BackgroundIn the Canadian Alliance for Healthy Hearts and Minds (CAHHM) cohort, participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain, heart, and abdomen, that generated incidental findings (IFs). The approach to managing these unexpected results remain a complex issue. Our objectives were to describe the CAHHM policy for the management of IFs, to understand the impact of disclosing IFs to healthy research participants, and to reflect on the ethical obligations of researchers in future MRI studies.MethodsBetween 2013 and 2019, 8252 participants (...) (mean age 58 ± 9 years, 54% women) were recruited with a follow-up questionnaire administered to 909 participants (40% response rate) at 1-year. The CAHHM policy followed a restricted approach, whereby routine feedback on IFs was not provided. Only IFs of severe structural abnormalities were reported.ResultsSevere structural abnormalities occurred in 8.3% (95% confidence interval 7.7–8.9%) of participants, with the highest proportions found in the brain (4.2%) and abdomen (3.1%). The majority of participants (97%) informed of an IF reported no change in quality of life, with 3% of participants reporting that the knowledge of an IF negatively impacted their quality of life. Furthermore, 50% reported increased stress in learning about an IF, and in 95%, the discovery of an IF did not adversely impact his/her life insurance policy. Most participants (90%) would enrol in the study again and perceived the MRI scan to be beneficial, regardless of whether they were informed of IFs. While the implications of a restricted approach to IF management was perceived to be mostly positive, a degree of diagnostic misconception was present amongst participants, indicating the importance of a more thorough consent process to support participant autonomy.ConclusionThe management of IFs from research MRI scans remain a challenging issue, as participants may experience stress and a reduced quality of life when IFs are disclosed. The restricted approach to IF management in CAHHM demonstrated a fair fulfillment of the overarching ethical principles of respect for autonomy, concern for wellbeing, and justice. The approach outlined in the CAHHM policy may serve as a framework for future research studies.Clinical trial registrationhttps://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/nct02220582. (shrink)

Bereits mit Anfang Zwanzig, wohl zwischen 1829 und 1831, verfasst John Stuart Mill fünf Essays, die seine ersten ökonomischen Schriften darstellen. Mit der Ausnahme des fünften Essays werden diese allerdings erstmals 1844 veröffentlicht, zwei Jahre nach dem Erfolg von A System of Logic. Diese frühen Texte zeugen von Mills Fähigkeiten als Synthetisierer unterschiedlicher theoretischer Ansätze, aber ebenso von seiner oft verkannten Innovationskraft auf dem Feld der Ökonomie. Zudem zeigen sie ihn als Autor des Übergangs vom klassischen zum neoklassischen Paradigma. Mill (...) ist offen gegenüber Ideen, die nicht ohne Weiteres mit der Klassischen Nationalökonomie zu vereinbaren sind. Entsprechend findet sogar Karl Marx, trotz aller berechtigten Kritik an den Essays, lobende Worte für das „Schriftlein, das in der Tat alle originellen Ideen des Herrn J[ohn] St[uart] Mill über political economy enthält“ (MEW 26.3, 190). Für John R. Hicks sind die Essays „perhaps the freshest of Mill’s economic writings“ (Hicks 1983, 60). (shrink)

The article discusses Hannes Kuch's critique of a prominent assumption liberal theories of justice make: norms guiding economic behavior and political-moral norms are to be considered separately. Against this assumption, Kuch argues in his study ‘Economy, Democracy and Liberal Socialism’ that the economic sphere plays a central role in enabling and realizing democratic justice. In doing so, Kuch problematizes the fact that the economic sphere in its current form has a predominantly negative influence on the moral education of subjects. Following (...) on from this, Kuch ascribes a normative primacy to the political sphere, while he ascribes an empirical primacy to the economic sphere with regard to the moral education of subjects. The commentators criticize Kuch's position to the effect that it postulates a problematic contrast between an amoral economic sphere and an idealized moral political sphere. Besides an internal logical-argumentative problem, this contrast proves to be particularly problematic with regard to the analysis of real-political and global-economic power relations. The commentators therefore argue for a more differentiated analysis that recognizes the moral ambivalence of the two spheres and their morally formative and destructive potential. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to translate teaching experiences through an interpretation of the world of signs. In between confinements, teachers exercise on stagings that are not just replicating transformations of themselves; but, unique recreations in their worldliness, and in potent sensibilities; possibly different in their own repetition. As a way of resistance in the subjectification experience, we reinvent ourselves with worlds already created, rethinking the school as an environment, institution, space, time, world, and form. With Cortázar, we place (...) ourselves in the unstable opposition, where there is an amorous combat between signs and their interpretation. And this requires a permanent process of reconstruction and recreation of the research perspective, sustained, especially, in Deleuze. Being able to translate in a different way what we are doing, caused concerns in ourselves and even in others. (shrink)

Despite the efforts of Bosanquet, Muirhead, Basch, and many others, it is still frequently stated or implied, in both popular and scholarly literature, that Hegel constructed his philosophy of the State with an eye to pleasing the reactionary and conservative rulers of Prussia in his day, and condoned, supported, and, through his teaching, became partly responsible for some of the most criticized features in “Prussianism” and even of present-day National-Socialism.5 Ijn this article I propose to give reasons for denying that (...) Hegel the man is justly accused of servility to the Prussian Government, and that there is any warrant in the text of his Philosophie des Rechts for the charge that Hegel the philosopher was an exponent of “Prussianism” and “ frightfulness.”. (shrink)

There are religious and philosophical versions of the thesis that AIDS is a punishment for homosexual behaviour. It is argued here that the religious version is seriously incomplete. Because of this incompleteness and because of the indeterminacies that ordinarily attend religious argumentation, it is concluded that the claim may be set aside as unconvincing. Homosexual behaviour is then judged for its morality against utilitarian, deontological, and natural law theories of ethics. It is argued that such behaviour involves no impediment to (...) important moral goals and is not therefore immoral. Where natural law might be used to condemn homosexual behaviour, it is argued that the theory itself is not well established. Consequently there is a prima facie reason for rejecting the philosophical version of the punishment thesis. This conclusion is further supported by noting the lack of proportion between the purported immorality of homosexuality and a punishment as devastating as AIDS. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a solution to the qualitative version of David Miller's verisimilitude reversal argument. Miller (1974) shows that verisimilitude rankings are relative to language choice and hence, are not objective. My solution stems from a reply to an earlier solution proposed by Eric Barnes (1991). Barnes argues that the verisimilitude reversal problem can be solved by revealing an epistemic dimension. I show that Miller's problem cannot be solved by side-stepping foundational metaphysical claims as his epistemic solution suggests. (...) Rather, a substantive metaphysical basis grounds identity relations among properties. The problem of verisimilitude cannot be solved without embracing the fundamental metaphysical distinctions between basic and composite properties that ground the relationship of partial identity among properties. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Some think we should look at aspects of what is commonly thought of as non‐sentient nature as having a value in themselves apart from the use or recreation they provide for humans or even animals. But to what extent does nature, in the character it presents to us, exist apart from presence to consciousness such as ours? Surely at least many of its aspects cannot. However, that does not stop them having a genuinely intrinsic value, just as works of (...) art do, whose existence also is impossible apart from their display to a consciousness such as ours. But can nature, as it exists quite apart from human or animal consciousness, have any intrinsic value? It is suggested that only a panpsychic, and perhaps pantheist, view of nature (a view for which there are excellent metaphysical grounds) can give a positive answer, and even that must be a very vague one [1]. (shrink)

This is a slightly opinionated review of three main factions in metaontology: Quineans, Carnapians, and Meinongians. Emphasis is given to the last camp, as the metaontological aspect of Meinongianism has been underappreciated. The final section then offers some general remarks about the legitimacy of ontology, touching on ideas I have developed in other publications.

The pages of the history of science record thousands of instances of similar discoveries having been made by scientists working independently of one another. Sometimes the discoveries are simultaneous or almost so; sometimes a scientist will make anew a discovery which, unknown to him, somebody else had made years before.

Dans les débats classiques des xvie et xviie siècles, la représentation est considérée avant tout comme une question rhétorique et psychologique, mais à la fin du xviie siècle, elle devient une question épistémologique. Cet ouvrage explore le contexte de cette transformation et ses sources.

My analysis of the constitutional foundations of judicial review has been criticized by Paul Craig; but his objections confuse the ‘constructive’ account of legislative intent I defend with the ‘literal’ conception (reflecting the views of individual legislators) I expressly repudiate. He thinks we must choose between legislative intent, literally conceived, and common law principle. This mistake exemplifies the peculiar character of Craig's ‘common law model’ of judicial review, in which the requirements of the rule of law, on one hand, and (...) the relevant statute, on the other, exist in separate mental worlds. That model is conceptually confused, rejecting the doctrine of ultra vires that (unqualified) legislative supremacy entails, and ultimately grounded in a wholly implausible view of the relationship between common law and statute. It subordinates both statutory text and purpose to common law doctrine, treated as largely self-contained and impervious to context. It ignores the interdependence of legislative and judicial power, impeding a genuine integration of statutory command and common law principle. (shrink)