an article written with Tom Imbo for the forthcoming Compendium of Quantum Mechanics.

'By identifying the extent to which Aristotle's thinking about ethics was shaped by notions drawn from the crafts Angier has thrown new light on a surprising number of topics and has deepened our understanding of tensions within Aristotle's thought. It is by now a rare achievement to have said something new, true and important about Aristotle.' -- Alasdair MacIntyre, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, USA.

Accounts of the value of patient choice in contemporary medical ethics typically focus on the act of choosing. Being the one to choose, it is argued, can be valuable either because it enables one to bring about desired outcomes, or because it is a way of enacting one’s autonomy. This paper argues that all such accounts miss something important. In some circumstances, it is having the opportunity to choose, not the act of choosing, that is valuable. That is because in (...) many situations whether one has, or is denied, that opportunity conveys how one is seen. In particular, it conveys whether or not one is seen as an equal and competent member of society. Adequately recognising this fact has implications for what healthcare professionals should do, ones that require a move away from the current focus on autonomy. The paper draws out these implications by focusing on patients who may struggle to be recognised as competent and equal members of society, and whose autonomy may thus itself sometimes be in question. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement that it would be both morally and legally wrong to treat a competent patient, or to carry out research with a competent participant, without the voluntary consent of that patient or research participant. Furthermore, in medical ethics it is generally taken that that consent must be informed. The most widely given reason for this has been that informed consent is needed to respect the patient’s or research participant’s autonomy. In this article I set out to challenge (...) this claim by considering in detail each of the three most prominent ways in which ‘autonomy’ has been conceptualized in the medical ethics literature. I will argue that whilst these accounts support the claim that consent is needed if the treatment of competent patients, or research on competent individuals, is to respect their autonomy, they do not support the claim that informed consent is needed for this purpose. (shrink)

Ulysses contracts are a method by which one person binds himself by agreeing to be bound by others. In medicine such contracts have primarily been discussed as ways of treating people with episodic mental illnesses, where the features of the illness are such that they now judge that they will refuse treatment at the time it is needed. Enforcing Ulysses contracts in these circumstances would require medical professionals to override the express refusal of the patient at the time treatment is (...) required, something that is generally problematic both ethically and legally. In this paper I will argue that despite appearances Ulysses contracts can make it the case that treating a patient in such circumstances is an instance of treating him with his consent, although safeguards are needed to ensure that this is the case. Given the potential benefits to patients I further argue that modified Ulysses contracts should be made legally enforceable. (shrink)

In a recent article, Fabian Freyenhagen argues that we should understand first-generation Frankfurt School critical theory (in particular, the work of Adorno and Horkheimer) as being defined by a kind of ‘linguistic turn’ analogous to one present in the later Wittgenstein. Here, I elaborate on this hypothesis – initially by calling it into question, by detailing Herbert Marcuse’s extensive criticisms of Wittgenstein (and other analytic philosophers of language) in One-Dimensional Man. While Marcuse is harshly critical of analytic ordinary language philosophy, (...) he is much more sympathetic to a different sort of ordinary language philosophy, which he unpacks with reference to Karl Kraus. I show how, by getting Marcuse’s criticisms of Wittgenstein and other analytic philosophers, and lauding of Kraus, into view, we can better understand the first generation of the Frankfurt School as having practised a sort of ‘non-quietistic’ philosophical therapy (that may or may not have been the sort of thing that Wittgenstein himself had in mind). (shrink)

In this paper, I do three things. First, I unpack and outline an intriguing but neglected aspect of the thought of the Frankfurt School critical theorist Theodor W. Adorno—namely, his critique of Aristotle, which can be found in two of his lecture series: the unpublished 1956 lectures on moral philosophy and the 1965 lectures published as Metaphysics: Concept and Problems. Second, I demonstrate how Adorno's Aristotle critique constitutes a powerful critique of contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, of the sort advocated by (...) thinkers such as Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson and John McDowell. Third, I expound upon where this critique leaves the prospect of formulating a robust ethical naturalism more generally. (shrink)

I begin by detailing the semantic range of the English terms ‘work’ and ‘labour’, in comparison with that of their closest Greek equivalents. Narrowing matters down to work in the sense of ‘occupation’, what is striking about Aristotle, I maintain, is his willingness to sort occupations into a hierarchy. This hierarchy is fourfold. At the bottom we have servile work, which is directed at life’s ‘necessities’, and is founded on mere habit. Then we have technē or skilled work, which typically (...) produces material objects, and requires expertise. Further up the hierarchy we have praxis or morally-informed activity, which reaches its apogee in the life of the politikos or ruler. At the summit of Aristotle’s hierarchy is theōria or intellectual contemplation, which supposedly approximates divine activity. After documenting the resilience of this hierarchy in the Western tradition, I outline three grounds for it – social, metaphysical and psychological – which are manifestly weak. I then elaborate other grounds for it – found both within and outside Aristotle’s texts – which, I argue, are manifestly strong, and thus deserve our endorsement even today. (shrink)

Around the world, the population is ageing in ways that pose new challenges for healthcare providers. To date these have mostly been formulated in terms of challenges created by increasing costs, and the focus has been squarely on life-prolonging treatments. However, this focus ignores the ways in which many older people require life-enhancing treatments to counteract the effects of physical and mental decline. This paper argues that in doing so it misses important aspects of what justice requires when it comes (...) to older people. (shrink)

Paul Boghossian has argued that Externalism is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge because (i) the Externalist can cite no property to be the reference of an empty natural kind concept such as the ether; (ii) without reference there is no content; hence (iii) either we do know on the basis of introspection alone whether an apparent natural kind thought has content or not, in which case we can infer from self-knowledge and a priori knowledge of Externalism alone to the existence in (...) our environment of water, gold etc.; (iv) or we do not know, without empirical investigation, whether an apparent natural kind thought has content. An Externalist not wanting to accept either (iii) or (iv) can deny (i). All empty natural kind concepts refer to the necessarily uninstantiated property of being identical to nothing. Since they have different senses and self-knowledge is only held to extend to the existence and identity of sense, this is compatible with privileged self-knowledge, and Externalism is still true of the concepts. (shrink)

In this paper, I tackle Aquinas’s notion of ‘natural inclinations’, specifically as it occurs in his seminal elaboration of the natural law in Summa Theologiae I-II. Question 94. Article 2. Maintaining that it constitutes a departure from Aristotle’s terminology, and is hence puzzling, I go on to investigate a raft of modern, mainly Anglophone, interpretations of the concept. Beginning with Jacques Maritain, I move through the broadly chronological sequence of John Finnis, Jean Porter, Steven Jensen, Justin Matchulat and Stephen Brock. (...) In each case, I argue that – despite these scholars’ philosophical ingenuity and textual facility – there are crucial problems with their respective approaches and construals. I end the paper by outlining my own construal of ‘natural inclinations’, which, even if not bolstered by heavy textual scholarship, is at least coherent and, moreover, avoids the philosophical pitfalls of the above interpretations. (shrink)

Patents on biotech products have a scope that goes well beyond what is covered by the most widely applied ethical justifications of intellectual property. Neither natural rights theory from Locke, nor public interest theory of IP rights justifies the wide scope of legal protection. The article takes human genes as an example, focusing on the component that is not invented but persists as unaltered gene information even in the synthetically produced complementary DNA, the cDNA. It is argued that patent on (...) cDNA holds this information captive, or illegitimately appropriates it in limiting other researchers and inventors’ opportunity to explore new functions and uses based on this non-invented information. A tighter connection between legal IP protection and the use description stated in the patent claim is suggested. By binding protection to the product’s foreseeable functions and use, instead of the product itself and all future uses of it, legitimacy of biotech product patents is restored. (shrink)

This article examines Nietzsche’s engagements with Kantian idealism and Kantian ethics. From the mid-1860s to the mid-1870s, Nietzsche’s engagement with Kantian idealism combined an interest in its potential therapeutic and cultural benefits with an exploration of its theoretical difficulties. In later works, Nietzsche rejects Kantian idealism not only for the conceptual incoherence, epistemological insignificance, and suspicious psycho-physical and cultural functions of its notion of an inaccessible reality, but also for the unlicensed ontology and primitive psychology of its notions of judgement. (...) Nietzsche also developed his own version of ‘Kantian’ ethics—that is, an ethics which, like Kant’s, affirms agency as the highest and unconditional value, while, unlike Kant’s, admitting different degrees of agency and therefore moral significance, across agents and over time. (shrink)

Die Entdeckung des Straßburger Empedokles-Papyrus und seine 1999 erfolgte Publikation war für die Erforschung der antiken Philosophie ein einzigartiger Glücksfall. Die neu hinzugekommenen Texte ergänzten die fragmentarische Überlieferung von Empedokles’ naturphilosophischem Lehrgedicht Physika (so der in der Antike gebräuchliche Titel) an entscheidenden Stellen. Allerdings wurde das Potenzial des Papyrus zur Klärung ungelöster Interpretationsprobleme in der auf die Veröffentlichung folgenden Forschungsdiskussion noch nicht ausgeschöpft. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird auf der Basis einer kontinuierlichen inhaltlichen und sprachlichen Analyse des Textes eine Gesamtrekonstruktion (...) des empedokleischen Theoriegebäudes vorgelegt. Untersucht werden dabei vor allem die zyklische Struktur allen Werdens, die Funktionen von Liebe und Streit, die einzelnen Stadien von Kosmogonie und Zoogonie und das inhaltliche Verhältnis von Physika und einem weiteren Gedicht des Autors, den Katharmoi. Die Ergebnisse werden abschließend auch in einer neuen Übersetzung der durch Einbeziehung des Straßburger Papyrus wiedergewonnenen Teile des Gedichts zusammengeführt. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed an enormous increase in behavioral and neuroimaging studies of numerical cognition. Particular interest has been devoted toward unraveling properties of the representational medium on which numbers are thought to be represented. We have argued that a correct inference concerning these properties requires distinguishing between different input modalities and different decision/output structures. To back up this claim, we have trained computational models with either symbolic or nonsymbolic input and with different task requirements, and showed that this allowed (...) for an integration of the existing data in a consistent manner. In later studies, predictions from the models were derived and tested with behavioral and neuroimaging methods. Here we present an integrative review of this work. (shrink)

In today’s world driven by technological innovation and change, publisher John Brockman has proclaimed scientists as the new “humanists”. Many in the science arena have seized the public podium not only to discuss advances in their area of expertise, but often to speak almost ex cathedra, on the social and philosophical implications for humans and the planet itself. The break with The Church in the 15th & 16th century set in motion a secular humanism which began the movement within the (...) scholarly communities to separate knowledge into disciplines. Following the Enlightenment, many in the social arena turned from the theory based, deductive, approaches toward the sciences with the hope that this inductive methodology would yield the same success found in the bio-physical arena. While this approach has failed to achieve such heights, “science envy” is now driving academic institutions, particularly in the United States and manydeveloping countries, to reposition The Academy to become innovative and contribute to both the private and public sector much in the same manner that Science’s handmaiden, Technology, has contributed in the bio/physical arena.The Humanities, as sensed by Brockman and others, has turned inward or has been ineffective in responding except to utter the mantra that its area represents humanity’s soul and thus provides the critical knowledge needed to save the planet and thus humans. Yet philosophy has not been able, or is unwilling, to accept the challenge and enter the academic lists or command the public pulpit. In this default, a surrogate, religious fundamentalism, has raised its head above the trenches reminiscent of the ancient Science/ Church confrontation and seeks to restore the idea of salvation in the next world, hoping to destroy the Gnostic ideal of humans being able to create such peace on earth. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that Plato and Aristotle provide analyses of virtue and practical reason that are strongly shaped by the structure of the technai. Socrates assimilates virtue to skill, while Aristotle assimilates practical reason to a means-end technique. While both philosophers are sensitive to the problems these technē models generate, and try either to escape or to remedy them, they nonetheless remain under the impress of those models. I end by drawing a general lesson from this fascinating episode (...) in intellectual history. (shrink)

Explorations about and around the ethics of virtue dominated philosophical thinking in the ancient world, and recent moral philosophy has seen a massive revival of interest in virtue ethics as a rival to Kantian and utilitarian approaches. To help users make sense of the gargantuan--and, often, dauntingly complex--body of literature on the subject, this new four-volume collection is the latest addition to Routledge's acclaimed Critical Concepts in Philosophy series. The editor has carefully assembled classic contributions, as well as more recent (...) work, to create a one-stop 'mini library' of the best and most influential scholarship. While Volume I focuses on the Greek and Roman founding fathers, it also brings together key works that examine the roots of virtue ethics in Christian, Asian, and other traditions. Volume II is organized around 'Religious Virtue Ethics', especially in the last sixty years or so, and Volume III brings together 'Modern Virtue Ethics'. The final volume in the collection assembles major works on topics such as the beginning and end of life; the environment; animal rights; business ethics; sports ethics; the virtues and the economy; the virtues and political life; studies of particular virtues; and debates about whether particular traits are indeed virtues. With a comprehensive index and a useful synoptic introduction newly written by the editor, Virtue Ethicswill be welcomed as an indispensable resource for both reference and research. in the last sixty years or so, and Volume III brings together 'Modern Virtue Ethics'. The final volume in the collection assembles major works on topics such as the beginning and end of life; the environment; animal rights; business ethics; sports ethics; the virtues and the economy; the virtues and political life; studies of particular virtues; and debates about whether particular traits are indeed virtues. With a comprehensive index and a useful synoptic introduction newly written by the editor, Virtue Ethicswill be welcomed as an indispensable resource for both reference and research. (shrink)

about Hume: David Hume is one of the greatest of philosophers. Today he probably ranks highest of all British philosophers in terms of influence and philosophical standing. His philosophical work ranges across morals, the mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and aesthetics; he had broad interests not only in philosophy as it is now conceived but in history, politics, economics, religion, and the arts. He was a master of English prose. about the Clarendon Hume Edition: The Clarendon Hume will include all of his (...) works except his History of England and minor historical writings; it will be the only thorough critical edition, and will provide a far more extensive scholarly treatment than any previous editions. This edition offers authoritative annotation, bibliographical information, and indexes, and draws upon the major advances in textual scholarship that have been made since the publication of earlier editions--advances both in the understanding of editorial principle and practice and in knowledge of the history of Hume's own texts. General Editors: Professors T. L. Beauchamp, D. F. Norton, M. A. Stewart. The Edition will comprise: Vols. 1 and 2: A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by D. F. Norton Vol. 3: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, edited by T. L. Beauchamp Vol. 4: An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by T. L. Beauchamp Vol. 5: The Natural History of Religion and the Dissertation on the Passions Vols. 6 and 7: Essays Vol. 8: Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and other posthumous publications, edited by M. A. Stewart. (shrink)

It is relatively uncontroversial that some public health policies are paternalistic. Furthermore, that they are paternalistic is often taken to show that they are morally wrong. In this article I challenge this position. The article starts by arguing that given standard definitions of paternalism it is unclear why such policies count as paternalistic. Whilst it might appear that they impose restrictions on what individuals can, or cannot, do for their own good, this is not the case. The reason for this (...) is that whilst public health policies focus on achieving benefits at a population or group level, the imposition is made at the level of the individual. If we are to retain the idea that such policies are paternalistic we must characterize them in such a way that both the benefit and imposition are at the same level: either that of the individual or that of the group. I argue that in many cases moving to the group level is the only plausible option. However, if we move to the group level, the features that make a policy paternalistic will not, unlike in those cases where paternalism is targeted at an individual, make the policy morally wrong. (shrink)

Two positions that Rosamund Rhodes puts forward are the proper starting point for this commentary: 1. Medical ethics based on the common morality that uses a body of abstract principles or rules are not ‘an adequate and appropriate guide for physicians’ actions’. 2. We need, but do not have, a true professional medical ethics for physicians, which must be ‘distinctly different’ from ethics based on common morality. I will argue that both positions are mistaken. Rhodes does not analyse what she (...) means by a professional ‘medical ethics’ and does not supply content for what she calls ‘medical professionalism’. ‘Common morality‘ is also not given a precise meaning. However, I set aside these problems of conceptual clarity and concentrate on a paradigm case of professional ethics for physicians (and others) in interactions with patients. My example is The Belmont Report. Belmont is almost certainly a document that, in the USA, has for four decades been highly influential on physicians, especially physicians engaged in clinical research. It is not merely research ethics. In full satisfaction of the American Board of Medical Specialties’ ‘definition of medical professionalism’, The Belmont Report puts forward a system of ethical principles showing that physicians and other health professionals must conduct research in the service of the public interest and the well-being of patient–subjects. The Belmont Report also satisfies the earlier delineated conditions of medical professionalism in the American Board of Internal Medicine’s ‘Physician Charter’, which are stated in terms of the ‘fundamental principles’ of the primacy of patient welfare, patient autonomy and social justice.1,1–3 Belmont more than satisfies these conditions of medical professionalism. Indeed Belmont may well be the source of the principles …. (shrink)

Among the defining characteristics of moral cosmopolitanism are the convictions that personal relations, membership in social or political organizations like local communities or nation-states are insignificant for agents when determining their scope of moral concern. The moral scope is unlimited and the moral duties reach globally. Following up observations made by Onora O’Neill and others, it is argued that Singer’s model needs a complementary tool to allocate duties.That tool can be found by supplementing the agent centered perspective of the model (...) with a regard for the social and institutional circles encompassing right holders. Instead of focusing on the duty holder, I suggest that the cosmopolitan’s “ultimate unit of moral concern” – here, the claimholder is regarded central.Thus, Singer’s cosmological model is kept, but in a rights-based methodological approach for allocating duties. Methodologically, what needs to be investigated is whether the scope of legitimate moral claims expands from the agent for the same reasons that the circle of moral concern expands from Singer’s agent. (shrink)

The debate over foundationalism, the viewpoint that there exists some secure foundation upon which to build a system of knowledge, appears to have been resolved and the antifoundationalists have at least temporarily prevailed. From a firmly historical approach, the book traces the foundationalism/antifoundationalism controversy in the work of many important figures Animaxander, Aristotle and Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Hegel and Nietzsche, Habermas and Chisholm, and others throughout the history of philosophy. The contributors, Joseph Margolis, Ronald Polansky, Gary Calore, Fred and Emily (...) Michael, William Wurzer, Charlene Haddock Siegfried, Sandra B. Rosenthal, Kathleen Wallace, and the editors present well the diversity, interest, and roots of antifoundationalism. Tom Rockmore is Professor and Chairman in the Department of Philosophy at Duquesne University. Beth J. Singer is Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. (shrink)

We are living through a demographic transition from a world in which there were lots of young people and very few older adults to one in which the numbers in these age groups are becoming more evenly balanced. One reason for this is that more of us are living into our seventies, eighties, nineties, and beyond. That is the good news. Unfortunately, the chance of developing chronic illnesses (including diabetes, arthritis, and dementia) is typically higher for people in these older (...) age groups than for those who are younger. Because we do not know how to cure these illnesses, many of us will spend at least some of this extra time with one or more chronic illness. While we are more likely than in the past to live into older age, we are likely to be living with illness when we get there. That raises a challenge: how should we respond to this change? (shrink)

ABSTRACTIlya Somin's Democracy and Political Ignorance uses a by-now familiar rational-choice lens with which to explain and analyze Americans’ widespread political ignorance. Unlike some scholars who tout rational choice on purely predictive or heuristic grounds, Somin claims that it also offers a more accurate description of reality, in this case better explaining the findings of empirical public-opinion research. In this essay, I compare Somin's central concept of rational ignorance and the related concept of “rational irrationality” with the earlier explanatory approach (...) taken by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter in his classic study, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. While Schumpeter developed his description of the mass democratic citizenry over 70 years ago—prior to any of the significant empirical studies of American public opinion—its broad approach remains at least as persuasive as Somin's. (shrink)

We study which [Formula: see text]-distributive forcing notions of size [Formula: see text] can be embedded into tree Prikry forcing notions with [Formula: see text]-complete ultrafilters under various large cardinal assumptions. An alternative formulation — can the filter of dense open subsets of a [Formula: see text]-distributive forcing notion of size [Formula: see text] be extended to a [Formula: see text]-complete ultrafilter.

Common methods for analysing response time (RT) tasks, frequently used across different disciplines of psychology, suffer from a number of limitations such as the failure to directly measure the underlying latent processes of interest and the inability to take into account the uncertainty associated with each individual's point estimate of performance. Here, we discuss a Bayesian hierarchical diffusion model and apply it to RT data. This model allows researchers to decompose performance into meaningful psychological processes and to account optimally for (...) individual differences and commonalities, even with relatively sparse data. We highlight the advantages of the Bayesian hierarchical diffusion model decomposition by applying it to performance on Approach–Avoidance Tasks, widely used in the emotion and psychopathology literature. Model fits for two experimental data-sets demonstrate that the model performs well. The Bayesian hierarchical diffusion model overcomes important limitations of current analysis procedures and provides deeper insight in latent psychological processes of interest. (shrink)

(1994). Moral authority in law and criminal justice: Some reflections on Wilson's The Moral Sense. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 44-53.

Although space limitations do not permit including all the responses received after the passing of David Thomasma, some representative expressions are included below. As these remembrances attest, Edmund Pellegrino spoke for all of us when he said at David's memorial service, “It has been said that we die only when forgotten; if so, David will live a long time. He remains a presence for his family, friends, collaborators, and all who met him.”.

In After Parmenides, Tom Rockmore takes us all the way back to the beginning of philosophy. Parmenides held that thought and being are one: what we know is what is. For Rockmore, this established both the good view that we should think of the world in terms of what the mind constructs as knowable entities as well as the bad view that there is some non-mind-dependent "thing"-the world, the real-which we can know or fail to know. No, Rockmore says: what (...) we need to do is give up on the idea that there is any extra-mental "real" for us to know. We know and become acquainted with the objects of cognition that our mind constructs. After Parmenides illustrates the contest between variants of the "standard" view and variants of the "non-standard, constructivist view" in the history of philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes and Locke, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, post-Kantians including Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, Marx, the early pragmatists, analytic philosophy, contemporary French speculative realism, and more. This ambitious but accessibly written book shows how new connections can be made in the history of philosophy when it is reread through a new lens. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Note.