Reliabilists hold that a belief is doxastically justified if and only if it is caused by a reliable process. But since such a process is one that tends to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs, reliabilism is on the face of it applicable to binary beliefs, but not to degrees of confidence or credences. For while beliefs admit of truth or falsity, the same cannot be said of credences in general. A natural question now arises: Can reliability (...) theories of justified belief be extended or modified to account for justified credence? In this paper, I address this question. I begin by showing that, as it stands, reliabilism cannot account for justified credence. I then consider three ways in which the reliabilist may try to do so by extending or modifying her theory, but I argue that such attempts face certain problems. After that, I turn to a version of reliabilism that incorporates evidentialist elements and argue that it allows us to avoid the problems that the other theories face. If I am right, this gives reliabilists a reason, aside from those given recently by Comesaña and Goldman, to move towards such a kind of hybrid theory. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have argued that it is hard for finite agents like us to reason and make decisions relying solely on our credences and preferences. They hold that for us to cope with our cognitive limitations, we need binary beliefs as well. For they think that such beliefs, by disposing us to treat certain propositions as true, help us cut down on the number of possibilities we need to consider when we reason. But using Ross and Schroeder as (...) my stalking horse, I argue that such an appeal to binary beliefs does not work. I begin by explaining why there’s supposedly a problem for an account of reasoning that invokes only credences and preferences. I then argue that Ross and Schroeder’s account of belief—as well as other similar accounts—does not help solve the problem. Finally, I consider an alternative approach to solving the problem. This approach, unlike the accounts I criticise, does not hold that having a disposition to treat a proposition as true is necessary for believing it. (shrink)

Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative infallibility, the weaker assumption of any ‘level-bridging principle’ suffices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which the “Moorean contradiction” commonly thought to underlie the result is (...) in fact consistent. This generalised result improves on the current understanding of Fitch’s result and widens the range of modalities of philosophical interest to which the result might be fruitfully applied. Along the way, we also consider a semantic explanation for Fitch’s result which answers a challenge raised by Kvanvig. (shrink)

Augment the propositional language with two modal operators: □ and ■. Define ⧫ to be the dual of ■, i.e. ⧫=¬■¬. Whenever (X) is of the form φ → ψ, let (X⧫) be φ→⧫ψ . (X⧫) can be thought of as the modally qualified counterpart of (X)—for instance, under the metaphysical interpretation of ⧫, where (X) says φ implies ψ, (X⧫) says φ implies possibly ψ. This paper shows that for various interesting instances of (X), fairly weak assumptions suffice for (...) (X⧫) to imply (X)—so, the modally qualified principle is as strong as its unqualified counterpart. These results have surprising and interesting implications for issues spanning many areas of philosophy. (shrink)

Language assessment literacy is a significant component of language teachers’ expertise but is also a challenging task for most language teachers. To date, there have been relatively few studies examining the research on teachers’ LAL during these decades. To fill this void, this article reviews the conceptualizations of LAL and relevant empirical studies published from 1991 to 2021. It first analyzes various conceptualizations of LAL. Then in examining the empirical studies on teachers’ LAL, five major themes emerge: teachers’ LAL levels; (...) factors influencing LAL; language teachers’ assessment training needs; language assessment training courses; and LAL development through reflection. Finally, future research directions on teachers’ LAL are discussed. (shrink)

A growing interest has been observed among K-12 school educators to incorporate maker pedagogy into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education to engage students in the design and making process. Both cognitive engagement and emotional engagement of students can be promoted through satisfying the psychological need of relatedness that concerns a sense of connection and belonging. How to support relatedness would influence the effective development of students’ cognitive competencies, namely creativity and critical thinking, and non-cognitive characteristics, namely interest and identity. (...) Therefore, the present study investigated how two relatedness support strategies—real-world problems and mentoring influence the development of student’s STEM-related cognitive competencies and non-cognitive characteristics in STEM marker activities. We implemented a 7-week intervention study with three classes of Grade 9 students in Hong Kong. Three intervention conditions were designed in the experiment, comprising textbook problem, RWP, and RWP with mentoring. Our analysis showed that the differences in creativity among the three groups were non-significant, the RWP and RWPM groups showed stronger critical thinking than the TBP group, and the RWPM group exhibited stronger STEM interest and identity than the other two groups. This study revealed the effectiveness of adopting RWP strategy in developing secondary students’ perceived cognitive competencies and the feasibility of employing a mentoring mechanism for cultivating learners’ perceived non-cognitive characteristics. Hence, we also offered practical suggestions for teachers. (shrink)

kk states that knowing entails knowing that one knows, and K¬K states that not knowing entails knowing that one does not know. In light of the arguments against kk and K¬K⁠, one might consider modally qualified variants of those principles. According to weak kk, knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. And according to weakK¬K⁠, not knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one does not know. This paper shows that weak kk and weakK¬K are much stronger than (...) they initially appear. Jointly, they entail kk and K¬K⁠. And they are susceptible to variants of the standard arguments against kk and K¬K⁠. This has interesting implications for the debate on positive introspection and for deeper issues concerning the structure and limits of knowability. (shrink)

What are the conditions under which suspension of belief—or suspension, for short—is justified? Process reliabilists hold that our beliefs are justified if and only if these are produced or sustained by reliable cognitive processes. But they have said relatively little about suspension. Perhaps they think that we may easily extend an account of justified belief to deal with justified suspension. But it's not immediately clear how we may do so; in which case, evidentialism has a distinct advantage over reliabilism. In (...) this paper, I consider some proposals as to how process reliabilists might seek to account for justified suspension. Although several of these proposals do not work, two are promising. The first such proposal appeals to the notion of propositional justification; the second involves weaving evidentialist elements into reliabilism. I'll argue that the second proposal is better than the first. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the view that rationality requires that our credences be regular. I go through different formulations of the requirement, and show that they face several problems. I then formulate a version of the requirement that solves most of, if not all, these problems. I conclude by showing that an argument thought to support the requirement as traditionally formulated actually does not; if anything, the argument, slightly modified, supports my version of the requirement.Send article to KindleTo send this (...) article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.REGULARITY REFORMULATEDVolume 9, Issue 4Weng Hong TangDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.23Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. REGULARITY REFORMULATEDVolume 9, Issue 4Weng Hong TangDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.23Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. REGULARITY REFORMULATEDVolume 9, Issue 4Weng Hong TangDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.23Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

It’s often thought that the phenomenon of risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure but not for single-premise closure. But recently, Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter have challenged this thought. Lasonen-Aarnio argues that, insofar as risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure, it poses a similar problem for single-premise closure. For she thinks that, there being such a thing as deductive risk, risk may aggregate over a single premise and the deduction itself. Schechter argues that single-premise closure succumbs to risk (...) aggregation outright. For he thinks that there could be a long sequence of competent single-premise deductions such that, even though we are justified in believing the initial premise of the sequence, intutively, we are not justified in believing the final conclusion. This intuition, Schechter thinks, vitiates single-premise closure. In this paper, I defend single-premise closure against the arguments offered by Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter. (shrink)

According to success semantics, a belief’s content is that which guarantees the success of the actions that the belief, in combination with the relevant desires, would cause. One worry with the view is that it seems to apply only to full beliefs and fares poorly in dealing with partial beliefs. For example, if Ida’s partial belief that p is of strength 0.5, she may act in a way that would fulfill her desires if p were in fact false—assuming that she (...) desires money, she may well accept a bet that pays her $500 if not-p and costs her nothing otherwise. In response to the worry, defenders of success semantics hold that the content of a partial belief is simply that which guarantees the success of the actions it would cause were it a full belief. But, as I’ll argue in this paper, such a response is unsatisfactory. (shrink)

What is it for an imprecise credence to be justified? It might be thought that this is not a particularly urgent question for friends of imprecise credences to answer. For one might think that its answer just depends on how a well-trodden issue in epistemology plays out—namely, that of which theory of doxastic justification, be it reliabilism, evidentialism, or some other theory, is correct. I’ll argue, however, that it’s difficult for reliabilists to accommodate imprecise credences, at least if we understand (...) such credences to be determinate first-order attitudes. If I’m right, reliabilists will have to reject imprecise credences, and friends of imprecise credences will have to reject reliabilism. Near the end of the paper, I’ll also consider whether reliabilism can accommodate indeterminate credences. (shrink)

In a short note written in 1929, Frank Ramsey put forward a reliabilist account of knowledge anticipating those given by Armstrong (1973) and Goldman (1967), among others, a few decades later. Some think that the note comprises the bulk of what Ramsey has to say about epistemology. But Ramsey’s ideas about epistemology extend beyond the note. Relatively little attention has been paid to his reliabilist account of reasonable belief. Even less attention has been paid to his reliabilist account of reasonable (...) degree of belief. In this paper, I spell out these aspects of Ramsey’s epistemology in more detail than has been done so far. I argue that Ramsey anticipates contemporary reliabilist accounts of justified belief and justified degree of belief. I also flesh out Ramsey’s reasons for being a reliabilist. This is worth doing if only because Ramsey has one of the earliest arguments for reliabilism, but it has received scarce attention. Also, Ramsey calls his reliabilism “a kind of pragmatism,” and examining the argument will help us clarify Ramsey’s pragmatist commitments and better understand his version of reliabilism. I argue that when viewed through contemporary lenses, Ramsey’s reliabilism contains revisionist elements: he’s not opposed to what we now call “concep- tual engineering.”. (shrink)

Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or (...) modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems. (shrink)

O artigo trata da primeira da fase, bem mais breve, do pensamento filosófico de Lima Vaz, reconhecido como um dos principais filósofos de sua geração no Brasil. Depois de fornecer algumas indicações sobre sua formação intelectual, detém-se na sua reflexão sobre as condições de reconciliação entre a mensagem cristã e o pensamento moderno através de seus artigos sobre “consciência histórica”, visando resgatar o verdadeiro sentido da modernidade. Analisa também a aplicação feita por ele dessas ideias à solução dos graves problemas (...) da sociedade brasileira então em debate, bem como a repercussão pública de sua proposta num momento decisivo da história nacional. Discute em seguida se ele com isso se mostra então favorável a um pensamento cristão alternativo à metafísica tradicional, concluindo por uma provável negativa. (shrink)

La caricatura de Garzón, que aparece en el periódico El Espectador con el título de Cartones, es una caricatura filosófica, un dibujo del alma humana, en contraste con la de su contemporáneo Osuna que es la clásica caricatura política. Garzón prescinde, en general, de las palabras y critica con humor seco la insensatez. Adopta en sus dibujos del alma una posición ética que repudia el espíritu mercantil de nuestra época. El hombrecillo protagonista de sus dibujos recuerda los hombres grises, creados (...) por Michael Ende, en su novela Momo. En el maletín los hombrecillos de Garzón llevan el tiempo, pero también, como en una caja de Pandora, portan muchos otros de los pseudovalores que los humanos empleamos para autodestruirnos. Sin embargo, en ese mismo maletín muchos hombres llevan la esperanza. La obra de Garzón nos plantea tres desafíos: (I) el problema de la percepción, con la cual vemos y oímos solamente lo que podemos y queremos ver y oir, poniendo en jaque la objetividad; (II) el problema del lenguaje, que resuelve dejando el texto implícito, como Nicolás Gómez Dávila, invitándonos a escribir nuestros propios escolios; (III) el problema del instante y de nuestra inevitable relación con el tiempo, cuyo planteamiento nos deja entrever jirones de Heidegger y de Ende, cuando él dice, al comentar su propia obra que “conocemos desde donde estamos”. Garzón, de muchos de sus Cartones, ha hecho grabados, duplicando en esta forma la energía creadora de su obra periodística, dándose y dándonos un placer estético redoblado con genial generosidad. (shrink)

ObjectiveLeveraging an integrative multimodal MRI paradigm to elaborate on the hippocampus-derived structural and functional changes in children and adolescents with juvenile idiopathic arthritis and to explore potential correlations within the “joint-inflammation-brain” axis during the period of central neural system development.MethodsTwenty-one patients with JIA all completed the multimodal MRI scanning, laboratory tests, and neuropsychological assessments; meanwhile, 23 matched controls were recruited. We then harnessed the spherical harmonics with a point distribution model and the ROI-to-voxel functional connectivity to measure the hippocampal shape (...) and hippocampo-cortical FC patterns. Correlation analysis was performed to explore the potential links in neuroimaging features with disease-related indices.ResultsCompared to controls, JIA patients only presented an atrophic tendency in the posterior part of the bilateral hippocampus. The hippocampo-cortical FC revealed the between-group divergences mainly located at the pain matrix, striatum, and temporal lobe. Remarkably, the enhanced FC between the right hippocampus and postcentral cortex is positively correlated with the disability index, while the weakened FC of right anterior hippocampus with right insula and that of left posterior hippocampus with left superior temporal gyrus was inversely related to the erythrocyte sedimentation rate and anxiety status, separately.ConclusionAs with macroscopic damages, the altered functional-connectome patterns of the hippocampus in JIA patients might be more sensitive to detect the early neuropathological changes. Moreover, the functional disturbances were demonstrated associated with the physical disability, inflammation, and emotional status. These findings may enlighten us on the underlying neuropathological mechanism of CNS comorbidities in JIA. (shrink)

This article considers the theme of discernment in the tradition of Ignatian spirituality emanating from the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus. After a brief introduction which addresses the central problematic of bad influences that manifest themselves as good, the article turns to the life and work of two Jesuits, the 16th C English missionary to India, Thomas Stephens and the 20th C French historian and cultural critic, Michel de Certeau. Both kept (...) up a constant dialogue with local culture in which they sought authenticity in their response to ‘events’, whether a hideous massacre which shaped the pastoral commitment and writing of Stephens in the south of the Portuguese enclave of Goa or the 1968 student-led protests in Paris that so much affected the thinking of de Certeau. Very different in terms of personal background and contemporary experience, they both share in a tradition of discernment as a virtuous response to what both would understand as the ‘wisdom of the Spirit’ revealed in their personal interactions with ‘the other’. (shrink)

How should we account for self-knowledge of our inner lives? Some have argued that just as we have various senses that allow us to perceive the environment, we have an inner sense that allows us to perceive our inner lives. But others find such a view implausible and think that there are other ways to account for self-knowledge. With respect to all-or-nothing beliefs, some have held that we may account for self-knowledge by appealing to the claim that such beliefs are (...) transparent--that we may answer the question 'Do you believe p?' by answering the question 'Is it the case that p?' But surprisingly, little or no attention has been paid to the question of whether partial beliefs are transparent. In this paper, I clarify the question of whether partial beliefs are transparent. I also consider various attempts to answer the question in the affirmative. To anticipate, my verdict is pessimistic: I argue that such attempts fail. (shrink)

This paper introduces a concept called task muddiness as a metric for higher intelligence. Task muddiness is meant to be inclusive and expendable in nature. The intelligence required to execute a task is measured by the composite muddiness of the task described by multiple muddiness factors. The composite muddiness explains why many challenging tasks are muddy and why autonomous mental development is necessary for muddy tasks. It facilitates better understanding of intelligence, what the human adult mind can do, and how (...) to build a machine to acquire higher intelligence. The task-muddiness indicates a major reason why a higher biological mind is autonomously developed from autonomous, simple-to-complex experience. The paper also discusses some key concepts that are necessary for understanding the mind and intelligence, such as intelligence metrics, the mode a task is conveyed to the task executor, a human and a machine being a joint task performer in the traditional artificial intelligence (AI), a developmental agent (human or machine) being a sole task performer, and the need for autonomy in task-nonexplicit learning. (shrink)

This study explores cultural influence on corporate behavior employing the case of merchant guild culture in China and further the moderating role of Marketization. Using hand-collected data on merchant guild culture, we find that merchant guild culture is significantly negatively associated with owner-manager agency costs, suggesting that merchant guild culture in ancient China still has its continuous and remarkable effects on managerial behavior in contemporary corporations. This finding also implies that merchant guild culture motivates managers to upgrade the efficiency of (...) controlling operating costs, reduces agency conflicts between management and shareholders, and eventually mitigates owner-manager agency costs. Moreover, provincial Marketization level attenuates the negative association between merchant guild culture and owner-manager agency costs. Above results are robust to a variety of alternative measures of merchant guild culture and owner-manager agency costs. Furthermore, our findings are still valid after controlling for the potential endogeneity between merchant guild culture and owner-manager agency costs. (shrink)

Drawing on social cognitive theory, this study extends our understanding of the relationship between ethical leadership and employee work engagement, by exploring self-efficacy as an important mediating variable. In addition, we propose that the quality of LMX moderates the relationships such that the direct and indirect relationships between ethical leadership, self-efficacy, and work engagement are stronger when the quality of LMX is high. Data collected in two-waves from 373 respondents working in different manufacturing organizations of Pakistan supported our hypothesized theoretical (...) model. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)