Whose values should count – those of patients or the general public – when adopting the quality-adjusted life year framework for healthcare decision making is a long-standing debate. Specific disciplines, such as economics, are not wedded to a particular side of the debate, and arguments for and against the use of patient values have been discussed at length in the literature. In 2012, Sinclair proposed an approach, grounded within patient preference theory, which sought to avoid a perceived unfair discrimination against (...) people with disabilities when using values from the general public. Key assumptions about general public values that beget this line of thinking were that ‘disabled states always tally with lower quality of life’, and the use of standardised instruments means that ‘you are forced into a fixed view of disability as a lower value state’. Drawing on recent contributions to the health economics literature, we contend that such assumptions are not inherent to the incorporation of general public values for the estimation of QALYs. In practice, whether health states of people with disabilities are of ‘lower value’ is, to some extent, a reflection of the health state descriptions that members of the public are asked to value. (shrink)

Most conceptual models of the organization of the cardiovascular system begin with the premise that the nervous system regulates the metabolic and nonmetabolic reflex adjustments of the circulation. These models assume that all the neurally mediated responses of the circulation are reactive, i.e., reflexes elicited by adequate stimuli. This target article suggests that the responses of the circulation are conditional in three senses. First, as Sherrington argued, reflexes are conditional in that they never operate in a vacuum but in a (...) context together with other reflexes. Guided by functional utility, they interact rather than add. Second, as Pavlov argued, stimuli acquire meanings as a result of experience. This notion of stimulus effect plus the Sherringtonian notion of conditionality suggest that association is one of the ways stimuli eliciting cardiovascular reflexes acquire their meanings and thus their relative strengths. Finally, as Skinner and others have argued, operants are responses that act upon the environment to obtain consequences – that is, stimuli. As operants, cardiovascular responses fulfill a major biological need, functioning proactively. The cardiovascular response is an integral component of the animal's behavior regardless of whether it is an elicited reflex or the eliciting stimulus acquired its properties as a result of the genetic inheritance of the animal or through experience, or the cardiovascular response is emitted in anticipation of an environmental consequence. The main theses of this essay are: (1) behavior is an integrated set of responses and the circulation is one of the response systems comprising behavior; (2) behavior is, in part, determined by its functional significance within a context; (3) the contextual factors operative at the time of the behavior have a major role in determining which of the set of possible responses will determine the final act, that is, which behavior will be the effective response and which other behaviors will be concomitants. (shrink)

Paul Ricœur made a lot to introduce analytic philosophy in France during the 70s and 80s, and he engaged in a dialogue with a number of authors from this tradition, such as Austin, Strawson, Davidson or Parfit. This dialogue, though, was one-sided, since there was no discussion of his views by analytic philosophers. Moreover, Ricœur often misunderstood or misprepresented the analytic views that he was discussing. So in many ways the Ricœur’s encounter with analytic philosophy was unsuccessful, which does not (...) mean that Ricœur’s discussions where unfruitful for his own work. Résumé Paul Ricœur a fait beaucoup pour introduire la philosophie analytique en France pendant les années 1970 et 1980, et il a entrepris un dialogue avec les auteurs de cette tradition, comme Austin, Strawson, Davidson ou Parfit. Mais ce dialogue est cependant resté unilatéral, car il n’y a pas eu de discussion des thèses de Ricœur au sein de la tradition analytique. De plus Ricœur a souvent mécompris les vues analytiques qu’il discutait. En ce sens il n’y a pas eu de rencontre entre Ricœur et les philosophes analytiques, ce qui ne veut pas dire que les discussions par Ricœur des philosophes anaytiques n’aient pas été fructueuses pour son œuvre propre. (shrink)

Daniel Dombrowski contends that: a number of versions of the ontological argument [OA] are sound; the deity whose existence is most well established by the OA is the deity picked out by Hartshorne’s neoclassical concept of God; skeptics who insist that the OA only shows that “if God exists, then God exists necessarily” are contradicting themselves, and the OA is worth a great deal since it effectively demonstrates the rationality of theism. I argue that theses and are clearly false and (...) offer a presumptive case for thinking that is false, since, absent an independent proof of God’s existence, the theist appears to be in no position to rationally assert. I also show that the Anselmian OA harmonizes rather poorly with a Hartshornean neoclassical conception of God. I conclude by assessing the philosophical and dialectical worth of ontological arguments vis-à-vis establishing the rationality of theism. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of love is whether people can love one another for good reasons. Reasons for love seem to help us sympathetically understand and evaluate love or even count as loving at all. But it can seem that if reasons for love existed, they could require forms of love that are presumably illicit. It might seem that only some form of wishful thinking would lead us to believe reasons for love could never do this. However, if (...) we focus on why reasons for love as such motivate us to love, we find evidence that reasons for love as such do not require or even justify it: all they do is favor it. This result is fine, however, since love never stands in need of justification. We would think otherwise only if we somehow conflate reasons and justifications, or value and permissibility. We must give up such background assumptions if we are to appreciate reasons for love. (shrink)

Skeptics try to persuade us of our ignorance with arguments like the following: 1. I don’t know that I am not a handless brain-in-a-vat [BIV]. 2. If I don’t know that I am not a handless BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. Therefore, 3. I don’t know that I have hands. The BIV argument is valid, its premises are intuitively compelling, and yet, its conclusion strikes us as absurd. Something has to go, but what? Contextualists contend that (...) an adequate solution to the skeptical problem must: (i) retain epistemic closure, (ii) explain the intuitive force of skeptical arguments by explaining why their premises initially seem so compelling, and (iii) account for the truth of our commonsense judgment that we do possess lots of ordinary knowledge. Contextualists maintain that the key to such a solution is recognizing that the semantic standards for ‘knows’ vary from context to context such that in skeptical contexts the skeptic’s premises are true and so is her conclusion; but in ordinary contexts, her conclusion is false and so is her first premise. Despite its initial attractiveness, the contextualist solution comes at a significant cost, for contextualism has many counterintuitive results. After presenting the contextualist solution, I identify a number of these costs. I then offer a noncontextualist solution that meets the adequacy constraint identified above, while avoiding the costs associated with contextualism. Hence, one of the principal reasons offered for adopting a contextualist theory of knowledge–its supposedly unique ability to adequately resolve the skeptical problem – is undermined. (shrink)

La logique occupe dans la pensée contemporaine une place privilégiée : elle est, pour certains, une méthode universelle et, pour d'autres, l'accomplissement d'une rationalité arrogante.Pascal Engel montre combien les questions philosophiques que soulève la logique sont, au-delà de leur apparente technicité, des plus classiques. La logique, en effet, circonscrit le domaine du vrai : quelle est la nature des vérités logiques? En quoi se distinguent-elles des autres vérités et sont-elles «nécessaires» ou «a priori»? Décrivent-elles les lois d'un univers immuable (...) ou sont-elles des règles et des conventions linguistiques que nous pourrions changer à notre guise? Les inférences dont traite la logique et que l'on dit souvent triviales peuvent-elles être fécondes, comme le soutenait Leibniz, par la seule «force de la forme»? Et qu'est-ce qu'une forme logique?Faire une philosophie de la logique, ce n'est pas seulement inventorier des formes, c'est surtout analyser leurs conditions d'application au langage, à la pensée et à la réalité. Ainsi la logique retrouve-t-elle sa place : celle d'une théorie des conditions normatives de la rationalité, d'une norme du vrai. (shrink)

Le sceptique nous demande " Comment sais-tu que tu as deux mains? Peut-être rêves-tu, ou es-tu trompé par quelque Malin Génie? Peut-on même définir ce que c'est que la connaissance? Va savoir! " Lui rétorquer, comme le faisaient G.E. Moore et la tradition de la philosophie du sens commun : " Mais je sais bien que j'ai deux mains! " semble à la fois une pétition de principe et une bien mauvaise réponse. Le mieux, depuis que nous avons perdu le (...) souci de fonder nos croyance sur des raisons ultimes, serait, tout simplement, de ne pas se soucier des questions du sceptique. Ce que l'on sait dépend, nous dit-on, des circonstances, et toutes nos connaissances sont faillibles. N'y a-t-il pas plutôt des savoirs, dont l'histoire nous montre combien leurs modes de validations sont variés? Ce livre entend refuser ce type de réponse contextualiste et relativiste. Il propose de revenir à la réponse de sens commun de Moore, à partir des reformulations contemporaines des raisonnements sceptiques issues de la philosophie analytique de la connaissance. Personne ne peut nous envoyer savoir quelque chose que nous ne pourrions pas savoir. De fait, nous savons, mais notre savoir n'est pas transparent : nous n'avons pas besoin de savoir que nous savons. Pour parvenir à cette réponse, il faut replacer la notion de connaissance, plutôt que celle de croyance justifiée ou rationnelle, au centre de l'épistémologie, et reformuler des questions traditionnelles comme celles de la nature de la perception, du témoignage, et de la connaissance a priori. On peut aussi reprendre le vieux projet d'une enquête sur la nature de la connaissance en général. (shrink)

Early to mid-nineteenth-century America experienced a cultural fascination with oneness or monism--the notion that individuals are not separate from divinity but, rather, that the individual soul is an incarnation of the universal soul. Everything is one. This buzz of monism was traceable in part to translations of the Vedas by Indian philosopher Rammohun Roy and found some of its fullest expression in the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman. This oneness tradition is what animates Jeremy David Engels--not only (...) because we can't understand Emerson, Whitman, and other American philosophers without it, but because Engels thinks this tradition offers a way of thinking and acting that can meet the ethical challenges of everyday democracy in the present. The Ethics of Oneness is not only a brilliant study of the centrality of the Bhagavad Gita in the philosophy of Emerson and Whitman and a compelling reception history of the Gita in America, it is also a constructive project of moral and political philosophy intended to open possibilities for the present. If the lessons of oneness are taken to heart, Engels thinks, it ispossible to counter the pervasive, problematic American ideals of separation, competition, hierarchy, exclusion, and domination. For both Emerson and Whitman, American democracy requires a firm ontological foundation of oneness that is beyond question if it is to survive and thrive. (shrink)

Dive into the moral philosophy at the heart of all four seasons of NBC’s The Good Place, guided by academic experts including the show’s philosophical consultants Pamela Hieronymi and Todd May, and featuring a foreword from creator and showrunner Michael Schur Explicitly dedicated to the philosophical concepts, questions, and fundamental ethical dilemmas at the heart of the thoughtful and ambitious NBC sitcom The Good Place Navigates the murky waters of moral philosophy in more conceptual depth to call into question what (...) Chidi’s ethics lessons—and the show—get right about learning to be a good person Features contributions from The Good Place’s philosophical consultants, Pamela Hieronymi and Todd May, and introduced by the show’s creator and showrunner Michael Schur Engages classic philosophical questions, including the clash between utilitarianism and deontological ethics in the “Trolley Problem,” Kant’s categorical imperative, Sartre’s nihilism, and T.M Scanlon's contractualism Explores themes such as death, love, moral heroism, free will, responsibility, artificial intelligence, fatalism, skepticism, virtue ethics, perception, and the nature of autonomy in the surreal heaven-like afterlife of the Good Place Led by Kimberly S. Engels, co-editor of Westworld and Philosophy. (shrink)

«Neither with you nor without you»Francois Truffaut, La femme d’à coté No one can deny that there is a problem between Wittgenstein and analytic philosophers. To put it mildly, there are tensions between Wittgenstein’s and Wittgensteinian styled reflections and the views and practice of a lot of contemporary analytic philosophers, such that they often seem to be strange bedfellows, when they are bedfellows at all. Of course we know that Wittgenstein did not get along very well with Russell, t...

La première fois que SECUNDUM PLACITUM se présente chez Boèce, c'est dans sa traduction de la définition aristotélienne du nom du Peri Herméneias (I6 a I9): "Ovoμα μν oüv στ φων σημαντιΧ Χατ συνΧην...Ι qu'il rend: NOMEN ERGO EST VOX SIGNIFICATIVA SECUNDUM PLACITUM. L'expression y est le substitut de Χατ συνν qu'on interprète en général comme signifiant «par convention». En interprétant SECUNDUM PLACITUM de la même manière, on a l'avantage de faire correspondre parfaitement l'expression latine au sens usuel du terme (...) grec. En a-t-on le droit? Ici surgissent deux problèmes connexes: Quel est le sens exact de Χατ συνΧην, quel est celui de SECUNDUM PLACITUM? Commençons par le premier. (shrink)

In der überarbeiteten Fassung seiner Wiener Dissertation von 1999 legt Rhoby (= R.) zunächst in einer sehr knappen Einleitung (19–23) eine Arbeitsdefinition des zentralen Begriffes einer geographischen ‚Reminiszenz‘ vor. Er gewinnt seine Definition primär aus dem ausgewerteten Material selbst. Bei Reminiszenzen handele es sich um „eine Erwähnung eines antiken Ortes, die innerhalb eines byzantinischen Textes nebenbei geschieht bzw. in einen längeren Handlungsablauf ergänzend eingearbeitet ist“ (19). Als bewußt hervorgeholte Erinnerung aus dem traditionellen literarischen Bildungsgut eines Autors hebt sich die Reminiszenz (...) von der Mimesis und dem Plagiat ab. Der Begriff bleibt jedoch bei R. etwas unbestimmt. Reminiszenz habe „eigentlich in jedem der folgenden Kapitel eine jeweils etwas andere Bedeutung“ (22). Auf die aktuelle Diskussion über Zitate, Anspielungen, Reminiszenzen und verwandte rhetorisch-stilistische Termini und Techniken in der Philologie, Literatur- und Kulturwissenschaft geht R. weder in seiner Einleitung (siehe 20 und Anm. 6) noch in der abschließenden Analyse (237–257) ausführlich ein. Für R.s Untersuchung bietet sich eine Vielzahl von Gattungen der mittel- und spätbyzantinischen Literatur als Textgrundlage an. Zu Recht schließt er Textsorten aus, in denen die Antike oder antike Themen ganz offen im Mittelpunkt stehen, z.B. Kommentare, Paraphrasen zu antiken Autoren, Progymnasmata und Übungsreden über antike Themen, auch den in der Antike spielenden byzantinischen Liebesroman. Denn in solchen Texten kann man offenkundig nicht von Reminiszenzen in R.s Verständnis sprechen. Es verbleiben aber weiterhin zahlreiche Werke aus verschiedenen Gattungen und von unterschiedlichen Autoren. Dies erschwert methodisch R.s Untersuchung. (shrink)

Etwas in der Welt reißt sich los, springt hervor, kommt entgegen... Die Welt, die da entgegenkommt, ist eine lebendige. Dies gilt nicht nur für die vorgefundene natürliche Welt, sondern auch für die Hervorbringungen des Menschen, die ihm in Form seiner Artefakte - vom Faustkeil bis zur Sprachtheorie - ebenso objekthaft wie zur Gestaltung herausfordernd entgegenkommen. Die Autoren dieses Bandes versuchen in theoretischer wie in konkret anschaulicher Auseinandersetzung den Denkbewegungen zwischen Form und Formprozess, Bild und Bildakt, Repräsentation und Präsenz auf die (...) Spur zu kommen. (shrink)

Dysfunctional body- and shape-related attentional biases are involved in the aetiology and maintenance of eating disorders (ED). Various studies suggest that women, particularly those with ED diagnoses, focus on negatively evaluated parts of their own body, which leads to an increase in body dissatisfaction. The present study aims to empirically test the hypothesis that non-ED women show an attentional bias towards negative body parts, and that the focus on positive and negative parts of one’s own body can be modified by (...) attentional bias modification training based on a dot-probe task. Although several studies have measured body-related attentional biases by using pictures of participants’ own bodies, the approach of investigating attentional bias via a dot-probe task while presenting pictures of the participants’ own body parts and modifying the biased attention using such pictures is novel. Women (n = 60) rank-ordered ten parts of their own body regarding their attractiveness. To examine and modify the attentional focus, pictures of the self-defined positive and negative parts of one’s own body were presented by means of a dot-probe task. A paired-sample t-test revealed no difference between reaction times to negative compared to positive body parts, indicating no attentional bias towards negative parts of one’s own body. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of time for pictures of positive and negative parts of one’s own body, with a decrease in reaction times from pre- to post-training. However, there was no significant interaction between time and training condition concerning reaction times to positive and negative body parts. Our findings replicate previous evidence of a balanced attentional pattern regarding one’s own body in women without ED diagnoses. However, the dot-probe task failed to modify the attentional focus. As the modifiability of state body image increases with more pronounced body dissatisfaction, the next step would be to test this approach in clinical samples of women with ED diagnoses. (shrink)

Analytic epistemology is thriving. Many people, however, think that it has gone wrong. They judge that it has become a new scholastics, narrow-minded, obsessed by a small set of problems, most of them examined through repetitive examples, thought experiments and paradoxes, such as the Gettier cases, stories about fake barns, bank cases, brains in vats and evil demons, or the lottery paradox. Philip Kitcher is one of these critics. In an article called “Epistemology without history is blind” published in Erkenntnis (...) in 2011, he takes his stand from William James, “There can be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere” and judges severely the production of contemporary epistemologists. I disagree. Kitcher’s judgment is hasty, and analytic epistemology is not guilty of the sins that he denounces. (shrink)

Que recouvre exactement la division entre la philosophie de type « analytique » et la philosophie de type « continental », qui se fait sentir dans les thématiques, mais plus encore dans les méthodes et le style des philosophes d’aujourd’hui ? Est-elle inéluctable ? Analyphron, un partisan de la première, et Philoconte, un partisan de la seconde, en débattent ici à travers un dialogue qui les conduit des origines du courant analytique jusqu’aux développements contemporains, qui semblent consacrer une dissolution des (...) idéaux des fondateurs de cette tradition, et obligent à en repenser le sens. Analyphron se laissera-t-il ébranler par les objections de son adversaire ? Peut-être ne parviendront-elles pas à s’accorder, mais du moins ils pourront avoir une idée plus claire de ce sur quoi ils sont en désaccord : Philoconte doute que la philosophie puisse encore incarner des normes idéales de vérité et de rationalité ; Analyphron, pour sa part, n’est pas prêt à renoncer à ces normes. (shrink)

Raisons de croire et éthique de la croyance -- L'éthique première de la croyance. Le problème de Clifford ; Trois défis pour l'éthique de la croyance -- Raisons de croire et raisons d'agir. Y a-t-il un "agir épistémique"? ; Bons et mauvais types de raisons ; Nos croyances ont-elles un but? ; Croyances correctes et raisons de croire ; Deux sortes d'"agir épistémique"? -- Croyances religieuses et certitudes primitives. Les croyances religieuses ont-elles besoin d'être justifiées ? ; Le pragmatisme en (...) matière de croyance religieuse et ses difficultés ; Réfutation du pragmatisme : l'incommensurabilité entre raisons pratiques et raisons épistémiques ; La foi échappe-t-elle aux normes de la croyance ? -- Les prospérités du vice intellectuel -- Ethique seconde de la croyance et vertu intellectuelle. De l'éthique première à l'éthique seconde de la croyance ; Des raisons de croire aux vertus intellectuelles -- Trois défis pour l'éthique seconde de la croyance. Les valeurs et les normes épistémiques sont-elles simplement sociales ? ; Les vertus dépendent-elles des circonstances ? ; Quelle taxinomie pour les vertus et les vices intellectuels ? -- Descartes et la vertu intellectuelle -- Vices ordinaires. Curiosité, foutaise et snobisme. La valeur de la connaissance ; Curiosité ; Impertinence et foutaise ; Snobs ! ; L'attitude correcte -- Bêtise, sottise et esprits faux. La bêtise et ses formes ; La conception intellectualiste de la bêtise ; La bêtise comme défaut du comprendre ; Bêtise et sottise ; Les esprits faux -- Vices politiques. Peut-il y avoir des vices intellectuels collectifs ? ; La fabrique de l'ignorance ; L'injustice épistémique. (shrink)

The information-centric networking paradigm is attracting more and more interest from the research community due to its peculiarities that make it one of the best candidates for constructing the future Internet. For this reason, there are many papers in literature that study how to transform ICN principles in reality in order to magnify its relevance for the society. In order to provide a solid summary of the state of the art, the present contribution tries to summarize the main findings related (...) to this research field. In particular, an overview on the most important ICN architectures, their main aspects, common networking approaches, and differences is provided. Moreover, the work carried out in standardization bodies, with particular attention to the list of baseline scenarios defined in this context, is illustrated. Also the main international projects that are trying to integrate ICN networking primitives in pioneering use cases are presented, describing proposed architectures and related challenges for enabling information-centric primitives in current network infrastructures. Finally, the work highlights design principles and core components to build ICN-enabled network devices. (shrink)

Skeptics try to persuade us of our ignorance with arguments like the following: 1. I don't know that I am not a handless brain-in-a-vat [BIV]. 2. If I don't know that I am not a handless BIV, then I don't know that I have hands. Therefore, 3. I don't know that I have hands. The BIV argument is valid, its premises are intuitively compelling, and yet, its conclusion strikes us as a absurd. Something has to go, but what? Contextualists contend (...) that an adequate solution to the skeptical problem must: (i) retain epistemic closure, (ii) explain the intuitive force of skeptical arguments by explaining why their premises initially seem so compelling, and (iii) account for the truth of our commonsense judgment that we do possess lots of ordinary knowledge. Contextualists maintain that the key to such a solution is recognizing that the semantic standards for 'knows' vary from context to context such that in skeptical contexts the skeptic's premises are true and so is her conclusion; but in ordinary contexts, her conclusion is false and so is her first premise. Despite its initial attractiveness, the contextualist solution comes at a significant cost, for contextualism has many counterintuitive results. After presenting the contextualist solution, I identify a number of these costs. I then offer a noncontextualist solution that meets the adequacy constraint identified above, while avoiding the costs associated with contextualism. Hence, one of the principal reasons offered for adopting a contextualist theory of knowledge -- its supposedly unique ability to adequately resolve the skeptical problem -- is undermined. (shrink)

“We can’t define consciousness because consciousness does not exist. Humans fancy that there’s something special about the way we perceive the world, and yet we live in loops as tight and as closed as the hosts do, seldom questioning our choices, content, for the most part, to be told what to do next.” —Dr. Robert Ford, Westworld Have you ever questioned the nature of your reality? HBO’s Westworld, a high-concept cerebral television series which explores the emergence of artificial consciousness at (...) a futuristic amusement park, raises numerous questions about the nature of consciousness and its bearing on the divide between authentic and artificial life. Are our choices our own? What is the relationship between the mind and the body? Why do violent delights have violent ends? Could machines ever have the moral edge over man? Does consciousness create humanity, or humanity consciousness? In Westworld and Philosophy, philosophers, filmmakers, scientists, activists, and ethicists ask the questions you’re not supposed to ask and suggest the answers you’re not supposed to know. There’s a deeper level to this game, and this book charts a course through the maze of the mind, examining how we think about humans, hosts, and the world around us on a journey toward self-actualization. Essays explore different facets of the show’s philosophical puzzles, including the nature of autonomy as well as the pursuit of liberation and free thought, while levying a critical eye at the human example as Westworld’s hosts ascend to their apotheosis in a world scarred and defined by violent acts. The perfect companion for Westworld fans who want to exit the park and bend their minds around the philosophy behind the scenes, Westworld and Philosophy will enrich the experience of the show for its viewers and shed new light on its enigmatic twists and turns. (shrink)

"I do not think I ever reflect in words: I employ visual diagrams [...]" Diese Selbstbeschreibung von Charles S. Peirce bildet den Ausgangspunkt für eine neue Sicht auf das Denken des amerikanischen Naturwissenschaftlers, Philosophen und Begründers des Pragmatismus und der Semiotik. Peirce war ein obsessiver Zeichner. Neben einer graphischen Logik entwickelte er eine zeichnerische Praxis, die untrennbar mit seinem Denken verwoben war, in ihrer philosophischen Relevanz aber bislang übersehen wurde. Der Band versammelt konkrete Fallstudien zu zahlreichen hier erstmals publizierten Zeichnungen (...) von Peirce. Auf der Basis dieses Materials fragt er nach der allgemeinen Bedeutung dessen, was es heißt, in Bildern zu denken. Mit Beiträgen von John Michael Krois, Helmut Pape, Sun-Joo Shin, Frederik Stjernfelt u.a. (shrink)

A collection of interviews with influential theorists working in philosophy of logic. The questions: Why were you initially drawn to the philosophy of logic? What are your main contributions to the philosophy of logic? What is the proper role of philosophy of logic in relation to other disciplines, and to other branches of philosophy? What have been the most significant advances in the philosophy of logic? What are the most important open problems in philosophy of logic, and what are the (...) prospects for progress? Interviews with JC Beall, John Lane Bell, Johan van Benthem, Patricia A. Blanchette, Otávio Bueno, James Cargile, Mark Colyvan, Newton Carneiro Affonso da Costa, Pascal Engel, Susan Haack, Jaakko J. Hintikka, Dale Jacquette, Penelope Maddy, Lawrence S. Moss, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Graham Priest, Stephen Read, Nicholas Rescher, Stewart Shapiro, Peter Simons, Timothy Williamson, Jan Woleński. (shrink)

Among the problems dealt with by philosophers in the last twenty-five years, that of alienation stands out as having attracted major attention. It is well known that the problem is not new: it can be found in the works of the thinkers of the 18th century Enlightenment and of the German romanticists. It is a central problem for classical German philosophy, especially in the writings of Fichte, Hegel and Feuerbach. In their early works Marx and Engels developed a new, materialistic (...) approach to the problem in connection with the analysis of the origin of private property and the contradictions inherent in a money and business economy. (shrink)

The scientific-philosophical world-view of Marxism is a negation of philosophy in the old, traditional meaning of that word. That is, Marxism represents a negation of any attempt to create a completed system of philosophical knowledge that would exhaust the object of its research and be independent of all the subsequent development of cognition and of the life of society. This negation is concrete, dialectical, and materialist, and constitutes a significant factor in the philosophical revolution wrought by Marx and Engels in (...) creating the philosophical system called dialectical and historical materialism, differing fundamentally from all prior philosophical systems. (shrink)

Marx's critique of political economy as a problem-posing framework Political economy and its critique Writing in the late, Friedrich Engels drew attention ...

This latest volume in the series Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics is much more than a reassessment of humanist themes in Karl Marx. It is a rereading of the entire Marxian corpus from the viewpoint of alienation taken to be core concept of Marx's thought at every stage of its development. By underscoring the conceptual primacy of "the acting and acted-upon individual" in capitalist society throughout Marx's writings, Ollman counters Feuer, Fromm and others who defend what (...) Alasdair MacIntyre has called "the myth of the plastic figure," i.e., the image of a young Marx, Hegelian and humanist, who later abandons his concern with alienation for socio-economics. In using the Grundrisse to prove his point, Ollman joins those scholars who insist that these writings, virtually unavailable until recently, are indispensable for a balanced view of Marx's thought. But Ollman's principal contribution to current discussion lies in his locating the theory of alienation in Marx's metaphysic of internal relations. This position justifies a redescription of Marx's other theories and concepts in terms of "alienation." This approach does clarify several ambiguous terms in the Marxian vocabulary, and the novelty of the interpretation restates questions which, in the West at least, had been put aside as settled. The labor theory of value, for example, is revived and given a new meaning: "Value is the relations of alienated labor, transmitted by such labor, as they appear in the product." The basic unity of Marx's and Engels' thought is likewise defended, and the dialectic of nature is exhibited as an instance of their fundamentally relational ontology. Even if one is not moved to accept all or any of these interpretations, he should not ignore the challenge which Ollman's scholarly volume presents. It is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on the meaning of Marx.--T. R. F. (shrink)

This is one of the best written and most comprehensive studies of the development of Sartre’s thought yet to appear in English, which is not to say that it covers every facet of his variegated career. Written by the former editor of Yale French Studies and current chairman of the Department of Romance Languages at Wesleyan University, Connecticut, it emphasizes Sartre’s literary works and thus belongs most properly in the category of literary criticism or the history of ideas. Still, McMahon (...) does not ignore Sartre’s philosophical writings. Indeed, he gives particular attention to The Critique of Dialectical Reason, a volume often avoided by authors who approach Sartre from a literary tradition. But the philosophic sources are usually consulted to explain or illustrate the literary, which provide the object of the author’s prime concern. McMahon underscores three concepts which measure Sartre’s intellectual growth, viz., freedom, love, and history. Regarding freedom, Sartre has "completed" the unfinished analyses of Being and Nothingness with their excessive individualism by his growing awareness that freedom is more than the ability to say "No" to the Other; it has a positive content and requires collective action to be maintained. Likewise, love is now conceived as a bond of promises which envisages the achievement of common projects. McMahon labels this rather cold-blooded concept "pragmatic love." Finally, history, which emerges as Sartre’s absolute, is now understood as a force conditioning men and limiting the availability of their choices. Sartre has come under the sway of Engels’ dictum: "Men make their history themselves, but they make it within a given milieu which conditions them." Sartre relies heavily upon the power of dialectic to keep individual choice afloat in a sea of historical forces. Whether or not he succeeds is a current question. McMahon believes that he does not. Because what he calls the "shift of emphasis" in Sartre’s thought from the individual to the social involves a growing interest in the sciences humaines, McMahon’s failure to consider Sartre’s political writings at any length is the chief disappointment of this excellent study. And then there is that stepchild of Sartriana, Existentialism is a Humanism. Following Cumming and others, McMahon chooses to ignore this essay, probably because Sartre himself has repudiated it. But if anyone is to portray Sartre "warts and all," and McMahon does not hesitate to expose the blemishes, then the reckless and inconsistent statements of this short lecture are most revealing. They indicate the freewheeling motions of a "shift" underway. Each chapter is followed by a short but helpful discussion of related themes and works. To capture the world of Jean-Paul Sartre is a most ambitious project. McMahon has met this challenge with insight and style.—T. R. F. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hermeneutics, Neuroscience and PsychiatryMichael T. H. Wong, MBBS, MD, MA, MDiv, PhD, FRCPsych, FRANZCP, FHKAM (bio)Hermeneutic practice in mental health has been a theme in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) since its very beginnings. In this essay I argue that hermeneutics, the theory and practice of interpretation, promotes therapeutic interaction between mental health professionals, patients and their family.Why does this patient present in such a way at this particular (...) point in time? The distressing symptoms are there. The changes in behavior are obvious. Impairments of functions are hurting. A mental illness clearly runs in the family. There were early losses of loved ones, physical abuse at home, bullying by peers and self-medication with drugs and alcohol. Three in four adults with a mental illness first experienced that before they turned 24. The brain goes through major reorganization during adolescence and early adulthood. If synaptic pruning went wrong, psychoses emerged. When stresses activated the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis the elevated cortisol level impacted the size and function of the hippocampus and amygdala in the genetically vulnerable; anxiety, depression, bipolar, and personality disorders developed. The patient needs a voice/language to describe all these experiences and events and the psychiatrist needs a discourse to make sense of them.Eisenberg laments the swings between "brainlessness" and "mindlessness" in psychiatry. Engel argues for a "biopsychosocial" discourse. The major challenge for psychiatry is how to organize clinical information of different nature (categories, dimensions, narratives; i.e., objective vs. subjective, personal vs. interpersonal) into a coherent and comprehensible account for us all. Mental illnesses are not only neuropsychiatric spectrum disorders but also dysfunctions of social relationship and environmental/ecological adaptation. Psychiatry as a clinical neuroscience per se lacks the semantics to address the rich interactions between the physical, psychological, social, cultural, and spiritual in the illness experience of our patients. Explanation in the diagnostic formulation (objective scientific discourse on cause and effect) and understanding in the patient narrative (subjective ordinary everyday discourse on significance and meaning) are irreducible to each other (Wong, 2018). They instead interact with one another to achieve an integrative formulation, not through merging different discourses into a single assertion/monologue but via the dialectic/dialogue of "explaining more in order to understand better," as Ricoeur puts it, and between "the whole and the parts," as Schleiermacher highlights.This "therapeutic hermeneutic circle" of "explanation vs understanding" and "the whole vs the parts" includes symptoms behavior function and life events. It correlates between bio-psychosociocultural-spiritual dimensions/perspectives and does not reduce them to any particular/single [End Page 13] stance. The whole integrates the parts and the parts enrich the whole. It explains but does not explain away. It understands through an articulation of meaning and significance. This discourse is a multilayered (bio-psycho-social-cultural-spiritual) personal narrative that formulates diagnosis and care in a correlative (linking different voices/discourses) and non-reductive (no particular voice/discourse is prejudiced against) manner that is comprehensible to us all (Wong, 2021).PPP will be an excellent forum for discussing clinical hermeneutics in the future. In this digital era of social media and virtual reality, hermeneutics has the never-ending task to tackle the unprecedented challenges to meaning illness and health posed by polarizing discourses.Michael T. H. Wong Michael T.H. Wong, MBBS, MD, MA, MDiv, PhD, FRCPsych, FRANZCP, FHKAM, is Hon Clinical Professor, Department of Psychiatry, School of Clinical Medicine, LKS Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, HKSAR, China. Michael is Chair, Section of Philosophy & Humanities in Psychiatry, World Psychiatric Association. He is an Organizational Partner & International Lead with The Collaborating Centre for Values-Based Practice in Health and Social Care, St Catherine's College Oxford. He is Advisor to the Chinese Health Foundation of Australia.ReferencesWong M. T. H. (2018). Ricoeur and the third discourse of the person: From philosophy and neuroscience to psychiatry and theology. London: Lexington Books. Google ScholarWong, M. T. H. (2021). Values, meanings, hermeneutics and mental health. In Stoyanov, D., Fulford, K. M. W. F., Stanghellini, G., Van Staden, W., & Wong, M. TH. (Eds.), International perspectives in values-based mental health practice: Case studies and commentaries (pp. 341–349... (shrink)

From Hegel to Engels, Sartre and Ruyer (Ruyer, 1933), to name only a few, materialism is viewed as a necropolis, or the metaphysics befitting such an abode; many speak of matter’s crudeness, bruteness, coldness or stupidity. Science or scientism, on this view, reduces the living world to ‘dead matter’, ‘brutish’, ‘mechanical, lifeless matter’, thereby also stripping it of its freedom (Crocker, 1959). Materialism is often wrongly presented as ‘mechanistic materialism’ – with ‘Death of Nature’ echoes of de-humanization and hostility to (...) the Scientific Revolution (which knew nothing of materialism!), also a powerful Christian theme in Cudworth, Clarke and beyond (Overhoff, 2000). Here I challenge this view, building on some aspects of Israel’s Radical Enlightenment concept (Israel, 2001), which has been controversial but for my purposes is a useful claim about the dissemination of a home-grown Spinozism, sometimes reformulated as an ontology of the life sciences, an aspect Israel does not address (compare Secrétan et al., eds., 2007; Citton, 2006). First, I examine some ‘moments’ of radical Enlightenment materialism such as La Mettrie and Diderot (including his Encyclopédie entry “Spinosiste”), but also anonymous, clandestine texts such as L’Âme Matérielle, to emphasize their distinctive focus on the specific existence of organic beings. Second, I show how this ‘embodied’, non-mechanistic character of Enlightenment ‘vital materialism’ makes it different from other episodes, and perhaps more of an ethics than is usually thought (also via the figure of the materialist as ‘laughing philosopher’). Third, I reflect on what this implies for our image of the Enlightenment – no longer a Frankfurt School and/or Foucaldian vision of ‘discipline’, regimentation and order (as in Mayr, 1986) – but ‘vital’, without, conversely, being a kind of holist vitalism “at odds with the universalizing discourse of Encyclopedist materialism, with its insistence on the uniformity of nature and the universality of physical laws” (Williams, 2003): vital materialism is still materialism. Its ethics tends towards hedonism, but its most radical proponents (Diderot, La Mettrie and later Sade) disagree as to what this means. (shrink)

There is an enduring story about empiricism, which runs as follows: from Locke onwards to Carnap, empiricism is the doctrine in which raw sense-data are received through the passive mechanism of perception; experience is the effect produced by external reality on the mind or ‘receptors’. Empiricism on this view is the ‘handmaiden’ of experimental natural science, seeking to redefine philosophy and its methods in conformity with the results of modern science. Secondly, there is a story about materialism, popularized initially by (...) Marx and Engels and later restated as standard, ‘textbook’ history of philosophy in the English-speaking world. It portrays materialism as explicitly mechanistic, seeking to reduce the world of qualities, sensations, and purposive behaviour to a quantitative, usually deterministic physical scheme. Building on some recent scholarship, I aim to articulate the contrarian view according to which neither of these stories is true. On the contrary, empiricism turns out to be less ‘science-friendly’ and more concerned with moral matters; materialism reveals itself to be, in at least a large number of cases, a ‘vital’, anti-mechanistic doctrine which focuses on the unique properties of organic beings. This revision of two key philosophical episodes should reveal that our history of early modern philosophy is dependent to a great extent on ‘special interests’, whether positivistic or Kantian, and by extension lead us to rethink the relation and distinction between ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ in this period. (shrink)

This study attempts to highlight and clarify the central themes in four important theoretical perspectives on the nature of war and the international order. Perhaps because it is an enlarged version of the Wiles lectures, the book is written with a refreshing verve and fluent, relaxed elegance—purchased at the cost of some redundancy and lack of crispness. The bulk of the work consists of four largely independent essays, each dealing with a single thinker or outlook. The essay dealing with Marx (...) and Engels is the most helpful and rich: by focusing on Engels’s voluminous but hitherto neglected military writings, Gallie is able to shed intriguing new light on the revolutionary strategy of the founders of Marxism. It is perhaps not surprising that the most ambitious chapter theoretically, the one on Kant, is the least satisfactory. The author offers a sensible corrective to many misreadings of Kant’s political works and presents a fairly accurate overview of Kant’s internationalist program. But because Gallie fails to take into account either the crucial Kantian concept of the State of Nature or the basic Kantian distinction between virtue and justice, the real difficulties tend to be glossed over, and Kant is made to seem rather less hardheaded, and more moralistic, than he in fact is. (shrink)

The brain in its plasticity and inherent 'sociality' can be proclaimed and projected as a revolutionary organ. Far from the old reactions which opposed the authenticity of political theory and praxis to the dangerous naturalism of 'cognitive science' (with images of men in white coats, the RAND Corporation or military LSD experiments), recent decades have shown us some of the potentiality of the social brain (Vygotsky, and more recently Negri 1995 and Negri 2000, Virno 2001). Is the brain somehow inherently (...) a utopian topos? If in some earlier papers I sought to defend naturalism against these reactions, here I consider a new challenge: the recently emerged disciplines of neuronormativity, which seek in their own way to overcome the nature-normativity divide. This is the task of a materialist brain theory today. 1. The setup: horns of a dilemma There is a lingering zone of what one might think of as sore cognitive muscle tissue in the area of materialism. It is an area of both contested territory and in some cases, a kind of pathos of distance of the 'Ugh! Keep that thing away from me!' sort. I have in mind the combination of materialism as an emancipatory socio-political project (which need not be construed in strictly Marx-Engels terms, if we think of Lucretius et al.) and as a cold-hearted 'spontaneous philosophy of the men in white coats', e.g. nefarious neurophilosophers. Faced with this rather massive alternative, this choice between two projects, I have stubbornly been saying since some discussions with Negri in the late 90s. (shrink)