خواجه نصيرالدين طوسي در زمرة بزرگ‌ترين و پرنفوذترين عالمان مسلمان سدة هفتم هجري به شمار مي‌رود. بخش عمده‌اي آثار وي ناظر به آثار و آراء فخرالدين رازي و در دفاع از فلسفه و ارائة كلامي درست و متين تدوين شده است. خواجه علاوه بر كلام و فلسفه، آثار عرفاني نيز دارد. مشكل مطالة آثار وي اين است كه گاه وي در كلام به مطالبي معتقد شده و در فلسفه از آنها دست برداشته است. وي همچنين با پذيرش محوري‌ترين آموزة عرفان (...) اسلامي، از سطح فلسفة رايج نيز گذشته است. برخي معتقدند كه خواجه نصير نيز مانند عده‌اي ديگر از انديشمندان، دچار تحوّل فكري شده و اين اختلاف‌ها مربوط به دوران‌هاي گوناگون فعاليت علمي و معرفتي وي بوده است. اين مقاله نشان مي‌‌دهد كه خواجه نصير هم ‌زمان همة اين سطوح انديشه را داشته است و نمي‌توان او را دچار تحوّل فكري دانست. درحقيقت، سه سطح طولي انديشه خواجه، به ترتيب عبارتند از: كلام، فلسفه و عرفان. در اين مقاله، با ارائة نمونه‌هايي، وجود اين سه سطح در كار وي، اثبات شده است. (shrink)

حقايق اندماجي مقام ذات، حيثيات، احوال و صفات آن ذات بسيط اند. ازآنجا كه اين حقايق، تفصيل نيافته و تعينات ذات نيستند، در ذات مستهلك اند. حقايق اندماجي، كثرتي بالفعل را در ذات ايجاد نمي كنند و در غيب ذات، مخفي اند؛ يعني ظهور ندارند. اين حقايق، از جهت واحد بر ذات صادق اند، يعني حيثيات جهت واحد ذات هستند. عارفان مكتب ابن عربي، از واژگاني مانند استهلاك، اندماج، استجنان، اجمال، كمون و قوه، براي اشاره به اين حقايق استفاده كرده (...) اند. آنان تبيين هايي دربارة چگونگي حضور اين حقايق در متن ذاتي كه بدان موجودند، ارائه داده و از مثال هايي نيز براي دريافت بهتر آنها استفاده كرده اند. از نظرگاه عرفاني، اين حقايق را بايد داراي نحوه اي ويژه از موجوديت مجازي يا بالعرض دانست. اين نوشتار، از حقايق اندماجي با تأكيد بر مقام ذات بحث مي كند. كمالات و شئون ذاتي مقام ذات، مهم ترين مصداق حقايق اندماجي در عرفان محيي الديني هستند. اما اصل بحث عموميت دارد و دربارة ساير مصاديق اين حقايق نيز جريان دارد. (shrink)

The fruit of several centuries of rationalistic thought in the West has been to reduce both the objective and the subjective poles of knowledge to a single level. In the same way that the Cogito of Descartes is based on reducing the knowing subject to a single mode of awareness, the external world which this ‘knowing self’ perceives is reduced to a spatio-temporal complex limited to a single level of reality – no matter how far this complex is extended beyond (...) the galaxies or into aeons of time, past and future. The traditional view as expressed in the metaphysical teachings of both the Eastern and Western traditions is based, on the contrary, upon a hierarchic vision of reality, not only of reality's objective aspect but also of its subjective one. Not only are there many levels of reality or existence stretching from the material plane to Absolute and Infinite Reality, but there are also many levels of subjective reality or consciousness, many envelopes of the self, leading to the Ultimate Self which is Infinite and Eternal and which is none other than the Transcendent Reality beyond. Moreover, the relation between the subjective and the objective is not bound to a single mode. There is not just one form of perception or awareness. There are modes and degrees of awareness leading from the so-called ‘normal’ perception by man of both his own ‘ego’ and the external world to awareness of Ultimate Selfhood, in which the subject and object of knowledge become unified in a single reality beyond all separation and distinction. (shrink)

Free will is an intuitive reality that all humans apprehend in their actions. Moral responsibility also stems from this freedom of will. This article first explains that the strong human intuition about free will cannot be dismissed as an illusion. It then examines the notion that a physical being cannot possess free will because it implies the ability to both perform and abstain from an action. In the physical world, all human actions are determined by preceding causes, leaving no room (...) to avoid an action volitionally. Building on this, the article concludes that free will becomes plausible only when rooted in the existence of the soul. Consequently, free will serves as independent evidence for the existence of an immaterial soul. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers of mind disagree with substance dualism, saying that despite the failure of physical theories of mind, substance dualism cannot be advocated, because it faces more serious problems than physical theories, lacking compatibility with philosophical arguments and scientific evidence. Regardless of the validity of the arguments in support of substance dualism, it is demonstrated in this article that this theory is coherent, with no philosophical or scientific problems. The main arguments of opponents of substance dualism are explained and (...) criticized in this respect. Based on this, it becomes clear that the interaction of soul and body has a reasonable philosophical explanation, the problem of the pairing of soul and body, although it may not have a scientific explanation, it has a philosophical and theological solution, the principle of the physical causal closure lacks conclusive reasons and cannot reject the existence of the soul, the existence of the soul does not contradict the theory of evolution, the dependence of the soul on the brain is compatible with its independence, and finally, the principle of simplicity does not make any problem for accepting the substance dualism. (shrink)

In his Finite and Infinite Goods, Robert Adams puts forward a theistic framework for ethics according to which finite objects of value become good through resembling God who is the infinite Good and is the source and criterion of goodness. One question that immediately arises regarding this theory is whether any resemblance to God is sufficient for goodness or not. Adams’ answer to this question is negative. He puts forward further qualifications that resemblances to God have to meet so that (...) they can constitute goodness in finite objects of value. In his God and Moral Law, Mark Murphy objects to these qualifications as inadequate for addressing the sufficiency question and puts forward his own suggestion as to how Adams’ theory has to be amended. In this paper I will first argue that Murphy’s suggestion for fixing the goodness as Godlikeness thesis is not an alternative to Adams’ proposed qualifications on resemblances to God and is best understood as an insightful interpretation and elaboration of Adams’ proposed qualifications. I will then show that as it stands, Murphy’s suggestion is not up to this task and itself is in need of reconstruction. Drawing on Judith Thomson’s discussions of goodness and virtue in her book Normativity, I will try to reconstruct Murphy’s suggestion and come up with an interpretation of Adams’ goodness as Godlikeness thesis that is more elaborate, informative, and plausible than Adams’ original formulation. (shrink)

Ensuring the trustworthiness of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence is an important interdisciplinary endeavour. In this position paper, we argue that this endeavour will benefit from technical advancements in capturing various forms of responsibility, and we present a comprehensive research agenda to achieve this. In particular, we argue that ensuring the reliability of autonomous system can take advantage of technical approaches for quantifying degrees of responsibility and for coordinating tasks based on that. Moreover, we deem that, in certifying the legality (...) of an AI system, formal and computationally implementable notions of _responsibility_, _blame_, _accountability_, and _liability_ are applicable for addressing potential responsibility gaps (i.e. situations in which a group is responsible, but individuals’ responsibility may be unclear). This is a call to enable AI systems themselves, as well as those involved in the design, monitoring, and governance of AI systems, to represent and reason about who can be seen as responsible in prospect (e.g. for completing a task in future) and who can be seen as responsible retrospectively (e.g. for a failure that has already occurred). To that end, in this work, we show that across all stages of the design, development, and deployment of trustworthy autonomous systems (TAS), responsibility reasoning should play a key role. This position paper is the first step towards establishing a road map and research agenda on how the notion of responsibility can provide novel solution concepts for ensuring the _reliability_ and _legality_ of TAS and, as a result, enables an effective embedding of AI technologies into society. (shrink)

Introduction -- 1. Mulla Sadra and his socio-political and cultural situation -- 2. The central importance of philosophical psychology in Sadra's politics -- 3. Transcendent politics -- 4. Justice -- 5. The ideal state -- 6. Political leadership -- Conclusion.

The author gives a clear explanation of the philosophy of Sard al-Din Shirazi.

Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, “belief” and “justification”, in the definition of knowledge. It argues that belief is distinct from knowledge; belief is an act of will, whereas knowledge is acquired automatically. One may possess knowledge without being actively willing to believe it, and conversely, one may will to believe something without actually knowing it. Additionally, justification should be seen as a method (...) of validating knowledge, not a fundamental part of its definition. Therefore, knowledge without justification remains knowledge, even though its truth cannot be proven. Building on this perspective, the proposed definition of knowledge shifts to “awareness or recognition of facts.” According to this definition, the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox find alternative solutions. (shrink)

Different scholars have considered the Kara Koyunlu “Twelver Shiites”, “Radical Shiites” and some others “Sunnites.” A review of the “criteria for being recognized a Shiite” and comparing them with the Kara Koyunlu can confirm that they were Shiites. However, the Kara Koyunlu must be considered as having a type of Shia referred to as doctrinal Shia and Sufic Shia which having been formed through Shi’ization of the Sunnites and sharing Sufic characteristics, does not belong to any of the common sects (...) of Shia. The present study aims to prove that the Kara Koyunlu were Shiites using descriptive-analytic method and library research. (shrink)

The literature on the problem of evil does not draw enough upon the relevant debates in (meta)ethics, and ethical theorists (broadly understood) can engage with the problem of evil as a way of inquiry in their field. I review how the problem of evil is essentially formed based on (evaluative and deontic) ethical judgments, and how responses to it, either theistic or atheistic, are mainly based on the relevant ethical judgments. Meanwhile, though contemporary debates in metaphysics and epistemology have influenced (...) the literature on the problem of evil, the same does not hold true for ethics. This suggests that there are ways to engage with the problem of evil as doing axiology or ethical theory more generally, which may be fruitful regardless of their being theodicy. I end by briefly discussing an example focused on the idea of moral progress. (shrink)

One of the premises of the argument from design is the need for the order of a designer. This premise has been explained in various ways, one of which is the calculus of probabilities. It posits that the likelihood of an ordered thing coming into existence by chance is so low that human beings consider it nearly impossible; therefore, this order requires an intelligent designer. However, some contemporary Muslim philosophers, such as Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī, along with certain Western philosophers, have (...) contested the validity of the calculus of probabilities. They argue that the calculus of probabilities does not reveal reality but is merely practically useful. They assert that undesigned states have the same probability as designed states. In this article, I address these objections, refute them, and ultimately demonstrate the soundness of the argument from design based on the calculus of probabilities. (shrink)

Reasons are not the same. Normative reasons need to be distinguished from non-normative reasons. Then, due to some considerations, we have to draw a distinction between explanatory reasons and motivating reasons. In this paper, I focus on a rather implicit assumption in drawing the explanatory-motivating distinction. Motivating reasons are mostly characterized as those reasons that the agent takes to be normative. This may imply that the agent always knows the reasons their motivating reasons. This I call the infallibility or transparency (...) assumption. This suggests that there is some sort of report condition on motivating reasons. In contrast, one may ask whether it is possible for the agent to be mistaken about what their motivating reasons are. I argue that we can distinguish motivating reasons and satisfy the motivations for the explanatory-motivating distinction without committing to this infallibility assumption. I briefly sketch a character-based approach to motivating reasons as an alternative. Next, I argue that, in addition to being important on its own, this account has implications for other debates. I illustrate this by mentioning cases such as recalcitrant actions as well as critically discussing one kind of counter-example presented against the guise of the good thesis. (shrink)

Various theories concerning how to speak positively about God have been proposed. One such theory, the theory of complete univocity, states that although the mode of existence between God and human beings is different, there are, in principle, ontological commonalities between God and humans in existence and His attributes. These ontological commonalities make it possible to attribute a single meaning to both God and human beings univocally. In this article, it is attempted to both explain and defend the theory of (...) complete univocity, while also critiquing the theory of partial univocity, a theory which believes solely in semantic univocity and ontologically assumes that God is absolutely different and separate from humans. Further, as the commonality of meaning between God and humans requires the existence of an ontological commonality between them, the theory of analogy is also not acceptable. Because, firstly, the denial of shared attributes between God and humans has many unsatisfactory theological implications. Secondly, there is no middle term between univocity and equivocality. Therefore, the only theologically defensible theory is that of complete univocity. (shrink)

One of Kripke’s innovations concerning the philosophy of language is the doctrine that the truth of some metaphysically necessary propositions is only known a posteriori. The typical example he gives is the identity statement consists of two different proper names that refer to the same referent, like “Hesperus = Phosphorus”. By metaphysically necessary he means that the proposition is true in all possible worlds and by a posteriori knowledge he means that its truth is known by experiment or investigation. Some (...) philosophers have given arguments against Kripke’s doctrine and claimed that such propositions can, also, be known a priori. In this paper, I will defend Kripke’s view by showing that his approach to the issue is linguistic not metaphysical, opposite to his critics. (shrink)

A standard reaction to the problem of evil is to look for a greater good that can explain why God (with the traditional attributes) might have created this world instead of a seemingly better one which has no (or less) evil. This paper proposes an approach we call the Moral Progress Approach: Given the value of progress, a non-perfect world containing evil may be preferable to a perfect world without evil. This makes room for the possibility that this world, with (...) all its evil, may be preferable to a world with less evil. We argue that our proposal is different from apparently similar views such as soul-making theodicy. (shrink)

The possibility of acting for normative reasons calls for explanation, considering that such reasons are facts. Facing this issue, some argue that to act for a normative reason, the normative reason and the reason we act for (i.e. the motivating reason) need to be identical. Others reject the idea that normative reasons are facts in the first place. A conciliatory proposal is that by appealing to dispositions we can simultaneously accept that normative reasons are facts and that we can act (...) for them, without accepting the identity of the normative reasons and the motivating reason. After sketching an example of such a view, I mention an obstacle on its way. This view relies heavily on the correspondence relation, to make the action connected to the normative reason via a descriptive belief. It is argued that this is challenging since the correspondence relation might not be suitable to play the metaphysical role needed. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore one line of argument for the Humean Theory of Reasons, the view that all normative reasons are based on desires. Then, I suggest a way to block that argument inspired by Aquinas’s discussions on choice, will, and indeterminacy of reason alone.

The demonstration of the absolute simplicity and real oneness of the Necessary Being, on the one hand, and the presentation of an explanation for the possible beings that are consistent with this oneness are among the most important challenges that Islamic philosophy has to deal with. By restricting the reality of being to the Essence of the Necessary, gnostics have solved this problem successfully; however, philosophers' confirmations of an independent and original existence for possible beings based on the principles of (...) causality is inconsistent with the absolute simplicity of the Necessary. All the efforts of Muslim philosophers for solving this problem were unsuccessful until Mulla Sadra's time. By posing the philosophical principle of 'the Truth in its simplicity contains all things', he solved this riddle and demonstrated the individual oneness of being in the light of a new explanation of the principle of causality. In this way, he paved the way for philosophy to have access to the individual oneness of being. This paper aims to explain Mulla Sadra's significant efforts in this regard. (shrink)

According to a rule of traditional logic concerning the relation between general (or universal) concepts, if a given concept is more general than a second one, then the opposition (or contradictory) of the first concept is more specific than the opposition (or contradictory) of the second one. Kātibī, one of the Muslim logicians in the 13th century, has raised a question against this rule and, by giving some counterexamples, claims that it results in contradiction. Some Muslim logicians have replied to (...) Kātibī, and in this paper I have examined their replies. Also, by using rules of modern logic, we may easily show that either Kātibī's argumentation is fallacious or it does not result in contradiction; however, it seems that if modern logic rules had been represented to Muslim logicians, some of those rules would have been rejected by them. (shrink)

The Ismaili is one of the sub-sects of Shiite sect which in addition to being involved in some specific events in the history of different regions in the world of Islam from India to Iran and North Africa has been able to form governments. The record of Ismaili’s presence in Azerbaijan goes back to the third century A.H and the ruling period of Mosafer and Sajian in the fourth century A.H that continued to Seljuqs and Ilkhanids periods. Upon Mongol attacks (...) the center of Immamat moved to Azerbaijan, during 8 and 9th century A.H and this coincided with the Nezari Ismaili’s internal evaluations in Iran. The level of Ismaili sect’s presence in and its contribution to Azerbaijan between 4th and 10th century A.H is assessed here through a descriptive-analytic method and library studies. (shrink)

All previous solutions to the problem of evil have attempted to resolve the issue by showing that God permits them in order for a greater good. However, some contest that there are some instances in which there is no greater good, while in other cases good and evil have been distributed unjustly. I intend, in this paper, to show that if God compensates the harms of evil in the afterlife, any sort of good is enough to resolve the problem of (...) evil; even if the good is not greater than the evil nor distributed appropriately. To attain this end, I have divided the theory of compensation into a weak and a more effective account. The weak account alleges that the goodness of evils is merely based upon their compensation in the afterlife. I have proposed, in this article, a new, strong account of this theory, which considers both primary goods of evils and afterlife compensation as combined elements that can justify evils. After distinguishing the weak and strong versions of compensation, the idea is explained, and the advantages of the theory are pointed out. Finally, there are two chief objections raised against the validity of this theory, both have been mentioned and answered in this paper. (shrink)

According to Aristotelian logic, in categorical logic, there are three kinds of judgements (qaḍīyya): affirmative, negative, and metathetic (ma‘dūla). Khūnajī, a famous Muslim logician in the 13th century, introduces a different judgement (or statement) entitled “affirmative judgement with the negative predicate” (mūjiba al-sāliba al-maḥmūl; henceforth, ANP judgement). Although in the Arabic language, formally, ANP judgement is similar to definite negative (sāliba muḥaṣṣala) and also metathetic judgements, the way of its construction is different from both of them and its truth conditions (...) are different from metathetic ones. From a modern logic viewpoint, ANP may indicate equality judgement; however, attributing it to Muslim logicians is questionable, although some of their wordings may implicitly show it. According to Ḥāʾirī, an Iranian contemporary philosopher and logician, the new judgement is supposed to solve some problems, especially logical explanation of the division of modalities into necessity, impossibility, and contingency (imkān khāṣṣ). However, Ṭabāṭabāʾī, another Iranian contemporary philosopher, disagrees with Ḥāʾirī and regards ANP judgement the same as an affirmative metathetic one. In this paper, while examining Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s and Ḥāʾirī’s reasons, by using some insights into modern logic, I will try to strengthen Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s views, although it may be confronted with some questions or deficiencies. (shrink)

This paper explores the impact of ethical philosophies on developing an authentic leader’s internalized moral perspective. It builds on prior research on moral identity, proposing that ethical philosophies such as deontology, rule utilitarianism, and virtue can be internalized over time to form an authentic leader’s internalized moral identity. The paper argues that while virtues and altruism are discussed in the authentic leadership literature, the relevance of other ethical philosophies to authentic leadership has been largely overlooked. These ethical philosophies embedded in (...) business settings can be internalized and become integral to the content of a leader’s moral identity rather than merely being lenses for moral reasoning. Authentic leaders’ moral identities regulate their moral motivation and actions. In addition, the paper posits that internalized ethical philosophies can be activated by triggering events or changing the domain of moral issues. Authentic leaders with highly internalized moral identities are also encouraged to be morally modest, reflecting on different ethical philosophies when facing new challenges and internalizing them as needed while staying committed to their virtue-centric moral identity. This interdisciplinary paper proposes a framework and presents theoretical propositions to further understand the role of ethical philosophies in shaping an authentic leader’s internalized moral perspective. (shrink)

The principal goal of the brain-computer interface is to translate brain signals into meaningful commands to control external devices or neuroprostheses to restore lost functions of patients with severe motor disabilities. The invasive recording of brain signals involves numerous health issues. Therefore, BCIs based on non-invasive recording modalities such as electroencephalography are safer and more comfortable for the patients. The BCI requires reconstructing continuous movement parameters such as position or velocity for practical application of neuroprostheses. The BCI studies in continuous (...) decoding have extensively relied on extracting features from the amplitude of brain signals, whereas the brain connectivity features have rarely been explored. This study aims to investigate the feasibility of using phase-based connectivity features in decoding continuous hand movements from EEG signals. To this end, the EEG data were collected from seven healthy subjects performing a 2D center-out hand movement task in four orthogonal directions. The phase-locking value and magnitude-squared coherence are exploited as connectivity features along with multiple linear regression for decoding hand positions. A brute-force search approach is employed to find the best channel pairs for extracting features related to hand movements. The results reveal that the regression models based on PLV and MSC features achieve the average Pearson correlations of 0.43 ± 0.03 and 0.42 ± 0.06, respectively, between predicted and actual trajectories over all subjects. The delta and alpha band features have the most contribution in regression analysis. The results also demonstrate that both PLV and MSC decoding models lead to superior results on our data compared to two recently proposed feature extraction methods solely based on the amplitude or phase of recording signals. This study verifies the ability of PLV and MSC features in the continuous decoding of hand movements with linear regression. Thus, our findings suggest that extracting features based on brain connectivity can improve the accuracy of trajectory decoder BCIs. (shrink)

The current ecological crisis is a matter of urgent global concern, with solutions being sought on many fronts. In this book, Seyyed Hossein Nasr argues that the devastation of our world has been exacerbated, if not actually caused, by the reductionist view of nature that has been advanced by modern secular science. What is needed, he believes, is the recovery of the truth to which the great, enduring religions all attest; namely that nature is sacred. Nasr traces the historical (...) process through which Western civilization moved away from the idea of nature as sacred and embraced a world view which sees humans as alienated from nature and nature itself as a machine to be dominated and manipulated by humans. His goal is to negate the totalitarian claims of modern science and to re-open the way to the religious view of the order of nature, developed over centuries in the cosmologies and sacred sciences of the great traditions. Each tradition, Nasr shows, has a wealth of knowledge and experience concerning the order of nature. The resuscitation of this knowledge, he argues, would allow religions all over the globe to enrich each other and cooperate to heal the wounds inflicted upon the Earth. (shrink)