Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

Author: Szubka Tadeusz Title: MAIN VARIETIES OF ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS (Główne typy metafizyki analitycznej) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 849-864 Keywords: ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS, G.E. MOORE, B. RUSSELL, P.F. STRAWSON, D. DAVIDSON, M. DUMMETT, W.V. QUINE, D.M. ARMSTRONG, D. LEWIS. Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In a widespread general view about analytic philosophy it is often emphasized the supposed animosity or mistrust of that movement towards metaphysics. That opinion (...) is in many respects one-sided and incorrect. First, one cannot find that animosity towards metaphysics in the works of G.E. Moore and B. Russell, the founders of modern analytic philosophy. Of course, they criticized the speculative, Hegelian metaphysics of their idealistic predecessors, but they did it in order to defend metaphysics of a different kind, more careful, empirical, and realist one. Moreover, even if it is to some extent true that over a few decades analytic philosophy was dominated by the attitude of mistrust towards more theoretical and comprehensive metaphysical investigations, it should be stressed that that attitude has almost completely disappeared in the last fifty years. Metaphysics has again regained the status of central and vigorously pursued philosophical discipline. One of the main originators of that metaphysical turn in contemporary analytic philosophy was Sir P.F. Strawson, the Oxford philosopher, who in 1959 forcefully articulated the idea of descriptive metaphysics. A somewhat similar way of doing metaphysics was later developed in the writings of D. Davidson, M. Dummett, and – in certain respects – H. Putnam. One may say that all those thinkers have attempted to identify the basic structure of reality by describing and elucidating the basic structural features of our thought and talk. Since in such a method of doing metaphysics one can discern some characteristic marks of Kantian transcendental arguments, there is a point to call it analytic-transcendental metaphysics. In a completely different way metaphysics has been pursued by those analytic thinkers who are under heavy influence of the conception of philosophy put forward by W.V. Quine. For Quine philosophy, including metaphysics, is continuous with science, and, to be more precise, constitutes the theoretical end of science. Among many followers of that kind of metaphysics, that may be called analytic-naturalistic one, there are D.M. Armstrong and D. Lewis. The paper presents those two varieties of analytic metaphysics, and succinctly discusses their main difficulties. Subsequently, it mentions those examples of contemporary analytic metaphysics that, for one reason or another, do not belong to either of those two varieties. The paper ends with a brief appendix discussing the most recent revival of metaphysics within the analytic movement and a critical response to it from the deflationary point of view. (shrink)

The paper considers certain properties of intermediate and moda propositional logics.The first part contains a proof of the theorem stating that each intermediate logic is closed under the Kreisel-Putnam rule xyz/(xy)(xz).

The author of the article argues against some of Stanisław Pyszka's views presented in the article Ewolucja katolickiej nauki społecznej [Evolution of the Catholic social teaching], published in: „Forum Philosophicum", 8: 2003. T. Ślipko reproaches S. Pyszka for considering the views on social problems expressed in the encyclical letter „Kerum novarum" „dogmatic", as influenced in part by the Thomistic philosophy. Pyszka opposes them to a pastoral perspective of the encyclical letters written by Pope John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul (...) II. Ślipko states that Catholic social teaching develops, taking into consideration historical circumstances in which human social groups are placed, but the moral principles are unchanged. (shrink)

Dnia 2 czerwca zmarł w Warszawie Jerzy Pelc, założyciel oraz wieloletni redaktor „Studiów Semiotycznych”. Przez prawie pół wieku troszczył się On o to, aby na ich łamach ukazywały się wspomnienia pozgonne upamiętniające polskich i zagranicznych uczonych semiotyków. Wspomnienia te albo pisał sam, albo prosił o ich napisanie osoby najlepiej znające dorobek i działalność naukową zmarłego. Jego odejście postawiło nas wszystkich w sytuacji niemożliwej: sam nie może być autorem wspomnienia, a tylko On mógłby kompetentnie napisać kilka słów o swoim ogromnym dorobku (...) naukowym [...]. (shrink)

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

The popular interpretation of token‐reflexivism states that at the level of logical form, indexicals and demonstratives are disguised descriptions that employ complex demonstratives or special quotation‐mark names involving particular tokens of the appropriate expression‐types. In this article I first demonstrate that this interpretation of token‐reflexivism is only one of many, and that it is better to think of token‐reflexivism as denoting a family of distinct theoretical frameworks. Second, I contrast two interpretations of the idea of the token‐reflexive paraphrase of an (...) indexical sentence. The utterance approach claims that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of entire utterances. The sub‐utterance approach maintains that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of the particular indexical words used in the utterance. Next, I pose a problem that shows that neither of the two approaches is correct. The problem shows that the only viable version of the token‐reflexive proposition must somehow take into account the referential intentions of the speaker of the context. Therefore I conclude the article by sketching the framework of restricted intentional token‐reflexivism. I argue that it is an attractive semantic theory of distributed utterances that, among other things, enables automatic and intentional indexicals to be distinguished. (shrink)

The main thesis of this article states that patriotism constitutes a key role in the process of globalization. The author perceives the moral dimension of nation and homeland categories as the validation of such a position. Patriotism, which is not chauvinism, deeply connects with its own nation, as well as homeland, and due to its very nature, should be open to foreigners and other nations.

This paper criticizes non-constructive uses of set theory in formal economics. The main focus is on results on preference aggregation and Arrow’s theorem for infinite electorates, but the present analysis would apply as well, e.g., to analogous results in intergenerational social choice. To separate justified and unjustified uses of infinite populations in social choice, I suggest a principle which may be called the Hildenbrand criterion and argue that results based on unrestricted axiom of choice do not meet this criterion. The (...) technically novel part of this paper is a proposal to use a set-theoretic principle known as the axiom of determinacy ), not as a replacement for Choice, but simply to eliminate applications of set theory violating the Hildenbrand criterion. A particularly appealing aspect of \ from the point of view of the research area in question is its game-theoretic character. (shrink)

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is (...) not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS—understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices—and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology. (shrink)

I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne, recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s (...) proposal that intentionality comes in two distinct kinds. (shrink)

Lesio to piąta powieść kryminalna Joanny Chmielewskiej, która stanowi w jej pisarstwie pozycję wyjątkową. Podjęta w artykule interpretacja ma ukazać zarówno sposoby przekształcenia modelu powieści kryminalnej, jak i wydobyć jej humorystyczna dominantę. W analizie tekstu stosowano metody badań strukturalnych połączone z elementami socjologii literatury. Powieść odbiega od ukształtowanego wcześniej wzorca zmianą struktury narracyjnej z pierwszoosobowej na trzecio-osobową oraz mocniejszym wyeksponowaniem ludycznego obrazu świata. Autorka akcentowała aspekt humorystyczny, wysuwając go przed kryminalną intrygę i skupiając się na kreacji bohatera oraz na wywołanych (...) jego działaniami komicznych zdarzeniach. Twórczość Chmielewskiej wyodrębniał stosowany przez nią typ komizmu, który odróżniał jej utwory od „klasycznego” kryminału. W Lesiu nastąpiła zmiana konwencji – kryminał „serio” zastąpiła zabawa w kryminał. Autorka konwencjom powieści kryminalnej, nadawała nowe znaczenia i odwołując się do obiegowych motywów gatunku (zbrodnia (nie)doskonała, napad na pociąg), banalizuje je i ośmiesza. Kolejne części artykułu skupiają się na: charakterystyce bohatera; aspektach komediowych; parodii i stylizacjach językowych, których tłem są stosunki społeczno-kulturowe w PRL w latach siedemdziesiątych XX wieku. Istotną przyczyną zwrotu pisarzy i czytelników w stronę „zabawnej sensacji” zdaje się rodzaj oswajania negatywnie kojarzonej przez wielu Polaków niezbyt odległej przeszłości. Kpina z aparatu sprawiedliwości, pokazywanie nieudolnych policjantów, opieszałość organów ścigania łączą się z apologią zwykłego obywatela, który „domowymi sposobami” radzi sobie w tej rzeczywistości. Powieść Chmielewskiej znalazła licznych naśladowców i kontynuatorów po roku 1989 w nurcie groteskowym powieści kryminalnej. Lesio stanowi ważny przykład rozmaitości gatunkowej powieści kryminalnej, zmienności form i funkcji aspektu ludycznego w jej strukturze. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is modern representative democracy. Instead of discussing the many theories which strive to define and describe the essence of democracy, such as the classic, the competitive, the structural, the participatory, the concessionary, etc., it is our aim to present the various practical approaches to "democracy in action" in the post-Communist period, i.e., to characterize the various notions of the axiological and philosophical assumptions that provide the cornerstone of democracy.

Summary The logical structure of the complete process of argumentation in the historical science is deductive. It implies confirmation and disconfirmation of hypotheses with the help of the concept of the indicator, which is more objective and more universal than the one of the source; the problem of the objectivity of criteria of the reasoning of hypotheses is being discussed.

The paper tries to show that the theory of Srzednicki and Żurkowska can be viewed as an new and interesting solution of the classical problem: Can we cognize the objective reality? The theory discussed here conquer the cognitive skepticism on the condition, that there is not a impassable gap between the pre-ego experiencing without the notions and the subject cognizing by using the notions.

The paper shows that the paradox of the totality of propositions rest on assumptions characteristic of some theories of structured contents (like Jeffrey King's "new account of structured propositions").

A set-theoretical proof of Gowers’ Dichotomy Theorem is presented together with its application to another dichotomy concerning asymptotic l 2 basic sequences.