The writer responds to the commentary “Physician Burnout Calls for Legal Intervention,” by Sharona Hoffman, in the November‐December 2019 issue of the Hastings Center Report.

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 21-28, January/February 2022.

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

Francis Fukuyama's controversial new book, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, has elicited varied reactions, but like it or not, it seems likely to be influential. Here are three opinions. —Ed.

The distinction between literal and figurative use is well-known and embedded in ‘folk linguistics’. According to folk linguistics, figurative uses deviate from literal ones. But recent work on lexical modulation and polysemy shows that meaning deviation is ubiquitous, even in cases of literal use. Hence, it has been argued, the literal/figurative distinction has no value for theorising about communication. In this paper, we focus on metaphor and argue that here the literal–figurative distinction has theoretical importance. The distinction between literal and (...) metaphorical needs to be captured by our account of communication because literal uses transmit information in a way that metaphorical ones do not. We argue that there is a way to explain the literal/metaphorical distinction that preserves the core of the folk-linguistic idea and gives the distinction theoretical relevance. We propose that literal uses of a word are made with the intention to conform to an established practice of use, while metaphorical uses do not so conform, but depend on this pre-existing practice. Our account can deal with data that are problematic for other theories. A further advantage is that it extends naturally to other non-literal uses of words, including metonymy. (shrink)

Human beings engage works of the arts in many different ways: they sing songs while working, they kiss icons, they create and dedicate memorials. Yet almost all philosophers of art of the modern period have ignored this variety and focused entirely on just one mode of engagement, namely, disinterested attention. Nicholas Wolterstorff asks why this might be, and proposes that almost all philosophers have accepted the grand narrative concerning art in the modern world. It is generally agreed that in (...) the early modern period, members of the middle class in Western Europe increasingly engaged works of the arts as objects of disinterested attention. The grand narrative claims that this change represented the arts coming into their own, and that works of art, so engaged, are socially other and transcendent. Wolterstorff rejects this claim, and offers an alternative framework for thinking about the arts. Central to his alternative framework are the idea of the arts as social practices and the idea of works of the arts as having different meaning in different practices. (shrink)

Cian O’Driscoll’s Victory: The Triumph and Tragedy of Just War covers a vast range of materials, discussing the idea of victory and its relationship to just war theory. The idea of victory raises s...

Among all their sensations, agents need to distinguish between those caused by themselves and those caused by external causes. The ability to infer agency is particularly challenging under conditions of uncertainty. Within the predictive processing framework, this should happen through active control of prediction error that closes the action-perception loop. Here we use a novel, temporally-sensitive, behavioural proxy for prediction error to show that it is minimised most quickly when volatility is high and when participants report agency, regardless of the (...) accuracy of the judgement. We demonstrate broad effects of uncertainty on accuracy of agency judgements, movement, policy selection, and hypothesis switching. Measuring autism traits, we find differences in policy selection, sensitivity to uncertainty and hypothesis switching despite no difference in overall accuracy. (shrink)

Plausibly, an inference is an act of coming to believe something on the basis of something else you already believe. But what is it to come to believe some- thing on the basis of something else? I propose a disjunctive answer: it is either for some beliefs to rationally cause another—where rational causation is understood as causation that is either actually or potentially productive of knowledge—or for some beliefs to “deviantly” cause another, but for the believer mistakenly to come thereby (...) to believe that the former have rationally caused the latter. The result, I argue, is both a theoretically satisfying account of the act of inferring and a demonstration of the power of a knowledge-first approach to the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

An examination of philosophical realism from the standpoint of pragmatic epistemology, this book addresses the core idea of Rescher's work in epistemology: that functional and pragmatic concerns exert a controlling influence on the conduct ...

Supervaluational accounts of vagueness have come under assault from Timothy Williamson for failing to provide either a sufficiently classical logic or a disquotational notion of truth, and from Crispin Wright and others for incorporating a notion of higher-order vagueness, via the determinacy operator, which leads to contradiction when combined with intuitively appealing ‘gap principles’. We argue that these criticisms of supervaluation theory depend on giving supertruth an unnecessarily central role in that theory as the sole notion of truth, rather than (...) as one mode of truth. Allowing for the co-existence of supertruth and local truth, we define a notion of local entailment in supervaluation theory, and show that the resulting logic is fully classical and allows for the truth of the gap principles. Finally, we argue that both supertruth and local truth are disquotational, when disquotational principles are properly understood. (shrink)

There is a debate about the possibility of mind-uploading – a process that purportedly transfers human minds and therefore human identities into computers. This paper bypasses the debate about the metaphysics of mind-uploading to address the rationality of submitting yourself to it. I argue that an ineliminable risk that mind-uploading will fail makes it prudentially irrational for humans to undergo it.

In this paper the kinds of education available to the population of the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus, founded in 1192 following the island’s conquest by King Richard I of England during the Third Crusade, shall be discussed. The extent to which Latins and Greeks on Cyprus made use of the education available on the island or pursued studies abroad on account of the lack of suitable schools of further education, a theme that has relevance today, will be dealt with, as (...) will differences in the education received by the clergy, Latin and Greek, and by lay persons, given that much though by no means all of the education on offer was offered by members of the clergy, Latin or Greek. The availability of libraries, language education, especially when one considers that Arabic was widely spoken on Cyprus as well as Greek and the Romance languages, and the phenomenon of Cypriot students studying abroad will also be examined and discussed. Trends and developments in education on Cyprus will be analysed within a wider contemporary European context. The subjects studied by most students going abroad, law, theology, medicine, and art, as well as the reasons why they were studied will also be examined. Finally, the shortcomings of the education available in Cyprus, what was done to remedy such shortcomings and to what extent these attempts succeeded is a theme running right through this paper. (shrink)

I want to thank all of those who have commented on my article in the Journal of Medical Ethics.1 The commentaries address a wide cross-section of the issues raised in my article. I have organised my responses thematically.The state of playAllen Buchanan's scepticism2 about moral statuses higher than personhood derives, in part, from our apparent inability to describe them. We seem to have little difficulty in imagining what it might be to have scientific understanding far beyond that of any human (...) scientist. By contrast, it is exceedingly difficult to describe moral statuses superior to that of any person. Boosting cognitive capacities seems to result in cognitively superior persons—not post-persons . I offer an explanation of our moral myopia.2 We are necessarily clueless in respect of moral statuses superior to our own. If mice understood practical reasons sufficiently well to truly understand why persons have a moral status superior to their own then they would be capable of the feats of practical reason constitutive of personhood—they would be persons. Our cluelessness about post-persons is compatible both with their possible existence and with their necessary non-existence. I propose an inductive argument for the existence of statuses superior to personhood. The observed existence of many moral statuses up to and including persons provides moderately strong inductive support for the possibility of post-persons.Who do we trust to make decisions about higher moral statuses?What precisely does the inductive argument predict? If my diagnosis of our moral myopia about post-personhood is correct, then mere persons cannot really understand what properties of post-persons give them a superior status. They will be able to infer their existence indirectly by an appeal to the predicted judgments of beings who lack our cognitive limitations. Wasserman3 questions my suggestion that we should defer to the sincere moral judgments of …. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł analizuje dowody zebrane z weneckich i genueńskich aktów notarialnych, sporządzonych na Cyprze w latach 1362–1458, w celu zbadania i omówienia relacji między niewolnikami domowymi lub służącymi (na ogół kobietami) a ich właścicielami (zazwyczaj mężczyznami). Niektóre z tych aktów były testamentami zawierającymi zapisy na rzecz niewolnych kobiet, które prawdopodobnie pozostawały w długotrwałych związkach seksualnych ze swoimi właścicielami, oraz na rzecz nieślubnych dzieci, które urodziły się z tych związków. Niektóre umowy o naukę zawodu sporządzone w Famaguście, głównym porcie na wyspie, (...) również dotyczą urodzonych przez niewolnice lub służące nieślubnych dzieci, które były przyuczane na koszt właściciela przez kilka lat do rzemiosła, aby po wyuczeniu mieć źródło zarobku na życie. Niektórzy właściciele zapisywali domy kobietom innym niż ich żony albo jako prezent, albo zastrzegając sobie w nich prawo do zamieszkania. Czasami zapisywano w testamencie majątek ruchomy, taki jak meble, pościel, srebro, cenne przedmioty, a nawet sumy pieniędzy. Najwyraźniej przynajmniej niektórzy panowie chcieli zapewnić swoim kochankom i nieślubnym dzieciom dobrobyt po własnej śmierci. Dla porównania: w Genui sytuacja przedstawiała się zgoła inaczej, gdyż tamtejsi panowie, którzy spłodzili nieślubne dzieci ze swoimi niewolnicami, często unikali łożenia za ich wychowanie. Jednak nawet na Cyprze troska panów o niewolników lub służących nie była standardową praktyką. Dowody z XV-wiecznej cypryjskiej kroniki Leontiosa Makhairasa pokazują, że niewolnicy byli czasem traktowani okrutnie, nawet do tego stopnia, że popełniali samobójstwa. (shrink)

From a review by a young Santayana of James's IThe Principles of PsychologyD, written well before IThe Life of ReasonD, are found reasons for questioning the position that only in the later years does his philosophy find its materialist ontology. His special delight is James's "tendency everywhere to substitute a physiological for a mental explanation of the phenomena of mind." Although he sees other aspects of James's metaphysics which conflict with this naturalism, it is clearly the latter which Santayana admired (...) and in some measure adopted. (shrink)

This article argues that ‘Critical International Relations’, often counterpoised to ‘mainstream IR’, has come to function as a major theoretical category in its own right. It argues that critique involves ‘minor theorising’, defined as the practice of disturbing settled theoretical assumptions in the discipline. The article examines the role and significance of ‘minor theories’ in the context of ongoing debates about Critical IR. It argues that critique is defined by context, and is politically and ethically ambiguous. The article concludes that (...) the scope for critique could be advanced if the terms ‘Critical IR’ and ‘Critical IR Scholar’ are dropped from scholarly parlance. (shrink)

This volume presents influential work by Nicholas Wolterstorff at the intersection between political philosophy and religion, alongside nine new essays on the nature of liberal democracy, human rights, and political authority. These novel essays offer an attractive alternative to the public reason liberalism defended by thinkers such as John Rawls.

The philosopher Jerry Fodor was a key figure alongside Noam Chomsky in the revolution that led to the renaissance of the cognitive sciences from around 1960. This chapter describes key difference between Chomsky and Fodor. It focuses on Chomsky's and Fodor's conceptions of modularity. The chapter discusses two ways of understanding Chomsky's proposal, in particular how it claims an underlying faculty is related to processing and performance. Chomsky is largely agnostic on this question; the commitments of his programme are to (...) be found elsewhere. The most persuasive evidence for Fodorian modules, as for Chomskyan faculties, comes from dissociations. The chapter also reviews the evidential foundation of all versions of modularity: double dissociation (impairments of one or more mental abilities caused by accidents or other pathology which leave other abilities intact). (shrink)