In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of the space of possible analyses of the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction, together with a set of considerations which militate against all but our own proposal. Among the many accounts we consider and reject are the ‘explicit’ approach to quantifier domain restric‐tion discussed, for example, by Stephen Neale, and the pragmatic approach to quantifier domain restriction proposed by Kent Bach. Our hope is that the exhaustive discussion of this special case of (...) context‐dependence will provide guidelines for how to decide, for an arbitrary case of context‐dependent discourse, whether it should be treated syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically. (shrink)

The Danish philosopher K. E. Løgstrup is best known in the Anglo-American world for his original work in ethics, primarily in _The Ethical Demand _. Løgstrup continued to write extensively on issues in ethics and phenomenology throughout his life, and extracts from some of his later writings are now also available in translation in _Beyond the Ethical Demand_. In _Concern for the Other: The Ethics of K. E. Løgstrup_, eleven scholars examine the structure, intention, and originality of Løgstrup's ethics as (...) a whole. This collection of essays is a companion to _Beyond the Ethical Demand_, as well as to _The Ethical Demand_. The essays examine Løgstrup’s crucial concept of the “sovereign expressions of life”; his view of moral principles as a substitute for, or inferior form of, ethics; his relationships to other philosophers, including the twentieth-century British moral philosophers; and the role of his Lutheran background in his ethics. Løgstrup also firmly advanced the controversial thesis, examined by several essays in this volume, that the demand for “other-concern” central to his ethics does not depend on religious faith. “The significance of Løgstrup’s work is well demonstrated by the substantive criticisms made of that work by the essays here collected. Hopefully this book will encourage others to engage this significant but unfortunately not well-known thinker.” —_Stanley Hauerwas, Gilbert T. Rowe Professor of Theological Ethics, Duke Divinity School_ “Svend Andersen and Kees van Kooten Niekerk have done a great service for everyone with the publication of this stellar book on the thought of Knud E. Løgstrup, the most prominent Danish theologian-philosopher of the last century. CONCERN FOR THE OTHER includes essays by renowned thinkers who critically engage Løgstrup’s work with both insight and depth. The book thereby provides an engagement with this important thinker’s ideas about morality, trust, and responsibility and yet also presents features of the current state of the debate within ethics. I enthusiastically commend this book to anyone interested in contemporary ethics and moral theory as well as the relation between theology and philosophy.” —_William Schweiker, Edward L. Ryerson Distinguished Service Professor of Theological Ethics, The University of Chicago_. (shrink)

Fictionalist approaches to ontology have been an accepted part of philosophical methodology for some time now. On a fictionalist view, engaging in discourse that involves apparent reference to a realm of problematic entities is best viewed as engaging in a pretense. Although in reality, the problematic entities do not exist, according to the pretense we engage in when using the discourse, they do exist. In the vocabulary of Burgess and Rosen (1997, p. 6), a nominalist construal of a given discourse (...) is revolutionary just in case it involves a “reconstruction or revision” of the original discourse. Revolutionary approaches are therefore prescriptive. In contrast, a nominalist construal of a given discourse is hermeneutic just in case it is a nominalist construal of a discourse that is put forth as a hypothesis about how the discourse is in fact used; that is, hermeneutic approaches are descriptive. I will adopt Burgess and Rosen’s terminology to describe the two different spirits in which a fictionalist hypothesis in ontology might be advanced. Revolutionary fictionalism would involve admitting that while the problematic discourse does in fact involve literal reference to nonexistent entities, we ought to use the discourse in such a way that the reference is simply within the pretense. The hermeneutic fictionalist, in contrast, reads fictionalism into our actual use of the problematic discourse. According to her, normal use of the problematic discourse involves a pretense. According to the pretense, and only according to the pretense, there exist the objects to which the discourse would commit its users, were no pretense involved. My purpose in this paper is to argue that hermeneutic fictionalism is not a viable strategy in ontology. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I discuss in detail several problematic consequences of any interesting application of hermeneutic fictionalism. Of course, if there is good evidence that hermeneutic fictionalism is correct in some cases, then some of these drastic consequences would have to be accepted.. (shrink)

Karttunen's seminal 1973 article Presuppositions of compound sentences, lays the groundwork for the elegant and fruitful theory of this subject which he subsequently presented in (1974). In (1973, pp. 185–8), however, he fallaciously argued that the regularities he discovered concerning the behavior of and, or, and if ... then in English cannot be embodied in any three-valued logic giving a truth-functional interpretation to these connectives. The present paper refutes Karttunen's argument by exhibiting an interpretation with the desired properties, and shows (...) further how the full articulation of his 1974 system can be developed naturally within a truth-conditional semantics for English if bivalence is abandoned — contrary to what Karttunen expected. (shrink)

S. Pockett and G. Gomes discuss a possible bias in the method by which Libet's subjects estimated the time at which they became aware of their intent to move their hands. The bias, caused by sensory delay processing the clock information, would be sufficient to alter Trevena and Miller's conclusions regarding the timing of the lateralized readiness potential. I show that the flash-lag effect would compensate for that bias. In the last part of my commentary I note that the other (...) target articles do not examine the most interesting aspect of Libet's unfashionable views on free will. I point out that Libet's views are less strange than they at first appear to be. (shrink)

According to what I call ‘the asymmetry thesis’, persons, though they are the direct bearers of the properties expressed by mental predicates, are not the direct bearers of properties such as those expressed by ‘weighs 135 pounds’ or ‘has crossed legs’. A number of different views about persons entail the asymmetry thesis. I first argue that the asymmetry thesis entails an error theory about our discourse involving person‐referring terms. I then argue that it is further threatened by consideration of the (...) grounds we have for self‐ascribing mental and physical predicates. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 5, Page 711-712, August 2012.

Our intuitions about whether someone knows that p vary even fixing the intuitively epistemic features of that person’s situation. Sometimes they vary with features of our own situation, and sometimes they vary with features of the putative knower’s situation. If the putative knower is in a risky situation and her belief that p is pivotal in achieving a positive outcome of one of the actions available to her, or avoiding a negative one, we often feel she must be in a (...) particularly good epistemic position to know that p. If however she is not in a risky situation, we tend to be considerably more permissive in our attributions of knowledge. Our intuitions about when someone knows that p and when she doesn’t also fluctuate with what is salient, either to the putative knower or ourselves. If someone claims to know where their car is, and I raise the possibility that it has been stolen, she may retract her claim to know. Which of these tendencies, if any, reveal something about the nature of our epistemic terms or concepts? (shrink)

A conference sponsored by the U.S. National Institutes of Health in 1995 proposed 13 categories by which alternative and complementary medical systems could be described. This model was applied to Filipino Christian Spiritist (Espiritista) Healing, a folk healing system that dates back hundred of years. This system was found to match each of the model's categories, providing a framework in which future research projects could be designed. The utility of this model speaks well for the sophistication of Espiritista healing, even (...) though its effectiveness is still an open question. (shrink)

The anomalous experiences of shamans have been reported over the centuries, but only recently have they been subjected to rigorous investigation. Although interviews, reports, and informal observations can produce interesting material, their anomalous nature can only be determined by controlled observations and experimental studies. Examples of each are given and recommendations are made for further research.

I focus on some of Peter McHugh’s most recent papers. This is work that is not yet widely known, some of which has not even been published as yet. I try to show that while the work does not in any way contradict his life-long commitments, it still has the capacity to be not at all predictable.

Religion after Deliberative Democracy responds to gaps exposed by the case of religion in deliberative democratic theory. Religion's persistent visibility in political life has called for new solutions for healing deeply divided societies. In response, the author begins with Jeffrey Stout’s pragmatist vision of democracy before providing a series of supplements in subsequent chapters. Past legacies are refigured in a rapprochement with Jürgen Habermas’s work which is differentiated from the distinctive relevance of Hannah Arendt’s vita activa. New developments in comparative (...) political theology are complemented by recent systems theory approaches to institutional interactions. Peaceful protest movements are reframed in light of the trust-building capacities of minipublics. The result is reason for renewed confidence in democratic practices attuned to fostering political plurality and capable of responding to persistent religious partisanship. This book fills a crucial space in the literature on religion and democracy and will be of interest to students and scholars of philosophy of religion, theology, pragmatism, and political theory. (shrink)

This Special Issue of The European Legacy focuses on Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, first published in Latin as Meditationes de Prima Philosophia in Paris, in 1641. The ten articles ap...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:19. AN 'INCONVENIENCE' OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM In Part II of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Cleanthes maintains that the similarities between the works of nature and those of human contrivance, namely, the presence of means to ends relations and a coherence of parts, are sufficient to enable us to reason analogically to the conclusion that the cause of the design of the world resembles human intelligence. Cleanthes insists in Part (...) IV that the ideas which -we have of mind are 'just and adequate and correspondent' to God's nature. Philo, who throughout the discussion has insisted on 'the adorable mysteriousness ' of the divine nature, responds to Cleanthes by saying that he will endeavour to show the inconveniences of that anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged; in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute. (D160) It is the aim of this paper to explicate this 'inconvenience of Cleanthes' anthropomorphism. Philo begins by claiming that nothing is gained by Cleanthes' position whether it is assessed by 'reason' or by 'experience'. The judgment of reason is that a mental world or universe of ideas requires a cause as much as does a material world or universe of objects ; and if similar in its arrangement must require a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? In an ahi: L ra.-t view, they are entirely alike; and no difficulty attenda the one supposition, which is not common to both of them. (D160) Similarly, experience cannot perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two kinds of worlds, but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. (D16ÌÌ 20. Philo concludes that the type of argument employed by Cleanthes leads to an infinite regress: How therefore shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being, whom you suppose the Author of nature, or, according to your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle. (D161) He then suggests, as though it will prove to be more satisfactory, that we should not go beyond the material world itself: But if we stop, and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on in infinitum? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression?... If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on, without end. It were better... never to look beyond the present material world. (D161-162) In suggesting that it is better never to look beyond the material world, what precisely is it that Philo is 2 advocating? George Nathan maintains that "Cleanthes is unaware that Philo is trying to eliminate only the externality of the cause. He is not trying to deny its intelligence ". (Chappell 410) Pike, on the other hand, interprets Philo' s position as eliminating the requirement for a causal account of the order present in the world: If we introduce an ordered mind in an effort to explain the existence of an ordered world, must we not provide a similar explanation of the ordered mind? But if we accept this demand, we shall have to introduce yet another intelligent being as the creator of the first. This explanatory chain can end only in an infinite regress. We would probably do better to assume that order in the material world is an ultimate fact that does not require explanation. Once we take the first step down the explanatory trail we are committed to go on forever. (Pike 157) 21. I will now examine critically the interpretations suggested by Nathan and Pike. Certain questions suggest themselves regarding Nathan's position. First, what does Nathan mean by the intelligence of... (shrink)

The power of literature to resist "totalization," to divide and oppose whole meaning, to separate Being from the word, or to name Being as itself divided—this is de Man's oldest and best-defended idea. Behind its deconstructionist and semiological variations in the recent work is a long genealogy of such insistence.6 This "genealogy" contains instructive continuities and aberrations. The continuities tend to show de Man to an extraordinary degree the captive of his beginnings. The aberrations pose a threat to the very (...) criterion of rigor which he makes the touchstone of his position. I will restrict myself here to an account of what is coherent and what is incoherent in de Man's treatment of the category of error.[…]Error is not mistake. The concept of the mistake is usable, perhaps, within the restricted teleology of pragmatic acts or within the quasi-rigorous language of scientific description. Mistakes are without true value: trivial, in principle corrigible according to a norm already known. But the skew of error implies a truth. Furthermore, the concept of error supplies to the categories of blindness and insight as much coherence as they are able to achieve. As we shall see, it brings together the constituents of the essential ambivalence of all literary and at least some philosophical language .6. In 1956, for instance, in a review of Nathalie Sarraute's L'Ère du Soupçon, de Man offered his reading of "the central moment of Ulysses, the carefully prepared encounter between Bloom and Stephan Dedalus": it "indicates, surely, the total impossiblity of any contact, of any human communication, even in the most disinterested love" .Stanley Corngold, professor of German and comparative literature at Princeton University, is the author of books and articles on Kafka, including The Commentator's Despair and an annotated translation of The Metamorphosis. A volume of his essays on the question of the self in Hölderlin, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Freud, Kafka, Mann, and Heidegger is forthcoming. (shrink)

A sentence is never not in a context. We are never not in a situation. A statute is never not read in the light on some purpose. A set of interpretative assumptions is always in force. A sentence that seems to need no interpretation is already the product of one...No sentence is ever apprehended independently of some or other illocutionary force. Illocutionary force is the key term in speech-act theory. It refers to the way an utterance is taken—as an order, (...) a warning, a promise, a proposal, a request, etc.—and the theory's strongest assertion is that no utterance is ever taken purely, that is, without already having been understood as the performance of some illocutionary act. Consider, as an example, the sentence "I will go." Depending on the context in which it is uttered, "I will go" can be understood as a promise, a threat, a warning, a report, a prediction, etc., but it will always be understood as one of these, and it will never be an unsituated kernel of pure semantic value. In other words, "I will go" does not have a basic or primary meaning which is then put to various illocutionary uses; rather, "I will go" is known only in its illocutionary lives, and in each of them its meaning will be different. Moreover, if the meaning of a sentence is a function of its illocutionary force , and if illocutionary force varies with the circumstances, then illocutionary force is not a property of sentences, but of situations. That is, while a sentence will always have an illocutionary force , the illocutionary force it has will not always be the same. Stanley E. Fish is the author of, among many other works, Is There a Text in This Class? Interpretative Authority in the Classroom and in Literary Criticism, and The Living Temple: George Herbert and Catechizing. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Facts and Fictions: A Reply to Ralph Rader" , "Interpreting the Variorum" , "Interpreting 'Interpreting the Variorum'" , "A Reply to John Reichert; or, How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Interpretation" , and "One More Time". (shrink)

Debates about freedom, an ideal continually contested, were first set out in their modern version by the eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His ideas and analyses were taken up during the philosophical enlightenment, often invoked during the French Revolution, and still resonate in contemporary discussions of freedom. This volume, first published in 2010, examines Rousseau's many approaches to the concept of freedom, in the context of his thought on literature, religion, music, theater, women, the body, and the arts. Its expert (...) contributors cross disciplinary frontiers to develop thought-provoking new angles on Rousseau's thought. By taking freedom as the guiding principle of their analysis, the essays form a cohesive account of Rousseau's writings. (shrink)

I could go on in this way, replying to Reichert's reply, point by point, but the pattern of my replies is already set: he charges that my position entails certain undesirable consequences and flies in the face of some of our most basic intuitions; I labor to show that none of those consequences follow and that our basic intuitions are confirmed rather than denied by what I have to say. This of course is exactly what I was doing in the (...) article to which he takes exception and will soon do at length in a book to be published within the year. I am not, however, optimistic that a reading of that book will make Reichert a convert because the fears that impel his argument are so basic to his beliefs. I take the key sentence in his article to be this one: "Since I would like to think that I read the same King Lear that Dr. Johnson read, and am therefore free to disagree with his interpretation of it, I would like to find a way out of Fish's formulation of the reader's situation" . Reichert's commitment to what he would like to be able to do and his conviction that if what I say is true he will be unable to do it make it impossible for him to regard my position as anything but perverse and dangerous. Even if I could demonstrate in his own terms that his fears are unfounded—that he is still free to disagree with Dr. Johnson or anyone else—any argument I might make would be received within the belief that it had to be wrong, and within that belief he could only hear it as wrong. To this Reichert would probably reply that arguments are either good or bad, irrespective of beliefs, and that mine are bad; but it is my contention that arguments are forceful only within a set of beliefs and that unless someone is willing to entertain the possibility that his beliefs are wrong he will be unable even to hear an argument that constitutes a challenge to them. That is why the fact that Reichert is likely to remain unconvinced by my argument is its strongest confirmation. Stanley Fish is the author of, among other works, Is There a Text in This Class? Interpretative Authority in the Classroom and in Literary Criticism. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Facts and Fictions: A Reply to Ralph Rader" , "Interpreting the Variorum" , "Interpreting 'Interpreting the Variorum'" , "Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases" , and "One More Time". (shrink)

What I would add, and what Reichert seems unable to see, is that the facts of the text do not identify themselves. He faults Roskill for failing to see that coherence is not a function of the text but of "principles we bring to the text"; yet he himself does not see that the text, insofar as one can point to it, is produced by those same principles. Indeed, Reichert is continually doing the very thing for which he criticizes Roskill, (...) attributing to the text qualities and features that are the product of interpretive strategies. Thus, for example, he cites the instance of "the interpreter . . . noticing something in the text that makes his former reading seem implausible" as evidence that the text is at some level independent of interpretation; but noticeability is a function of what it is possible to notice given a particular set of assumptions: a reader innocent of the principles of typology would be incapable of "noticing" a typological pattern, whereas for a reader like Madsen, the pattern will seem to announce itself; and a reader who "notices" something he didn't "notice" before is a reader who is proceeding within a different set of interpretive assumptions. That which is noticeable, in short, can never be the means of confirming or constraining interpretations because it is always a product of one. The same argument dissolves the distinction, invoked by Reichert, between extratextual and textual evidence; it is not that such a distinction is never in force but that what counts as internal and external evidence will vary according to the interpretive principles one espouses. Just what is and what is not extratextual is a matter of continual debate, and when the debate has been concluded, it is not because the matter has been settled by the facts but because one set of interpretive principles has won the right to say what the facts are. Stanley E. Fish is the author of, among other works, Is There a Text in This Class: The Sources of Interpretative Authority. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Facts and Fictions: A Reply to Ralph Rader" , "Interpreting the Variorum" , "Interpreting 'Interpreting the Variorum'" , "Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases" , and "A Reply to John Reichert; or, How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Interpretation". (shrink)

Descartes and Hume share at least one fundamental philosophical belief, and that is the proper mindset required in order to begin philosophizing in an orderly manner. Each holds that, once this mindset is achieved, the reader will readily accept the procedures and conclusions that follow. I propose to show that Descartes and Hume argue for the identical starting point for doing philosophy. However, despite this agreement between them, Hume rejects Descartes' teachings, even in regard to the Cogito ergo Sum. I (...) attempt to show why Hume rejects Descartes' account of the Cogito. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:69. A PROPOS D'UNE DIFFICULTE LOGIQUE DANS L'ARGUMENT DE CLEANTHE L'argument de Cléanthe ("the Argument from Design", c'est-à-dire la preuve de Dieu par le dessein du monde) se fonde sur le principe que "des effets semblables prouvent des causes semblables" pour montrer que la ressemblance entre le dessein du monde et le dessein des machines amène la conclusion que la cause du dessein du monde ressemble à l'intelligence humaine. (...) Dans l'attaque de Philon contre cet argument, nous trouvons deux passages dans les Parties IV et V consacrés aux difficultés qui proviennent de l'anthropomorphisme de Cléanthe. Et le raisonnement par l'absurde de Philon prend pour point de départ cette conception anthropomorphique de Dieu: Et que dites-vous des découvertes d'anatomie, de chimie, de botanique?... - Ce ne sont certes pas là des objections, répondit Cléanthe; elles découvrent seulment de nouveaux exemples d'art et d'industrie. C'est encore l'image de l'esprit que réfléchissent sur nous d'innombrables objets. - Ajoutez: un esprit pareil à l'esprit humain, dit Philon. - Je n'en connais point d'autre, répondit Cléanthe. - Et plus it est pareil, mieux cela vaut? insista Philon. - Bien sûr, dit Cléanthe. (p. 53) La première étape de son argument s'ensuit: Eh bien, Cléanthe, dit Philon, avec un air d'allégresse et de triomphe, remarquez les conséquences. Premièrement, par cette méthode de raisonnement, vous renoncez à toute prétention à l'infinité en aucun des attributs de la Divinité. Car, puisque la cause doit seulement être proportionnée à l'effet, et que l'effet, pour autant qu'il tombe sous notre connaissance, n'est pas infini, quel droit avons-nous, selon vos suppositions, de prêter cet attribut à l'Etre divin? Vous soutiendrez encore 70. qu'en l'éloignant à ce point de toute similitude avec les créatures humaines, nous donnons dans l'hypothèse la plus arbitraire, et, en même temps, affaiblissons toutes les preuves de son existence. (p. 53) On pourrait croire que l'argument de Philon est inadmissible, soit à cause de son pyrrhonisme, soit à cause de sa doctrine sur la causalité (celle de Hume lui-même) qui n'admet pas la connaissance a priori des causes. Mais en fait l'argument déployé par Philon ne représente pas sa propre position (et n'entre donc pas en conflit avec son pyrrhonisme), et en tant qu'il fait appel à la causalité, n'est point valable. Pour voir qu'il en est ainsi, on n'a qu'à regarder sa phrase préliminaire "par cette méthode du raisonnement" ainsi que la phrase "selon vos suppositions" qui montrent que cette première étape s'ensuit de la position de Cléanthe. Pourquoi Philon met-il en avant cet argument? Ou plutôt, qu'a dit Cléanthe pour amener Philon à mettre cet argument à son compte? La response se trouve dans la version de Cléanthe de la preuve de Dieu par le dessein, dans la Partie II: "Puis donc que les effets se ressemblent entre eux, nous sommes conduits à inférer, d'après toutes les règles de l'analogie, que les causes se ressemblent également, et que l'auteur de la nature est quelque peu semblable à l'esprit de l'homme, quoique doué de facultés bien plus vastes, proportionnées à la grandeur de l'oeuvre qu'il a exécutée. Par cet argument a posteriori, et par cet argument seul, nous prouvons à la fois l'existence d'une Divinité et sa similitude avec l'esprit et l'intelligence de l'homme." (p. 26 les italiques sont de moi) C'est donc Cléanthe qui peu après le début voudrait que, dans ces cas où seul l'effet se fait observer, nous devions proportionner la cause à l'effet. 71. On pourrait m'objecter que je n'ai pas encore montré que l'argument de Philon ne l'engage pas à poser un Dieu fini qui conviendrait à l'effet fini (le dessein du monde), que son propos que "la cause devrait être proportionnée à l... (shrink)

At the end of Book 1, Part 1, Section IV of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume informs us that the topics in Book 1, Part 1 “may be consider’d as the elements of this philosophy”. Among the topics discussed in Part 1 of this Book is distinctions of reason, which he covers briefly toward the end of his treatment of abstract ideas. While other topics treated in this Part of Book 1 are clearly utilized in subsequent Sections, Parts, and (...) Books of the Treatise, distinctions of reason are rarely mentioned beyond his discussion of this topic toward the end of Section V11 of Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise. My paper has several aims: First, I will attempt to show the role that distinctions of reason play in providing our awareness of space; second, I will show how Hume’s empiricist account of Geometry in the Treatise is developed through his account of our awareness space; and third, I will briefly address the altered account of Geometry in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:155. REMARKS ON P. S. WADIA" S 'PHILO CONFOUNDED' In responding to Professor Wadia's paper in McGiIl Hume Studies, I will attempt to show why his analysis of the illustrative analogies in Part III of the Dialogues fails to capture what it is that Cleanthes sought to accomplish through them. On p. 285, Wadia begins his discussion of Part III and admits to being bewildered because one expects Cleanthes (...) to confine his illustrations to familiar things in the world around him. One wonders, however, why Wadia thinks the ilustrations should be so confined, since it is precisely matters such as these for which the Design Argument is attempting to account through the hypothesis of an intelligent external artificer - an hypothesis which Philo refuses to accept in this regard. Contrary to what Wadia maintains, there is one occasion in Part III where Cleanthes' defense does have recourse to natural phenomena. On p. 154 he asks Philo to consider, anatomise the eye, and behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions and whole course of life before and after generation to be persuaded that the most obvious conclusion surely is in favour of design! Cleanthes explains Philo's resistance to this most obvious conclusion as due to too luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections. (DNR155) On two occasions in Part III-in the first paragraph and once again toward the end of the seventh - Cleanthes comments on Philo's 'blindness' in rejecting the inference from natural phenomena to an intelligent cause of design. Given this assessment of Philo by Cleanthes, the employment of imaginary examples is easily appreciated inasmuch as actual examples have been impotent in convincing Philo. Just how these imaginary examples are relevant to his position has yet to be discussed; but the use of imaginary illustrations is not bewildering. 156. In setting the stage for his central claim on Cleanthes* intended use of his illustrations, Wadia seriously misrepresents the disagreement between Philo and Cleanthes. At one point (p. 286) he takes Philo to be arguing that empirical evidence regarding an intelligent designer is actually inconceivable. But, in fact, this was not Philo's position in Part II at all. Philo finds it easy indeed to conceive of the empirical evidence required to support the conclusion of the Design Argument, namely, the world must sufficiently resemble some thing which is known to be intelligently contrived to enable us to classify it as a further instance of that kind of thing. If this could be done, the principle 'like effects prove like causes' could be used to infer an intelligent cause for the design of the world. Philo, of course, denies that the required resemblance can be found. However, as I have shown, he never denies that it is conceivable. One page earlier, Wadia offers an account of Philo's position in Part II which is also incorrect. He argues that since, for Philo, an inference to the existence of an intelligent designer of the world requires having seen worlds formed under our eyes, this claim amounts to saying that it is impossible for there to be empirical evidence relevant to the conclusion of the Design Argument, because no one can satisfy this condition. Philo's argument in Part II, however, is not this one. He begins by considering how the world must present itself to justify reasoning by analogy to an intelligent designer. And it is only because the required resemblances between the world and objects of human contrivance are not present, that he offers 'seeing worlds formed under our eyes' as a condition which must be satisfied if the inference to an intelligent designer is to be acceptable. Now since Philo himself entertains possible states of the world which, if they existed, would constitute evidence for an intelligent designer, Wadia is mistaken in attributing "the impossibility claim* 157. to Philo. For Wadia to argue successfully regarding Philo's adoption of 'the impossibility claim' he must show that Philo has argues that it is impossible for the world to resemble objects of human contrivance - a position which Philo never... (shrink)

In this article, I examine one of the most famous and controversial illustrative analogies in all philosophical literature—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds—which is presented by Cleanthes in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes holds that this illustration will unprejudice Philo’s mind to the point where the latter will accept the analogical Argument from Design, which Cleanthes presents in Part 2 of the Dialogues. Since Philo offers no direct reply to this illustrative analogy in Part (...) 3, I attempt to locate where, in the Dialogues, he assesses the Articulate Voice illustration. My critical assessment reveals that it is Hume’s/Philo’s considered position in Part 12 that the Articulate Voice fails to strengthen Cleanthes’ position regarding the analogical Design Argument. In Part 3, Cleanthes also makes reference to a natural or irregular argument for inferring an intelligent cause for the Voice heard from the clouds, and for the design of the world. I argue that in Part 12, Philo accepts the natural or irregular argument for the inference to an intelligent cause for the design of the world, but rejects this type of argument in the case of the Articulate Voice heard from the clouds. (shrink)

In this article, I examine one of the most famous and controversial illustrative analogies in all philosophical literature—the Articulate Voice speaking from the clouds—which is presented by Cleanthes in Part 3 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes holds that this illustration will unprejudice Philo’s mind to the point where the latter will accept the analogical Argument from Design, which Cleanthes presents in Part 2 of the Dialogues. Since Philo offers no direct reply to this illustrative analogy in Part (...) 3, I attempt to locate where, in the Dialogues, he assesses the Articulate Voice illustration. My critical assessment reveals that it is Hume’s/Philo’s considered position in Part 12 that the Articulate Voice fails to strengthen Cleanthes’ position regarding the analogical Design Argument. In Part 3, Cleanthes also makes reference to a natural or irregular argument for inferring an intelligent cause for the Voice heard from the clouds, and for the design of the world. I argue that in Part 12, Philo accepts the natural or irregular argument for the inference to an intelligent cause for the design of the world, but rejects this type of argument in the case of the Articulate Voice heard from the clouds. (shrink)