What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of (...) reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. (shrink)

This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the interpretation (...) of this approach that lifts the requirement of certainty in all logical truths, the view becomes vacuous, issuing no requirements on rational believers at all. Finally, I develop and endorse a new solution to the problem. This view proposes dynamic norms for reasoning with credences. The solution is based on an old proposal of Ian Hacking’s that says you’re required to be sensitive to logical facts only when you know they are logical facts. (shrink)

A Boltzmann Brain, haphazardly formed through the unlikely but still possible random assembly of physical particles, is a conscious brain having experiences just like an ordinary person. The skeptical possibility of being a Boltzmann Brain is an especially gripping one: scientific evidence suggests our actual universe’s full history may ultimately contain countless short-lived Boltzmann Brains with experiences just like yours or mine. I propose a solution to the skeptical challenge posed by these countless actual Boltzmann Brains. My key idea is (...) roughly this: the skeptical argument that you’re one of the Boltzmann Brains requires you to make a statistical inference, but the Principle of Total Evidence blocks us from making the inference. I discuss how my solution contrasts with a recent suggestion, made by Sean Carroll and David Chalmers, for how to address the skeptical challenge posed by Boltzmann Brains. And I discuss how my solution handles certain relevant concerns about what to do when we have higher-order evidence indicating that our first-order evidence is misleading. (shrink)

We give a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. We also try to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications.

White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument (...) is that the best explanation of the value of promoting rationality is an explanation that entails uniqueness. (shrink)

I object to Markos Valaris’s thesis that reasoning requires a belief that your conclusion follows from your premisses. My counter-examples highlight the important but neglected role of suppositional reasoning in the basis of so much of what we know.

This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.

In this paper, we investigate how the interactions of a robot with its environment can be used to create concepts that are typically represented by verbs in language. Towards this end, we utilize the notion of affordances to argue that verbs typically refer to the generation of a specific type of effect rather than a specific type of action. Then, we show how a robot can form these concepts through interactions with the environment and how humans can use these concepts (...) to ease their communication with the robots. We demonstrate that iCub, a humanoid robot, can use the concepts, which it has developed, to to understand what a human performs, perform multi-step planning for reaching a goal state as well as to specify a goal to the robot using symbolic descriptions. (shrink)

In section 1, I develop epistemic communism, my view of the function of epistemically evaluative terms such as ‘rational’. The function is to support the coordination of our belief-forming rules, which in turn supports the reliable acquisition of beliefs through testimony. This view is motivated by the existence of valid inferences that we hesitate to call rational. I defend the view against the worry that it fails to account for a function of evaluations within first-personal deliberation. In the rest of (...) the paper, I then argue, on the basis of epistemic communism, for a view about rationality itself. I set up the argument in section 2 by saying what a theory of rational deduction is supposed to do. I claim that such a theory would provide a necessary, sufficient, and explanatorily unifying condition for being a rational rule for inferring deductive consequences. I argue in section 3 that, given epistemic communism and the conventionality that it entails, there is no such theory. Nothing explains why certain rules for deductive reasoning are rational. (shrink)

Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.

Jacques Lacan was a notoriously difficult and idiosyncratic thinker. But is there any value in his hermetically difficult style? By highlighting certain crucial elements of his practice, I show how Lacan enlists the notion of difficulty to press home that he did not want his readers to understand directly. Instead, as Foucault and Althusser explain so well, Lacan wished for his readers and auditors to discover themselves as subjects of desire through reading him. Indeed, in miming the language of the (...) unconscious, Lacan believed he could throw into sharp relief the notion of the unconscious itself and, paradoxically, better express himself. This temporary detour through misunderstanding indicates the programmatic value of difficulty itself. By commenting on the comedic aspect of Lacan's difficult literary dandyism, I also seek to playfully remind the reader that Lacan was a master of comedy and irony and that it is only by adopting a comparative literary approach to his work that we can appreciate how his theory of misunderstanding is at the heart of his conceptualization of madness and psychosis, allowing us to see how, for Lacan, the subject is ontologically sick. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.

I develop a new version of the ordinary language response to skepticism. My version is based on premises about the practical functions served by our epistemic words. I end by exploring how my argument against skepticism is interestingly non-circular and philosophically valuable.

Ehrenmord ist eine nicht selten vorkommende Tat in der Turkei. Mit fortgesetzter Wanderung in die großen Städte der Türkei und ins Ausland, wird dieses Phänomen auch in andere Regionen getragen. Daher setzt sich auch die Öffentlichkeit in zunehmenden Maße mit dieser Thematik auseinander. In diesem Artikel wird versucht, den Ehrenmord unter philosophischen Gesichtspunkten zu erklären.Hierzu werden Gedanken Engels, Butlers, Foucaults, Levi Strauss’ und auch weitere bedeutende Forschungsarbeiten zum Thema Selbstmord hinzugezogen.

We can make new progress on stalled debates in epistemology if we adopt a new practical approach, an approach concerned with the function served by epistemic evaluations. This paper illustrates how. I apply the practical approach to an important, unsolved problem: the problem of forgotten evidence. Section 1 describes the problem and why it is so challenging. Section 2 outlines and defends a general view about the function of epistemic evaluations. Section 3 then applies that view to solve the problem (...) of forgotten evidence. (shrink)

This paper aims to accessibly present, and then critique, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber's recent proposals for the evolutionary function of human reasoning. I take a critical look at the main source of experimental evidence that they claim as support for their view, namely the confirmation or “myside” bias in reasoning. I object that Mercier and Sperber did not adequately argue for a claim that their case rests on, namely that it is evolutionarily advantageous for you to get other people (...) to believe whatever you antecedently believe. And I give my own argument that this claim is false. I also critically look at their suggestion that reasoning has a justificatory function, functioning as a kind of reputation management tool. I argue this suggestion does not amount to a plausible evolutionary function. (shrink)

The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...) belief. I give an initial assessment of the view by examining its compatibility with leading theories of introspection. And I identify a challenge for the view, and explain why I'm optimistic that the view can overcome it. (shrink)

True beliefs and truth-preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth-preserving, but truth-preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: the orthodox definition given (...) in terms of interpretations or models, a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference. (shrink)

Credences are beliefs about evidential probabilities. We give the view an assessment-sensitive formulation, show how it evades the standard objections, and give several arguments in support.

I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive (...) reliability. Thus, the argument that would debunk our moral views would also, absurdly, debunk all inductive reasoning. (shrink)

İslâm hukuku, gelişmiş bir hukuk teorisine sahiptir. Edille-i erbaa’nın yanında yorum ve akıl yürütmeye dayalı birçok hüküm elde etme teorisi türetilmiştir. Bunların mahiyeti ve nasıl kullanılacağı İslâm hukukçuları tarafından süreç içerisinde geliştirilmiştir. İslâm hukukçuları, hüküm elde etme yöntemlerinin gerek yanlış kullanımı gerekse bu yöntemlerin kapsamının genişletilmesiyle ortaya çıkan problemli sonuçların düzeltilmesinde bazı ilimlerden ve tekniklerinden yararlanmışlardır. Disiplinler arası bu çalışmalarla özellikle kıyas işlemine ve illete yöneltilen eleştirilerin doğru bir şekilde tespit edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Bu eleştiri ve itirazların haklı bir nedene ve (...) delile dayanıp dayanmadığını ortaya koyma noktasında istifade edilen ilimlerden biri de münâzaradır. İslâm ilim geleneğinde fıkıh ve kelamla birlikte müstakil bir ilim haline gelen münâzara, mezheplerin teşekkül ettiği dönemlerde oluşmaya başlamıştır. Daha çok fıkıhta kendisine pratik alan bulan münâzara, özellikle usûl-i fıkhın önemli bir bölümü oluşturan kıyasın yorumlanmasına etki etmiş ve hatta istidlâl yöntemleri arasına olduğu varsayılmıştır. Usûl-i fıkıhta pek çok münâzara yönteminden istifade edilmiştir. Bunlardan biri de fesâdü’l-vaz‘dır. En çok kullanılan tanımıyla fesâdü’l-vaz‘, bir illete o illetin gerektirdiği şeyin zıddı olan bir hükmün bağlanması şeklinde tarif edilmektedir. Bu ise illeti bütünüyle geçersiz kılan bir durumdur. Fesâdü’l-vaz‘da, mu‘teriz istidlâlde bulunana, bu yönteme mahsus itirazları yönelterek kıyasın hatalı olduğunu ispat etmeye çalışmaktadır. Fesâdü’l-vaz‘, kıyas kurgusunun temeline yöneltilen bir itiraz türü olduğundan usûlcüler tarafından illete yöneltilen kuvvetli itiraz türlerinden biri olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte bu itiraz türünün hangi illete yöneltilebileceği hususu İslâm hukukçuları arasında tartışılmıştır. Hanefîler fesâdü’l-vaz‘ı sahih bir itiraz yöntemi olarak kabul ederler ancak bununla müessir illete itirazda bulunulamayacağını düşünürler. Zira Hanefîler’e göre müessir vasfın doğruluğu Kitap, sünnet ve icmâ ile ortaya konulmuştur. Bu delillerin fasit vasıf üreteceği düşünülemez. Şâfiîler’e göre ise fesâdü’l-vaz‘ ile her türlü illete ve hükme itiraz edilebilir. Hatta bazı Şâfiî hukukçuları, bu yöntemin kıyasa mahsus olmayan genel bir itiraz türü olduğunu düşünmektedirler. Mezheplerin hem kıyasın şartlarına hem de fesâdü’l-vaz’ın mahiyetine yükledikleri bu farklı yorumlardan dolayı fürû meselelerde farklı sonuçlar ortaya çıkabilmektedir. Bu çalışmada İslâm hukuk usûlünde kıyas işlemine yöneltilen bir itiraz türü olarak fesâdü’l-vaz‘ incelenmiş ve mukayeseli fürû örnekler tespit edilerek fesâdü’l-vaz‘ın mahiyeti ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Böylelikle, İslâm’da hukuk mantığında önemli bir yere sahip olan ve kıyas adı altında toplanması mümkün olan hukukî akıl yürütme yöntemlerinin çeşitliliğinin tespit ve tahlil edilmesi hedeflenmiştir. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPopular culture has many examples of evil characters having vertically pupilled eyes. Humans have a long evolutionary history of rivalry with snakes and their visual systems were evolved to rapidly detect snakes and snake-related cues. Considering such evolutionary background, we hypothesised that humans would perceive vertical pupils, which are characteristics of ambush predators including some of the snakes, as threatening. In seven studies conducted on samples from American and Turkish samples, we found that vertical pupils are perceived as more threatening (...) on both explicit and implicit level and they are associated with physical, rather than social, threat. Findings provided partial support regarding our hypothesis about the relevance of snake detection processes: Snake phobia, and not spider phobia, was found to be related to perceiving vertical pupils as threatening, however an experimental manipulation of saliency of snakes re... (shrink)

Ecological intelligence refers to systemic thinking, ecophilosophy, holistic perspective, collective lifestyle and cultural commons. It is difficult to determine the exact nature of EI and its...

After briefly expositing some fundamental issues in current debates about apriority, I go on to critically examine meaning-based explanations of how we acquire apriori justification.

Rationalism, my target, says that in order to have perceptual knowledge, such as that your hand is making a fist, you must “antecedently” (or “independently”) know that skeptical scenarios don’t obtain, such as the skeptical scenario that you are in the Matrix. I motivate the specific form of Rationalism shared by, among others, White (Philos Stud 131:525–557, 2006) and Wright (Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 78:167–212, 2004), which credits us with warrant to believe (or “accept”, in Wright’s terms) that our (...) senses are reliably veridical, where that warrant is one we enjoy by default, that is, without relying on any evidence or engaging in any positive argument. The problem with this form of Rationalism is that, even if you have default knowledge that your senses are reliable, this is not adequate to rule out every kind of skeptical scenario. The problem is created by one-off skeptical scenarios, scenarios that involve a highly reliable perceiver who, by a pure fluke, has a one-off, non-veridical experience. I claim you cannot infer that your present perceptual experience is veridical just on the basis of knowledge of your general reliability. More generally, if you infer that the present F is G, just on the basis of your knowledge that most Fs are Gs, this is what I call statistical inference, and, as I argue, statistical inference by itself does not generate knowledge. I defend this view of statistical inference against objections, including the objection that radical skepticism about our ordinary inductive knowledge will follow unless statistical inference generates knowledge. (shrink)

This article focuses on recent discussions about holobionts and evolutionary individuality to evaluate the merits of integrative pluralism. I argue that integrative pluralism is the wrong approach to take when it comes to holobiont research because integrative pluralism is not liberal enough to accommodate both single-species and multispecies individuals. I conclude by suggesting two points. First, a pluralistic view helps us better understand holobiont research. Second, the case of holobionts helps us develop a better account of scientific pluralism.

It can easily look like evolution is in a better position to explain the reliability of our perceptual beliefs than the reliability of our moral beliefs. This paper takes a closer look at the issue and argues that there’s no reason—no reason which armchair philosophers could uncover—to think evolution can better explain perceptual reliability than moral reliability. It also offers a diagnosis of why it seemed otherwise. The diagnosis concerns our need to use the truth predicate as a generalizing logical (...) device in the perceptual case but not in the moral case. (shrink)

If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement is thus a kind of moral lottery, to adapt a similar metaphor from Sharon Street. Her own genealogical debunking argument, as I discuss, relies on a premise (...) of such disagreement among evolutionary counterparts. -/- In this paper, I resist the threat from disagreement by showing that, on some of the most influential and most attractive theories of content determination, the premise of moral disagreement cannot serve any skeptical or revisionary purposes. I examine and criticize attempts, made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street, to argue from disagreement to relativism by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that, within certain constraints, maximizes the attribution to us of true beliefs. And I examine and criticize Robert Williams’s attempt to show there is moral disagreement by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that instead maximizes the attribution to us of rationality. My overall aim is to defend commonsense moral realism via a careful look at the theory of content and concepts. (shrink)

In recent years, commentators have begun to re-examine the proximity of Frantz Fanon's and Jacques Lacan's work — a proximity which has traditionally been underappreciated. This article adds to these voices, demonstrating the reciprocal intellectual relationship between these two figures. It develops five interrelated arguments to chart this proximity. First, it emphasizes Lacan's and Fanon's connections through their ontological perspectives on madness. Second, it arbitrates the two theorists’ criticisms of the limits of Western psychoanalysis. Third, it shows the importance placed (...) by both on social structures in determining mental illnesses. Next, it demonstrates the centrality of their common understanding of psychosis. Finally, it argues that Lacan's argument in The Sinthome concerning the colonizer's power is inherited from Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks — itself influenced by Lacan's early theory of language. The article does not attempt to cast Fanon as an apprentice Lacanian but rather to argue that reciprocity helped shape both oeuvres. (shrink)

İnsanların günlük hayatlarında en çok kullandıkları muamelelerden biri olan alış veriş, toplumların örflerine göre çeşitlilik göstermiştir. Bu sebeple klasik füru fıkıh eserlerinde akitlerin çok bilinenlerine yer verilmiş, diğerleri için de genel şartları sağlaması kaydıyla caiz olabileceği kanaatine varılmıştır. Bununla beraber mezheplerin nasları anlama yöntemleri ve örfi uygulamaları değerlendirme biçimleri, akitlerin sıhhatini değerlendirmelerinde de ektili olmuştur. Mahiyeti itibariyle değişik formları bulunmasıyla birlikte kısaca, ürünün peyderpey alınıp ücretin ürünün tüketilmesinden sonra ödenmesinin taahhüt edilmesi şeklinde tarif edilen isticrâr akdi, İslam hukuk ekolleri tarafından (...) tartışılmıştır. Bu tartışmalar genellikle akdin sıhhat ve kuruluş unsurlarını taşıyıp taşımaması etrafında gerçekleşirken Hanefi fukahası, isticrâr yoluyla yapılan alışveriş işlemlerinin insanlar tarafından sıkça yapıldığını göz önünde bulundurarak bu akdin istihsan yoluyla caiz görülmesi gerektiği kanaatine varmışlardır. Diğer mezheplerde de bu akde benzer gerekçelerle olumlu yaklaşımların bulunduğunu görmekteyiz. Bu çalışmamızda günümüz kırsal kesimde uygulanan ve özellikle finans dünyasında uygulanmaya başlanan ve aynı isimle literatüre girer isticrâr akdini, mezheplerin görüşleri bağlamında değerlendirmeye çalışacağız. (shrink)