What is called “time travel” cinema is but one aspect in a tripartite series of interweaving modes of disjunctive narration which is also – simultaneously – a cinema of “many worlds” and “altered states”. Exploiting Gilles Deleuze's three syntheses of time, space, and consciousness from Difference and Repetition (1968) allows a conceptual development of these cinematic series through three popular Hollywood film cycles beginning with Planet of the Apes (Franklin J. Schaffner, 1968), The Terminator (James (...) Cameron, 1984), and Back to the Future (Robert Zemeckis, 1985). In so doing, film and philosophy are deployed as two series which together create inexhaustible atemporal, aspatial, and ahuman disjunctions, ungrounding everyday spatio-temporal identities, and affirming productive images of cinematic thought. (shrink)

We explore the better known paradoxes of Zeno including modern variants based on infinite processes, from the point of view of standard, classical analysis, from which there is still much to learn (especially concerning the paradox of division), and then from the viewpoints of non-standard and non-classical analysis (the logic of the latter being intuitionist).The standard, classical or Cantorian notion of the continuum, modeled on the real number line, is well known, as is the definition of motion as the (...) class='Hi'>time derivative of distance (we are not concerned with position and motion in more than one dimension, since Zeno wasn't). The real number line consists of its points, the distance between distinct points being positive and finite. The standard, classical derivative relies on the classical notion of limit, which does not use infinitesimals. (shrink)

In Cinema 1 Deleuze creates the taxonomy of the movement-image by extending Henri Bergson's account of the sensory-motor process in Matter and Memory through the semiotic system of Charles Sanders Peirce. Through this nexus of Bergson and Peirce, Deleuze can account for each image and sign, their impetus and their relationship to one another. In contrast, the taxonomy of the time-image, the focus of Cinema 2, is given no such genesis. Rather, the images and signs appear in situ, as (...) if ready-made. This article proposes that the impetus for the taxonomy of the time-image lies in the account given of the three passive syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition, and that the nine aspects of the passive syntheses can be seen to correspond to the nine proper signs of the time-image. (shrink)

This book is a synthesis of more than three decades of research into the concept of time and its semiotic nature. If traditional philosophy – and philosophy of time should be no exception – in the shadow of advancing biology can be said to have reached an impasse, one important reason for this, in harmony with Wittgenstein’s vision, appears to have been its lack of appropriate tools for explicating language. The present theory of time proceeds, accordingly, (...) from the exploration of temporal expressions in language as an evolutionary fact. It derives in a hypothetical, coherent feedback process of hierarchically ordered distinctions the semantics of time from its biologically dictated perceptual and cognitive-pragmatic origins. The corresponding abductive-regulative model is anchored in the assumption of biological rhythmization as the very foundation of perception and mental/physical action. Understood to originate in space and spatial perspective, time reveals itself as an instrument for temporal perspective on motion (events and situations) in a process of analysis, i.e., discontinuation of chaos made divisible and continuous by the rhythmical screen. Whereas traditional philosophy of time paid attention almost exclusively to the temporal category of tense, the biopragmatic model sees strong evidence in the perspectival nature of time for ascribing the decisive, and probably universal, role in temporal analysis to the linguistic category of aspect. Aspect may, according to the present findings, be assumed to partake already of change-of-state and cause-effect analysis without which man’s adaptation to new situations – and precondition for survival – would be inconceivable. The proposed model of space/time cognition, inspired by Hegelian dialectics, Heidegger-Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle and Peircean logic, makes Kantian a priori superfluous and liberates time from its enigmatic appearance. For the first time in temporal studies it thus appears possible to derive hypothetically linguistic expressions of time all the way from pretemporal, homogeneous continuity effected by biological rhythmization, via pretemporal metonymic (Gestalt), chunk-wise partitioning – as a general precondition for the perception and, based on primary metaphorization, the cognition of things, space and motion – to temporal analysis/discontinuation proper, primarily by aspectual perspective, and the subsequent synthesized, heterogeneous continuity of temporally ordered events. The conception of time, so disastrous for modern temporal logic, i.e., as moving object assigned extension, divisible continuity (‛linearity’) and direction, can be shown to have emerged as a result of secondary metaphorization. (shrink)

본 논문은 들뢰즈가 『의미의 논리』에서 논한 ‘아이온의 시간’을 『시네마 2』에서 논한 ‘시간의 직접적 이미지’ 개념으로 이어서 이해하고자 한다. 특히 오즈의 영화가 시간의 직접적 이미지를 어떻게 표현하고 있는가를 논하고, 이 표현이 곧 들뢰즈가 논한 아이온의 시간의 표현임을 밝히고자 했다. BR 이 논의를 위해 우선 들뢰즈가 크로노스의 시간을 아이온의 시간과 어떻게 구분하는지를 논한다. 이는 곧 『차이와 반복』에서의 ‘시간의 세 가지 종합’에 대한 논의와 『의미의 논리』에서의 ‘사건의 시간’에 대한 논의를 연결시켜 논하는 것이다. 크로노스의 시간이 지속하는 사물들의 시간이고 아이온의 시간이 반복하는 사건들의 시간임을 밝히고자 (...) 했다.BR 논문의 후반부에서는 이 시간론의 논의를 기반으로 들뢰즈 이미지론/영화론에서의 시간의 직접적 이미지 개념을 논한다. 특히 들뢰즈가 오즈의 영화들을 분석한 대목에 초점을 맞추어, 오즈의 “필로우 쇼트”들이 정물들을 통해 시간의 직접적 이미지를 표현하고 있음을 밝힌다. 그리고 결론적으로 이 직접적 시간이미지들이란 결국 아이온의 시간을, 순수 사건들을 표현하고 있음을 밝힐 것이다. 이 논의를 통해서 들뢰즈와 오즈의 관계가, 아이온의 시간과 시간의 직접적 이미지들의 관계가 밝혀질 것이다. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the concept of time-reversal invariance in physics suffers from metaphysical underdetermination, that is, that the concept may be understood differently depending on one’s metaphysics about time, laws, and a theory’s basic properties. This metaphysical under-determinacy also affects subsidiary debates in philosophy of physics that rely on the concept of time-reversal invariance, paradigmatically the problem of the arrow of time. I bring up three cases that, I believe, fairly illustrate my (...) point. I conclude, on the one hand, that any formal representation of time reversal should be explicit about the metaphysical assumptions of the concept that it intends to represent; on the other, that philosophical arguments that rely on time reversal to argue against a direction of time require additional premises. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of the theological-academic ontological doctrine of the three types of being formulated within the framework of the Russian theological-academic philosophy of the 19th century. The study of this problem in the context of the general analysis of the phenomenon of theological-academic philosophy allows expanding our understanding of the genesis of Russian philosophy and its religious-philosophical component. The main aim of the article is the historical-philosophical analysis (on the material of philosophical courses of (...) Russian theological academies and original works of professors of academies) of the doctrine about three types of being, which was developed within the framework of the theological-academic philosophy in Russia in the 19th century. The set goal is achieved by means of textual and religious analysis methods, as well as historical-functional, historical-genetic, and comparative research methods. The authors conclude that the specificity of theological-academic philosophizing was determined by confessional affiliation and consisted in its theistic form: the transversal theme of all theological-academic interpretations was the problem of being. Thus, theological-academic ontology took the form of the doctrine of God as an absolute being and the world as its derivative. The theological-academic doctrine of the three types of being and the synthesizing function of the absolute in relation to theological and material being cannot be characterized as quite logical and consistent. The notion of God as an absolute being is conditioned by the aspiration of theological-academic philosophers not to go beyond traditional orthodoxy and is one of the main specific features of theological-academic philosophical interpretations of religious consciousness. At the same time, the historical and philosophical analysis of the works of professors from Russian theological academies allows tracing how the powerful ideological and theoretical potential accumulated in Russian theological academies after their reforms in the 19th century contributed to the development of professional philosophy in Russia, the development of a philosophical categorical apparatus and the systematic formation of Russian philosophical thought. The development of this theme responds to the urgent research tasks of the history of philosophy. Further, this topic is very interesting not only for historians of philosophy but also for historians of religion, historians of orthodoxy, and culturologists. (shrink)

In this paper I describe a specific emotional reaction to the fact that we will cease to exist, namely existential dread, and I argue that the B-theory of time, according to which reality contains a four-dimensional spacetime manifold and the present time is metaphysically on a par with past and future times, cannot accommodate it. Some may see this as an advantage of the B-theory; some may see it as a problem for the view. My aim is not (...) to argue either for or against the B-theory, but merely to show that it is incompatible with a certain common emotion. The paper is split into three sections. I begin by introducing existential dread. Next, I show how existential dread fits into a widely accepted theory of emotion according to which emotions are intentional states susceptible of being both intelligible and correct, where an emotion is intelligible if, roughly, it makes sense; and is correct if, roughly, it fits its object. The core of the paper is the third section: in that section, I introduce the B-theory of time and I argue that it is incompatible with existential dread. (shrink)

Stemming from a general study of rhythm in the work of Gilles Deleuze, we propose a distribution of this concept throughout three levels: a topic level, in which we place rhythm between chaos and measure; a dynamic level, in which we analyse the formation of rhythm towards its stabilisation as a spatio-temporal dynamism; and an unfolding, in which these dynamisms take on the form of rhythmic machines applied in music (refrain), in painting (sensation) and in cinema (montage and (...) class='Hi'>time crystals). In this last phase, the rhythmic devices of various arts lead to a genesis of time. We are thus driven to think and elaborate on the link between these two concepts, rhythm and time, in the writings of Deleuze. Bearing this purpose in mind, we turn to the schema of the three syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition. These syntheses show how time emerges from different ways of understanding repetition, in the place of which rhythm will then appear. We will compare this schema with the argument articulated by Deleuze in Logic of Sensation regarding rhythm in its pictorial form. This comparison will enable us to deduce that both concepts follow a parallel path arising from the same series of processes: vibration, coupling, resonance and forced movement. We will conclude that the schema proposed in Difference and Repetition and its aesthetic purpose delineate the ways in which rhythms unfold creatively. These three syntheses of rhythm are implicated in artistic processes. (shrink)

This paper explores some key texts of Virginia Woolf in the context of Deleuzian concepts. Using a close reading style, it shows how the prose poetry in Mrs Dalloway engages a complex interplay of repetition and difference, resulting in a remarkably similar model of the three syntheses of time as Deleuze understands them. It subsequently explores Woolf's technical processes in a key passage from To the Lighthouse, showing how the prose-poetic technique systematically undoes the structures of logical (...) fact and rationality inscribed in both language and everyday speech to an extremely precise level. (shrink)

Deleuze's theory of time set out in Difference and Repetition is a complex structure of three different syntheses of time – the passive synthesis of the living present, the passive synthesis of the pure past and the static synthesis of the future. This article focuses on Deleuze's third synthesis of time, which seems to be the most obscure part of his tripartite theory, as Deleuze mixes different theoretical concepts drawn from philosophy, Greek drama theory and (...) mathematics. Of central importance is the notion of the cut, which is constitutive of the third synthesis of time defined as an a priori ordered temporal series separated unequally into a before and an after. This article argues that Deleuze develops his ordinal definition of time with recourse to Kant's definition of time as pure and empty form, Hölderlin's notion of ‘caesura’ drawn from his ‘Remarks on Oedipus’ (1803) and Dedekind's method of cuts as developed in his pioneering essay ‘Continuity and Irrational Numbers’ (1872). Deleuze then ties together the conceptions of the Kantian empty form of time and the Nietzschean eternal return, both of which are essentially related to a fractured I or dissolved self. This article aims to assemble the different heterogeneous elements that Deleuze picks up on and to show how the third synthesis of time emerges from this differential multiplicity. (shrink)

The analysis of the temporal structure of canonical general relativity and the connected interpretational questions with regard to the role of time within the theory both rest upon the need to respect the fundamentally dual role of the Hamiltonian constraints found within the formalism. Any consistent philosophical approach towards the theory must pay dues to the role of these constraints in both generating dynamics, in the context of phase space, and generating unphysical symmetry transformations, in the context of a (...) hypersurface embedded within a solution. A first denial of time in the terms of a position of reductive temporal relationalism can be shown to be troubled by failure on the first count, and a second denial in the terms of Machian temporal relationalism can be found to be hampered by failure on the second. A third denial of time, consistent with both of the Hamiltonian constraints roles, is constituted by the implementation of a scheme for constructing observables in terms of correlations and leads to a radical Parmenidean timelessness. The motivation for and implications of each of these three denials are investigated. (shrink)

This essay shows how real objects must be processes for Gilles Deleuze. These processes are determined by his account of time as a nine-fold manifold of processes deduced from Deleuze’s account of three interconnected syntheses of time in his Difference and Repetition . It will also be argued that Deleuze’s philosophy of time is speculative in a broad sense and that Deleuze’s account of the real is opposed to forms of abstraction which associate objects with (...) conceptual, perceptual or transcendental identity. In order to demonstrate the radical and systematic nature of Deleuze’s account of process, there is a discussion of a basic process underlying his manifold of time. This process is opposed to Markov chains, in order to set up an opposition to interpretations of Deleuze’s philosophy that deny its metaphysical and speculative approach in favour of scientific realism. (shrink)

This study investigated the possible prosodic transfer influences native regional dialects may have in the perception of English lexical stress by speakers of three Chinese dialects [Beijing (BJ), Changsha (CS), and Guangzhou (GZ)] compared to 20 American English (AE) speakers. F0, duration, intensity, and vowel reduction were manipulated in nonce disyllabic words. Participants performed four-word sequence recall tasks to identify lexical stress location. They performed better with natural sounds than with manipulated words. This study focused on the performance differences (...) in manipulating words. The results showed that all four-group members performed similarly processing F0 condition nonce words. BJ and CS participants were more accurate than GZ participants in duration and vowel reduction cues. Reaction time (RT) suggested that the processing time of acoustic cues differed significantly across language groups. The findings indicate that first language (L1) dialect effect is robust in second language (L2) stress perception tasks. (shrink)

Winner of the Bernard J. Brommel Award for Biography & Memoir Best Graphic Novels of the Year--Forbes Jewish Book Award Finalist Finalist for the Chautauqua Prize For Persepolis and Logicomix fans, a New Yorker cartoonist’s page-turning graphic biography of the fascinating Hannah Arendt, the most prominent philosopher of the twentieth century. One of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century and a hero of political thought, the largely unsung and often misunderstood Hannah Arendt is best known for her landmark 1951 (...) book on openness in political life,The Origins of Totalitarianism, which, with its powerful and timely lessons for today, has become newly relevant. She led an extraordinary life. This was a woman who endured Nazi persecution firsthand, survived harrowing "escapes" from country to country in Europe, and befriended such luminaries as Walter Benjamin and Mary McCarthy, in a world inhabited by everyone from Marc Chagall and Marlene Dietrich to Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud. A woman who finally had to give up her unique genius for philosophy, and her love of a very compromised man--the philosopher and Nazi-sympathizer Martin Heidegger--for what she called "love of the world." Compassionate and enlightening, playful and page-turning, New Yorker cartoonist Ken Krimstein's The Three Escapes of Hannah Arendt is a strikingly illustrated portrait of a complex, controversial, deeply flawed, and irrefutably courageous woman whose intelligence and "virulent truth telling" led her to breathtaking insights into the human condition, and whose experience continues to shine a light on how to live as an individual and a public citizen in troubled times. (shrink)

The notion of time reversal has caused some recent controversy in philosophy of physics. The debate has mainly put the focus on how the concept of time reversal should be formally implemented across different physical theories and models, as if time reversal were a single, unified concept that physical theories should capture. In this paper, I shift the focus of the debate and defend that the concept of time reversal involves at least three facets, where (...) each of them gives rise to opposing views. In particular, I submit that any account of time reversal presupposes (explicitly or implicitly) modal, metaphysical, and heuristic facets. The comprehension of this multi-faceted nature of time reversal, I conclude, shows that time reversal can be coherently said in many ways, suggesting a disunified concept. (shrink)

This article investigates Husserl’s arguments for the constitutive role of memory in producing the awareness of objective time. Husserl explicitly connects his thoughts on time and memory to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, while developing an original understanding of the syntheses of recognition and reproduction. This offers a novel avenue for considering what is transcendental about Husserl’s phenomenology of memory. I contend that Husserl developed three transcendental functions of memory with a quasi-Kantian cast in writings from (...) 1917 to 1926. These three functions concern the re-identifiability of objects over time, the objectuality (Gegenständlichkeit) of moments in time, and the rigidity of the relations between moments. An exposition of these three transcendental functions and a comparison with Kant’s critical philosophy of time establish what sort of legitimacy objective time had for Husserl and how memory served as its subjective condition of possibility. This article also offers an account of the connection between individuation and memory and a novel comparison between Husserl and Kant on the topic of memory in transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

Dieter Henrich ‘s “Notion of a Deduction” (1989), opened up approaches to both Deductions in terms of legal as opposed to syllogistic reasoning. Since the CpR is shot through with juridical metaphors and analogies, many points of connection suggest themselves. In this paper, I extend and modify Henrich’s approach, in order to extract a particular logic of evidence. I argue that the three syntheses of the A-Deduction correspond to parts of a deductive procedure, and that their names have (...) been chosen to indicate this connection to the reader. Nonetheless, the principal aim of the paper is not to develop and defend these historiographical claims, but to explicate the structure of the logic of evidence in question and link it to Kant’s intended refutation of Hume. Since the procedures Kant describes are part of the law of evidence of many nations and are equally well at work in contemporary information-theory, a precise reconstruction can map directly onto contemporary problems in philosophy, physics, and informatics, without any loss of historical accuracy. (shrink)

Deleuze’s two Cinema books explore film through the creation of a series of philosophical concepts. Not only bewildering in number, Deleuze’s writing procedures mean his exegesis is both complex and elusive. -/- Three questions emerge: What are the underlying principles of the taxonomy? How many concepts are there, and what do they describe? How might each be used in engaging with a film? -/- This book is the first to fully respond to these three questions, unearthing the philosophies (...) inspiring Deleuze’s classifications, exploring every concept and reading a film for each. -/- Clearly and concisely mapping the Cinema books for newcomers to Deleuzian film studies, as well as opening up new areas of enquiry for expert readers. -/- > An interpretation of Bergson’s Matter and Memory through Deleuze’s Bergsonism describing the ground of Deleuze’s film-philosophy > A reading of Peirce’s semiosis from Pragmatism and Pragmaticism explicating the genesis and components of the movement-image > An examination of Deleuze’s syntheses of time, space, and consciousness from Difference and Repetition illuminating the genesis and components of the time-image > Concise engagements with each of the cinematic signs to assist reading Deleuze’s Cinema books, as well as commentaries and monographs that draw upon them > 44 film readings – one for each cinematic sign – to clarify their application. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Three Pillars of Catholic EducationArchbishop Salvatore CordileoneIntroductionOn February 13, 1999, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger visited St. Patrick's Seminary and University in Menlo Park, California. He gave a lecture entitled, "Faith and Culture." Pope St. John Paul II had only back in September of the previous year published his momentous encyclical Fides et Ratio. Purposely placing his own remarks under the umbrella of that encyclical, Cardinal Ratzinger used the (...) opportunity at St. Patrick's Seminary to discuss the growing relativism which was even at that time eroding our culture.He began his lecture by using an example from C. S. Lewis's great work The Screwtape Letters. The future Pope remarked:This book consists of fictional letters from a senior devil who is giving advice on how best to proceed to one beginning in the work of leading men astray. The younger devil has expressed concern to his superior that especially intelligent people, in particular, might read the books of wisdom of the ancients and might thus come upon the track of the truth. Screwtape calms him by pointing out that the "Historical point of View," with which the intellectuals of the Western world have fortunately been inculcated by the devils, means in fact that "when a learned man is presented with any statement in an ancient author, the one question he never asks is whether it [End Page 7] is true. He asks who influenced the ancient writer, and how far the statement is consistent with what he said in other books, and what phase in the writer's development, or in the general history of thought, it illustrates, and how it affected other writers," and so on.1The startling truth is that now, almost twenty-five years later, what Cardinal Ratzinger articulated back in 1999 has only crystallized. In almost every area of our culture, the notion of truth has receded due to the acidic encroachment of relativism. As a culture we have given up on any hope of finding truth and instead consigned reality to something that is determined by the individual. We see the extent to which this relativism has taken hold of our culture in the now-famous words of Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."2 In this breathtaking statement, Justice Kennedy seemingly makes irrelevant the entire history of Western civilization. The irony, of course, is that it is precisely the course of Western philosophy and thought which has steered the culture in such a direction that it could produce a Supreme Court justice who would articulate such a bewildering statement. For we do not, nor can we, exist in a philosophical vacuum. And such is the great irony of this moment that we occupy—it is on the ash heap of Western civilization that relativists stand attacking the very history which brought them to be there in the first place.Given this sad reality, we can see Cardinal Ratzinger's criticism from 1999 as a clarion call, and as prophetic in describing what has transpired in the decades since. The complete dominance of relativism in all its forms demands that we return to the primacy of truth. But it is not only unfettered relativism that necessitates this return to truth. The return to the splendor of truth becomes all the more important for us as Christians. As the First Letter of St. Peter makes clear, the Christian is to purify his soul by obedience to the truth (1 Pet1:22). And in the Gospel of St. John, we are told that Christ is the true Light who enlightens all, and who gives the power to become children of God to those who receive him (John 1:9–11).In this vein, I would like to present what I believe is the strength of Catholic education and the need to restore a truly Catholic vision. To this end, I believe Cardinal Ratzinger was correct in his forecast of the repercussions of bracketing out truth from our culture. While the broader repercussions of... (shrink)

I examine the career advancement facilitators of organizational stakeholders who may be identified as simultaneously “core” and “fringe” in this article, via the insights of 21 leaders with disabilities. To navigate barriers and advance their careers, these leaders benefited from three categories of facilitators, including career self-management strategies, social networks, and organizational and societal factors. Facilitators are synthesized with a metaphor, the three-legged stool, which depicts three foundational pillars that underlie the leaders’ success. Focusing on an understudied (...) element of the social networks pillar, I examine how leaders’ external networks (family, friends, acquaintances, and role models) facilitated their career advancement. Findings point to the role of strong and weak ties in developing leaders’ career self-management strategies as well as their access to core stakeholder positions. Last, contributions, implications, and limitations of this article are discussed. (shrink)

A. N. Prior’s writings should obviously be studied already for historical reasons. His inventions of modern temporal logic and hybrid logic are clearly important events in the history of logic. But the enduring importance of studying his works also rests on his methodological approach, which remains highly relevant also for systematical reasons. In this paper we argue that Prior’s formulation in the 1950s of a tense-logical paradigm for the study of time should be understood in the light of at (...) least three other principles or perspectives which were manifest already in his studies during the 1940s and further developed in the 1950s: his emphasis on the value of interdisciplinary studies, his reflections on formalisation and his view of the role of symbolic logic in conceptual studies and in the philosophy of science. Our investigation into Prior’s basic tenets and principles makes extensive use of Prior’s Nachlass. It is thereby also exemplified how his correspondence and unpublished papers contain important information for a deeper understanding of Prior’s paradigm for the study of time. (shrink)

With regards the crucial issue of the existence of the self, within canonical texts of the Buddhist Abhidharma schools we find passages that are frequently at odds with one another. Sometimes the Buddha defends or respects the belief in the self and in personal continuity; at other times he seems to deny that beyond the psycho-physical factors to which our existential experience can be reduced there is an ātman that contains, owns or controls these same factors; in further cases still, (...) he states that the use of the metaphysical categories of “being” and “non-being” must be avoided – thus, about the self (or everything else), it is inappropriate to say that it exists or that it does not exist. Faced with these divergences (or contradictions) within contemporary Buddhist studies, we can detect two main tendencies. Some scholars start from the assumption that the Buddha’s teaching is or should be coherent and univocal, and, therefore, propose readings of his original message that are supposed to iron out or conciliate any inconsistencies. Others believe that the inconsistencies are actually irreconcilable and, therefore, maintain that the Abhidharma canons are a composite and stratified redaction in which the opposite views of different writers overlap and intersect. Against these historiographical approaches, the purpose of the present paper is to show that the three aforementioned modes of the Buddha’s teaching are, in fact, both alternative and irreconcilable. This, however, far from presenting a puzzle to be solved or explained (by resorting to suppositions of which, in the canons, we have no explicit confirmation), is nothing more than a feature of the Buddha’s Dharma, which appears to be a teaching that develops different pedagogical/soteriological modes for different purposes, and which is conceived for the spiritual growth of followers with different intellectual and psychological profiles. (shrink)

The aim of the series of the three articles entitled “Name game…” is to present the historical information about nomenclature history of every known chemical element. The process of naming each chemical element is analyzed, with particular emphasis on the first publication with a given name. It turned out that in many cases this information is not obvious and unambiguous, and the published data are even contradictory. In a few cases, the names of the elements were changed even several (...) times. Moreover, even when the author of a given element name is known, it is sometimes not entirely clear in which publication he/she first used it. Therefore, the series of three articles are an attempt to sort out the issue of first publishing of the names of all 118 chemical elements known so far, based on original source texts, available thanks to the digitization of a number of collections of scientific literature. The articles are divided according to the time of discoveries: (1) research till the end of the 18th century, (2) discoveries in the 19th century, (3) discoveries and syntheses of elements in the 20th and 21st centuries. This particular article presents the history of naming of the first 37 elements: known from antiquity, discovered in nature and named in 17th and 18th century. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to show how the reading of Kafka’s Prometheus offered by Hans Blumenberg in Arbeit am Mythos authorizes a re-understanding of this short story as a device within which the meta-representative moment and the questioning moment are configured as two indissolubly linked aspects. In this perspective, starting from the recognition of the key role played by the mechanism of irony in the construction of the Kafkaesque short story, the article aims to highlight the three (...) different levels of articulation of such a mechanism, with particular reference to its ability to exhibit – at the same time – the transcendibility of the datum and the need to think the sense as «infinite deferral». (shrink)

In the causal inference framework of Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines, inferences about causal relationships are made from samples from probability distributions and a number of assumptions relating causal relations to probability distributions. The most controversial of these assumptions is the Causal Faithfulness Assumption, which roughly states that if a conditional independence statement is true of a probability distribution generated by a causal structure, it is entailed by the causal structure and not just for particular parameter values. In this paper we (...) show that the addition of the Causal Faithfulness Assumption plays three quite different roles in the SGS framework: it reduces the degree of underdetermination of causal structure by probability distribution; computationally, it justifies reliable causal inference algorithms that would otherwise have to be slower in order to be reliable; and statistically, it implies that those algorithms reliably obtain the correct answer at smaller sample sizes than would otherwise be the case. We also consider a number of variations on the Causal Faithfulness Assumption, and show how they affect each of these three roles. (shrink)

In his private notes written in 1936 (now published as GA82), Heidegger enumerates three “fundamental deceptions” at play in Being and Time (1927). The thrust of these deceptions is twofold: that Dasein is something given and that the task of phenomenology is to describe Dasein in its givenness. These are deceptions, Heidegger claims in 1936, because Dasein is not something given, but can only be reached in a leap, and because the task of phenomenology is not to describe (...) Dasein in its givenness, but to bring about Dasein and the “there,” the site of Being’s happening, through a creative leap-in. Scholars might be inclined to read these deceptions as further evidence for the view that Heidegger in the 1930s abandons phenomenology understood as a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness. This paper argues, to the contrary, that phenomenology for the young Heidegger was never a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness, but always, however obliquely presented throughout the 1920s, a way of participating in the creative unfolding of the site of Being’s happening. (shrink)

In our experience, we see more than what we see in a strict sense. We see things as identical through (and despite) multiple spatio‐temporal appearances; we recognize things as something. In this article, I address this issue by asking how temporality allows us to see more in the present than what the present actually contains. I argue that presence and absence are “available,” not just as they are perceived through our senses, but as they are encountered through time, and (...) notably, according to the relations that unify past, present, and future. To support this view, I refer to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's notion of synthesis. Specifically, I consider Heidegger's reading of the so‐called A‐Deduction, where Kant describes our relation with objects as enabled by three syntheses (i.e., apprehension, reproduction, and recognition). I reconstruct Heidegger's holistic interpretation of the threefold synthesis as an interplay of past, present, and future. I show how in such interplay, temporal dimensions are unified by relations that do not rely on perception; these “time‐relations,” which Heidegger also calls “rules,” allow us to see what we see not just as it is literally perceived, but as part of an “image” of the manifold. (shrink)

A two-systems model of moral judgment proposed by Joshua Greene holds that deontological moral judgments (those based on simple rules concerning action) are often primary and intuitive, and these intuitive judgments must be overridden by reflection in order to yield utilitarian (consequence-based) responses. For example, one dilemma asks whether it is right to push a man onto a track in order to stop a trolley that is heading for five others. Those who favor pushing, the utilitarian response, usually take longer (...) to respond than those who oppose pushing. Greene's model assumes an asymmetry between the processes leading to different responses. We consider an alternative model based on the assumption of symmetric conflict between two response tendencies. By this model, moral dilemmas differ in the "difficulty" of giving a utilitarian response and subjects differ in the "ability" (tendency) to give such responses. (We could just as easily define ability in terms of deontological responses, as the model treats the responses symmetrically.) We thus make an analogy between moral dilemmas and tests of cognitive ability, and we apply the Rasch model, developed for the latter, to estimate the ability-difficulty difference for each dilemma for each subject. We apply this approach to five data sets collected for other purposes by three of the co-authors. Response time (RT), including yes and no responses, is longest when difficulty and ability match, because the subject is indifferent between the two responses, which also have the same RT at this point. When we consider yes/no responses, RT is longest when the model predicts that the response is improbable. Subjects with low ability take longer on the "easier" dilemmas, and vice versa. (shrink)

Extensionalist theories of the specious present suggest that every perceptual experience is extended in time for a short while, such that they are co-extensive in time with the time experienced in them. Thus, there can be no experience of time, unless the experience itself is extended in time. Accordingly, there must be something that unites the temporal parts of a perceptual experience into temporally extended wholes. I call this the “glue-problem for extensionalism”. In this paper (...) I suggest three desiderata that an extensionalist theory should meet in order to solve the glue-problem. I also distinguish between different versions of extensionalism, and argue that none of them can solve the glue-problem without violating at least one desideratum. (shrink)

The time?honored concept of change seems capable of accounting for the appearance of matter from the primal energy of the Universe, and in turn for the emergence of life from that matter. As sentient beings, we, perhaps along with other advanced life forms in the cosmos, have become the collective consciousness of the Universe. Our raison d'etre is our ability to appreciate the cosmos?to wonder, to introspect, to abstract, to explain?for technological intelligence is a preeminently evolved agent of the (...) Universe. (shrink)

There is an important disagreement in contemporary epistemology over the possibility of non-epistemic reasons for belief. Many epistemologists argue that non-epistemic reasons cannot be good or normative reasons for holding beliefs: non-epistemic reasons might be good reasons for a subject to bring herself to hold a belief, the argument goes, but they do not offer any normative support for the belief itself. Non-epistemic reasons, as they say, are just the wrong kind of reason for belief. Other epistemologists, however, argue that (...) there can be cases where non-epistemic reasons directly offer normative support for the beliefs a subject holds. -/- My aim in this paper is to remove an apparent obstacle for the view that there can be non-epistemic normative reasons for belief, by showing that the existence of non-epistemic reasons for belief does not conflict with epistemic standards for the assessment of inference. More specifically, I aim to show that the following principles are compatible: -/- Epistemic Norm of Inference (ENI): Necessarily, for all subjects, S, and inferences, I: I is a good inference for S only if S can gain a (doxastically) epistemically justified belief in I’s conclusion on the basis of I’s premises. -/- Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief (NERB): Possibly, for some subject, S, reason, R, and belief, B: R is a good (i.e., normative) reason for S to hold B, and R is not an epistemic reason for B. -/- Guidance: For all subjects S, potential reasons R, and beliefs/actions φ: In order for R to count as a normative reason for S to φ, it must be possible for S to take R into account as relevant to the determination of whether S ought to φ. -/- One might naturally think that these principles conflict, for if there are non-epistemic reasons for belief, then they must guide deliberation, and in guiding deliberation, they would violate epistemic standards. The aim of this paper is to show that no such conflict need arise. -/- Section 2 of the paper proceeds to set out the concept of an inference, and to sketch an epistemic framework for the assessment of inferences and arguments. Section 3 sets out the distinction between normative and motivating reasons, and briefly defends the view that there can be non-epistemic reasons for beliefs. Section 4 shows that non-epistemic reasons for belief are compatible with epistemic standards for inference, because any time a reason R is a good non-epistemic reason for a subject S to hold a belief B, there is an epistemically good inference available to S which takes R as a premise and which concludes with the meta-belief that S ought to hold B. So the paper employs a level-connecting principle between normative reasons for φ-ing and epistemic reasons for believing that one ought to φ. The paper ends with clarifications of that level-connecting principle, and responses to three objections. (shrink)

Early Heyen is interesting for religious scholars for at least two reasons. First, at this time in Japan there is an independent professional philosophy. Second, at this time the formation of the first of three religious-cultural-sociopolitical syntheses, which highlights in the history of the religions of Japan Dzh.Kitagava - the synthesis of Ritsurio: "paradigmatic form of immanent theocracy", ends. The religious and philosophical culture of early Heyana is a complex, multi-layered phenomenon. Its basis was the linguistic (...) conceptualization of the world of classical Japanese and, to some extent, classical Chinese, as well as mythological representations, inherited mostly from archaic times. On this basis, ideas developed from the continent in the previous period - Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, who managed to get well here for three hundred years Developed. (shrink)

There is an important point behind Earman's criticisms of the causal theory of time and space-time. This point has been made perspicuously in a recent paper by Glymour. It concerns the novel problems raised for a theory of space-time by the general theory of relativity, and I shall explain it briefly in Section II below. Section I briefly states my own view of the status of the causal theory, and Sections III and IV deal with Earman's specific (...) criticisms. (shrink)

We propose a conceptual framework for analysing the relationship between social emancipation and alternative technology development. Key is the “functional autonomy” of the collective of users and developers of the technology vis-a-vis state and capital. We draw on previous empirical work about three hacker projects to substantiate the claim that the functional autonomy of hackers rests on three “pillars of autonomy”: technical skill, shared values, and collective memory. These three pillars sustain the autonomy of a community of (...) hackers so that it may successfully resist recuperation attempts by capital. We make this claim in contradistinction to looser constellations of users, citizen scientists, DIY hobbyists, etc., where the functional autonomy tends to be much weaker. Hence, in the latter case, we should expect the actors to be recuperated in short time. The emancipatory promises that they make in regard to their practices, and are often mirrored in the academic literature about user innovation, citizen science, etc., will then turn sour. From this observation, we develop a second-order reflection on the role of the scholar studying purportedly emancipatory technology projects. As against the popular “follow-the-actors” approach, we defend the continued need for scholarly critique. We do so with the caveat that critique must in part be conducted as self-critique. (shrink)

Cet article s'interroge sur le statut à la fois épistémologique et ontologique d'un passé qui « a été » et dont les individus comme les sociétés retiennent le souvenir, mais qui, comme le langage ordinaire l'exprime, « n'est plus » . Toute une tradition de réflexion sur la conservation du passé par la mémoire depuis Platon et Aristote a voulu ramener la mémoire à la métaphore de l'empreinte. En revanche, cet article tente de montrer que la mémoire à plusieurs dont (...) dépend la connaissance historique n'est pas simplement assimilable à ce topos traditionnel. Ce qui caractérise la mémoire plurielle et publique qui alimente le travail de l'historien, c'est le statut privilégié du témoignage, la possibilité de confronter différents témoignages les uns aux autres, dont dépend la crédibilité du récit historique. C'est ainsi moins la problématique d'une ressemblance entre récit et événements racontés — problématique de la trace, héritée d'une tendance traditionnelle à identifier la mémoire avec l'empreinte — que la confrontation de témoignages dans leurs différents degrés de fiabilité qui nous fait assister à l'événement raconté. Cette réflexion sur le décalage entre mémoire et histoire ouvre, dans la deuxième partie de cet article, à une analyse approfondie de la temporalité propre au passé qui fait l'objet du souvenir et conduit à une confrontation avec privilège accordé, dans la synthèse des trois modes du temps, chez saint Augustin au présent et, chez Heidegger, au futur. De cette manière, l'article tente de rééquilibrer la synthèse des temps en lui restituant un autre rapport au passé, que l'on ne saurait atteindre à partir d'Augustin ou de Heidegger. Libérer l'histoire du paradigme de la trace, de la métaphore de la mémoire comme empreinte, revient précisément à la restitution de ce mode de temporalisation du passé jusqu'ici esquivé : cet autre rapport au passé vise, conjointement à la mise en évidence du témoignage propre au travail de l'historien, à souligner la dette envers le passé et de la possible délivrance de la dette. C'est, en effet, en délivrant « par le moyen de l'histoire, les promesses non tenues, voir empêchées et refoulées par le cours ultérieur de l'histoire, qu'un peuple, une nation, une entité culturelle, peuvent accéder à une conception ouverte et vivante de leurs traditions ». This article examines both the epistemological and the ontological status of the past which at once « has been » and is remembered by individuals and societies, but which, and ordinary language tells us, is « no more ». An important tradition of reflection that has focused, since Plato and Aristotle, on the conservation of the past by memory, has attempted to account f or memory in terms of the metaphor of the impression. This article, on the contrary, argues that the plural memory retained by a number of individuals, upon which historical knowledge depends, cannot simply be derived from this traditional presup-position concerning memory. Memory which is at once plural and public that is the source of the historian's research most directly concerns the testimony of witnesses, the possibility of confronting different testimonies, each with the others, which constitutes the basis of the credibility of the historian's argument. Hence, it is less a problem of the resemblance of the historical narrative to narrated events — inherited from the traditional tendency to identify memory with the impression — than the confrontation of witnesses in their différent degrees of trustworthiness, which makes it possible to understand the significance of the narrated event. This reflection concerning the disparity between memory and history is followed, in the second part of this article, to an analysis of the temporality that characterizes the past which is remembered. It leads to a questioning of the privilege accorded, in the synthesis of the three modes of time, to be present in the philosophy of saint Augustine and to the future in that of Heidegger., To liberate history from the paradigm of the trace, from the metaphor of memory as impression, is tantamount to the retrieval of mode of temporalization of the past which has previously been neglected: this other relation to the past intends, while underlining the status of the witness that characterize the historian's endeavor, to place in evidence the idea of the debt toward the past. It is consciousness of the debt toward the past, and of need of deliverance from the debt which, by means of history, aims at emancipation from « the unkept promises that have been blocked or repressed by the later course of history, through which a people, a nation, a culture, may attain a living and open conception of its own traditions ». (shrink)

At a time when global warming due to greenhouse gas emissions pose a present and clear threat to the environment, the Nuclear Energy Industry is gearing up to provide a solution to this problem, trading upon a number of fallacies to argue that it neither makes, nor will in future make, any significant contribution to these or to other radiation-linked diseases. This paper exposes these fallacies and argues, to the contrary, that even should the industry be able to avoid (...) all accidents, routine radioactive emissions to the environment during power production and fuel reprocessing threaten to destroy all human life on the planet. Dr. Glynn is a Full Professor of Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University, having earned his doctorate at The University of Manchester, England. His many publications include Continental and Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science, eds. Babette Babich, Debra Bergoffen and Simon Glynn, (Vermont: Avebury, 1995). This paper was presented at the Comparative Studies Association 2008 Conference: Interdisciplinarity and Environmental Sustainability. (shrink)

When writing about cinema does Deleuze have a conception of cinema spectatorship? In New Philosophy for New Media, Mark Hansen argues that Deleuze does have a conception of cinema spectatorship but that the subjectivity central to that spectatorship is weak and impoverished. This article argues against Hansen's reductive interpretation of Deleuze. In doing so, it relies on the three syntheses of time developed in Difference and Repetition alongside an elaboration of Deleuze's notion of a ‘cinematographic Cogito’. In (...) this way, the article offers a way of understanding the processes of cinema spectatorship from a Deleuzian perspective. (shrink)

In recent times, the exponential growth of sequenced genomes and structural knowledge of proteins, as well as the development of computational tools and controlled vocabularies to deal with this growth, has fueled a demand for conceptual clarification regarding the concept of function in molecular biology. In this article, we will attempt to develop an account of function fit to deal with the conceptual/philosophical problems in that domain, but which can be extended to other areas of biology. To provide this account, (...) we will argue for three theses: (1) some authors have confused metatheoretical issues (about the meaning and application criteria of terms) with metaphysical ones (about teleology); this led them to (2) look for explicit definitions of “function”, in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria of application, in order to make the concept of function eliminable; however, (3) if one leaves metaphysical worries aside and focuses on functional attribution practices, it is more adequate to say that the concept of function has an open texture. That is, that a multiplicity of application criteria is available, none of which is sufficient nor necessary to attribute a function to a trait, and which only in concert form a clear picture. We distinguish this thesis from some usual forms of pluralism. Finally, we will illustrate this account with a historical reconstruction of the ascription of a water transport function to aquaporins. (shrink)

This book empirically investigates the nature of time biases. Many philosophers think that it is rationally permissible to prefer a life that is overall worse to one that is overall better, as long the badness of that life lies in the past rather than the future. These philosophers think that it is rationally permissible to be time biased. Time biased individuals differently value the wellbeing of their various selves in virtue of where those selves are located in (...) time. This book focuses on three key kinds of time bias: near, present, and future bias. It presents a rich picture of the conditions under which we display these biases, and it outlines several psychological explanations for them. It then uses this new empirical research we conducted to inform arguments regarding the normative status of these biases. At its heart it considers the question: does having time biased preferences of one sort or another make us better off or worse off? And it uses the answers to these questions to inform our theorizing about whether we have reason either to have, or to avoid having, such preferences. (shrink)

Previous research on sustainable entrepreneurship has mainly aimed to understand the antecedents of entrepreneurs’ sustainability-oriented behavior. Yet the literature lacks a more nuanced understanding of how entrepreneurs implement sustainability strategies when creating a new venture. Drawing on sustainability concepts, we first examine how entrepreneurs balance the economic, environmental, and social dimensions as part of their ventures’ strategic ambitions. We show that sustainable entrepreneurs prioritize the three sustainability dimensions and possibly reprioritize them in response to stakeholder interests. Applying a stakeholder (...) theory perspective, we theorize that how entrepreneurs balance their sustainability dimensions and goals depends on the degree of stakeholder involvement and of external expectations. Our contributions refine the growing sustainable entrepreneurship literature and call attention to the importance of including weightings and time when examining the dimensions of sustainability. (shrink)

This paper consists of two parts and has two aims. The first is to elaborate on the historical-philosophical background of Cantor’s notions of infinity in the context of Spinoza’s influence on him. To achieve this aim, in the first part I compare Spinoza’s and Cantor’s conceptions of actual infinity along with their mathematical implications. Explaining the metaphysical, conceptual, and methodological aspects of Cantor’s expansion of the orthodox finitist conception of number of his time, I discuss how he adopts Spinoza’s (...) motifs to overcome the challenges on his way to proposing his transfinite infinites. To achieve the second aim, i.e., to investigate the philosophical foundations of Cantor’s transfinite infinites, I follow a three-step outline analyzing Cantor’s three principles along with their metaphysical and epistemological-linguistic aspects. I analyze the strengths and weak sides of Lakoff and Núñez’s Basic Metaphor of Infinity and Pantsar’s Process → Object Metaphor, then compare their interpretations with mine. I conclude that the metaphors can be improved when their source domains are limited to the target domains they apply to and when supported by a thorough analysis of the historical-philosophical background of their target domains. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, there are three qualitatively different forms of rule: royal, political, and despotic. Royal and political rule are free, while despotic rule is unfree. In unfree rule the ruler rules in his own interest. But free men deserve to be ruled in their own interests, which occurs in royal and political rule. In political rule some of the ruled have a right to participate in public life. Being a citizen does not necessarily mean, however, having the right (...) to higher office. In actual constitutions, the distribution of political power beyond that accompanying mere citizenship usually depends on an additional criterion. Political virtue is the best criterion because officials possessing it are most likely to produce a happy citizenry. If a political community has a man with political virtue that outweighs that of all others combined, no other man is qualified to participate in public deliberation and judgment, to be a citizen. Under this royal rule, there is neither shared rule nor rule of law. Despite this Aristotle says that royal rule is better than political rule. A king is more effectively able to produce a happy population than would any multitude of citizens ruling jointly. This means that one need not be a citizen, let alone hold high office, to be happy. In fact happiness primarily consists in philosophical contemplation, for which there is more time in a monarchy. Corresponding to the three kinds of rule there were three dimensions to Aristotle's practical policies. (shrink)

In the second chapter of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze explores the relationship of the unconscious to the three syntheses of time that he previously outlined, in order to conceive of an unconscious that is no longer representational but rather "differential and iterative, serial, problematic, and questioning." This article examines the implications of this refoundation of the unconscious with respect to psychoanalysis. I particularly emphasize the topical, dynamic, and energetic consequences of this undertaking, through which Deleuze seeks to (...) replace Freudian metapsychology with an ontological approach to the unconscious. I show how this development is indebted to Lacan’s thematization of a symbolic order, though Deleuze offers an original interpretation of it. In doing so, I aim to situate his work within the context of a discussion with psychoanalysis that began before his doctoral thesis and whose provisional resolution would lead to his encounter with Guattari. (shrink)

This article argues that annual hours per employed person and per working-age person capture important dimensions of political-economic success that should be weighed against aggregate employment and wealth patterns. It also argues that partisan-driven work-time policies and welfare-regime institutions give rise to diverging Social Democratic, Liberal, and Christian Democratic “worlds” of work time in terms of these two measures. Descriptive statistics for eighteen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries reveal broad clustering and trends suggestive of the (...) class='Hi'>Three Worlds, while panel estimation suggests the influence of partisan and welfare-institutional conditions underlying them. Case study of Finland, the United States, and the Netherlands further illustrates the political process and sequence of the Three Worlds. (shrink)

I have so far ignored Earman's Section IV in which spatiotemporal coincidence is discussed. The answer will be clear from the preceding: the exact definitions and principles of the exact theories we have displayed are to be discussed with reference to the special and not the general theory of relativity. But moreover, Earman's transition from (C) to (1) assumes what we do not grant: that events are causally connectible exactly if the points in the mathematical space-time at which they (...) are located are linked by a causal curve.This captures in a nutshell my own conclusions. The first is that the causal theory, after its success vis-à-vis the STR, must now provide a detailed analysis of spatiotemporal concepts in the GTR. The second is that the points raised by Earman do not provide substantive reasons for doubting the adequacy of the causal theory to this task, because Earman insists in his extrapolations on a much closer relation between the empirical structure of events and the mathematical structures that model it than ought to be assumed. (shrink)

The spatialization mechanism of time is one of the important ways to explore the essence of time. The theory of cognitive linguistics holds that metaphor and metonymy are two ways of spatialization of time concept. However, from the perspective of Information Philosophy, the above research only stays at the level of regenerative temporal and spatial information(concept), and does not trace back to the source of objective ontology to explain the spatialization process of time. According to the (...) ontology theory of Information Philosophy, information can be divided into three different forms and the concept is just the third form of information. Thus, we can analyze the spatialization process of time under the objective time and space, in-itself, for-self and regenerative space-time information form, revealing the inevitability spatialization of human temporal cognitive. This informational perspective shows the ontological source of the human’s perception of "past, present and future" and deepens the study of the essence of time. (shrink)

This thesis introduces and defends a ‘C theory’ of time. The metaphysics of time literature is primarily concerned with the distinction between the A and B theories of time, with the disagreement concerning whether the passage of time is an objective feature of reality. I argue that the distinction between the B and C theories—in terms of whether time has a ‘privileged’ direction—is of more obvious relevance to the philosophy of physics than is the distinction (...) between the A and B theories. The thesis has three main contentions. (1) In order to maintain a substantial metaphysical dispute between the different theories of time, they must be defined in terms of structural properties, and the naturalistic metaphysics of time direction involves the assessment of these structures in light of contemporary physics. (2) The A theory of time requires a model with two temporal dimensions, and although such a model provides a resolution to a number of problems faced by standard A theories, it is not motivated by physical theory. (3) The dispute between the B and C theories of time is of direct relevance to the philosophy of physics: the B theorist’s assumption of the existence of a privileged temporal direction is of explanatory relevance to physics; and a comparison between unidirectional and adirectional explanations in physics can in principle shed light on whether time is B- or C-theoretic. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a close reading of Deleuze's complex account of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle in Difference and Repetition. The first part provides a reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle itself, showing why Freud feels the need to develop a transcendental account of repetition. In the second, I show the limitations of Freud's account, drawing on the work of Weismann to argue that Freud's transcendental model mischaracterises repetition. In the third part, I show how (...) Freud's account of the death drive is shadowed by Deleuze's own non-representational transcendental account. (shrink)