Avery’s et al. ’s 1944 paper provides the first direct evidence of DNA having gene-like properties and marks the beginning of a new phase in early molecular genetics (with a strong focus on chemistry and DNA). The study of its reception shows that on the whole, Avery’s results were immediately appreciated and motivated new research on transformation, the chemical nature of DNA’s biological specificity and bacteria genetics. It shows, too, that initial problems of transferring transformation to other systems and prominent (...) criticism of its results nurtured skepticism. Avery’s experiment was downplayed and neglected particularly by many of those scientists who worked in the new fields of biochemical and biophysical genetics, genetic phage, and TMV research. This was not due to the fact that the implications of the paper could not be connected to generally accepted knowledge. Contrary to a widespread belief, the assumed uniformity of DNA as opposed to proteins was not used as an argument against the validity of Avery’s et al.’s finding. The indifference rather reflected, among other things, the disciplinary gap between the chemically oriented microbiologists and the old and new geneticists who remained committed to genetic and physical methods (in particular x-ray studies) and clung to the assumption that proteins were the sole carriers of biological specificity. The responses to Avery’s et al.’s paper show how different research interests in the areas between microbiology, genetics, and biochemistry interacted with the prejudices, dogmas, individual farsightedness or short-sightedness, and scientific authority during a pivotal period of early molecular biology. (shrink)

The development of both the modern state and modern scientific discourses in the non-Western world are closely linked together, both being the outcome of the colonial encounter. Using a Foucauldian framework of power/knowledge and his notions of ‘episteme’ and ‘governmentality’, this article explores how colonial governmentality in India produced statistical knowledge of the country thus ushering in a new social scientific discourse of ‘progress’, ‘history’, ‘economy’ and ‘society’.

This very brief paper provides plausible answers to the two residual questions that Jamie Tappenden states, but leaves unanswered, in his 2024 paper ‘Following Bobzien: Some notes on Frege’s development and engagement with his environment’, namely, why Frege read Sigwart’s Logik and what caused Frege to read Prantl.

Due to the potential ethical and psychological implications of screening, and especially inregard of screening on children without available and acceptable therapeutic measures, there is a common view that such procedures are not advisable. As part of an independent research- and bioethical case study, our aim was therefore to explore and describe bioethical issues among a representative sample of participant families (n = 17,055 children) in the ABIS (All Babies In South-east Sweden) research screening for Type 1 diabetes (IDDM).The primary (...) aim is the identification of risk factors important for the development of diabetes and other multifactorial immune-mediated diseases. Four hundred, randomly chosen, participant mothers were asked to complete a questionnaire exploring issues of information, informed consent, bio-material, confidentiality and autonomy, and of prevention/intervention. 293 completed the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 73.3%. The majority of questions had the form of 6-point Likert-type response scales (1–6).We found that the majority of respondents felt calm in regard of samples and written material, and also concerning the possibility of their child in the future being identified as having high risk of developing Type 1 diabetes. An important finding concerning access and control of mainly biological data was indicated, with the respondents expressing concern for potential future use. We believe our findings indicate that this kind of empirical studies can substantially contribute to our understanding of bioethical issues of medical research involving genetics. Issues, such as safeguards ensuring theethical criteria of autonomy and respect, were emphasised by our respondents. We believe theissues brought up may promote further discussion, and do suggest issues for consideration by, among others, researchers, bioethicists and Institutional Review Boards. (shrink)

Ullin Thomas Place died on 2nd January 2000 at the age of seventy-five. I had met him a little over three years earlier, in November 1996, during the annual 'Mind and Brain' symposium organized by Peter Fenwick and held at the Institute of Psychiatry in London. At that meeting Professor Place delivered a slightly shortened version of the paper reproduced here, in which he told his personal story — a pilgrim's progress? — recounting, as he put it, 'the history of (...) a thought process leading from an adolescent interest in mystical experience to an article entitled‘Is consciousness a brain process?’[Place, 1956] in which I argued for an affirmative answer to that question'. (shrink)

Volume 35, Issue 1, March 2025, Page 68-104.

Volume 45, Issue 3, August 2024, Page 278-301.

There’s a possibly more interesting general question: does technology transform and extend the mind and our mental powers? In a widely discussed 1998 paper titled “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that mind and cognition can extend outside the head and can include items and processes in the world. In their thought experiment, Otto has alzheimer’s syndrome but does not lose his ability to function because he records information he learns in a notebook that he always carries. (...) Thus, C&C claim, Otto continues to have beliefs. The notebooks function as his memory. C&C propose a "parity principle": a part of the world is part of a cognitive process if it "functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing [it] as part of the cognitive process .... Cognitive processes ain't (all) in the head!" (in Menary p. 29, original emphasis). (shrink)

Let k be the number of all pure sets, und let K be the number of all pure classes. The Platonist, assuming that the class \V of all pure sets cannot be enlarged by any formal means, will come to the conclusion that cardinalities between k und K are conceptually impossible. So the Continuum Hypothesis is true on class level. And if this feature of \V is reflected by all infinite sets \Va, the General Continuum Hypothesis is true on set (...) level. (shrink)