Product Dimensions: 8.6 x 5.6 x 1.1 inches Description: Very little is known about the author of this book apart from the facts that he is a retired Government of India officer, now in his late nineties, apparently hoary, but healthy. When requested for more bio-data, he wrote back…The Real author of the Original Yoga is the Lord Siva. In the mundane world, Patanjali is the prime propagator of yoga. Any other claim to authorship, therefore, cannot but be spurious. …It (...) is Truth that matters, not the utterer of the Truth. No Truth ever becomes a bit truer even when repeated by the most distinguished person. …Hence all genuine aspirants of yoga should be content to remain unknown and unnoticed by others. His other published work is Hindu Concept of Life and Death. (shrink)

Abdul Halim, of the National Translation Mission (NTM) India, interviews Ranganathan about his contributions to translation theory. Translation Today is a Double-blind, Peer- reviewed journal of the NTM.

Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons (...) explain obligations and show that it solves this problem. (shrink)

Reasons can interact in a variety of ways to determine what we ought to do or believe. And there can be cases where two reasons to do an act or have a belief are individually worse than a reason to not do that act or have that belief, but the reasons together are better than the reason to not do that act or have that belief. So the reasons together―which we can call the accrual of those reasons—can have a strength (...) that is an increasing function of the strengths of the individual reasons. In this paper, we will look at how reasons determine what we ought to do and believe in cases where the accrual of reasons is relevant. Our focus will not primarily be on questions about the nature of individual reasons and their weight. Instead, we will at the outset rely on our pretheoretical grip on what reasons there are and how weighty they are individually and ask the more formal or structural question of how to determine the strength of their accrual based on these facts. In looking at these issues, my goal will not be anything as ambitious as developing a full theory of the accrual of reasons. Rather, my goal will be more modest: I will introducing some of the challenges for providing an adequate model and argue that a promising approach to resolving these challenges involves making use of the familiar distinction in moral philosophy between derivative and non-derivative normative notions. (shrink)

A traditional picture is that cases of deontic constraints--- cases where an act is wrong (or one that there is most reason to not do) even though performing that act will prevent more acts of the same morally (or practically) relevant type from being performed---form a kind of fault line in ethical theory separating (agent-neutral) consequentialist theories from other ethical theories. But certain results in the recent literature, such as those due to Graham Oddie and Peter Milne in "Act and (...) Value", do not sit well this traditional wisdom. My aim in this paper is to argue that both the traditional wisdom and Oddie and Milne are mistaken. I begin by looking more closely at the traditional wisdom and why it fails (§1). Then I develop my account of this fault line in ethical theory and its importance (§2). Finally I show that a diagnosis of where Oddie and Milne go wrong follows as a corollary of this new account (§3). An important upshot will be that discussions of cases of deontic constraints would do best to focus on the account of the nature and importance of the cases identified in this paper rather than continuing to work with the mistaken traditional picture. (shrink)

One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic (...) logic concerning the existence of conflicting obligations. The second problem arises from a tension between the fact that reasons can conflict and a model of how reasons explain ‘ought’s that has been widely accepted. Having presented each of these problems, I develop a unified solution to them that is informed by results in both ethics and deontic logic. An important implication of this solution is that we must distinguish between derivative and nonderivative reasons and revise our conception how it is that reasons explain ‘ought’s. (shrink)

In contrast to a stereotypical account of Indian philosophy that are entailments of the interpreter’s beliefs (an approach that violates basic standards of reason), an approach to Indian philosophy grounded on the constraints of formal reason reveals not only a wide spread disagreement on dharma (THE RIGHT OR THE GOOD), but also a pervasive commitment to the practical foundation of life’s challenges. The flip side of this practical orientation is the criticism of ordinary experience as erroneous and reducible to the (...) agent’s mental states. If we ignore the background practical orientation in Indian philosophy, this seems not like an error theory, that I call Ironic Idealism, but as a defense of idealism. I consider salient candidates for Indian Idealism (Advaita Vedānta, Yogācāra Buddhism, Kāśmīra Śaivism and the Yogavāsiṣṭha) and note that these positions continue a theme in Indian philosophy of articulating Ironic Idealism. Ironic Idealism depends upon the very Indian distinction between ultimate and provisional truth, and Ironic Idealism criticizes the mundane, provisional sort of "truth" as psychological and mental --- and ultimately false. Interpretation, the common approach to the study of Indian philosophy, is an example of what Ironic Idealism criticizes. This explains why authors incorrectly find Idealism everywhere in Indian thought. (shrink)

Hinduism: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation explores Hinduism and the distinction between the secular and religious on a global scale. According to Ranganathan, a careful philosophical study of Hinduism reveals it as the microcosm of philosophical disagreements with Indian resources, across a variety of topics, including: ethics, logic, the philosophy of thought, epistemology, moral standing, metaphysics, and politics. This analysis offers an original and fresh diagnosis of studying Hinduism, colonialism and a global rise of hyper-nationalism, as well as the frequent acrimony (...) between scholars and practitioners of Hindu traditions. -/- This text is appropriate for use in undergraduate and graduate courses on Hinduism, and Indian philosophy, and can be used as an advanced introduction to the problems of philosophy with South Asian resources. (shrink)

This is the first lesson of the MA level 1 course in Ethics, which spans the European and Asian traditions. This lesson consists of three main components: Part 2 concerns the discipline of philosophy – its scope and aim. Part 3 is an elaboration of philosophy, the discipline, as an exploration of the GOOD and the RIGHT. This is called “ethics” or “moral philosophy.” In Sanskrit, these explorations fall under the heading of dharma. In Part 4 we shall address some (...) basic concerns about understanding ethics internationally. Part 5 is a brief conclusion. (shrink)

Although the mathematics of interest is very precise, the practice of charging computing and disclosing interest or cost of credit is full of variations and therefore often questionable on ethical grounds. The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the prevalent practices which are incorrect, illogical, unfair or deceptive. Both utilitarian and formalist schools of ethical theory would find these practices to be inappropriate. The paper will specifically look at unfair practices in the areas of estimation of intrayear (...) rates, use of 360 days in a year, the "rule of 78th", interest rate ('APR') advertising, and computation of unpaid balance by credit card issuers to figure interest costs.The current practices are not in the best interest of the average consumer. There is, therefore, an urgent need for new legislation, change in regulatory code and disclosure requirement for eliminating these unethical practices. The author recommends that the Truth in Lending Code of the Federal Reserve should require the disclosure of the effective APR if the periodic rate is determined by dividing the 'APR' by the number of payment period in a year; the use of 360 days in a year methods and the "Rule of 78ths" should be immediately discontinued; Deceptive advertising, which tend to understate the true cost of credit or hides hidden costs and fees should be outlawed; interest should be payable with the same frequency as the frequency of compounding and credit card holders should be provided with a comparative example of various methods of balance computation. (shrink)

The present paper deals with the idea of understanding Vedic ethics as a code of righteous living, in the light of Mīmāṁsā philosophy. The paper also intends to reflect upon the possibility of such methods as a means of attaining liberation. In other words, the Vedas provide us with prescriptive codes of right and wrong actions. It commands us about duties and non-duties, through the performance of rituals, in order to lead a good life. We know that human endeavours are (...) primarily based on attaining the desired, and to prevent the unwanted ends. Hence, the entire effort of human actions lies in the fact that we want to attain the cessation of sufferings. This paves the way for studies in Soteriology, and the question arises that, could the Vedas be considered as a literature on Soteriology. The paper consists of a number of sections. The initial ones involve the linguistic analysis of the Vedic statements based on Sanskrit grammar and semantics. These are aimed at depicting the manner in which Vedic sentences act as prescriptive ethical codes. The latter ones deal with the questions raised by the opposing schools, namely Sāṁkhya-Yoga, against the idea of considering Vedas as a supreme sanction of means, leading beings to their salvation from empirical sufferings, and their plausible responses. Keywords: duties, ends, sacrifices, knowledge, liberation. (shrink)

Metaethics is that part of moral philosophy that is interested in the conceptual resolution of the relationship between the RIGHT and the GOOD. Metaethics is, hence, one step removed from practical questions of how to live—but not disconnected from them. Our investigation will begin with the early Buddhist account of language as meaningful for intersubjective reasons. This gives rise to a critical awareness of the correspondence between linguistic meaning and reality. The correspondence is outside of our control, but also structured (...) by our own intersubjective purposes. Hence, a proper appreciation of reality involves an appreciation of the causal interdependency of what we refer to. This, in turn, gives rise to an appreciation of intentional action – karma – as a special case of the general metaphysical principle: dependent origination. While our subjective desires may fail to correspond to reality, our choices constitute our contribution to causality. Some of these contributions can be good, and others are bad. The implication for our own self is that our character itself is constituted by our choices. The result is that we have little reason to believe in a permanent self, characterised by unchanging personal characteristics. Positive change that takes us away from error of a subjective approach to reality can be characterised as a void (nirvāṇa) outside of the ordinary practice of linguistic categorisation. (shrink)

In this lesson we review the philosophical foundations of ethics as a sub-field of philosophy. Ethics, moral or dharma philosophy is the confluence of dissenting theories and what they have in common as they disagree is the basic concept of ETHICS/DHARMA: THE RIGHT OR THE GOOD. Every theory of ethics or dharma is an account of this concept from some perspective. This allows us to identify three varieties of moral philosophical investigation: applied ethics, normative ethics and metaethics. It also involves (...) discerning four basic, normative theoretical options: Virtue Ethics (the good leads to the right), Consequentialism (the good justifies the right), Deontology (the right justifies the good), and a fourth theory peculiar to the Indian tradition: Bhakti/Yoga (the right leads to the good). Examples of all four ethical theories are found in the Indian tradition. (shrink)

Rational outcomes of a social system do not necessarily require its individual participants to be rational. In macro systems, aggregate properties distinct from the behavior of their micro level components can emerge through complex interactions. Caution in building social sciences on assumption of methodological individualism seems appropriate.

How do multiple reasons combine to support a conclusion about what to do or believe? This question raises two challenges: How can we represent the strength of a reason? How do the strengths of multiple reasons combine? Analogous challenges about confirmation have been answered using probabilistic tools. Can reductive and nonreductive theories of reasons use these tools to answer their challenges? Yes, or more exactly: reductive theories can answer both challenges. Nonreductive theories, with the help of a result in confirmation (...) theory, can answer one, and there are grounds for optimism that they can answer the other. (shrink)

This article, addressed to Yoga Therapists, sorts out the historical roots of our idea of Yoga, elucidates the colonial interference and distortion of Yoga, and shows that trauma and therapy are the primary focus of Yoga. However, unlike most philosophies of therapy, Yoga's solution is primarily moral philosophical---Yoga itself being a basic ethical theory, in addition to Virtue Theory, Consequentialism and Deontology. This article goes some way to elucidating that it is quite ironic (and absurd) that many feel the need (...) to bring being “trauma-informed” into the title of Yoga education. That’s like the vacuous “chai tea” moniker (“chai” being the Hindi word for tea). Decolonizing our understanding of Yoga involves retrieving the original theory as the primary explanation of the topic, which allows us to understand how various activities, called "yoga," can be ways of practicing the moral philosophy of Yoga. The idea that "yoga" means many things and projects relies upon a contra logical methodology of interpretation which violates constraints of basic reasoning. Putting aside interpretation for explication is part of critical thinking but also our own self therapy. (Originally published in Yoga Therapy Today, a publication of the International Association of Yoga Therapists. Shared with permission.). (shrink)

The authors study the impact of institutional corporate social responsibility —defined as CSR targeted at a borrowing firm’s secondary stakeholders—on bank loans. Findings suggest that higher levels of institutional CSR are associated with lower levels of interest rates and loan spreads. In addition, institutional CSR also tempers the positive impact of loan maturity and firm leverage on interest rates and loan spread. These effects were strongest among firms that demonstrated sustained performance, rather than among firms that showed mixed performance in (...) terms of their secondary stakeholder-related activities. This study indicates institutional CSR is valued by stakeholders for its risk mitigating and transaction cost reducing effects independent of technical CSR, defined as CSR targeted at primary stakeholders. (shrink)

This paper examines how Western colonialism erases the rich history of moral and political philosophy from South Asia, choosing to at once appropriate from it and depict it as too immature to be taken seriously. And yet, if we attend to methodological questions central to research, the question of whether we ought to explain anything by way of propositional attitudes like beliefs (interpretation) or engage in a logic-based recovery of reasons for controversial conclusions (explication) we see that the latter decolonial (...) method shows that South Asian moral philosophers disagreed about ahiṃsā. Jains depicted ahiṃsā teleologically in accordance with their Virtue Ethics, while Yoga, a radically procedural ethical theory, entails that ahiṃsā is a procedure. The former idea is about not breaking things. The latter is about disrupting systemic harm. Insufficient attention to these contrary approaches to ahiṃsā are part of a pattern of dismissing the importance of learning from South Asian moral philosophers. Deliberate choice in contrast requires attention to this tradition and its exploration of ahiṃsā. Contrary to colonial glosses, we derive our contemporary tradition of progressive, activist politics from the Yogic approach to ahiṃsā. (shrink)

As Mishra Tarc (2020) does through her evocative words on engaging texts today, I contemplate how texts, specifically children’s books, open pedagogical possibilities to reckon, repair, and reworld in a world that is on fire. From climate change to racial justice, it is children’s books, I believe, that can serve as pedagogical interventions and responses for teachers and teacher educators who are interested in addressing and confronting these complex and sometimes ineffable issues. I offer a glimpse of this approach through (...) my practice as an elementary school teacher, a teacher candidate, and a teacher educator. Through these experiences, I consider how children’s books open up productive conversations around “difficult” and “hard” topics while also grappling with the ongoing questions that remain in my practice. Turning to children’s books, I outline both the immense potential of and need for using texts in the field of education. Immersing texts pedagogically and as a site of study, I hope, animates a renewed significance in supporting students to examine and tackle the issues confronting them. (shrink)

While Yoga (also called Bhakti, “devotion”) is a comprehensive philosophy, it is importantly an ancient and basic ethical theory, unique to South Asia (what is commonly called the Indian tradition). It is not a variant of virtue ethics, consequentialism and deontology, but is an additional kind of moral theory. And in its literary articulation, in dialog and story (such as the Mahābhārata and the Upaniṣads), it has a long history of criticizing teleological ethical theories, including – and especially – consequentialism. (...) It is a radically procedural ethical theory, does not require the Good to elucidate the Right, and provides a critical response to all three alternatives. -/- The main obstacle to understanding Yoga is methodological. It pertains to how we can understand philosophical options that we do not necessarily agree with, and which are novel relative to our background assumptions and beliefs. Without methodological clarity, we will be doomed to understand alternatives in terms of familiar options. Yoga's metaethics provides us the tools necessary to engage in this research. In addition, it also sets out a unique normative (ideal) ethical theory and a non-ideal practice that is now the foundation of decolonial practices of direct action. (shrink)

Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy (Motilal Banarsidass 2007). Regretfully, it is not an uncommon view in orthodox Indology that Indian philosophers were not interested in ethics. This claim belies the fact that Indian philosophical schools were generally interested in the practical consequences of beliefs and actions. The most popular symptom of this concern is the doctrine of karma, according to which the consequences of actions have an evaluative valence. Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy argues that the (...) orthodox view in Indology concerning Indian ethics is false. The first half the book deals with theoretical issues in studying ethics: defining moral terms, understanding the subject matter of ethics so as to transcend culturally specific substantive commitments and touches upon issues of cross-cultural hermeneutics and translation. The second half consists of a systematic explication of the moral philosophical aspects of nine major Indian philosophical schools. I argue that “dharma” in its various uses in Indian philosophy is always rationally treated as a moral term—even in so called “ontological” employments of the term as seen in Buddhism and Jainism. In understanding “dharma” in this manner, the Indian philosophical tradition is replete with different versions of moral realism that fit tidily with other philosophical commitments of Indian philosophers. Pains are taken to show the breath of moral philosophical disagreement in this tradition. On a comparative note, some Indian moral philosophy resembles realist approaches of the Western tradition (such as the Non-natural realism of Neo-Platonism, or the Naturalism of Utilitarianism). Out of the major Indian philosophical schools, a slim minority are shown to be committed to moral irrealism while some are shown to regard their entire philosophical orientation as firmly planted within moral philosophy (such as Jainism, Buddhism, Purva Mimamsa and Yoga). In response to those who would argue that what Indian philosophers meant by “dharma” is very different from what moral philosophers in the West have meant by “ethical” or “good,” I argue that this is as vacuous as noting that Utilitarians have a different conception of the good from Deontologists. If philosophy is concerned with theoretical debate, as I argue it is, philosophical terms function to articulate such disagreements. The various seemingly desperate uses of “dharma” in the Indian tradition are no longer confusing or disorderly when we understand the theoretico-philosophical function of this term in Indian philosophical disputes. -/- The second edition contains an additional chapter that addresses the colonial and political context of the study of Indian Ethics. (shrink)

Undergraduate students of philosophy are often told that Kant is famous for teaching us that “ought implies can,” and furthermore that this principle implies that it makes no sense to tell someone that they ought to do something if they do not have the ability to execute the action in question. It is thus surprising to find that the words “ought implies can” do not appear conspicuously in popular English translations of Kant’s main moral philosophical texts (such as the Groundwork, (...) and Critique of Practical Reason). I argue that Kant’s writings do not clearly support it, and at points stand opposed to it. One may still attribute the formula “ought implies can” to Kant, but only at the cost of understanding this formula in a nonstandard manner. (shrink)

This chapter explores the role of evil in the development of the Vedas and Upaniṣads. The Vedas and the Upaniṣads, or the Vedas are the repository of veda of the early Indo-European peoples of South Asia. Written and collected over a thousand-year period, from 1500 BCE to 500 BCE, the Vedas says many things about evil. However, the corpus presents a philosophical shift from naturalism to non-naturalism that also mirrors a shift from Consequentialism to Deontology. The problem with naturalism on (...) the Vedic reckoning is that it renders evil an ineliminable primitive that motivates a devotion to naturalistic forces to maximise good results. Vedic non-naturalism, rooted in the idea of self-development, treats evil as an inessential malady of self-governance. On the latter account, evil plays no essential role in self-understanding, and can be eliminated by self-governance. (shrink)

Confucius, being one of the earliest of Chinese philosophers that we know of, seems uniquely responsible for setting the tone of Chinese philosophy. His focus on ethical questions of the Way no doubt serves as a reminder of the type of perennial questions that philosophers should answer. In this module, I outline the main concepts of the Analects, followed by an elaboration on the central Confucian ethical doctrines: The doctrine of the Mean, Filial Piety, Patriarchal Hierarchy and the Golden Rule. (...) This is followed by a discussion of the Analects’ comments on politics, and finally, a discussion of the underlying metaethics or moral semantics of Confucius's ethics: The Rectification of Names. Confucius's ethics constitutes a uniquely Asian source of Humanism, and while similar to the ethics of Aristotle, provides a distinctive account of moral theory and Virtue Ethics. (shrink)

This lesson explores the relationship between ethics and religion. There is a tradition of thinking that religion takes explanatory priority in ethics, but there is a counter tradition of philosophy that shows that philosophical questions of the right or the good take priority over religious questions: without answering the philosophical question we are not in a position to endorse a religious tradition as right or good. But on a global scale the issue is fraught with the realities of the colonial (...) context of the classification and minting of religions from prior philosophical traditions. This serves to delegitimize non-Western moral philosophy as a mere traditional practice in need of further philosophical justification, which by default (owing to this process) ends up being philosophical justification from the West. Thinking critically about ethics involves reclaiming the philosophy under the veneer of the political identification of non-Western moral traditions as religions. The idea of religion on a global scale must be criticized as a means of avoiding moral theory and moral philosophy from diverse sources. The argument involves exploring a revised version of the Euthyphro Dilemma that I call "Euthyphro Dilemma 2.0.". (shrink)

In this lesson, I explore three areas of intersection between ethics and metaphysics: accounts of the self, the reality of value, and basic distinctions in ethical theory. I compare the account of the self as a chariot from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Deontology), early Buddhism from Questions of King Milinda (Consequentialism), and Plato's Phaedrus (Virtue Ethics). In each case, the metaphysical model is continuous with the moral theory of the same perspective and adopted to accommodate the moral theory. I also compare (...) debates across traditions on controversies such as: Naturalism vs. Nonnaturalism, ethics vs. action (dharma vs. karma), and the perennial question of Moral Realism. The relationship between metaphysics and ethics is not peculiar to a specific philosophical tradition. It has to do with central questions of moral philosophy. A common point that these issues converge on is the question of moral standing: what kinds of things count, and what are their properties. (shrink)

In the previous module, I covered the basics of Early Buddhist metaethics. The core ideas here are: (1) linguistic representation is not the same as reality – linguistic representation depicts reality as static, but reality is relational and dynamic; (2) reality can drift away from linguistic representation causing disappointment – duḥkha; (3) choosing wisely now can result in a better future; (4) ethical choice involves appreciating the justifying relations of states of affairs. In this module, I explore the Four Noble (...) Truths and the Eight-Fold Path as efforts to systematise these findings as the basis of a normative theory and applied ethics. Of special concern is its culmination in Buddhist practices of meditation. In the fourth section, we shall examine the relationship between these meditational practices and Buddhist Consequentialism. Indeed, the very practice of meditation is, in large measure, justified by the outcomes that Buddhists meditate upon. This approach to ethics is not only consequentialist, but provides a uniquely Buddhist approach to overcoming personal challenges. This allows us to revisit the issue of rule following in Buddhism. Contrary to those who would claim that Buddhist uses of "dharma" to identify wrong motives is proof that such uses are amoral, or inconsistent with Consequentialism, I show that this is exactly what we would expect if Buddhist ethics is Consequentialist. Such dharmas (ethical ends) are to be treated as ends, and not as means. Mindfulness is the appropriate means justified by such ends. The absurdity arises if we abandon Consequentialism and treat such ends requiring justification or as procedures that are reasonable, and not what confers justification. (shrink)

Differential equations of second order appear in physical applications such as fluid dynamics, electromagnetism, acoustic vibrations, and quantum mechanics. In this paper, necessary and sufficient conditions are established of the solutions to second-order half-linear delay differential equations of the form ς y u ′ y a ′ + ∑ j = 1 m p j y u c j ϑ j y = 0 for y ≥ y 0, under the assumption ∫ ∞ ς η − 1 / a d (...) η = ∞. We consider two cases when a c j, where a and c j are the quotient of two positive odd integers. Two examples are given to show effectiveness and applicability of the result. (shrink)