The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

Franz Rosenzweig : the other side of the West -- Dissimilation -- Hegel taken literally -- Utopia and redemption -- Walter Benjamin : the three models of history -- Metaphors of origin : ideas, names, stars -- The esthetic model -- The angel of history -- Gershem Scholem : the secret history -- The paradoxes of messianism -- Kafka, Freud, and the crisis of tradition -- Language and secularization.

La question des instincts est une voie d’entrée privilégiée pour le rapport du pragmatisme au naturalisme. Le problème que soulève la théorie des instincts de William James et John Dewey vient du maintien, à première vue surprenant, de l’idée d’une « nature humaine ». Je soutiens que c’est au sein même de la théorie pragmatiste des instincts que l’on trouve des arguments pour montrer que la nature humaine ne détermine pas univoquement la conduite. Bien comprendre la naturalité de l’être humain (...) suffit à défaire toute tentative pour l’ériger en source d’autorité des principes de la conduite. (shrink)

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

Local sustainable food systems have captured the popular imagination as a progressive, if not radical, pillar of a sustainable food future. Yet these grassroots innovations are embedded in a dominant food regime that reflects productivist, industrial, and neoliberal policies and institutions. Understanding the relationship between these emerging grassroots efforts and the dominant food regime is of central importance in any transition to a more sustainable food system. In this study, we examine the encounters of direct farm marketers with food safety (...) regulations and other government policies and the role of this interface in shaping the potential of local food in a wider transition to sustainable agri-food systems. This mixed methods research involved interview and survey data with farmers and ranchers in both the USA and Canada and an in-depth case study in the province of Manitoba. We identified four distinct types of interactions between government and farmers: containing, coopting, contesting, and collaborating. The inconsistent enforcement of food safety regulations is found to contain progressive efforts to change food systems. While government support programs for local food were helpful in some regards, they were often considered to be inadequate or inappropriate and thus served to coopt discourse and practice by primarily supporting initiatives that conform to more mainstream approaches. Farmers and other grassroots actors contested these food safety regulations and inadequate government support programs through both individual and collective action. Finally, farmers found ways to collaborate with governments to work towards mutually defined solutions. While containing and coopting reflect technologies of governmentality that reinforce the status quo, both collaborating and contesting reflect opportunities to affect or even transform the dominant regime by engaging in alternative economic activities as part of the ‘politics of possibility’. Developing a better understanding of the nature of these interactions will help grassroots movements to create effective strategies for achieving more sustainable and just food systems. (shrink)

Foucault’s Forgotten Marxism. This article tries to point out several methodological issues concerning Foucault’s Surveiller et punir, such as the equivocal status of some of Foucault’s main concepts, or the assumed homogeneity of the various disciplinary institutions analyzed in this book. And it aims at suggesting that such issues might find a solution, should one consider the Marxist background on which, as the Lectures at the Collège de France of the year 1973 clearly show, Foucault’s theories were dependant. In the (...) opinion of the author, only in as much as this heritage is accepted and seriously taken into account, shall Foucault’s concepts and theses regain their political and critical pertinence. (shrink)

Quel rôle joue le concept de vie quotidienne dans le scepticisme de Sextus Empiricus? À partir d’une analyse du concept de βιωτικὴ τήρησις, il s’agit de faire apparaître, d’une part (i) que la vie quotidienne, par opposition à la vie philosophique, est un fait empirique qui permet au sceptique d’agir sans pour autant avoir d’opinions et d’autre part que (ii) la vie quotidienne est une valeur qui donne sens à la philosophie sceptique. Bien que ces deux approches paraissent contradictoires, le (...) but de cet article est de montrer que le scepticisme philosophique proposé par Sextus les rend compatibles. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First, we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian (...) Hypotyposes 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, (...) I rely on several considerations: the similarity between epistemic feelings and the feeling of being decided that tells us that we have an intention, the necessity of postulating a gate mechanism to explain our hesitating behavior, and the tight link that exists between the realization of our actions and our desires. In agreement with non-reductivists, I nevertheless acknowledge that intentions encompass plans, although I emphasize that the planning capacity must also be dependent on our motivational life and the general evaluative mechanisms that explains our emotions. (shrink)

Nel suo recente libro Das Recht der Freiheit, Axel Honneth propone un'interpretazione critica del neocapitalismo - risultato di una patologica evoluzione di un fenomeno, in sé, normale e persino positivo: la predominanza dei meccanismi di mercato nella sfera del lavoro e della produzione. Per Honneth, il mercato non solo č economicamente efficiente, ma permette anche l'emergere di forme di riconoscimento originali e insostituibili. Ciononostante, queste forme possono facilmente corrompersi se la relazione fra i partner dello scambio diventa troppo squilibrata, come (...) avviene nel neocapitalismo. L'articolo propone una valutazione critica di questa interpretazione storica. (shrink)

C’est dans les premiers essais théoriques d’Erich Fromm publiés par la Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung au début des années 1930 que l’on trouve une première élaboration des notions de « personnalité autoritaire » et de « caractère autoritaire ». Une sociologie psychanalytique, explique Fromm, ne saurait se ramener, comme le suggère une..

Why is there a specific problem with biological individuality? Because the living realm contains a wide range of exotic particular concrete entities that do not easily match our ordinary concept of an individual. Slime moulds, dandelions, siphonophores are among the Odd Entities that excite the ontological zeal of the philosophers of biology. Most of these philosophers, however, seem to believe that these Odd Cases oblige us to refine or revise our common concept of an individual. They think, explicitly or tacitly, (...) that to be a living, evolutionary entity is to be a living individual. In this paper, we explore an alternative proposal: the variety and oddity of the forms of the living realm might be ontologically regimented through an increase in the categorial complexity of the living realm, by admitting, beside living individuals, living non-individuals or by acknowledging, more generally, that the evolutionary development of the living forms is not necessarily a process of building individuals, that life is not necessarily individuals-oriented. We claim that, from an ontological point of view, the spectacle of the living realm obliges us to take aggregativity seriously. (shrink)

This article renders a close reading of those passages in Walter Benjamin's work where he uses the term “unscheinbar.” Arguing that this concept cannot be reduced to its privative prefix “un-,” the article explores how moments in time, objects or images that are not meaningful in themselves can nevertheless trigger an experience that is to be called such. The article analyzes Benjamin's ideas on friendliness, commemoration, melancholy, mémoire involontaire and photography with the purpose of understanding how a detail or fragment (...) strikes us as significant, despite the fact that it cannot become visible as a unity or whole in its own right. (shrink)

Our contribution concerns the continuous training of teachers that will be forming future teachers during their traineeship. It aims to describe how the professional development of the trainees’ coaches, both the training supervisors as well as the supervisors form the trainees’ schools, was used during a course proposed by a university and during meetings where practices were shared by the participants. In this manner, we identified the ideal moments for development of the trainees, as well as the most important levers (...) for the transformation of the coaches. We paid particular attention to the reflexive contract co-defined by the group, as well as to the principle of social moderation at the heart of the collaborative group’s dynamic. (shrink)

S. Haber tente de montrer combien le projet de relire l’œuvre de Marx au prisme d’une réévaluation philosophique, en elle-même justifiée et féconde, des descriptions « phénoménologiques » de la souffrance sociale, le conduit non seulement à entériner, même s’il en inverse la téléologie, l’idée althussérienne d’une coupure épistémologique dans l’œuvre de Marx, mais aussi à interpréter différemment, pour cette raison même, les deux « moments » de la pensée marxienne et ce qui caractérise la transition de l’un a l’autre (...) : Les manuscrits de 1844 d’abord, dont Henry ne retiendrait que ce qu’ils doivent à Hegel, Le Capital ensuite, dont il méconnaitrait au contraire ce qu’il lui doit encore. C’est l’équation posée entre souffrance sociale/aliénation et praxis subjective qui est ici interrogée, sur l’horizon d’une théorie de l’« organisation collective », basée sur les concepts de « socialité » et de « coopération », minimisant du coup l’opérativité forte du concept phénoménologique de chair. (shrink)

This work is divided in two papers (Part I and Part II). In Part I, we study a class of polymodal logics (herein called the class of "Rare-logics") for which the set of terms indexing the modal operators are hierarchized in two levels: the set of Boolean terms and the set of terms built upon the set of Boolean terms. By investigating different algebraic properties satisfied by the models of the Rare-logics, reductions for decidability are established by faithfully translating the (...) Rare-logics into more standard modal logics. The main idea of the translation consists in eliminating the Boolean terms by taking advantage of the components construction and in using various properties of the classes of semilattices involved in the semantics. The novelty of our approach allows us to prove new decidability results (presented in Part II), in particular for information logics derived from rough set theory and we open new perspectives to define proof systems for such logics (presented also in Part II). (shrink)

Il ne subsiste aucun vestige de la charpente du temple d’Apollon construit à Delphes durant le ive s. av. J.‑C., ni de bloc comportant des réservations pour l’appui des poutres. En revanche, de nombreux passages des comptes de construction mentionnent des pièces en bois et font état de travaux sur les parties hautes du monument. Nous présentons ici un commentaire de ces inscriptions qui s’articule autour de trois objectifs principaux : déterminer la destination et la fonction des pièces de bois (...) ; analyser le vocabulaire technique ; établir la chronologie des travaux dans les parties hautes du temple. Au‑delà d’une étude centrée sur l’architecture delphique, le corpus mobilisé contribue à la caractérisation des techniques de charpente et à la connaissance du déroulement des chantiers d’architecture monumentale en Grèce ancienne. (shrink)

We provide a simple translation of the satisfiability problem for regular grammar logics with converse into GF2, which is the intersection of the guarded fragment and the 2-variable fragment of first-order logic. The translation is theoretically interesting because it translates modal logics with certain frame conditions into first-order logic, without explicitly expressing the frame conditions. It is practically relevant because it makes it possible to use a decision procedure for the guarded fragment in order to decide regular grammar logics with (...) converse. The class of regular grammar logics includes numerous logics from various application domains. A consequence of the translation is that the general satisfiability problem for every regular grammar logics with converse is in EXPTIME. This extends a previous result of the first author for grammar logics without converse. Other logics that can be translated into GF2 include nominal tense logics and intuitionistic logic. In our view, the results in this paper show that the natural first-order fragment corresponding to regular grammar logics is simply GF2 without extra machinery such as fixed-point operators. (shrink)

Two features are often assumed about emotions: they are intentional states and they are experiences. However, there are important reasons to consider some affective responses that are not experienced or only partly experienced as emotions. But the existence of these affective responses does not sit well with the intentionality of conscious emotions which are somehow geared towards their object. We therefore face a trilemma: either these latter affective responses do not have intentional objects and we should renounce intentionality as a (...) defining feature of emotions; or we have to explain how they actually have intentional, though unconscious, objects; or after all we must deny that they are really emotions. I suggest that the second option is the correct one: we can provide an account of the intentionality of unconscious emotions and its relation to the intentionality of conscious emotions. To do this, I rely on neuropsychological studies that distinguish two kinds of attention: salience as enriched treatment, and focus as a way of turning our attention. Then, given that only salience is always present in unconscious emotional phenomena, I suggest that emotions are intentional because they involve an object being made salient. I further argue that this feature of emotions explains why unconscious and conscious emotions can be taken as organized around their object. Finally, I defend this account against several objections, showing that the account can be applied whatever the cognitive base of the emotions may be and is not falsified by the fact that attentional aspects of emotions may vary in other dimensions. (shrink)

The basic premise of the host‐defense theory is that genomic imprinting, the parent‐of‐origin expression of a subset of mammalian genes, derives from mechanisms originally dedicated to silencing repeated and retroviral‐like sequences that deeply colonized mammalian genomes. We propose that large clusters of tandemly‐repeated C/D‐box small nucleolar RNAs (snoRNAs) or microRNAs represent a novel category of sequences recognized as “genomic parasites”, contributing to the emergence of genomic imprinting in a subset of chromosomal regions that contain them. Such a view is supported (...) by evidence derived from studies of the imprinted snoRNA‐ and/or miRNA‐encoding Dlk1‐Dio3, Snurf‐Snrpn, Sfbmt2, and C19MC domains. While adding a new piece to the challenging puzzle of mammalian genome history, this hypothesis also reinforces the notion that dissecting the features and molecular mechanisms that discriminate between “foreign” and “endogenous” sequences is of crucial importance in the field of mammalian epigenetics. (shrink)

Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example, that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah, 2012) rationality indicates self-consciousness. (...) I evaluate the case for rat rationality by analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behaviors need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats. (shrink)

De los filósofos acusados de “giro teológico”, Jean-Luc Marion es posiblemente el que mejor ha seguido la iniciativa heideggeriana de una fenomenología radical: una fenomenología de lo inaparente. Lo ha hecho al introducir en la fenomenalidad los llamados “fenómenos saturados”, lo que lo ha puesto en el centro del debate. Contra sus críticos, este ensayo muestra que esta ampliación de la fenomenalidad no proviene prioritariamente de una voluntad teológica, sino de una necesidad de liberar la fenomenalidad del paradigma de la (...) visión, en favor del paradigma del decir. Con este presupuesto, se intenta reconciliar la filosofía analítica con la fenomenología. (shrink)

L'aptitude a dire Je est une des remarques distinctives de la subjectivite: si un caillou se mettait a nous parler de lui-meme, nous pourrions difficilement, l'etonnement dissipe, ne pas le tenir pour une personne. Toutefois, pour beaucoup de philosophes, cette aptitude a dire je n'est que l'une des manifestations d'une aptitude plus profonde et plus generale de la conscience de soi. Une creature ne pourrait parler de soi que parce qu'elle serait consciente de soi et c'est cette aptitude a la (...) conscience de soi qui constiturait l'essence de la subjectivite. On se propose de renverser ici cet order de preseance et de montrer que la subjectivite est identique a l'aptitude a dire je. L'egologie n'est pas le signe ou la manifestation de la subjectivite, mais son essence meme et la conscience de soi n'est rien d'autre que la pensee egologique. Il en resulte qu'une conscience, dont le langage ne contriendrait nul marqueur de la premiere personne, ne serait pas un sujet. Mais un langage pourrait-il ne pas contenir de marquer de la premiere personne? Etait-il possible que nous ne fussion pas des sujets? Une exsitence impersonnelle est-elle possible? (shrink)

L’idée de faire de la liberté individuelle le point d’appui de la philosophie politique normative constitue l’une des manifestations les plus frappantes de l’influence du libéralisme sur la pensée moderne – une influence qui s’est d’ailleurs exercée jusque dans les conceptions non-libérales telles que le républicanisme. Après tout, il n’est pas naturel de vouloir faire passer toute la définition d’un ordre social désirable et d’un gouvernement raisonnable (c’est ce à quoi vise, en général la...

We provide a simple translation of the satisfiability problem for regular grammar logics with converse into GF2, which is the intersection of the guarded fragment and the 2-variable fragment of first-order logic. The translation is theoretically interesting because it translates modal logics with certain frame conditions into first-order logic, without explicitly expressing the frame conditions. It is practically relevant because it makes it possible to use a decision procedure for the guarded fragment in order to decide regular grammar logics with (...) converse. The class of regular grammar logics includes numerous logics from various application domains. A consequence of the translation is that the general satisfiability problem for every regular grammar logics with converse is in EXPTIME. This extends a previous result of the first author for grammar logics without converse. Other logics that can be translated into GF2 include nominal tense logics and intuitionistic logic. In our view, the results in this paper show that the natural first-order fragment corresponding to regular grammar logics is simply GF2 without extra machinery such as fixed-point operators. (shrink)

This book aims to re-evaluate the relations between two major ideologies that have been increasingly contested in recent years, yet continue to be invoked or rejected as foundational systems for political thought or action. With socialism conceiving of itself as an alternative to economic liberalism, the two systems of thought emerged partially in opposition to each other. However, this book seeks to redefine their specificities and the way in which they have not only opposed each other but drew on common (...) notions or paradigms to become both competing and complementary systems of thought and practices. With contributions from eminent political scientists and historians of political and economic thought, the book examines how the polarisation of debates and politicisation of concepts such as property, freedom, the individual, or the State, serve to construct the adversary and form a basis for political commitment. Offering an interdisciplinary assessment of the relation between liberalism and socialism, the authors help to make sense of current debate on individual freedom, political obligation and the changing role of the State. Providing an innovative perspective, this edited collection will be of interest to scholars and students researching political and economic thought, history or science, as well as anyone seeking to understand current developments affecting Western societies, and their past, present, and future ideologies. (shrink)

D'abord, la " Nature ", avec ses composantes bigarrées, ses lois inexorables et ses principes aveugles ; et puis, au-dessus d'elle, la supplantant, l'écrasant, la " Société ", recueil des expressions de l'ingéniosité humaine, somme des arrangements plus ou moins fiables dont nous avons convenu entre nous. Ce schéma dualiste, dans lequel se concentre une partie de l'héritage idéaliste de la pensée philosophique occidentale, a joué un rôle central dans l'autocompréhension historique de la modernité. Certains hommes seraient devenus, justement, modernes, (...) et ils auraient conféré cette qualité éminente à leurs idées, en particulier aux savoirs qu'ils se proposaient de développer, en séparant de façon tranchante Nature et Société. Ce faisant, ils les auraient rendues, dit-on, pensables l'une et l'autre. Le présent ouvrage prend le contre-pied de cette conception en développant deux motifs. Premièrement : la " modernité " s'est aussi construite autour de positions qui insistaient sur l'appartenance des êtres humains à l'ordre englobant de la Nature, qui, par exemple, illustraient la continuité entre les savoirs visant le corps organique et le corps social. Deuxièmement : cette modernité-là ne rompt nullement avec l'Antiquité. Car les Grecs et les latins n'ont pas seulement institué ce partage ; ils se sont aussi inquiétés de sa valeur et de ses limites - ils l'ont discuté, déplacé, dissout, refonde, à mesure qu'ils entendaient justifier de nouveaux savoirs, les séparer d'autres ou les unir en de nouvelles continuités. Ainsi se substitue à la césure moderne le temps long d'une histoire où la multiplicité des façons de faire et de défaire cette frontière accompagne depuis l'Antiquité la production des savoirs. Nous héritons dès lors d'une autre histoire que celle que nous nous sommes racontée. Faudra-t-il renoncer à trier les êtres ou les processus selon qu'ils paraissent relever plutôt de l'existence naturelle ou de l'artificialité sociale ? Il suffira de désinvestir ce geste : lui rendre sa juste mesure, celle de n'être qu'un moyen, tout aussi utile que le geste opposé, lorsque l'on veut faire paraître des objets de pratique ou de connaissance, selon leurs discontinuités plutôt que leurs continuités. Aucune thèse dogmatique ne sort donc du travail de déprise auquel incite cet ouvrage. Peut-être une conviction : l'avenir de notre interprétation philosophique du " social " tiendra probablement beaucoup à notre capacité à le rapprocher du " naturel ", c'est-à-dire à dévoiler la masse des liens d'appartenance, de dépendance, de continuité, d'analogie, d'entrelacement, qui le rattachent à ce que l'on avait pris à tort pour son autre absolu. (shrink)

We should not understand in this title "What does not return to the same" the announcement of a return to Levinas, but rather of what the word or concept of "return" could mean in Levinas's work. There is perhaps no better way of misunderstanding Levinas than imposing on his philosophical gesture the interpretative grid of a "horizon of return". This article will attempt to dismantle the strategies of reading which stipulate that Levinas's philosophy is one of "return". In this way (...) we shall reveal the complexity of Levinasian thought, and that, beyond the numerous slogans, there are the ones of a "return" or of its simple contrary, the ones of a "philosophy of exile". (shrink)

In what sense could discourse ethics be linked with normative problems raised by the ecological crisis? Even if Apel and Habermas have not really addressed this question extensively, and even if their position in moral philosophy seems to develop and reinforce a neo-Kantian anthropocentric point of view, one can find in their works some evidence for the possibility of connecting a dialogical view with an ecological one. In order to defend the philosophical interest in highlighting this possibility, this essay analyses (...) Habermas' position concerning the moral and ontological status of animality in particular, and attempts to situate this position within the history of Critical Theory. (shrink)

This paper seeks to answer the following question: does it still make sense today to speak of political emancipation, in particular in the sense bequeathed to us by Marx, as emancipation from capitalism? I consider three serious objections to this possibility: the objection that reference to “capitalism” is unduly essentialist in view of the multiplicity of historical situations; the anti-utopian objection according to which the programme of emancipation from capitalism lacks any precise, practical content; and the normative objection that emancipation (...) in and of itself does not specify the norms of the putative post-capitalist society. In the final section of the paper, I attempt to respond to these three objections, and seek to outline the different levels at which something like an emancipatory project, understood as a surpassing of capitalism, can still make sense today. (shrink)

In various ways, Marx ascribes a central role to the body in his theoretical and political system. In both his philosophy of praxis and his critique of political economy, the body is presented as a site of forces and needs. This enables Marx to provide a naturalist ground for the dynamics of praxis. It also enables him to define a critical perspective in terms of the effects registered in the body of a structure of domination and exploitation. The aim of (...) the article is to present these themes and to discuss their subsequent treatment by authors such as Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu and Foucault, while reflecting on the way recent transformations of capitalism have led to their reformulation and to the emergence of two new critical tropes: the body as commodity and as an ideology. (shrink)

L'évolution de la clinique psychiatrique a mis au centre de ses recherches l'écoute et la parole du patient. Cependant le plus souvent la parole échoit dans les discours et l'écoute se décentre vers la vérification des a priori théo­riques. L'empathie ou les règlements qui incitent le clinicien à mettre le patient au centre de ses préoccupations apportent confort et sécurité mais ratent la rencontre clinique qui échoit dans le relationnel. Une relation n'est pas une rencontre. Le contexte de...