Depuis le début de ce siècle, l'art et la littérature n'ont cessé de déborder leurs limites et de bousculer leurs catégories. Cette démarche radicale a contribué, en retour, à réveiller une théorie jusqu'alors quelque peu engourdie dans des conceptions héritées de la fin du XVIIIe siècle, aux confins des âges classique et romantique. Les études ici réunies témoignent de ce renouveau de l'esthétique, particulièrement dans la philosophie de tradition analytique. Leur trait commun est le caractère relativiste de leurs critères. Les (...) "symptômes" de la relation artistique sont de l'ordre de l'usage, de la circonstance, de la fonction : il n'y a d'oeuvre qu'à la rencontre d'une intention et d'une attention. Pour le public comme pour les créateurs, l'art est aussi une pratique. (shrink)

This study considers the philosophical arguments against that Extended Conciliar Christology and argues that none of them succeed in showing the doctrine to be false, or incoherent, or inconsistent.

In his Fifth Meditation, Husserl appears to confront the problem of solipsism. As a number of commentators have suggested, however, since it arises from within phenomenology itself and the existence of the other is never in doubt, it is not a solipsism in the traditional Cartesian sense. Alfred Schutz, however, appears to understand Husserl's inquiry in precisely these terms. As such, his critical discussions of the Fifth Meditation, as well as his subsequent rejection of transcendental philosophy, might not be well-founded. (...) Yet in spite of this misconstrual, Schutz's criticisms do highlight the problematic relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity in Husserl's late phenomenology, and albeit misplaced, ironically, his rejection of the Fifth Meditation forms a coherent response to Husserl's call for a “science of the life-world.” Intersubjectivity, Schutz concludes, must be assumed as a basis for phenomenological investigation rather than derived as a result of philosophical inquiry. “Negatively,” this is clearly a departure from Husserl's project since Schutz inevitably negates the “radical” motif under which phenomenological inquiry ostensibly proceeds. “Positively,” however, the project to which this criticism leads—a “phenomenology of the natural attitude”—represents a legitimate direction for phenomenological study as well as a radical turn within the theory and practice of social science. (shrink)

The purpose of this response piece is to summarize what is meant by “critical religion” as a contribution to the ongoing debates within the discipline, and specifically in relation to critical research on religion.

The degree to which the early dharma literature was an extrapolation from the earlier ritual codes can be seen from a number of shared features of form and content. One of these that has not received more than passing notice is the fact that the Dharmaśāstric principle of regarding customary norms as a valid basis of dharma, both in general and in limited spheres, has its origins in ritual rules in the śrautasūtras and gṛhyasūtras. Passages from the Baudhāyanaśrautasūtra and numerous (...) gṛhyasūtras show that already in these rulebooks established practices of particular social groups were accepted as a valid authority in certain contexts where explicit textual warrant was lacking, and that a further distinction was there made between the general norms of experts and the valid particular norms of locality or social group. (shrink)

The United States, unlike all other industrialized nations, does not have a comprehensive public system for financing health care. Nevertheless, the magnitude of America's public health care financing effort is remarkable. Of the one trillion dollars the United States spent on health care in 1996, almost half, $483.1 billion, was spent by public programs. In 1995, Medicare—our social insurance program for persons over sixty-five and the long-term disabled—overed 37.5 million Americans; Medicaid—our program for indigent elderly and disabled persons and indigent (...) children and their families—covered 36.3 million. In 1996, Medicare and Medicaid spent $203.1 and $147.7 billion, respectively. The payment policies of these massive public health care programs have a profound effect on the provision of health care.Many of the recipients of Medicare and Medicaid suffer pain. In 1994, 376,200 Americans over age sixty-five died of cancer. Virtually all of these would have been Medicare recipients, and as many as 70 percent of them died in unrelieved pain. Nearly four million Americans over sixty-five endured the pain of inpatient surgery in 1995, again nearly all of whom were Medicare recipients. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncements and Government a.d. 284–324T. D. BarnesSimon Corcoran. The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncements and Government a.d. 284–324. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. xv 1 406 pp. Cloth, $85. (Oxford Classical Monographs)The four decades between the accession of Diocletian on 20 November 284 and the abdication of Licinius on 19 September 324 witnessed profound changes in the government and administrative structure of (...) the Roman world. These changes are naturally reflected in the legislation of the period, which survives in relative abundance—indeed, a larger proportion of the emperors’ legal decisions and enactments probably survives from these four decades than from any previous period of forty years in the history of the Roman Empire. The high rate of survival is due in part to the activity of the commissioners who compiled the Theodosian Code in the 430s and the Codex Justinianus in the sixth century: the former set out to collect general laws and edicts of the Christian Roman Empire since the conversion of Constantine, while the latter included in their compilation a large part of two Diocletianic collections of imperial rescripts, the Codex Gregorianus and the Codex Hermogenianus. But the legislation of Diocletian and his imperial colleagues and successors is also known from a wide variety of other sources—papyri, inscriptions, nonofficial collections of laws, Lactantius’ account of the decade of Christian persecution from 303 to 313 in his On the Deaths of the Persecutors, and Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History. Moreover, Eusebius’ Life of Constantine quotes important documents from the last months of 324.Simon Corcoran includes all this varied and historically significant material in his purview, and he provides a reliable guide to it. His monograph is a revised version of an Oxford doctoral thesis which he began in 1987 under the supervision of Fergus Millar and completed in 1992 under that of John Matthews, and he has also taken advice from Tony Honoré. His work is technically proficient. I have not noticed any careless errors of any consequence, and Corcoran has used my work on the period of Diocletian and Constantine in the spirit in [End Page 145] which I intended it to be used: he has understood the underlying principles upon which it rests, then applied them critically, sometimes to reach conclusions which not only differ from my own but are superior to them.Corcoran begins with two introductory chapters which succinctly survey the subject and the evidence available. On interpolation in legal texts, he is cautious and sensible. He proceeds on the assumption that though “the transmitted texts are seldom identical with what the imperial chancery originally issued,” they have seldom undergone drastic alteration: “abbreviation is the most common fate of constitutions in the legal sources” (19). Yet he provides a salutary reminder and example of what can happen (16–18): whereas a rescript in the Fragmenta Vaticana denies that the temporary gift of estates subject to tax is valid (Frag. Vat. 283, si stipendariorum proprietatem dono de-disti,... donatio inrita est), the same rescript in the Codex Justinianus directly contradicts and asserts that such a gift is valid (CJ 8.54.2, si praediorum proprietatem dono dedisti,... donatio valet). On a priori grounds alone, it seems highly probable that something similar has happened to some texts which are known only through the Codex Justinianus—and where the alteration may not be at all obvious.What of the date and contents of the two Diocletianic codes? Corcoran confronts the problems of dating and attribution squarely and honestly. Most of his conclusions may not be new, but his discussion has been able to proceed from the fact that an Aurelius Hermogenianus, who can hardly be anyone other than the jurist, is now securely attested as praetorian prefect between 293 and 305 with Julius Asclepiodotus as his colleague (AE 1987, 456). Corcoran argues that Gregorius published the Codex Gregorianus in 291/2 or ca. 292, after serving as magister libellorum with Diocletian from 285 to 290: he accounts for the ascription of some later constitutions to this code by postulating a second edition compiled ca. 306, possibly at the court of Maximinus or... (shrink)

Thanks to its brilliant melding of film noir, science fiction, and cyberpunk motifs, not to mention its stirring music and unprecedented visual density, Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982/2007) has become an influential cultural icon. What really sets the film apart from most movies, however, are the ways in which it encourages philosophical questions. Virtually all commentators agree that “What does it mean to be human?” – understood as asking something like “What characterizes the real (or authentic) human being?” – is (...) the central philosophical question the film raises. Attempting to answer that question can be a fertile approach to the film, with moral implications for how to think about the qualifications for inclusion in the human community. That is not, however, the only way to appreciate the philosophical significance of Blade Runner. The film also encourages viewers to ponder the question, “What fundamental experiences constitute the uniquely human mode of self-consciousness?” Showing how the latter question leads to a richer appreciation of Blade Runner as philosophy is the aim of this chapter. (shrink)

The notion of accountability was introduced by Harold Garfinkel in the opening pages of Studies in Ethnomethodology as part of his ‘central recommendation’ for sociological inquiry. Though the term itself first appears in the Studies, it will be argued that elements of the idea were already discernible in earlier writings. The current article traces the development of the notion from its early emergence in the proto-ethnomethodological period, through its elaboration in the Studies, and, finally, to its refinement in certain later (...) works produced toward the end of the author’s career. In so doing, it reveals the centrality of the notion to ethnomethodologically-informed study and shows its enduring contribution to social theory. (shrink)

Comparative philosophy is dependent upon translation, often translations that will help preserve some fundamental commitments: to linguistic mastery, to the recovery or preservation of an original, and to the protection of an authenticity that will ground these commitments. Such a view can sometimes obscure a nostalgia for questionable causes. Comparative philosophy, especially with continental affinities, often relies on two moves: first, a boundary must be found (or produced) between philosophy itself and other forms of writing (literature or fiction, say), to (...) ensure proper grounding. Second, it must be understood that this boundary depends upon an underlying philosophy of language: language speaks us, it speaks Being; to dwell in a different language is to dwell in a different house of being (Martin Heidegger). But how might this project – its historiography of return and grounding, and its mythologizing of linguistic and ontological recovery – be challenged by the very practice of translation itself? Perhaps this challenge is one of translation’s philosophical benefits. (shrink)

Describing Cinema is part theory, part rhetoric, and part pedagogy. It examines and demonstrates acts of describing scenes, shots, and sequences in films, as probably the most common and the most underestimated way viewers respond to movies. Practiced energetically and carefully, descriptions become exceptionally rich ways to demonstrate and celebrate the activities, varieties, and challenges of a central generative movement in the viewing and interpretation of films. My motto might be an inversion of one character's tongue-in-cheek remark in Jean-Luc Godard's (...) First Name, Carmen (played by Godard himself), "badly seen, badly said," rephrased for this project as "badly said, badly seen." Here, that phrase becomes an indication how acts of describing films or parts of films can measure and instantiate complex ways of seeing that are partly about accuracy but also about the mobility of understanding and interpretation. At its best, describing films never simply denotes actions, images, sounds, or styles but rather produces the orchestration of one or more of those dimensions as an often creative and intersubjective movement between images, viewers, and a rhetorical language. Here, especially, writing about film becomes thinking about film. Part I provides a theoretical basis for this argument. Part II features sixteen short essays from landmarks of post-war cinema that demonstrate the energy and movement of precise descriptions. (shrink)

There is relatively little comprehensive treatment of Heidegger’s theory of essences despite his ubiquitous use of essences. It is commonplace in contemporary analytic philosophy to view essences as the ground for true de re modal claims. I argue that Heidegger offers an account of essences that can best be understood as a type of relative essentialism. Relative essentialism is the view that more than one being can occupy the same space at the same time and those beings have distinct sets (...) of de re modal truths about them. Heidegger’s account of essences allows for true de re modal claims about a wide variety of things including scientific and cultural entities. At the same time, Heidegger rejects absolute essentialism: the view that there is one privilege collection of beings whose natures determine the truth values of de re modal claims about them. Relative essentialism is distinguished from contextual essentialism. (shrink)

ㅤThis article is part of a symposium on Jc Beall's "Christ-A Contradiction.".

Three experiments investigated the modularity of harmonic expectations that are based on cultural schemata despite the availability of more predictive veridical information. Participants were presented with prime–target chord pairs and made an intonation judgment about each target. Schematic expectation was manipulated by the combination of prime and target, with some transitions being schematically more probable than others. Veridical information in the form of prime–target previews, local transition probabilities, or valid versus invalid previews was also provided. Processing was facilitated when a (...) schematically probable target chord followed the prime. Furthermore, this effect was independent of all manipulations of veridical expectation. A solution to L. B. Meyer's (1967b) query "On Rehearing Music" is suggested, in which schematic knowledge contributes to harmonic expectation in a modular manner regardless of whether any veridical knowledge exists. (shrink)

Since its publication in 1985, Elaine Scarry's The Body in Pain has become a seminal text in the study of embodiment. In its foregrounding of the body in war and torture, it critiques the minimising of the body in questions of politics, offering a compelling account of the structure and phenomenology of violent domination. However, at the same time the text can be seen to shore up a mind/body dualism that has been associated with oppressive forms of gendering, racialisation and (...) disablement. Divisive, powerful and elegant, the text has been central in the shaping of approaches to embodiment over the past 30 years. This special issue revisits Scarry's text in the light of 30 years of scholarship on embodiment and the body. Its legacies and limits are exemplified through a series of articles that mobilise the arguments of The Body in Pain even as they push at the limits of the text. (shrink)

This book is intended as a philosophical introduction to geo-ontologies, in response to their increasing diffusion within the contemporary debate, where philosophy plays a fundamental, though still unexplored, role. Accordingly, the first part offers a short overview of the ontological background of geo-ontologies, which comprehends computer science, philosophy and geography. The second part is devoted to describe the ontology of geography, to define notions such as geographical entities and boundaries, and to trace some philosophical tools useful for spatial representation. The (...) third part investigates the emerging of geo-ontologies from the spatial turn and is concerned with a taxonomy for geo-ontologies grounded on some fundamental geographical distinctions. Finally, the last part presents the emergence of Digital Humanities and the consequent proliferation of geographical projects focused on the ancient world, in particular Greek and Roman. (shrink)

Experiences of qualia, subjective sensory-like aspects of stimuli, are central to imagistic representation. Following Raffman , qualia are considered to reflect experiential knowledge distinct from descriptive, abstract, and propositional knowledge; following Jackendoff , objective neural activity is distinguished from subjective experience. It is argued that descriptive physical knowledge does not provide an adequate accounting of qualia, and philosophical scenarios such as the Turing test and the Chinese Room are adapted to demonstrate inadequacies of accounts of cognition that ignore subjective experience. (...) Arguments by Dennett and others that qualia do not exist or that qualia do not provide additional explanatory power are addressed, and it is suggested that consideration of qualia is necessary in order to explain objective behavior. The hypotheses of functional equivalence, second-order isomorphism, and psychophysical complementarity between imagery and perception are discussed, and the ability of analog and schematic models of imagery to account for qualia is examined. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of equilibrium in the work of Michel Serres. It starts with analysis of Serres’s philosophy of nature and, in particular, of the Lucretian cosmology he adumbrates in his 1977 text The Birth of Physics. By beginning here, we can see that his fundamental account of the material world is framed in terms of equilibrium or, rather, as a series of different equilibria that are dynamic, internally nested and reactive to each other in complex ways. In (...) this respect, Serres’s philosophy of nature resonates with work in contemporary Earth System Science that models the planet as a complex, adaptive system trending towards homeostatic regulation. But crucially, Serres goes further by extracting from this modelling important insights into human values. That is to say, he suggests that necessary and urgent questions about what sort of people we must be and what sort of social order we must pursue can be addressed through the prism of the concept of equilibrium. At the time of the Anthropocene, when planetary stability itself seems to be at stake, with potentially catastrophic implications for present and future life on earth, Serres’s work thus shows itself to be timely and apposite across a range of disciplinary applications. (shrink)

According to an almost axiomatic standard in bioethics, moral commitment should ground parents’ relationship with their children, rather than biogenetic relatedness. This standard has been used lately to express skepticism about extending existing assisted reproductive treatments (ARTs) to same‐sex couples and to research into novel fertility interventions for those couples, but this skepticism is misplaced on several grounds. As a matter of access and equity, same‐sex couples seem presumptively entitled to genetic relatedness to their children as far as possible both (...) in regard to existing ARTs and to novel ARTs under investigation. For those worried about the effects of trying to secure biogenetic relatedness for same‐sex couples, it may be noted that same‐sex couples will only ever be a fraction of the parents implicated in propping up “biologism,” as the expectation of biogenetic relatedness it is sometimes called. The cultural force of biologism would survive almost intact even if no same‐sex couples were ever to have genetically related children. It is therefore hard to see why same‐sex couples should forfeit aspirations to biogenetic relationships with their children or enjoy less subsidy for ARTs than the subsidy given to different‐sex couples. As matter of moral consistency, the full implications of the biologism critique have yet to be evaluated relative to different‐sex couples. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas has argued against prenatal genetic interventions used to influence traits on the grounds that only biogenetic contingency in the conception of children preserves the conditions that make the presumption of moral equality possible. This argument fails for a number of reasons. The contingency that Habermas points to as the condition of moral equality is an artifact of evolutionary contingency and not inviolable in itself. Moreover, as a precedent for genetic interventions, parents and society already affect children's traits, which (...) is to say there is moral precedent for influencing the traits of descendants. A veil-of-ignorance methodology can also be used to justify prenatal interventions through its method of advance consent and its preservation of the contingency of human identities in a moral sense. In any case, the selection of children's traits does not undermine the prospects of authoring a life since their future remains just as contingent morally as if no trait had been selected. Ironically, the prospect of preserving human beings as they are – to counteract genetic drift – might even require interventions to preserve the ability to author a life in a moral sense. In light of these analyses, Habermas' concerns about prenatal genetic interventions cannot succeed as objections to their practice as a matter of principle; the merits of these interventions must be evaluated individually. (shrink)

Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters--places that tend to ...

Effective Altruism encourages affluent people to make significant donations to improve the wellbeing of the world’s poor, using quantified and observational methods to identify the most efficient charities. Critics argue that EA is inattentive to the systemic causes of poverty and underestimates the effectiveness of individual contributions to systemic change. EA claims to be open to systemic change but suggests that systemic critiques, such as the socialist critique of capitalism, are unhelpfully vague and serve primarily as hypocritical rationalizations of continued (...) affluence. I reformulate the systemic change objection, rebut the charges of vagueness and bad faith and argue that charity may not be worth doing at all from a purely altruistic perspective. In order to take systemic change seriously, EA must repudiate its narrowly empiricist approach, embrace holistic, interpretive social analysis and make inevitably controversial judgments about the complex dynamics of collective action. These kinds of evidence and judgment cannot be empirically verified but are essential to taking systemic change seriously. EA is thereby forced to sacrifice its a-political approach to altruism. I also highlight the importance of quotidian, extra-political contributions to perpetuating or changing harmful social practices. Radical efforts to resist, subvert and reconstruct harmful social practices, such as those involved in economic decision-making, could be just as effective and demanding as charity. But such efforts may be incompatible with extensive philanthropy, because they can require people to retain some level of affluence for strategic reasons but to repudiate both the acquisition of significant wealth and charity as is currently organized. The wealth and status of some critics of charity may indeed be incompatible with effectively contributing to social change, but the altruistic merits of charity are neither as obvious nor as easily demonstrated as EA believes. (shrink)

Possession of a BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene mutation puts a woman at very high risk of developing breast and ovarian carcinoma at an early age. One treatment option is surgical removal of the target organs—breasts, ovaries, and fallopian tubes—before the malignancy develops. This risk-reduction surgery has been shown to significantly reduce the likelihood that a woman will develop one of these cancers. This paper argues that such surgeries do not violate Catholic moral principles, but can be justified using the principles (...) of double effect and totality and integrity. The paper does not recommend or endorse any specific treatment option. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.1 : 75–89. (shrink)

One of the fundamental components of the concept of economic rationality is that preference orderings are “complete,” i.e., that all alternative actions an economic agent can take are comparable. The idea that all actions can be ranked may be called the single utility assumption. The attractiveness of this assumption is considerable. It would be hard to fathom what choice among alternatives means if the available alternatives cannot be ranked by the chooser in some way. In addition, the efficiency criterion makes (...) sense only if one can infer that an individual's choice reflects the best, in expected welfare terms, among all choices that individual could have made. The possibility that a rearrangement of resources could make someone “better off” without making others “worse off” can be understood only if the post-rearrangement world is comparable with the pre-rearrange-ment world. (shrink)

Most advocates of biogenetic modification hope to amplify existing human traits in humans in order to increase the value of such traits as intelligence and resistance to disease. These advocates defend such enhancements as beneficial for the affected parties. By contrast, some commentators recommend certain biogenetic modifications to serve social goals. As Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu see things, human moral psychology is deficient relative to the most important risks facing humanity as a whole, including the prospect of Ultimate Harm, (...) the point at which worthwhile life is forever impossible on the planet. These risks can be mitigated, they say, by enhancing moral psychology in novel ways. Persson and Savulescu argue that some parents should modify the underlying biogenetics of their children's moral psychology, if such measures were safe and effective, but they admit these interventions may not decouple humanity from Ultimate Harm. Neither are these modifications the only options, they concede, for addressing risks to humanity. Even with these concessions, saving humanity from itself is a fairly poor reason to modify the moral psychology of children. In most ways, adults would be better candidates, morally speaking, for modifications of psychology. Even then, there is no direct link between morally enhanced human beings and the hoped-for effect of better protection from Ultimate Harm. Asserting a general duty of all to contribute to the avoidance of Ultimate Harm is a better moral strategy than intervening in the moral psychology of some, even though meeting that duty may involve substantial interference with the free exercise of one's interests. (shrink)

This book is about how big is the universe and how small are quarks, and what are the sizes of dozens of things between these two extremes. It describes the sizes of atoms and planets, quarks and galaxies, cells and sequoias. It is a romp through forty-five orders of magnitude from the smallest sub-nuclear particles we have measured, to the edge of the observed universe. It also looks at time, from the epic age of the cosmos to the fleeting lifetimes (...) of ethereal particles. It is a narrative that trips its way from stellar magnitudes to the clocks on GPS satellites, from the nearly logarithmic scales of a piano keyboard through a system of numbers invented by Archimedes and on to the measurement of the size of an atom. (shrink)

A look at the relationship between the cosmos and human beings explores the complexity of the human brain and what constitutes real intelligence and the nature of consciousness.

Blend classically beautiful illustrations with the wisdom of the ages to awaken your inner being as never before. Read this collection from cover to cover, and then concentrate on applying the different thoughts on your daily life. Start with first light, going with the flow, detachment, and harmony. Turn to a quote each day as a focus for meditations like these: Being a good listener spares one the burden of giving advice. Peace and knowledge will be yours!