCarty [9]).

In quantum logic, introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann, De Morgan's Laws play an important role in the projection-valued truth value assignment of observational propositions in quantum mechanics. Takeuti's quantum set theory extends this assignment to all the set-theoretical statements on the universe of quantum sets. However, Takeuti's quantum set theory has a problem in that De Morgan's Laws do not hold between universal and existential bounded quantifiers. Here, we solve this problem by introducing a new truth value (...) assignment for bounded quantifiers that satisfies De Morgan's Laws. To justify the new assignment, we prove the Transfer Principle, showing that this assignment of a truth value to every bounded ZFC theorem has a lower bound determined by the commutator, a projection-valued degree of commutativity, of constants in the formula. We study the most general class of truth value assignments and obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for them to satisfy the Transfer Principle, to satisfy De Morgan's Laws, and to satisfy both. For the class of assignments with polynomially definable logical operations, we determine exactly 36 assignments that satisfy the Transfer Principle and exactly 6 assignments that satisfy both the Transfer Principle and De Morgan's Laws. (shrink)

This chapter surveys set theory, model theory, and computability theory: how they first emerged from the foundations of mathematics, and how they have developed since. There are any amounts of mathematical technicalities in the background, but the chapter highlights those themes that have some philosophical resonance.

Kurt Gödel, mathematician and logician, was one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Gödel fled Nazi Germany, fearing for his Jewish wife and fed up with Nazi interference in the affairs of the mathematics institute at the University of Göttingen. In 1933 he settled at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, where he joined the group of world-famous mathematicians who made up its original faculty. His 1940 book, better known by its short title, The Consistency of (...) the Continuum Hypothesis, is a classic of modern mathematics. The continuum hypothesis, introduced by mathematician George Cantor in 1877, states that there is no set of numbers between the integers and real numbers. It was later included as the first of mathematician David Hilbert's twenty-three unsolved math problems, famously delivered as a manifesto to the field of mathematics at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900. In The Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis Gödel set forth his proof for this problem. In 1999, Time magazine ranked him higher than fellow scientists Edwin Hubble, Enrico Fermi, John Maynard Keynes, James Watson, Francis Crick, and Jonas Salk. He is most renowned for his proof in 1931 of the 'incompleteness theorem,' in which he demonstrated that there are problems that cannot be solved by any set of rules or procedures. His proof wrought fruitful havoc in mathematics, logic, and beyond. (shrink)

In a recent series of papers, I and others have advanced new logical approaches to familiar paradoxes. The key to these approaches is to accept full classical logic, and to accept the principles that cause paradox, while preventing trouble by allowing a certain sort ofnontransitivity. Earlier papers have treated paradoxes of truth and vagueness. The present paper will begin to extend the approach to deal with the familiar paradoxes arising in naive set theory, pointing out some of the promises (...) and pitfalls of such an approach. (shrink)

Russell’s way out of his paradox via the impre-dicative theory of types has roughly the same logical power as Zermelo set theory - which supplanted it as a far more flexible and workable axiomatic foundation for mathematics. We discuss some new formalisms that are conceptually close to Russell, yet simpler, and have the same logical power as higher set theory - as represented by the far more powerful Zermelo-Frankel set theory and beyond. END.

In this paper we review the most common forms of reflection and introduce a new form which we call sharp‐generated reflection. We argue that sharp‐generated reflection is the strongest form of reflection which can be regarded as a natural generalization of the Lévy reflection theorem. As an application we formulate the principle sharp‐maximality with the corresponding hypothesis. The statement is an analogue of the (Inner Model Hypothesis, introduced in ) which is compatible with the existence of large cardinals.

Completed in 1983, this work culminates nearly half a century of the late Alfred Tarski's foundational studies in logic, mathematics, and the philosophy of science. Written in collaboration with Steven Givant, the book appeals to a very broad audience, and requires only a familiarity with first-order logic. It is of great interest to logicians and mathematicians interested in the foundations of mathematics, but also to philosophers interested in logic, semantics, algebraic logic, or the methodology of the deductive sciences, and to (...) computer scientists interested in developing very simple computer languages rich enough for mathematical and scientific applications. The authors show that set theory and number theory can be developed within the framework of a new, different, and simple equational formalism, closely related to the formalism of the theory of relation algebras. There are no variables, quantifiers, or sentential connectives. Predicates are constructed from two atomic binary predicates (which denote the relations of identity and set-theoretic membership) by repeated applications of four operators that are analogues of the well-known operations of relative product, conversion, Boolean addition, and complementation. All mathematical statements are expressed as equations between predicates. There are ten logical axiom schemata and just one rule of inference: the one of replacing equals by equals, familiar from high school algebra. Though such a simple formalism may appear limited in its powers of expression and proof, this book proves quite the opposite. The authors show that it provides a framework for the formalization of practically all known systems of set theory, and hence for the development of all classical mathematics. The book contains numerous applications of the main results to diverse areas of foundational research: propositional logic; semantics; first-order logics with finitely many variables; definability and axiomatizability questions in set theory, Peano arithmetic, and real number theory; representation and decision problems in the theory of relation algebras; and decision problems in equational logic. (shrink)

Michael Potter presents a comprehensive new philosophical introduction to set theory. Anyone wishing to work on the logical foundations of mathematics must understand set theory, which lies at its heart. Potter offers a thorough account of cardinal and ordinal arithmetic, and the various axiom candidates. He discusses in detail the project of set-theoretic reduction, which aims to interpret the rest of mathematics in terms of set theory. The key question here is how to deal with the paradoxes (...) that bedevil set theory. Potter offers a strikingly simple version of the most widely accepted response to the paradoxes, which classifies sets by means of a hierarchy of levels. What makes the book unique is that it interweaves a careful presentation of the technical material with a penetrating philosophical critique. Potter does not merely expound the theory dogmatically but at every stage discusses in detail the reasons that can be offered for believing it to be true. Set Theory and its Philosophy is a key text for philosophy, mathematical logic, and computer science. (shrink)

We consider the foundational relation between arithmetic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to emphasize the incomplete picture of both theories and treat models as their syntactical counterparts. Insisting on the incomplete picture will allow us to argue in favor of the revisability of the standard model interpretation. We then show that it is hopeless to expect that (...) the relative grounding provided by a standard interpretation can resist being revisable. We start briefly characterizing the expansion of arithmetic `truth' provided by the interpretation in a set theory. Further, we show that, for every well-founded interpretation of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original. This theorem expansion is not complete however. We continue by defining the coordination problem. The problem can be summarized as follows. We consider two independent communities of mathematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms for ZF and PA. How likely are they to be coordinated regarding PA’s interpretation in ZF? We prove that it is possible to have extensions of PA not interpretable in a given set theory ST. We further show that the probability of a random extension of arithmetic being interpretable in ST is zero. (shrink)

It is well known that number theory can be interpreted in the usual set theories, e.g. ZF, NF and their extensions. The problem I posed for myself was to see if, conversely, a reasonably strong set theory could be interpreted in number theory. The reason I am interested in this problem is, simply, that number theory is more basic or more concrete than set theory, and hence a more concrete foundation for mathematics. A partial solution (...) to the problem was accomplished by WTN in [2], where it was shown that a predicative set theory could be interpreted in a natural extension of pure number theory, PN, (i.e. classical first-order Peano Arithmetic). In this paper, we go a step further by showing that a reasonably strong fragment of predicative set theory can be interpreted in PN itself. We then make an attempt to show how to develop predicative fragments of mathematics in PN.If one wishes to know what is meant by reasonably strong and fragment please read on. (shrink)

In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo have recently offered an argument in favour of the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended. In this paper, we argue that, since the connection between the two hierarchies is indeed tight, any philosophical conclusions cut both ways. One should either hold that both the ontological hierarchy and the ideological hierarchy are open-ended, or (...) that neither is. If there is reason to accept the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended, that will be because such a view is the most compelling one to adopt on the purely ontological front. (shrink)

Introduction. This survey is intended to introduce to logicians some notions, methods and theorems in set theory which arose—largely through the work of Saharon Shelah—out of attempts to solve problems in abelian group theory, principally the Whitehead problem and the closely related problem of the existence of almost free abelian groups. While Shelah's first independence result regarding the Whitehead problem used established set-theoretical methods, his later work required new ideas; it is on these that we focus. We emphasize (...) the nature of the new ideas and the historical context in which they arose, and we do not attempt to give precise technical definitions in all cases, nor to include a comprehensive survey of the algebraic results.In fact, very little algebraic background is needed beyond the definitions of group and group homomorphism. Unless otherwise specified, we will use the word “group” to refer to an abelian group, that is, the group operation is commutative. The group operation will be denoted by +, the identity element by 0, and the inverse of a by −a. We shall use na as an abbreviation for a + a + … + a [n times] if n is positive, and na = if n is negative. (shrink)

In 1963, the first author introduced a course in set theory at the University of Illinois whose main objectives were to cover Godel's work on the con sistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH), and Cohen's work on the independence of the AC and the GCH. Notes taken in 1963 by the second author were taught by him in 1966, revised extensively, and are presented here as an introduction to axiomatic set theory. (...) Texts in set theory frequently develop the subject rapidly moving from key result to key result and suppressing many details. Advocates of the fast development claim at least two advantages. First, key results are high lighted, and second, the student who wishes to master the subject is com pelled to develop the detail on his own. However, an instructor using a "fast development" text must devote much class time to assisting his students in their efforts to bridge gaps in the text. (shrink)

A survey of the isomorphic submodels of Vω, the set of hereditarily finite sets. In the usual language of set theory, Vω has 2ℵ0 isomorphic submodels. But other set-theoretic languages give different systems of submodels. For example, the language of adjunction allows only countably many isomorphic submodels of Vω.

In many ontological debates there is a familiar challenge. Consider a debate over X s. The “small” or anti-X side tries to show that they can paraphrase the pro-X or “big” side’s claims without any loss of expressive power. Typically though, when the big side adds whatever resources the small side used in their paraphrase, the symmetry breaks down. The big side plus small’s resources is a more expressively powerful and thus more theoretically fruitful theory. In this paper, I (...) show that there is a very general solution to this problem, for the small side. Assuming the resources of set theory, small can successfully paraphrase big. This result depends on a theorem about models of set theory with urelements. After proving this theorem, I discuss some of its philosophical ramifications. (shrink)

We discuss the work of Paul Cohen in set theory and its influence, especially the background, discovery, development of forcing.

We propose a set theory, called NRFST, in which the Cantorian axiom of infinity is negated, and a new notion of infinity is introduced via non standard methods, i. e. via adequate notions of standard and internal, two unary predicates added to the language of ZF. After some initial results on NRFST, we investigate its relative consistency with respect to ZF and Kawai's WNST.

Inasmuch as physical theories are formalizable, set theory provides a framework for theoretical physics. Four speculations about the relevance of set theoretical modeling for physics are presented: the role of transcendental set theory (i) in chaos theory, (ii) for paradoxical decompositions of solid three-dimensional objects, (iii) in the theory of effective computability (Church-Turing thesis) related to the possible “solution of supertasks,” and (iv) for weak solutions. Several approaches to set theory and their advantages and disadvatages (...) for physical applications are discussed: Canlorian “naive” (i.e., nonaxiomatic) set theory, contructivism, and operationalism. In the author's opinion, an attitude of “suspended attention” (a term borrowed from psychoanalysis) seems most promising for progress. Physical and set theoretical entities must be operationalized wherever possible. At the same time, physicists should be open to “bizarre” or “mindboggling” new formalisms, which need not be operationalizable or testable at the lime of their creation, but which may successfully lead to novel fields of phenomenology and technology. (shrink)

Quasi-set theory Q is an alternative set-theory designed to deal mathematically with collections of indistinguishable objects. The intended interpretation for those objects is the indistinguishable particles of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, under one specific interpretation of that theory. The notion of cardinal of a collection in Q is treated by the concept of quasi-cardinal, which in the usual formulations of the theory is introduced as a primitive symbol, since the usual means of cardinal definition fail for collections (...) of indistinguishable objects. In a recent work, Domenech and Holik have proposed a definition of quasi-cardinality in Q. They claimed their definition of quasi-cardinal not only avoids the introduction of that notion as a primitive one, but also that it may be seen as a first step in the search for a version of Q that allows for a greater representative power. According to them, some physical systems can not be represented in the usual formulations of the theory, when the quasi-cardinal is considered as primitive. In this paper, we discuss their proposal and aims, and also, it is presented a modification from their definition we believe is simpler and more general. (shrink)

This book offers a foundation for mathematics grounded in a collection of axioms for logical possibility in a first-order language. The offered foundation is ar.

This volume presents the philosophical and heuristic framework Cantor developed and explores its lasting effect on modern mathematics. "Establishes a new plateau for historical comprehension of Cantor's monumental contribution to mathematics." --The American Mathematical Monthly.

We introduce an operational set theory in the style of [5] and [16]. The theory we develop here is a theory of constructive sets and operations. One motivation behind constructive operational set theory is to merge a constructive notion of set ([1], [2]) with some aspects which are typical of explicit mathematics [14]. In particular, one has non-extensional operations (or rules) alongside extensional constructive sets. Operations are in general partial and a limited form of self{application is (...) permitted. The system we introduce here is a fully explicit, nitely axiomatised system of constructive sets and operations, which is shown to be as strong as HA. (shrink)

This is an extensively revised edition of Mr. Quine's introduction to abstract set theory and to various axiomatic systematizations of the subject. The treatment of ordinal numbers has been strengthened and much simplified, especially in the theory of transfinite recursions, by adding an axiom and reworking the proofs. Infinite cardinals are treated anew in clearer and fuller terms than before. Improvements have been made all through the book; in various instances a proof has been shortened, a theorem strengthened, (...) a space-saving lemma inserted, an obscurity clarified, an error corrected, a historical omission supplied, or a new event noted. (shrink)

Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important particular case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the reduction is unexplanatory. In (...) defense of this claim, I offer evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences. (shrink)

We study constructive set theories, which deal with operations applying both to sets and operations themselves. Our starting point is a fully explicit, finitely axiomatized system ESTE of constructive sets and operations, which was shown in 10 to be as strong as PA. In this paper we consider extensions with operations, which internally represent description operators, unbounded set quantifiers and local fixed point operators. We investigate the proof theoretic strength of the resulting systems, which turn out to be impredicative . (...) © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim. (shrink)

In this contribution, I explore the possibility of characterizing the emergence of time in causal set theory (CST) in terms of the growing block universe (GBU) metaphysics. I show that although GBU seems to be the most intuitive time metaphysics for CST, it leaves us with a number of interpretation problems, independently of which dynamics we choose to favor for the theory —here I shall consider the Classical Sequential Growth and the Covariant model. Discrete general covariance of the (...) CSG dynamics does not allow us to individuate a single history of the universe (defined by a causal history of different causal sets), thereby making the claim that ‘the past exists’ at best problematic. In addition, because the evolution of the universe in CSG dynamics leads to an outward branching causal tree, it becomes impossible to determine a proper ‘line of becoming’, thereby blurring the presentists’ claim that only the present exists. Similarly, the covariant approach runs into the same, if not even more severe problems, since each configuration of the universe would amount to a set of possible causal sets, thereby making the individuation of a single configuration of the universe —and thus the physical interpretation of the theory— implausible. (shrink)

This is a book review of Cantorian set theory and limitations of size by Michael Hallett.

We present an extension of constructive Zermelo{Fraenkel set theory [2]. Constructive sets are endowed with an applicative structure, which allows us to express several set theoretic constructs uniformly and explicitly. From the proof theoretic point of view, the addition is shown to be conservative. In particular, we single out a theory of constructive sets with operations which has the same strength as Peano arithmetic.