In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I (...) survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief. (shrink)

This article reports results of an empirical study of Slovak media coverage of international affairs. The goal of the article is to determine whether the outputs of selected Slovak media correspond to the expectations of the Propaganda Model. In order to accomplish this goal, a content analysis of coverage of two cases of international conflict was performed and two hypotheses were evaluated. The hypotheses amount to an expectation that there will be a quantitative and qualitative difference in the way that (...) selected Slovak media cover civilian casualties and potential breaches of international law based on the relationship of Slovak elites to the perpetrator. The analysis concludes that the degree of quantitative and qualitative inconsistency in the coverage of the selected issues could not be attributed to factors external to Slovak media and therefore have to be attributed to structural factors of Slovak media space, which need to be further examined. (shrink)

Malgré l’avènement de la figure de l’acteur créateur au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles, les procédés de copie, d’imitation et de réactivation constituent une part non négligeable des outils convoqués dans les exercices spécifiques au jeu. Cette persistance, qui trouve son origine dans le Paradoxe sur le comédien de Diderot, se lit et se décline tout au long de l’histoire des théories du jeu, dans le recours fréquent à un modèle, dont le type varie (nature ou réel, arts plastiques, (...) personnage théâtral, performance). C’est cette double continuité, celle des procédés de copie et du modèle dans les théories du jeu auxquelles s’adossent des pratiques et dont découlent des modes de fabrication, qui a nourri une expérimentation pédagogique pratique au sein de La Manufacture – Haute École des Arts de la Scène de Lausanne. Les ateliers élaborés pour les étudiant.e.s consistant à mettre en œuvre ces trois opérations, à leur proposer une histoire sensible, c’est-à-dire éprouvée, du jeu de l’acteur, et à leur faire percevoir l’importance des procédés de copie, d’imitation et de réactivation dans la pensée et dans la pratique du jeu. (shrink)

The article analyzes one of the fundamental rights – the right to maintenance, which proper implementation ensures normal development of the child. This right matches with the duty of parents to maintain their minor children. Paragraph 6 of Article 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania states that parents have a duty to educate their children to be honest people and loyal citizens, supporting them until adulthood. The obligation to maintain children is established in the first 3.192 Article (...) paragraph of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and the responsibility for avoiding to maintain a child is provided in Article 164 of the Criminal Code. The article discusses the fact that the analysis of criminal law rate is not precise enough. Article 164 of the Criminal Code does not match with the child maintenance methods specified in the CC Article 3.196 paragraph 1. Since criminal liability is only for judgment in default in civil cases, a person shall only be liable for breaking the right to maintain a child, provided in the CC 3.196 paragraph 1. This article deeply analyzes the problematic qualification aspects of the avoidance to maintain a child. Some alternative ways of child maintenance are mentioned, as can be chosen from other law instruments (bailiffs, Guarantee child support fund) and it leads to the ultima ratio principle. On the other hand, it is not required to seek alternative remedies for affected interests, and it is possible to initiate a pre-trial investigation. Therefore, this article seeks to identify specific civil and criminal law rules delimitation. Avoidance of child maintenance is an ongoing crime. The main problem in legal practice is to determine an end of this ongoing criminal conduct. The practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania is not unanimous. In some cases, the end of this ongoing conduct is considered to be a moment when the past judgment has entered into force, in other cases – the moment of indictment. These positions are criticized by many authors and it is suggested to follow the Supreme Court’s practice, according to which the moment when a judgment of conviction for the criminal act is passed should be considered as an end of an ongoing criminal conduct. (shrink)

El presente texto acompaña la traducción de los apuntes de Walter Benjamin sobre la literatura de la Rusia Soviética hacia finales de la década de 1920. En este sentido, se intentará reponer el contexto de producción de estos apuntes con el fin de proponer una lectura que recorra aquellos rasgos de la incipiente cultura soviética que suscitaron estas impresiones en el pensador alemán.

_ This scholarly article delves into the significance of international collaboration in mitigating global environmental challenges. By examining case studies and collaborative efforts, the paper underscores the necessity of unified action, shared responsibility, and global partnerships in safeguarding the planet's ecological integrity._.

Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. (...) But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument. (shrink)

In this work it is proposed that the conditions of identity for biological organisms are given by the following principle: for all organisms x and y, x = y if and only if x has been caused by the self-preserving activity of y. This principle determines both the inter-temporal identity of organisms and the identity of organism in different possible worlds. It unifies what can be supposed about conditions of identity coming from —at least— three different conceptions about the nature (...) of biological organisms, those of RobertWilson, Thomas Pradeu and Ellen Clarke. These conceptions are presented and compared. (shrink)

This article critically analyses the notion of intentionality from several philosophical cognitive points of view. The authors argue that the notion of mental representation in the wider sense and intentionality in the narrower sense remains elusive despite accommodated paradoxes, improved semantic precision and more sophisticated strategies in dealing with intentionality. We will argue that different approaches to intentionality appear to be coherent in their inferences. However, most of them become contradictory and mutually exclusive when juxtaposed and applied to borderline questions. (...) While the explanatory value of both philosophy of mind as well as cognitive psychology should not be underestimated, we must note that not even hard-core neuroscience has been able to pin point what is going on in our minds, let alone come up with a clear cut explanation how it works or a definition of what thought really is. To date, however, intentionality is the best of all explanatory models regarding mental representations. (shrink)

Mediation is a process in which two parties agree to resolve their dispute by negotiating over alternative solutions presented by a mediator. In order to construct such solutions, the mediator brings more information and knowledge, and, if possible, resources to the negotiation table. In order to do so, the mediator faces the challenge of determining which information is relevant to the current problem, given a vast database of knowledge. The contribution of this paper is the automated mediation machinery to resolve (...) this issue. We define the concept of a Mediation Problem and show how it can be described in Game Description Language. Furthermore, we present an algorithm that allows the mediator to efficiently determine which information is relevant to the problem and collect this information from the negotiating agents. We show with several experiments that this algorithm is much more efficient than the naive solution that simply takes all available knowledge into account. (shrink)

By considering Davidson’s analysis of prepositions as defining individual events predicates, I argue against his semantics for action sentences and stress some logico-linguistic puzzles concerning both the interpretive pretension and the referential indifference of this proposal. Inspired by Evans as well as by Grice, I advance another interpretive semantics for those cases which does not take as assumption the individual character of events and argue for a constructivist approach to events in action discourse.

Donald Davidson and John Searle famously differ, among other things, on the issue of animal thoughts. Davidson seems to be a latter-day Cartesian, denying any propositional thought to subhuman animals, while Searle seems to follow Hume in claiming that if we have thoughts, then animals do, too. Davidson’s argument centers on the idea that language is necessary for thought, which Searle rejects. The paper argues two things. Firstly, Searle eventually argues that much of a more complex thought does depend on (...) language, which reduces a distance between himself and Davidson. Secondly, some of Davidson’s suggestions are promising – in particular the idea that we may lack a vocabulary to capture the contents of animal thoughts. Based on this insight, one might, pace Davidson, grant thoughts to animals. However, this does not mean, pace Searle, that it should be possible to construe even the simplest of such thoughts as propositional. Perhaps we need to move beyond Davidson and Searle by developing a theory of nonpropositional thought for animals. (shrink)

This article examines the dominant agricultural model in Colombia of which the emergence of biofuels is an inevitable and major consequence. Some uncertainties and complexities of the introduction of biofuels and the use of genetically modified crops are analyzed, including a general reflection on the possibilities of producing biofuels on the basis of a model of ecological agriculture.

Partial commentaries of Gomez Davila’s epigraphs in Scholia to an Implicit Text have been put forward by several scholars. Nevertheless, none of them has yet attempted a systematic study of their meaning and their relation to the rest of the book or the literary sources to which they allude. This article is aimed to present such a systematic analysis, thus revealing two things: first, a number of essential premises of Gómez Dávila’s thought; second, the importance of intertextuality for a thorough (...) understanding of this work: the epigraphs need an hors du texte and the scholia to be interpreted, just as the scholia need the epigraphs and an “out of the text” to be deciphered. In other words, neither is autonomous: their meaning is to be found in intertextuality. (shrink)

Motivated by H. Curry’s well-known objection and by a proposal of L. Henkin, this article introduces the positive tableaux, a form of tableau calculus without refutation based upon the idea of implicational triviality. The completeness of the method is proven, which establishes a new decision procedure for the (classical) positive propositional logic. We also introduce the concept of paratriviality in order to contribute to the question of paradoxes and limitations imposed by the behavior of classical implication.

Claims about reduction or emergence appear in cases in which there are different levels of facts that have between them some kind of ontological connection by which one of them is ‘made up’ from the other. In the case of reduction, it is supposed that the reduced level of facts is ‘nothing over’ the reducing level of facts. In the case of emergence, on the other hand, it is supposed that the emergent level is something ‘new’ with respect to the (...) emergence base. In both reduction and emergence some kind of ontological priority of one level with respect to the other is involved, as well as some kind of explanatory asymmetry between them. In recent years a lot of work has been devoted to different notions of ontological priority, like grounding and dependence, that might be useful for the clarification of the more traditional questions about the nature of reduction and emergence. This work presents and discusses various attempts to make that clarification. Keywords: reduction, emergence, grounding, dependence, levels of reality. (shrink)

Traditionally, it has been supposed that the central object of Biology are ‘organisms’. The expression “organism” is relatively recent in the use that it has nowadays –it was introduced by the authors of the German Idealism– but corresponds to a very traditional notion. An ‘organism’ is a substance composed by a plurality of materials organized by the same substance that acts upon itself to persist in time, in order to a finality that is the organism itself. To make intelligible an (...) organism seems indispensable its order to an end. This teleological perspective, nevertheless, is unacceptable for the reductivist perspective of Biology, prevalent since the triumph of what has been called the “Modern Synthesis” the first half of last century. It has been proposed, for that reason, to substitute the traditional idea of ‘organism’ by that of ‘Darwinian individual’ (cf. Godfrey-Smith, 2009), that could offer a more adequate perspective of the object of Biology. The object of this science could not be organisms, but individuals that can enter the Darwinian evolutionary drift. In this work it is explained why a hiatus persists between organisms teleologically oriented and a Darwinian individual. The Darwinian perspective leaves aside the central character of the object of Biology: life. (shrink)

Resumen: Husserl propone dos descripciones fenomenológicas diferentes de los universales: la primera en Investigaciones lógicas y la segunda en Experiencia y juicio. En este trabajo se presentan y discuten estas dos descripciones fenomenológicas. Resulta que la perspectiva de Experiencia y juicio parece tener que ver con un acceso hermenéutico a los universales, mediado por un lenguaje y una tradición cultural, mientras que la perspectiva de Investigaciones lógicas parece estar centrada en un fenómeno pre-lingüístico más originario. Este segundo fenómeno de los (...) universales parece ser más fundamental. En ambas perspectivas, sin embargo, los universales son dados en nuestras experiencias ordinarias. Entonces, uno debería aceptar universales en principio –dada la evidencia fenomenológica– a menos que otras razones de orden teórico recomienden lo contrario. (shrink)

RESUMEN Trabajos recientes han propuesto un tratamiento de la fundación “a la imagen de la causalidad”. Hay importantes analogías entre la fundación y la causalidad: ambas parecen ser relaciones de ‘construcción’, ambas parecen ser órdenes estrictos y ambas parecen ser representables por modelos de ecuaciones estructurales. Pero también parece que hay importantes diferencias, porque la causalidad es usualmente considerada como una relación externa, mientras que la fundación es interna; hay casos de causalidad probabilística, pero no hay nada como una fundación (...) probabilística; la fundación se considera una relación ‘bien fundada’, pero no la causalidad; la fundación implica superveniencia ontológica, pero no la causalidad. Se argumenta aquí que la mayoría de estas supuestas diferencias están motivadas por una concepción humeana de la causalidad en la que no hay conexiones necesarias entre causa y efecto. Una perspectiva no humeana de la causalidad, sin embargo, hace que la unificación de la fundación y la causalidad sea mucho más razonable que cualquier tratamiento separado. ABSTRACT Recent works have proposed a treatment of grounding “in the image of causation”. There are important analogies between grounding and causation: both seem to be ‘building’ relations, both seem to be strict orders, and both seem amenable to representation by models of structural equations. But it seems also that there are important differences, because causation is usually considered as an external relation, while grounding is internal; there are cases of probabilistic causation, but there is nothing like probabilistic grounding; grounding is taken to be a well-founded relation, but not causation; grounding entails ontological supervenience, but not causation. It is argued here that most of those supposed differences are motivated by a Humean conception of causation in which there are no necessary connections between cause and effect. A non-Humean view of causation, though, makes the unification of grounding and causation much more reasonable that any separate treatment. (shrink)

Resumen En una serie de escritos Timothy Williamson ha argumentado a favor del necesitismo, esto es, la tesis de que es necesario que todo exista necesariamente. Este trabajo discute el necesitismo de segundo orden, esto es, la tesis de que es necesario que toda propiedad exista necesariamente, considerando líneas de argumentación semejantes a las desplegadas en primer orden. Se examinan tres de estos argumentos: el carácter necesario de ser una propiedad, la aparición de las propiedades en proposiciones, y los compromisos (...) ontológicos del metalenguaje en el que se formula la semántica. Se argumenta que ninguno de ellos es realmente convincente. La justificación del necesitismo de segundo orden parece requerir más metafísica sustantiva que resultados formales, al menos si es que los resultados formales de que se trata son aquellos discutidos aquí.In a series of writings Timothy Williamson has argued for necessitism, i. e. the thesis that it is necessary that everything exists necessarily. This work discusses second-order necessitism, i. e. the thesis that it is necessary that every property exists necessarily, considering lines of argument similar to those displayed on first-order. Three of those arguments are examined. the necessary character ofbeing a property, the occurrence of properties in propositions, and the ontological commitments of the metalanguage where the semantics is formulated. It is argued that none of them are compelling. The justification for second-order necessitism seems to require more substantive metaphysics than formal results, at least if the formal results in view are those discussed here. (shrink)

The term etonism is from «Etona» that means flag, marks, evidence, and reason in Kikôngo. The variants in Umbûndu: etonolo or etonuilo means, allegations, reasons, indulgence (tolerance). The Nyaneka form is etŏnya: 1) reasons, 2) allegations, 3) indulgence and 5) the justice and the tolerance. Etona is Angolan artist (sculptor/painter). In his sculpture they are morphologically evidenced three treatments in the surface of the matter, namely 1) flat treatment; 2) rude treatment and finally 3) accidental treatment. Each one is a (...) code: #1. The flat treatment indicates well-knowledge; a man of superior class; race or tribe or religion of majority; thought well-organized and structured. In painting, the hot intensity indicates dominance, prosperity, energy, intense desires; #2. The rude treatment reveals an acquired knowledge without academism, self-taught; medium class men; speech out of the scientific perimeters but with certain admissibility; race, tribe or religion of lot of people, but not of majority. In his painting, the neutral intensity marks the balance and inspires recomfort nurtured from two opposed poles (hot and cold); #3. The accidental part of the sculpture indicates some knowledge’s lack (pure empiricism); inferior class; race, tribe, religion of minority. In the painting, the cold intensity is naturally contrary of #1. Etonism is the tolerant reason between #1=I, #2=YOU and #3=HE. All of them form the coherent society that we call WE: the Etonian jusphilosophy that African peoples need for stability of their democracies and finishing their War. (shrink)

In this paper I asses Davidson’s analysis of action sentences stressing its quantificational structure and its views on prepositions and adverbial modification. Three arguments inspired by Grice’s ideas are deployed against it. First, I point to weird consequences of taking prepositions as defining predicates; second, I show some obstacles for Davidson’s view on adverbs; finally, I raise some doubts about his putative analysis of “negative actions”. From these, I hope that connections among actions, facts and events should be reconsidered in (...) action theory. (shrink)

This work studies some problems connected to the role of negation in logic, treating the positive fragments of propositional calculus in order to deal with two main questions: the proof of the completeness theorems in systems lacking negation, and the puzzle raised by positive paradoxes like the well-known argument of Haskel Curry. We study the constructive com- pleteness method proposed by Leon Henkin for classical fragments endowed with implication, and advance some reasons explaining what makes difficult to extend this constructive (...) method to non-classical fragments equipped with weaker implications (that avoid Curry's objection). This is the case, for example, of Jan Lukasiewicz's n-valued logics and Wilhelm Ackermann's logic of restricted implication. Besides such problems, both Henkin's method and the triviality phenomenon enable us to propose a new positive tableau proof system which uses only positive meta-linguistic resources, and to mo- tivate a new discussion concerning the role of negation in logic proposing the concept of paratriviality. In this way, some relations between positive reasoning and infinity, the possibilities to obtain a ¯first-order positive logic as well as the philosophical connection between truth and meaning are dis- cussed from a conceptual point of view. (shrink)

El interés filosófico que despierta la doctrina profetológica de Maimónides encuentra su justificación si con ello se hace justicia, al menos, a lo que en cierta tradición reflexiva se ha entendido como las disposiciones fundamentales que han de acompañar a la filosofía como actitud. Pero, además, ese interés está prefijado, en contraste, por una señalada y actual merma de esas disposiciones en el pensar de buena parte de quienes hoy día se dedican a un arrogante uso publico de la razón.

Ciertas ideas erróneas que solemos asociar con el fenómeno de la libertad son aquí objeto de una crítica que se propone mostrar en qué consiste realmente la libertad de los seres humanos.