The notion of pleasure lies at the very heart of Sidgwick’s moral philosophy. For Sidgwick holds not merely that pleasure is a good, but that ultimately it is the only good. And hence it is the good of pleasure which grounds his utilitarianism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ULTIMATE END AND COMMON GOOD GREGORY FROELICH University of Alaska Anchorage, Alaska IN HUMAN ACTION what is last in execution is first in intention. For just this reason Thomas Aquinas begins the secunda jmrs of the Summa Theologiae with a consideration of man's ultimate end. It is the end and the end alone that renders intelligible all those choices and activities that human life comprises. " (...) Finis enim. (shrink)

This book deals with good, evil, happiness and morally enhanced post-humans. It offers a succinct historical elaboration of philosophical stances towards morality and happiness, focusing on Kant's ideas in particular. Human augmented ethical maturity in a futuristic version of Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth implies, among else, voluntary moral bio-enhancement ; consequently, more happiness – as morality and happiness are in a circularly supportive relationship; ultimate morality. UM is in its own way a universal morality. In line with the contention (...) that Kant’s vision of the future of humanity is one of a cosmopolitan moral order in which humans act virtuously in the broadest possible community, that is, humanity, it is justified to conclude that successful VMBE is conducive to Kant’s vision. In this context the book is of great interest to a broad audience, such as those interested in VMBE and novel conceptions of morality, and those with an interest in the historical development of morality and happiness, in philosophy and in post-humanity. (shrink)

The present paper proposes a new reading of one of the most obscure passages of De Architectura; in I, 1,3 Vitruvius claims that in architecture there is always a signifier and a signified, but his approach differs from Quintilian’s as presented in the latter’s Institutio Oratoria. Vitruvius’ is closer to Chrysippus approach, but he fails to mention the third constituent, the tynchanon. This omission is probably due to the fact that Vitruvius speaks of designs rather, than of existing buildings. What (...) can successfully signify a proposed building is, according to my reading, the design and erection of a building that is easily recognized by the public as realizing the intentions of the community to erect the proposed building. Such successful signification constitutes the ultimate criterion for good architecture. (shrink)

Religions that center around a revelation--around a 'good book,' like the Torah or Gospels or Quran, which is seen as God's word--are widely regarded as irrational and dangerous: as based on outdated science and conducive to illiberal, inhumane moral attitudes. The Good and the Good Book defends revealed religion and shows how it can be reconciled with science and liberal morality. Fleischacker argues that revealed texts aim to teach neither scientific nor moral doctrines but a vision of (...) what life is about overall. Purely naturalistic ways of thinking cannot make much sense of our overall or ultimate good; revealed texts, by contrast, do precisely that. But these texts also need to be interpreted so as to accord with our independent understanding of morality. The delicate balance required for this process of interpretatio is discussed at some length. The book concludes with an account of how believers in one religion can respect believers in other religions, and secular people. (shrink)

Raimond Gaita's _Good and Evil_ is one of the most important, original and provocative books on the nature of morality to have been published in recent years. It is essential reading for anyone interested in what it means to talk about good and evil. Gaita argues that questions about morality are inseparable from the preciousness of each human being, an issue we can only address if we place the idea of remorse at the centre of moral life. Drawing on (...) an astonishing range of thinkers and writers, including Plato, Wittgenstein, George Orwell and Primo Levi, Gaita also reflects on the place of reason and truth in morality and ultimately how questions about good and evil are connected to the meaning of our lives. This revised edition of _Good and Evil_ includes a substantial new preface and afterword by the author. (shrink)

How should we live? What do we owe to other people? In Goodness and Advice, the eminent philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson explores how we should go about answering such fundamental questions. In doing so, she makes major advances in moral philosophy, pointing to some deep problems for influential moral theories and describing the structure of a new and much more promising theory. Thomson begins by lamenting the prevalence of the idea that there is an unbridgeable gap between fact and value--that (...) to say something is good, for example, is not to state a fact, but to do something more like expressing an attitude or feeling. She sets out to challenge this view, first by assessing the apparently powerful claims of Consequentialism. Thomson makes the striking argument that this familiar theory must ultimately fail because its basic requirement--that people should act to bring about the "most good"--is meaningless. It rests on an incoherent conception of goodness, and supplies, not mistaken advice, but no advice at all. Thomson then outlines the theory that she thinks we should opt for instead. This theory says that no acts are, simply, good: an act can at most be good in one or another way--as, for example, good for Smith or for Jones. What we ought to do is, most importantly, to avoid injustice; and whether an act is unjust is a function both of the rights of those affected, including the agent, and of how good or bad the act is for them. The book, which originated in the Tanner lectures that Thomson delivered at Princeton University's Center for Human Values in 1999, includes two chapters by Thomson ("Goodness" and "Advice"), provocative comments by four prominent scholars--Martha Nussbaum, Jerome Schneewind, Philip Fisher, and Barbara Herrnstein Smith--and replies by Thomson to those comments. (shrink)

In a chapter of The Methods of Ethics entitled “Ultimate Good”, Henry Sidgwick defends hedonism, the theory that pleasure and only pleasure is intrinsically good, that is, good in itself and apart from its consequences. First, however, he argues against the theory that virtue is intrinsically good. Sidgwick considers both a strong version of this theory — that virtue is the only intrinsic good — and a weaker version — that it is one intrinsic (...) good among others. He tries to show that neither version is or can be true. Against the strong version of the theory, Sidgwick argues as follows. Virtue is a disposition to act rightly, and right action is identified by the good it promotes. But this means that treating virtue as the only intrinsic good involves a “logical circle”: virtue is a disposition to promote what is good, where what is good is itself just a disposition to promote what is good. Virtue turns out to be a disposition to promote virtue. As Hastings Rashdall notes in a commentary on Sidgwick, one can accept many of this argument's premises yet reject its conclusion. One can agree that right action is identified by its consequences but still hold that virtue is the only intrinsic good. One can do this if one denies that the relevant consequences are good. This is the Stoic view: certain states are “preferred”, and thus supply the criterion of right action, but are not themselves intrinsically good. (shrink)

Aristotle takes his ethics to be an inquiry into the ultimate good of human life. In the course of his criticism of Plato and Eudoxus, Aristotle formulates two general conditions on the concept of the ultimate good. Firstly, the ultimate good has to be something prakton. The primary sense of prakton is not, as it is often taken to be, of something that is "realizable" in human action, but of something that is, or can (...) be, aimed at in human action. Secondly, in addition to being based on an appropriate moral psychology and theory of action, an adequate ethical theory has to be non-reductivist--it has to give its due weight to the plurality and variety of the goodness of particular intrinsic goods. I examine why Aristotle's criticism of Eudoxus' hedonism as a reductive ethical theory is ineffective, and point out some deficiencies in Aristotle's own account of pleasure. ;Aristotle takes the view that every desire--whether rational or non-rational--is for something that appears good to the agent. This view is compared with what seems to be the currently accepted view, that some of our desires do not involve a valuation of any sort. Although I do not claim that the current view is wrong, I do argue that Aristotle's position may provide an alternative, and plausible, way of thinking about the nature of human motivation. I discuss next Aristotle's concept of telos. A telos has a dual character: it is something an action is aimed at, and also something attained in human action. Although Aristotle's ethics is not teleological, outcomes are important for the ethical evaluation of actions. In order to explicate how outcomes matter, I introduce the concepts of an Aristotelian outcome and of a good Aristotelian outcome. The notion of a third actualization is introduced to throw some light on the sort of success in the conduct of life which Aristotle takes eudaimonia to be. ;Finally, I provide an account of Aristotle's theory of practical reason. I argue that his ethical theory demands a very wide interpretation of the concept of deliberation. An analysis of Aristotle's concept of choice is given, and an attempt made to specify the conditions under which an action counts as chosen. Deliberation is ethical if it is guided by the deliberator's conception of eudaimonia. I explicate briefly what it is for a person to have such a conception, what such a conception is like, and in what way a person can be thought to be guided by it. Finally, the concept of practical reason is linked with the concept of the ultimate good. I propose an interpretation of the three conditions Aristotle imposes on the ultimate good in EN I.7--finality, self-sufficiency and choiceworthiness which requires that we initially construe the concepts of finality and of self-sufficiency in a narrow sense, and take the concept of finality as a comparative notion. The three conditions can then be regarded as specifying how deliberation ought to be conducted if it is to lead to eudaimonia. (shrink)

The Levinasian critique of Heidegger is well know: Heidegger’s phenomenological investigation into the nature of beings, employed towards the end of catching a glimpse of the Being behind those beings, though undeniably rich, is nevertheless fundamentally limited as it fails to allow for anything “beyond being,” anything outside the sway of presence, like, for Levinas, an ultimate Good. In recognition of this limitation, Levinas attempts to expand the Heideggerian project by accounting in his own work for those phenomena (...) which seem to indicate a Good “beyond being” at work within existence, phenomenon such as shame, Eros and fecundity. While intriguing, is Levinas’ critique of Heidegger accurate? Is it true that Heidegger excludes anything resembling a Good beyond being in his work? It is the aim of this paper to examine these questions and by exposing a hitherto unrecognized element within Heidegger’s thought and in doing so calling into question and clarifying Levinas’ criticisms of Heidegger. (shrink)

For most pre‐modern philosophers, questions about the good life and the happy life were inseparable. Happiness is primarily a subjective notion. The Good Place suggests that relationships are key to the good life. It is a laboratory for testing moral theories, providing the show's writers opportunities to see which theories help the protagonists become better persons. An ethics of virtue is difficult and messy because it does not reduce morality to a simple formula. Instead, it involves an (...) inner transformation of character that leads to virtuous actions. In Aristotle's ethical system, true moral progress toward the good life is within reach. In spite of the verbal commitments made to Kant's ethics, the show ultimately proves to be a vindication of virtue ethics. A universe governed by Aristotelian morality is one in which moral development is possible. (shrink)

How did bioethics manage to grow, flourish and ultimately do so well from a very unpromising birth in the 1970s? Many explanations have been advanced. Some ascribe the field9s growth to a puzzling, voluntary abnegation of moral authority by medicine to non-physicians. Some think bioethics survived by selling out to the biomedical establishment—public and private. This transaction involved bestowing moral approbation on all manner of biomedicine9s doings for a seat at a well-stocked funding table. Some see a sort of clever (...) intellectual bamboozlement at work wherein bioethicists pitched a moral elixir of objective expertise that the morally needy but unsophisticated in medicine and the biological sciences were eager to swallow. While each of these reasons has its defenders, I think the main reason that bioethics did well was that it did good. By using the media to move into the public arena, the field engaged the public imagination, provoked dialogue and debate, and contributed to policy changes that benefitted patients and healthcare providers. (shrink)

When we compare contemporary moral philosophy with the well-known moral systems of earlier centuries, we should be struck by the fact that a certain assumption about human well being that is now widely taken for granted was universally rejected in the past. The contemporary moral climate predisposes us to be pluralistic about the human good, whereas earlier systems of ethics embraced a conception of well being that we would now call narrow and restrictive. One way to convey the sort (...) of contrast I have in mind is to note that according to Plato and Aristotle, there is one kind of life, that of the philosopher, that represents the summit of human flourishing, and all other lives are worth leading to the extent that they approximate this ideal. Certain other ethical theories of the past were in a way more narrow than this, for whereas Plato and Aristotle maintained that many things are in themselves worthwhile, others argued that there is only one intrinsic good—pleasure according to the Epicureans, virtue according to the Stoics. By contrast, it is now widely assumed that all such approaches are too exclusive, that not only are there many types of intrinsic goods but there is no one specific kind of life—whether it is that of a philosopher or a poet or anyone else—that is the single human ideal. Even hedonism, a conception of the good that had a powerful influence in the modern period, has few contemporary proponents. A consensus has arisen in our time that there is no single ultimate good that provides the measure by which the worth of all other goods must be assessed. (shrink)

In Justice as Impartiality Brian Barry seeks to present ‘a universally valid case in favour of liberal egalitarian principles’. It is an ambitious enterprise undertaken with originality, vigour, and wit; and containing a wealth of interesting argumentation. If, ultimately, Barry fails in the task he sets himself, as I shall argue he does, the attempt is none the less highly instructive; not only because of the many local successes in his arguments with proponents of alternative theories and his often illuminating (...) discussions of particular issues, but also because of the lessons to be learnt from his failure. For if even Barry's formidable defence of a contractualist, neutralist liberalism does not succeed then there may be good reason to think that none will. While this larger claim will not be fully justified here, and the case against justice as impartiality does not depend upon it, one of my deeper motivating concerns is to try to show that the most important failures in Barry's argument are inextricably bound up with the nature of his undertaking. We are concerned, I believe, not just with some inevitable imperfections of execution but with a flawed project. (shrink)

In a gritty and unique take on the story of Job, Pastor Benjamin Windle shows that "the good life" is not one devoid of problems, pain, and heartache. It's one lived with hope engineered for adversity. You can flourish in the storms of life when you find the Ultimate Hope in the midst of unavoidable pain.

The problem of physician-assisted death, assisted suicide and active euthanasia, has been debated predominantly in the ethically familiar vocabulary of rights, duties, and consequences. Patient autonomy and the right to die with dignity vie with the duty of physicians to heal, but not to kill, and the specter of “the slippery slope” from voluntary euthanasia as a last resort for patients suffering from terminal illness to PAD on demand and mercy killing of “hopeless” incompetent patients. Another dimension of the debate (...) over PAD concerns the evaluative question of what constitutes a good death. At stake are Issues of character and virtue in the face of death and dying and their Implications for legitimizing the practice of PAD. Critics of PAD argue that “natural” death in the context of comfort care, as provided by hospice programs, is the good death. In contrast, PAD amounts to an easy way out, an evasion of the ultimate human challenge and task of dying. Because hospice care is clearly preferable to PAD, the former should be encouraged and the latter remain prohibited. (shrink)

One of the central assumptions of ancient Greek ethics is that human beings have a single supreme and ultimate good – eudaimonia or “well‐being” – which includes and integrates all other final goods into an account of the good life. Thomas Hobbes was a eudaimonist who held that felicity is an overarching good giving coherence to a valuable life; he therefore agreed with the Epicureans that it is good to forgo lesser pleasures for greater future (...) ones. Hobbes held that felicity consists primarily in the mental pleasures that arise from anticipating the satisfaction of one's desires. Hobbes was proposing a reforming definition for “good” firmly grounded in his substantive theory of what goodness consists in and of what makes it the case that something has that property. The anticipatory pleasure raised in everyone's mind by the prospect of peace and its pleasures is a potential basis for agreeing about what to call good. (shrink)

Hegel's Science of Logic makes the just not low claim to be an absolute, ultimate-grounded knowledge. This project, which could not be more ambitious, has no good press in our post-metaphysical age. However: That absolute knowledge absolutely cannot exist, cannot be claimed without self-contradiction. On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the fundamental finiteness of knowledge. But can absolute knowledge be finite knowledge? This leads to the problem of a self-explication of logic (in the sense (...) of Hegel) and further, as will be shown, to a new definition of the dialectical procedure. The stringency of which results from the fact that always exactly that implicit content is explicated that was generated by the preceding explication step itself and is thus concretely comprehensible. At the same time, a new implicit content is generated by this act of explication, which requires a new explication step, and so forth. In the dialectical procedure reinterpreted in this way, dialectical arguments are not beheld, guessed at or even surreptitiously obtained, but are methodically accountable. Thereby dialectics is understood as a self-explication of logic by logical means and thus as a proof of the possibility of ultimate-grounding in the form of absolute and nevertheless finite – and thus also fallible – knowledge. (shrink)

_Do good and evil exist? Absolutely._ In this bracing book, the eminent Dutch philosopher Andreas Kinneging turns fashionable thinking on its head, revealing how good and evil are objective, universal, and unchanging—and how they must be rediscovered in our age. In mapping the geography of good and evil, Kinneging reclaims, and reintroduces us to, the great tradition of ancient and Christian thought. Traditional wisdom enables us to address the eternal questions of good and evil that confront (...) us in both public and private life. Though it is common to accept uncritically the blessings of modernity and its intellectual sources, the Enlightenment and Romanticism, Kinneging shows that traditional thinking is richer and more realistic. Indeed, we see how, in more than a few respects, the Enlightenment and Romanticism brought not progress but deterioration. Kinneging skillfully reformulates and defends the insights of traditional thinking for today’s readers, demonstrating how an objective morality is to be understood and how we can know what morality demands of us. At a time when the traditional virtues have practically disappeared from our language, he lays out the foundations of virtue and vice. Ultimately, Kinneging reveals the lasting significance of these seemingly archaic notions—to our own lives, to our families, to our culture, and to civilization.__ This profound, award-winning work establishes Andreas Kinneging as one of our wisest moral philosophers. _“Shows with utmost clarity the virtue of intellectual courage... A brilliant model for sallies against our dark age.”_ _—_The Intercollegiate Review____ _“[Kinneging is] leader of a conservative intellectual revival in the Netherlands.”__ —_New York Times Magazine__. (shrink)

Expanded and up-to-date-the ultimate guide that explores meaning and philosophy of all six seasons of Lost Lost is more than just a popular television show; it's a complex examination of meaningful philosophical questions. What does good versus evil mean on the island? Is it a coincidence that characters John Locke and Desmond David Hume are named after actual philosophers? What is the ethics of responsibility for Jack? An action-adventure story with more than a touch of the metaphysical, Lost (...) forces viewers to ask difficult questions of themselves just as the story asks difficult questions of its characters. Ultimate Lost and Philosophy helps you explore the deeper meaning and philosophical questions hidden within every complex twist and turn in the historic show's entire six-season run. Includes every season of Lost, including 2010's final, highly anticipated season Connects events on the show to core philosophical issues such as truth, identity, and morality Explores a host of intriguing topics such as time travel, freedom, love, and loss For fans of Lost who are interested in what the show reveals about ourselves and the human condition, Ultimate Lost and Philosophy is an entertaining, informative, and enlightening resource. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Human Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic ThemesCatherine E. MorrisonHuman Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic Themes by Paul Schollmeier Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. x + 302. $80.00, cloth.This is a book about spirits—human, godly, ghostly, and alcoholic. Paul Schollmeier's Human Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic Themes explores how humble humans act morally in an absurd world. Schollmeier contends that the Socratic spirit, or daimon, of self-knowledge and (...) hypothesis testing provides the foundation for a deeply human moral philosophy. It is, in Schollmeier's elegant phrasing, daimonic rather than eudaimonic, joining Aristotle and Plato with William James, as well as contributions from the ghosts of David Hume and Immanuel Kant and a few rounds of whiskey. Spirits abound! Mixing Socratic skepticism with Jamesian empiricism, Schollmeier argues that we act best when we apply general principles held as opinion (not as certain knowledge), and tested through experience, to our particular situation. When these opinions yield fruit, we find ourselves less at the whim of our capricious surroundings; when they do not, we are obliged to recognize the provisional nature of our opinions and change them. The ends of these day-to-day activities reflect a far grander cosmological order, one we ignore to our mortal (and moral) peril. It is by engaging in this intellectual activity that we are made happy, and it is in measured pursuit of this happiness that we are virtuous. Our actions are neither absolutely true nor perfect. They are instead the best that we can do. And for a reviewer attempting to encapsulate a finely nuanced book in a small space, this is comforting advice indeed. [End Page 190]The book begins with a puzzle: The curious twin claims in Plato's Apology that, true to the Delphic oracle's proclamation, Socrates is both wise and knows nothing. The key to this apparent paradox, Schollmeier contends, is the difference between divine knowledge, "ultimate, nonhypothetical knowledge of final causes" (6), and human knowledge, which is hypothetical only. Schollmeier marshals William James to argue that as humans, we encounter objects of knowledge perceptually; even our concepts are fashioned from this meager material. Without access to divine knowledge, humans must test hypotheses and assume that they are true only provisionally.James's (and Hume's) emphasis on the passions as the foundation for action, however, gives Schollmeier pause. In order to construct a moral philosophy that avoids absolutism but remains objective, Schollmeier argues for a harmony between the intellectual and the passional that is ultimately rational, our Socratic daimon. We are neither gods nor animals. Should we surrender rationality to desire, Schollmeier warns in concert with Socrates, our already fragile perceptual knowledge will be further distorted by fickle emotion. It is precisely because our grasp on the world is so tenuous that we must pay heed to cool intellect rather than hot passion.Such skepticism of our claim to know might make one hesitant to engage in the enigmatic world—but we have no choice! In order to find our hybrid daimon, both Socratic and pragmatic, Schollmeier suggests rhetoric as the methodology best suited to serving practical knowledge because it eschews certainty in favor of probability and acknowledges that the hypotheses on which we act are tentative and revisable. To this end, Schollmeier highlights the enthymeme and argument by example as the two techniques that best suit the nature of our hypothetical knowledge, and he urges a return to philodoxy, the love of opinion.Giving up our claim to certainty need not be a dismal proposition. Having established his methodology, Schollmeier begins building a moral philosophy that embraces an ontology of change and contends that our happiness provides us with stability in the form of a rational teleology. The objects of our human happiness are fleeting and changeable, so happiness cannot be static but is, rather, an activity that is its own end, "an activity that is an intellectual inquiry" (78). Our happiness is contingent on our ability to hypothetically determine, in our particular setting, our function and then fulfill this role to the best of our abilities. Depending on the setting, it may be dancing, parenting, or simply a lively... (shrink)

As one would expect, Kant believes that there is a tension, and even a conflict, between our bodily humanity and its ethical counterpart: ‘Inclination to pleasurable living and inclination to virtue are in conflict with each other’ (Anthropology, 185-86 [7:277]). What is more unexpected, however, is that he further claims that this tension can be resolved in what he calls an example of ‘civilised bliss’, namely dinner parties. Dinner parties are, for Kant, part of the ‘highest ethicophysical good’, the (...) ultimate resolution of the conflict between our physical body and our moral powers, which consists in finding the right proportions for the ‘mixture’ between our partly ‘sensuous’ and partly ‘ethicointellectual’ nature. The aim of this paper is not only to explain Kant’s account of the ideal proportions of ethicophysical good in dinner parties, but also, and more importantly, to argue that dinner parties are in fact the ultimate experience for us, human beings. (shrink)

How should we live? What do we owe to other people? In Goodness and Advice, the eminent philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson explores how we should go about answering such fundamental questions. In doing so, she makes major advances in moral philosophy, pointing to some deep problems for influential moral theories and describing the structure of a new and much more promising theory. Thomson begins by lamenting the prevalence of the idea that there is an unbridgeable gap between fact and value--that (...) to say something is good, for example, is not to state a fact, but to do something more like expressing an attitude or feeling. She sets out to challenge this view, first by assessing the apparently powerful claims of Consequentialism. Thomson makes the striking argument that this familiar theory must ultimately fail because its basic requirement--that people should act to bring about the "most good"--is meaningless. It rests on an incoherent conception of goodness, and supplies, not mistaken advice, but no advice at all. Thomson then outlines the theory that she thinks we should opt for instead. This theory says that no acts are, simply, good: an act can at most be good in one or another way--as, for example, good for Smith or for Jones. What we ought to do is, most importantly, to avoid injustice; and whether an act is unjust is a function both of the rights of those affected, including the agent, and of how good or bad the act is for them. The book, which originated in the Tanner lectures that Thomson delivered at Princeton University's Center for Human Values in 1999, includes two chapters by Thomson, provocative comments by four prominent scholars--Martha Nussbaum, Jerome Schneewind, Philip Fisher, and Barbara Herrnstein Smith--and replies by Thomson to those comments. (shrink)

Marcus William Hunt argues that prepositional gratitude to God is metaphysically impossible. This is because a fitting target of prepositional gratitude should be able to be benefited in return. Having the maximum well-being, God cannot be benefited in return and fails to be a fitting target. This view is debatable as some argue that God’s well-being can be increased in some peculiar sense. This paper proposes that Zhu Xi (1130-1200), a Confucian philosopher in China, can offer some plausible perspective. The (...) ultimate reality in Zhu, while perfectly good itself, can be in a better state of being when it has more manifestations (namely, when humans fulfill their moral nature.) This can serve as a parallel to suggest alternative conceptualizations of God and of his well-being, which always guarantee his maximum well-being in an intensive sense, while allow for an increase in his well-being in an extensive sense. In other words, we can uphold God as perfectly good per se while admit his having varying degrees of external well-being, which can account for his relationship with things, especially human beings, in the world. (shrink)

What is good bioethics? Addressing this question is key for reinforcing and developing the field. In particular, a discussion of potential quality criteria can heighten awareness and contribute to the quality of bioethics publications. Accordingly, the objective of this article is threefold: first, we want to identify a set of criteria for quality in bioethics. Second, we want to illustrate the added value of a novel method: in-depth analysis of a single article with the aim of deriving quality criteria. (...) The third and ultimate goal is to stimulate a broad and vivid debate on goodness in bioethics. An initial literature search reveals a range of diverse quality criteria. In order to expand on the realm of such quality criteria, we perform an in-depth analysis of an article that is acclaimed for being exemplary. The analysis results in eleven specific quality criteria for good bioethics in three categories: argumentative, empirical, and dialectic. Although we do not claim that the identified criteria are universal or absolute, we argue that they are fruitful for fueling a continuous constitutive debate on what is “good bioethics.” Identifying, debating, refining, and applying such criteria is an important part of defining and improving bioethics. (shrink)

The Good Place was a historical landmark in the field of pop culture as philosophy, as it was the first mainstream sitcom to explicitly tackle the works of philosophers in its content. In addition to exposing its viewers to the works of famous philosophers, The Good Place makes its own philosophical arguments. The show is ultimately about the concept of the afterlife – what it might look like, how it would operate, and if it is even desirable. The (...) show also explores the relationship between morality and the afterlife. Essentially, The Good Place explores three focal questions: (1) Are there reasons to be morally good, irrespective of how that plays out in an afterlife? (2) What would a fair system for gaining admission to a merit-based afterlife look like? And (3) is an eternal afterlife even desirable? Ultimately the show argues that yes, virtue is worthwhile for virtue’s own sake, irrespective of the consequences in an afterlife. Second, it argues that a fair merit-based system would allow people the chance to improve and get better, given the right circumstances. Third, it argues that an eternal afterlife, in which you maintain your identity and live forever, is not desirable. (shrink)

Nothing is more common in moral debates than to invoke the names of great thinkers from the past. Business ethics is no exception. Yet insofar as business ethicists have tended to simply mine abstract formulas from the past, they have missed out on the potential intellectual gains in meticulously exploring the philosophic tradition. This paper seeks to rectify this shortcoming by advocating a close reading of the so-called “great books,” beginning the process by focusing on Aristotle. The Nichomachean Ethics and (...) The Politics points to Aristotle’s emphasis on tying business morality to a universal conception of the good life. This conception defines personal happiness to chiefly consist in practicing the virtues, a life in which both desire and the pursuit of wealth is kept under check. According to Aristotle, virtue reaches its height with the exercise of the intellectual virtues of prudence and wisdom – the first manifest in the leadership of organizations, and the second in the philosophic search for truth. From an Aristotelian point of view, therefore, the greatest ethical imperative for business is to give individuals opportunities to thoughtfully participate in the management of company affairs and to contemplate the ultimate meaning of things. (shrink)

Reasons-first theorists claim that facts about reasons for attitudes are normatively primitive, and that all other normative facts ultimately reduce to facts about reasons. According to their view, for example, the fact that something is good ultimately reduces to facts about reasons to favour it. I argue that these theories face a challenging dilemma due to the normativity of arational lifeforms, for instance the fact that water is good for plants. If all normative facts are, ultimately, facts about (...) reasons for attitudes, then reasons-first theorists must either (a) show that these facts do reduce to facts about reasons, or (b) concede that they do not and, instead, show that this is not a problem for their view. Both options, however, are riddled with difficulties—or so I will try to argue. (shrink)

An aesthetic distinction between good music and the good in music is crucial for a philosophy of music education. Ultimately, it is not the music's fault, as it were, that someone may view it as being 'not good' in either a social or aesthetic context. Regardless of how music is colored it remains an entity unto itself and thus untouched by our pronouncements. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations recognized the falseness of such propositions as biased pronouncements taking the form (...) of bad 'x' or good 'x.' Thus we may seek the good within the music if we know how to define what we mean by that. This approach allows music to be conceptualized and framed in a meaningful educational context. In such a way Plato and Aristotle attempted a conceptualization of the 'good' and the 'ungood' in the music of their time, as did Adorno in the preceding century. Although this context still does not allow pronouncements of music as good or bad, it does allow a seeking of its educational utility and unlimited potentiality in the name of an aesthetic and moral understanding. (shrink)

This article investigates the meaning of doing good and doing well in positive business. It examines the relationship between the two expressions and discusses their relevance, shedding new light on the significance of ‘positive’ in positive business and positive organizational scholarship. Thus, this article illuminates the ultimate end of positive states and practices. ‘Positive’ primarily represents values and assumptions. These lead to the creation of beneficial situations and marked improvements, which put individuals and organizations on an upward trajectory (...) toward achieving excellent functioning, assuring profitability in addition to sustainability and social well-being. Doing well, with reference to economic performance and profits, is partly constitutive of doing good. This presents a new approach regarding the role of economic outcomes in positive business and POS. It means that financial criteria do not have priority. Profits are considered vital and necessary, but the final ‘raison d'être’ of positive states and practices is the overall well-being of the stakeholders. (shrink)

Rüdiger Bittner argues that the aim of thinking about what to do, of practical reason, is to find, not what we ought to do, but what it is good to do under the circumstances. Neither under prudence nor under morality are there things we ought to do. There is no warrant for the idea of our being required, by natural law or by our rationality, to do either what helps us attain our ends or what is right for moral (...) reasons. While common moral understanding is committed to there being things we ought to do and to our being guilty and deserving blame if we fail to do them, we can lay aside these notions without loss, indeed with benefit. The volume also explains what it is for something to be good to do under the circumstances and argues for understanding practical reason in these terms. What is good to do we find by experience: what we go through teaches us what helps and what hinders, and helps us figure out what is prudentially useful and what is morally right to do-although ultimately this difference itself gives way, and morality turns out to be a part of prudence. (shrink)

In his third and final investigation into the science of belief, bestselling author Michael Shermer tackles the evolution of morality and ethics A century and a half after Darwin first proposed an “evolutionary ethics,” science has begun to tackle the roots of morality. Just as evolutionary biologists study why we are hungry (to motivate us to eat) or why sex is enjoyable (to motivate us to procreate), they are now searching for the roots of human nature. In The Science of (...) Good and Evil , psychologist and science historian Michael Shermer explores how humans evolved from social primates to moral primates, how and why morality motivates the human animal, and how the foundation of moral principles can be built upon empirical evidence. Along the way he explains the im-plications of statistics for fate and free will fuzzy logic for the existence of pure good and pure evil and ecology for the development of early moral sentiments among the first humans. As he closes the divide between science and morality, Shermer draws on stories from the Yanamamo, infamously known as the “fierce people” of the tropical rain forest, to the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, to John Hinckley’s insanity defense. The Science of Good and Evil is ultimately a profound look at the moral animal, belief, and the scientific pursuit of truth. (shrink)

Suppose that the ultimate point of ethics is to make the world a better place. If it is, we must face the question: better in what respect? If the good is prior to the right — that is, if the rationale for all requirements of the right is that they serve to further the good in one way or another — then what is this good? Is there a single fundamental value capable of underlying and unifying (...) all of our moral categories? If so, how might it defeat the claims of rival candidates for this role? If not, is there instead a plurality of basic goods, each irreducible to any of the others? In that case, how do they fit together into a unified picture of the moral life? These are the questions I wish to address, in a necessarily limited way. To many the questions will seem hopelessly old-fashioned or misguided. Some deontologists will wish to reverse my ordering of the good and the right, holding that the right constrains acceptable conceptions of the good. For many contractarians, neither the good nor the right will seem normatively basic, since both are to be derived from a prior conception of rationality. Finally, some theorists will reject the classification of moral theories in terms of their basic normative categories, arguing that the whole foundationalist enterprise in ethics should be abandoned. In the face of these challenges to the priority of the good, and in light of the many current varieties of moral skepticism and relativism, I cannot provide a very convincing justification for raising the questions I intend to discuss. (shrink)

This article responds to the theory of Common Good Constitutionalism as posited by Adrian Vermeule. He argues that a powerful centralized government composed of wise rulers must use law to direct the public towards a proper political and substantive morality to achieve the ends of the common good. This article then explores the broader concept of Integralism, in which Common Good Constitutionalism is rooted, similar in its belief that politics must be concerned with the human good (...) through the centralization of sovereign power. Natural law adherents created Common Good Constitutionalism and Integralism to combat the legitimate societal threat of modern liberal individualism and reintroduce the spiritual common good into our political and legal discourse. Though these arguments have some appeal, both theories are misguided in their understanding of the nature of politics, law, and the United States as a constitutional republic. This article instead suggests a more authentically Catholic salve for the societal wounds inflicted by acidic individualism; a true natural law understanding of the common good which respects the decentralized history and tradition of our country, the limits of political authority, the social priority of local communities above the state, and most importantly, the reality that man’s ultimate end is God’s gift of salvation. (shrink)

This moving, insightful and ultimately hopeful and helpful blend of memoir and philosophical exploration begins in Christopher Phillips's native stomping grounds of the tiny volcanic island of Nisyros, Greece and unfurls through space and time as the author explores the connections between his immediate circumstances and the eternal wisdom of popular philosophers.

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, which equates the ultimate end of human life with happiness, is thought by many readers to argue that this highest goal consists in the largest possible aggregate of intrinsic goods. Richard Kraut proposes instead that Aristotle identifies happiness with only one type of good: excellent activity of the rational soul. In defense of this reading, Kraut discusses Aristotle's attempt to organize all human goods into a single structure, so that each subordinate end is desirable for (...) the sake of some higher goal. This book also emphasizes the philosopher's hierarchy of natural kinds, in which every type of creature achieves its good by imitating divine life. As Kraut argues, Aristotle's belief that thinking is the sole activity of the gods leads him to an intellectualist conception of the ethical virtues. Aristotle values these traits because, by subordinating emotion to reason, they enhance our ability to lead a life devoted to philosophy or politics. (shrink)

Over the past one hundred years, Catholic sexual ethics has become more hospitable to sexual bonding as a good that is distinct from procreation. However, our increasing knowledge of women’s sexual pain disorders highlights ongoing problems with official Catholic sexual ethics. This essay argues that the Catholic Church still reproduces gendered social scripts that unwittingly encourage heterosexual women to ignore their sexual pain and continue to engage desperately in intercourse, out of an exacerbated concern to satisfy male partners. These (...) are tactics that only prolong and deepen women’s sexual suffering. Further, insights about the various options for women’s healing from sexual pain concretely suggest more liberative sexual scripts: the importance of women’s non‐obligatory, embodied desire and the need to reject intercourse as the compulsory norm for all sexual activity. Ultimately, women’s experiences of having sexual pain and healing from it lead to revisions in Catholic sexual ethics at a fundamental level. (shrink)

Can Plato’s ethical theory account for the goodness of actions? Plato’s Form of the Good is regarded as the ultimate explanatory principle of all good things, which presumably includes good actions. And this is indeed a standard view. However, in this paper I argue that the theory of the Form of the Good cannot explain the goodness of actions. This is a highly contested claim because, if it is accurate, it suggests that there is a (...) significant deficit in Plato’s theory of the Form of the Good - the transcendent principle of all goodness. The success of this thesis may seem to be bad news for Plato, for if the transcendent principle of all goodness fails to account for the goodness of actions, something seems to be awry in Plato’s ethical theory. However, not all is lost. In the second part of this paper, I argue that Plato’s ethical theory is nonetheless viable, because Plato has another, distinct type of explanation that does the explanatory work that the Form of the Good cannot do. This is what I call the Platonic Teleological Explanation, Plato’s own version of a teleological explanation. The Platonic Teleological Explanation is not reducible to an explanation in terms of the Form of the Good; it is an independent and non-dispensable type of explanation. Ultimately, I shall argue that only the Platonic Teleological Explanation can account for the goodness of actions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evil as the Good?A Reply to Brook ZiporynDavid R. LoyI was surprised to receive this lengthy response to my short review—yet not displeased, for the important question is, of course, how much Professor Ziporyn's reply helps to clarify the issues at stake, which we agree deserve to be pursued. One of the many admirable aspects of his Evil and/or/as the Good is that, in addition to presenting (...) the Tiantai ethical position in its historical context, it argues forcefully for the validity and relevance of that approach today. Moreover, I am pleased at the way Ziporyn's response focuses the argument of his rich and dense book, so I welcome this opportunity to continue the discussion. And perhaps those who have read this far will also be pleased that I am able to present my main concerns somewhat more concisely.Ziporyn begins with the relationship between ultimate and provisional truth, usually the crux of the matter from a Mahāyāna perspective. In response to a point I make—that ethically the nondual 'ultimate' point of view needs to be supplemented by a provisional 'lower truth' that distinguishes between good and evil—he emphasizes that according to Tiantai "conventional truth and ultimate truth are actually identical" (his italics) and that the conventional truth embraces all possible assertions, beliefs, and positions. Later, he elaborates that "provisional truth is a portion of ultimate truth, in a peculiar omnicentric sort of whole/part relation in which each part in fact contains the whole." The important term remains identity, for according to Tiantai "the idea that two entities might be mutually implicative and dependent, not adventitiously but in their nature, and yet not identical, is logically impossible." Ethically, of course, this means something more than the interdependence of good and evil: it is not only that "the most horrible evils are ineradicable, built into the absolute unchangeable nature of all existence, and fully and eternally present even in Buddhahood," but that "greed, anger, and delusion would be seen to be identical with Buddhahood, in accordance with precisely this Tiantai doctrine of the interpenetration of good and evil."As in the original review, my main point is that this emphasis on the identity of conventional truth and ultimate truth is an important insight, but one that turns out to be quite problematic ethically. Its value is mostly epistemological and metaphysical: it helps us escape from the kind of dualism that often postulates some 'higher' transcendental reality corresponding to a 'higher' ultimate truth. Instead, the 'higher' is not separate from the provisional and conventional, but the truth (whether realized or not) is that the whole 'ultimate' is completely contained within each conventional part or provisional position.Dōgen somewhere makes the point that the goal is not to eradicate concepts (which is a dualistic approach to practice, seeking a purified mind that transcends language) but to liberate concepts. What becomes important is our ability to move [End Page 348] (and play) freely among the multiplicity of linguistic possibilities—in Ziporyn's terms, to 'recontextualize' without getting stuck in any particular context or conceptual system. Nothing is lacking in any of these possibilities; in terms of Indra's Net, each node manifests the whole. We are not liberated from language, except in the sense that we are not trapped in any particular language game; rather, we are liberated in language. We should not blame the victim: the problem is not language itself, but our tendencies to cling to some concepts, et cetera, more than others- including, for example, our dualistic tendency to discriminate between 'good' and 'evil' in order to identify with the former by annihilating the latter (a very timely topic, unfortunately).But good and evil for Ziporyn are more than interdependent. He claims that they are identical, and that is where difficulties arise. The epistemological point about the identity of the two truths becomes more problematical when we move into ethics, where the 'cash value' is somewhat more obvious and immediate, in the sense that we need ethics to help us cope with moral choices that we find ourselves required to make in daily life, in circumstances not always... (shrink)

The Good and the Right is a Christian introduction to the major theories of ethics in the history of philosophy (e.g., relativism, egoism, utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, social contract theory, natural law theory, virtue theory, and divine command theory). Philosophers J. Caleb Clanton and Kraig Martin offer a lucid survey of each ethical framework, and they carefully reconstruct and critically evaluate the case for and against each view. Along the way, the authors engage with the presuppositions, affirmations, and implications of (...) the Christian Faith-and in a way that takes the Christian tradition seriously. Ultimately, the authors rediscover and incrementally develop a unique but classically Christian framework for thinking about the moral life and making ethical decisions. J. Caleb Clanton is the Distinguished University Chair in Philosophy & Humanities and professor of philosophy at Lipscomb University Kraig Martin is an associate professor of philosophy at Harding University. (shrink)

This paper presents a reflection upon Plato’s good that surpasses even being. It looks for parallels between Western and Asian sources and examines aspects of Pierce and Whitehead’s philosophy in some detail. Ultimately, it attempts to vindicate metaphysics from accusations of death.

In 1925 a debate erupted in the correspondence columns of the British Medical Journal concerning the effectiveness of eating raw pancreas as a treatment for diabetes. Enthusiasts were predominantly general practitioners , who claimed success for the therapy on the basis of their clinical impressions. Their detractors were laboratory‐oriented ‘biochemist‐physicians,’ who considered that their own experiments demonstrated that raw pancreas therapy was ineffective. The biochemist‐physicians consistently dismissed the GPs' observations as inadequately ‘controlled’. They did not define the meaning of ‘control’ (...) in this context, although it clearly did not have the term's present‐day meaning of a trial employing an untreated comparison group of patients. Rather, the physician‐biochemists' ‘properly controlled’ experiments involved careful regulation of their patients' diet and other environmental factors, and evaluation of the therapy's success through biochemical, rather than just clinical, criteria. However, my analysis suggests that these factors alone are inadequate to account for the biochemist‐physicians' dismissal of the GPs' work as ‘uncontrolled’. I suggest that the biochemist‐physicians were deliberately exploiting the powerful rhetorical connotations of the term ‘control’. Ultimately, they implied that only a trial which they themselves had conducted could be deemed ‘adequately controlled’. (shrink)

First published in Great Britain in 1948, this book examines the definition of goodness as being distinct from the question of What things are good? Although less immediately and obviously practical, Dr. Ewing argues that the former question is more fundamental since it raises the issue of whether ethics is explicable wholly in terms of something else, for example, human psychology. Ewing states in his preface that the definition of goodness needs to be confirmed before one decides on the (...) place value is to occupy in our conception of reality or on the ultimate characteristics which make one action right and another wrong. This book discusses these issues. (shrink)