Aus dem Inhalt: Views from the North: Hans Petter Graver: Law, Justice and the State: Nordic Perspectives u Jacob Dahl Rendtorff: The Danish Welfare State: Philosophical Ideals and Systemic Reality u Sigri!Dur *orgeirsdottir: Feminist Ethics and Feminist Politics u Kuellike Lengi: The Situation of Human Rights in Estonia u Einar Palsson: Pythagoras and Early Icelandic Law u Law, Discourse and Rationality: Mats Flodin: Internal and External Rationality of Legal Systems u Logi Gunnarsson: A Discourse About Discourse u Hjordi!s Hakonardottir: Legal (...) Language: A Tool of Justice u Ghita Holmstrom-Hintikka: On the Use of Expert Witness in Legal Reasoning and Inquiry u Law, State and Nation: Agust H. Ing*orsson: Democracy, Bureaucracy and Marginalization of the State u Aleksander Peczenik: Law-State, Legal Certainty and Legitimacy of Law u Ove K. Pedersen/Sverre Raffnsoe: Reorganizing Society u Juha Raikka: Mill on National Sentiment u Pall Skulason: Concepts of the State and Classes of Value u Problems of Law and Rights: Britt-Mari Blegvad: How to Cope With Uncertainty: Trust and Law u Jon Wetlesen: Animal Rights or Human Duties?. (shrink)

One enduring legacy of the twentieth century will be the slow, certain transformation of the world from insular civilizations to interactive societies enmeshed in global systems of electronic communication, economics, and politics. Financial news from Thailand or Brazil is often more important globally than political events in the old centers of power. Some bemoan the uncertainty and flux of all this. However, the mutual definition of the world’s societies presents an extraordinary opportunity to humanize a situation that all too (...) quickly could degenerate into a Weberian ‘iron cage’ of truly global proportions. What contribution can the world’s great philosophical traditions make toward humanity’s common task of civilizing the rise of globalization? Here the ancient concept of paideia walks upon the stage of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

One enduring legacy of the twentieth century will be the slow, certain transformation of the world from insular civilizations to interactive societies enmeshed in global systems of electronic communication, economics, and politics. Financial news from Thailand or Brazil is often more important globally than political events in the old centers of power. Some bemoan the uncertainty and flux of all this. However, the mutual definition of the world’s societies presents an extraordinary opportunity to humanize a situation that all too (...) quickly could degenerate into a Weberian ‘iron cage’ of truly global proportions. What contribution can the world’s great philosophical traditions make toward humanity’s common task of civilizing the rise of globalization? Here the ancient concept of paideia walks upon the stage of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

One enduring legacy of the twentieth century will be the slow, certain transformation of the world from insular civilizations to interactive societies enmeshed in global systems of electronic communication, economics, and politics. Financial news from Thailand or Brazil is often more important globally than political events in the old centers of power. Some bemoan the uncertainty and flux of all this. However, the mutual definition of the world’s societies presents an extraordinary opportunity to humanize a situation that all too (...) quickly could degenerate into a Weberian ‘iron cage’ of truly global proportions. What contribution can the world’s great philosophical traditions make toward humanity’s common task of civilizing the rise of globalization? Here the ancient concept of paideia walks upon the stage of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In the following, I will discuss the current social reaction to the ecological crisis and the ways in which society reacts to technological risks, which can be understood primarily as a reaction to scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the first section, I will clarify what is meant by scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the second section, I will contrast Max Weber's differentiation of science, law [Recht) and morality in the modern world with the process (...) of de-differentiation of these value spheres, a trend which can be observed in the present-day context of the ecological crisis and technological risks. We shall see that social contradictions emerge in the functional relationships between these value spheres, and that such contradictions go hand in hand with these value spheres or contexts of discourse either losing their original function or becoming transformed. Science forfeits its role as a functional authority and becomes a strategic resource for politics. Law becomes a basic constituent of an amoral form of negotiation, which can no longer be properly grasped in terms of legal categories. Morality is transformed into fear, and economics yields unprofitable practices. In the third section, I will in attempt to open up the moral and ethical dimension of how to deal with uncertainty with the help of discourse theory, as well as outline a possible solution. (shrink)

One enduring legacy of the twentieth century will be the slow, certain transformation of the world from insular civilizations to interactive societies enmeshed in global systems of electronic communication, economics, and politics. Financial news from Thailand or Brazil is often more important globally than political events in the old centers of power. Some bemoan the uncertainty and flux of all this. However, the mutual definition of the world’s societies presents an extraordinary opportunity to humanize a situation that all too (...) quickly could degenerate into a Weberian ‘iron cage’ of truly global proportions. What contribution can the world’s great philosophical traditions make toward humanity’s common task of civilizing the rise of globalization? Here the ancient concept of paideia walks upon the stage of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

"Evidence of a flight from reason is as old as human record-keeping: the fact of it certainly goes back an even longer way. Flight from science specifically, among the forms of rational inquiry, goes back as far as science itself... But rejection of reason is now a pattern to be found in most branches of scholarship and in all the learned professions."--from the introduction In the widely acclaimed Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science, Paul R. Gross (...) and Norman Levitt offered a spirited response to the "science bashers," raising serious questions about the growing criticism of scientific practice from humanists and social scientists on the academic left. Now, in The Flight from Science and Reason, Gross and Levitt are joined by Martin W. Lewis to bring together a diverse and distinguished group of scholars, scientists, and experts to engage these questions from a wide variety of perspectives. The authors take on critics of science whose views range from moderate to extreme, from social constructivists to deconstructionists, from creationists and feminists to Afro-centrists. They discuss the rise of "alternative medicine" and radical environmentalism (here skewered as "ecosentimentalism"). They explain why the "uncertainty principle" does not work as a metaphor for ambiguity, and why "chaos theory" cannot be invoked without an understanding of mathematics. Throughout, they grapple with the paradox inherent in arguing with opponents who contend that reason itself, and thus logic, is suspect. Distributed for the New York Academy of Sciences. (shrink)

Throughout the 19th century and early decades of the 20th century, milk was a dangerous food that required state intervention to make it safe. Throughout this period, the germ theory of contagious disease came to prominence, but could not explicitly determine the causal relationships linking germs, milk, and human illness. Using the notion of an ideational regime, I examine how (1) knowledge claims move from uncertainty to certainty and become privileged claims within ideational regimes that (2) result in an (...) unintended, but necessary deployment of a biopolitical strategy for governance. The argument here is that theoretical uncertainty meant managing populations as a uniform undifferentiated reality using pasteurization technologies. I use two historical moments as evidence of these processes. The first is the 1901 British Congress on Tuberculosis when I argue germ theory came to a theoretical standstill and the second is Ontario’s 1938 amendment to the province’s Public Health Act that permanently institutionalised province-wide compulsory pasteurisation laws organised around the notion of nutritional equivalency. This genealogical exploration should provide some insight into how bacteria became the singular cause of illness and into the conditions that led to targeting milk as the main site of intervention instead of treating individual bodies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Patient Self-Determination ActElizabeth Leibold McCloskey (bio)What are the ethics of extending the length of life? We know that we cannot artificially end life (Thou Shalt not Kill), but how about artificially extending life? Is that always good, sometimes good?... In ethics, is keeping people alive the highest good? Should our priority be to keep people breathing?... What does basic religious ethics say about this?(John C. Danforth, letter to (...) the author, 19 August 1989)The Patient Self-Determination Act, signed into law as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA '90) last November, marks the first time that Congress has passed legislation concerning the ethics of life-sustaining medical treatment. The bill was spearheaded by Senator John C. Danforth (RMO), who has a special interest in this area. An Episcopal priest, Danforth was formerly an assistant chaplain at New York's Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and now sits as a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, which oversees Medicare and Medicaid. Although Senator Danforth's legislative initiative was not a result of the Cruzan case, it was in his state of Missouri that the U.S. Supreme Court case involving removal of Nancy Cruzan's feeding tube arose (Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Department of Health, U.S. Supreme Court, 58 LW 4916, 26 June 1990). From his unique vantage point, he felt it was time to craft a legislative response to some of the difficult issues surrounding prolongation of life.The short answer to Senator Danforth's questions about when to artificially extend life is simple enough: people must be free to determine that for themselves. Common law and common sense dictate such a conclusion; living will and health care proxy statutes, enacted in almost every state, codify that right. The Catholic moral tradition teaches that one is not morally obligated to use extraordinary means to prolong life, a tradition shared both by the mainline Protestant and the reform and conservative Jewish community. Yet most people are unaware of their fundamental legal right to make such decisions, and as court cases from Quinlan (In re Quinlin, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 1975) to Cruzan demonstrate, few know [End Page 163] how to make arrangements for this right to be exercised if they become incapacitated.Meanwhile, health care practices are often driven by a denial of death. When Senator Danforth and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) introduced the bill on October 17, 1989, Senator Danforth said:More and more it is arguable that we play God by subjecting people to unwanted and sometimes unnecessary treatment, treatment that unnaturally prolongs the dying process. Our health care system has become obsessed with extending life, at times neglecting the caring component of medicine and trampling on the rights of patients.(Congressional Record 1989, 135:5.13566)The American Hospital Association estimates that 70 percent of deaths now occur after a determination to withhold or withdraw medical treatment. Many of those decisions are made without the benefit of an incapacitated patient's views, yet a Harvard study revealed that 95 percent of the population would like to prepare in advance for such decisions. Only 4 percent of hospitals have a systematic method of asking patients if they have an advance directive. Family members confront painful choices in the face of uncertainty about their loved one's wishes and it can be even more painful when a family knows the patient's desires but providers and the courts act otherwise because clear evidence is lacking.The Patient Self-Determination Act is rooted in the belief that people should be given information that enables them to specify the extent of medical treatment they wish to receive should they become incapacitated. The public should be educated about applicable state laws that protect the individual's right to make such choices through the use of an advance directive.The Act moves toward that goal by promoting knowledge of state laws. It requires every hospital, nursing home, home health agency, hospice, and health maintenance organization that participates in Medicaid or Medicare to routinely give all adult patients information about advance directives. Patients will also be given information on the... (shrink)

In the late 1970s, the U.S. Congress was debating a number of different proposals to provide monetary compensation to residents of Utah and Nevada who had been exposed to radioactive fallout from government nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s. Yet scientists and government officials expressed concern that such a program would end up compensating many people for cancers that were not caused by the fallout. Thus, after much debate, Congress directed the National Institutes of Health to produce a set of (...) statistical tables—the radioepidemiologic tables—to target compensation awards to “deserving” individuals. Advocates of the tables, notably Senator Orrin Hatch, argued that reliance on scientific data would provide compensation decisions with predictability and evenhandedness. Yet in the end, the effort to employ the tables failed. The substantial scientific uncertainties in the tables and in their application to individual claims failed to deliver the authority they promised. Additionally, the goal of fairness and objectivity could not be convincingly met because of persistent controversy and mistrust surrounding the government’s role in the study of health effects of low‐level radiation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In the Belly of the Whale:Some Thoughts on Preserving the Integrity of the New Bioethics CommissionF. Daniel Davis (bio)10 July 2010. Washington, D.C. President Obama's Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues has just concluded its inaugural meeting, designed as a primer—the first of three that it plans to hold—on synthetic biology. As a topic for deliberation by a national bioethics commission, "synbio" is ideal. A cloud of (...) equipoise hangs over the practical implications of recent developments in this, the latest phase in the evolution of biotechnology—a seemingly genuine uncertainty about the need for additional mechanisms of oversight to mitigate potential risks to biosafety or biosecurity. Despite these concerns, its advocates and practitioners enthusiastically champion the prospect of eventual, perhaps significant benefits to be gained with progress in "synbio," including, for example, enhanced processes for the mass production of vaccines and biofuels. And yet like the advent of recombinant DNA technologies in the mid-1970s, synthetic biology has generated not only hope for benefits and concern for risks, but also questions variously described as "deep," "profound," "fundamental," and "philosophical": Is the capacity to synthesize novel, living entities yet another technological invitation to hubris on the part of humankind? Will that capacity alter the relationship between humankind and nature? How should we think about the moral status of living entities created de novo in the laboratory? Should we even care? How will wide-scale applications of synthetic biology tip the scales of social justice? And finally, the democratization of synthetic biology, the growth of DIY-BIO (do-it-yourself-biology) communities beyond the usual scientific arenas of academia and industry, has infused old questions about scientific freedom and responsibility with new complexities—all in the midst of an American public that is reportedly unaware and uneducated about this new chapter in the often triumphant, unsettling history of biotechnology.Thus, the topic of synthetic biology presents the new commission with several possibilities. It could very well make a substantial contribution to public policies responsive to both the current capabilities and the possible trajectories of [End Page 291] these emergent biotechnologies. The very fact that the President explicitly asked the Commission to take up the topic and report back to him (in six months) means that that potential is especially promising. It could, as well, delve into the "deeper" philosophical questions that "synbio" raises with the aim of bringing both depth and breadth to the tasks of critically analyzing and reflecting upon what currently is known and what, with regard to the future, can only be glimpsed of this amalgam of the life sciences, engineering, and other disciplines. The Commission could also set its sights on diminishing the apparent deficit in public understanding of these biotechnologies. And finally, with this topic as well as any others it takes up, the Commission, along with the administration that established it, could make an effort to reinvigorate public bioethics in the United States. At the very least, in the sobering light of experience with the President's Council on Bioethics, certain actions or behaviors could be avoided in the interests of preserving the integrity—the moral and political legitimacy—of the new commission. Although each of these possibilities warrants further explanation, my focus here is the final one.The Belly of the WhaleIn several decades, some future historian of public bioethics in the U.S. will be able to look back on the bioethics commissions established to date and offer an insightful, comprehensive—maybe even magisterial—account of their beginnings and endings, their deliberations and the political forces that shaped them, and perhaps most important, their ultimate value as public bodies. Lacking the strategic perch of historical distance, and fresh from the trenches, I can only offer a few somewhat informed but partial observations and arguments about public bioethics in the context of contemporary American politics, acknowledging at the outset that my thoughts are open to, and needful of, critical amendment or supplement by others.In the U.S., bioethics commissions are political creatures, established through the authority of the Congress or the President for the purpose of providing counsel to the legislative and/or executive... (shrink)

In the early 1970s, the idea of precaution—of heeding rather than ignoring scientific evidence of harm when there is uncertainty, and taking action that errs on the side of safety—was so appealing that the US Congress used it as the basis of the toxics provisions of the Clean Water Act of 1972, the federal Environmental Protection Agency based its proposals for implementing those provisions on it, and the courts frequently tended toward it when resolving conflicts over the implementation of (...) pollution control law. In other words, precaution was written into toxic water pollutant control law and was beginning to be written into policy and regulations. By 1976, the tables were completely turned. The EPA abandoned the safety-providing approach in the implementation of the law, even though the law required it, and adopted a risk-taking approach in the creation of standards for the vast majority of toxic water pollutants. The article examines how this change was brought about. It builds on recent work on undone science as an obstacle to regulation and contributes to the development of an account of the creation of the regulatory system, with both its achievements and its limitations. (shrink)

This essay uses a specific example—proposals to exclude sugary drinks from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program —to explore some features of the contemporary U.S. administrative state. Dating back to the Wilsonian origins of the U.S. administrative state there has been uncertainty about whether we can and should separate politics and administration. On the traditional view, the agencies are to be kept separate from politics—technocratic and value-neutral—although they are indirectly accountable to the president and Congress. The SNAP exclusions example shows, (...) however, that agencies often must make complex and controversial decisions on their own, decisions that go beyond value-neutral technocratic administration. When authorizing legislation has multiple goals, as we’ll argue is the case in the SNAP example, an agency will have to choose between conflicting statutory mandates. Moreover, as the SNAP example shows, agencies often face complex normative questions of ethics and justice that go beyond the question of how to balance competing aims. The appropriate response to the SNAP exclusions example is not to keep politics out of administrative decision-making, but to develop procedures that allow ethical and political questions to be addressed in agency policy-making, consistent with overarching commitments to fairness and democracy. (shrink)

Naturalist aestetics, strictly speaking, is a move to establish naturalist explanation of aesthetic phenomena. It was nearly forgotten, at least in the history of aesthetics, where, if mentioned, it was put aside as something dead and despised. Its reappearance in recent years, among other occasions at the XIVIVth International Congress of Aesthetics (Rio de Janeiro, 2004), came as a surprise and a challenge. Its second modernity has predecessors in the first modernity, and Darwin is only one of the many, and (...) its background in contemporary naturalist proposals in social and human sciences (biosociology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, etc.). Contemporary proposals to explain some basic aesthetic preferences of taste, and aesthetic pleasure itself in terms of evolution, may be illuminated by historical background. We can also understand them (in Ulrich Beck's vocabulary) as second modernity, as a move to deal with uncertainties of aesthetics. What still makes contemporary naturalist aesthetics a continuation of aesthetic modernity, however, is its inability to take (contemporary) art seriously. (shrink)

The work of Georges Matisse (1874–1961), a French physicist, philosopher, epistemologist, and translator, has been largely overlooked, particularly his contributions to the history of science in the first half of the 20th century. His work focused on the emerging field of cybernetics and provided a philosophical perspective on new physics. His books delved into the philosophical underpinnings of scientific doctrines, viewing them as systems of reference and modes of representation rather than expressions of absolute truths. Although he could not personally (...) attend the Copenhagen Congress for the Unity of Science in 1936, his talk was presented, offering a unique case study on uncertainty and determinism. Matisse employed an expanded notion of causality to study concrete facts in human societies, arguing against a universal law of history. His final book was dedicated to Bachelard. This paper offers initial insights into Matisse’s sociology program, discusses his methodological approaches within logical empiricism, and outlines his perspective on the purpose of nature. The study concludes that Matisse’s interdisciplinary approach, which included a theory on the relationship between religion and science, was based on his robust understanding of biophysics and scientific history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gonzales v. Oregon and the Politics of MedicineRonald A. Lindsay (bio)Throughout 2005, the morbid joke on Capitol Hill was that the twin inevitabilities of "death and taxes" had been replaced by "death politics and taxes." There seemed to be some truth in this observation given the highly publicized intervention by some members of Congress in the Schiavo case and the continuing controversy over government regulation of end-of-life care. The (...) Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Oregon (74 U.S.L.W. 4068 (17 January 2006)) has resolved one of the critical issues relating to this controversy by holding that a physician may prescribe controlled substances to provide assistance in dying if such a practice is authorized by state law and not expressly prohibited by federal law. However, other issues remain. In fact, the Court's decision has underscored some of the reasons why there is not only continuing controversy over end-of-life care, but also over other aspects of the practice of medicine. First, it is apparent there is no consensus among health care professionals about the precise boundaries of the legitimate practice of medicine. Second, the regulation of the practice of medicine traverses ill-defined legal territory. In particular, there is significant uncertainty concerning the implications of some regulations as well as the allocation of regulatory authority between and within state and federal governments. This uncertainty leaves substantial room for political maneuvers.Before discussing the politics of medicine, it is worth looking at the regulation of controlled substances in some detail both because this review will provide the necessary background for understanding the ruling in Gonzales v. Oregon and because it will illustrate the uncertainty resulting from multiple sources of regulatory authority.Federal and State Regulation of Controlled SubstancesSince the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the federal government has regulated certain aspects of the distribution and administration of drugs deemed susceptible to abuse. The current primary vehicle for federal regulation is the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, enacted in 1970, of which Title II is known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.). A [End Page 99] "controlled" substance is just that, a substance that is regulated under the CSA. The CSA classifies controlled substances in five categories or schedules based on their potential for abuse, their accepted medical use, and the risks associated with their use under medical supervision. Schedule I substances have a high potential for abuse and have no currently accepted use in medical treatment. Schedule II-V substances are approved for medical use but are subject to a descending hierarchy of restrictions on their use. To give a lawful prescription for a controlled substance, a physician must be registered with the appropriate federal agency, currently the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Moreover, to be valid, such a prescription must be issued for "a legitimate medical purpose" (21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii)).There is little dispute that the primary purposes of the CSA are to control drug abuse and to eliminate illicit trafficking in drugs. In accomplishing these objectives, there is a division of responsibility among various federal agencies, in particular the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice. Of particular relevance to the controversy in Gonzales v. Oregon is the Attorney General's authority to revoke a physician's registration for prescribing controlled substances if the physician's registration would be inconsistent with the public interest.All 50 states have their own statutes and regulations that address various aspects of the distribution and administration of controlled substances. Most states have adopted versions of the model Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which largely mimics federal law, but several states have placed additional restrictions on a physician's ability to prescribe controlled substances, including time limits on the validity of a prescription and limits on the quantity of a drug that can be prescribed. States are the primary, but by no means the exclusive, source of regulation of medical practice in general. States license physicians, establish boards and agencies to regulate the actions of physicians, and promulgate rules and guidelines to which physicians... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Just Revolution: A Christian Ethic of Political Resistance and Social Transformation by Anna Floerke ScheidRamon LuzarragaJust Revolution: A Christian Ethic of Political Resistance and Social Transformation Anna Floerke Scheid lanham, md: lexington books, 2015. 208 pp. $84.00Anna Floerke Scheid argues that the Christian just war and just peacemaking ethical traditions lack a comprehensive ethic for revolutionary nonviolent activity and warfare. She proposes to fill this lacuna through a (...) theological exploration of what constitutes a just revolution. While Scheid maintains a consistent [End Page 212] preference for nonviolent resistance against tyranny, she remains open to the possibility of revolutionary warfare.The author articulates four stages of a just revolution. The first stage is jus ante, nonviolent resistance against a tyrannical government. Here the opposition develops a democratic and revolutionary vision of society that respects human rights, models that vision within its organizations, and resists through nonviolent acts. Second is jus ad, the stage where a tyrannical government eliminates all avenues for negotiation and represses peaceful resistance. This forces the revolutionary opposition to consider armed resistance as a last resort. Here Scheid grapples with two limitations of traditional just war theory. The first reserves the authority to start a war with governments. She argues that the legitimacy for a just revolution comes from a revolutionary organization's ability to envision and model a just society. Because a tyrannical government's authority is illegitimate, a revolutionary movement's just vision and practices gain for it a de facto legitimate authority. This legitimacy is reinforced by a revolutionary movement's ultimate intention to effect reconciliation with their oppressors postwar. The second limitation is the reasonable hope of success. Scheid analyzes the history of this criterion and demonstrates how it supports defensive wars despite the uncertainty of success. Oppressed persons, as the subjects of their own hope of liberation, ought to decide what constitutes the probability for success in fighting tyranny. Throughout this stage, revolutionary warfare must be practiced in tandem with continuing nonviolent resistance.The third stage is jus in, the justice practiced during armed revolutionary resistance. Fighting is deemed necessary to force a tyrannical government to negotiations. Meanwhile, revolutionary military units would work to minimize violence and loss of life. The last stage is jus post, the reconciliation needed to prevent revolutionary warfare from spiraling into revenge. Here the exercise of restorative justice—where responsibility for past injustices is assumed by all sides and a just resolution developed for social reconciliation and the development of a new, democratic society that respects human rights—is all important. Throughout the book, Scheid uses the African National Congress's revolutionary struggle against the South African apartheid government as a successful example of her theory in practice.Scheid's well-argued proposal deserves careful consideration by ethicists. Students will profit from her excellent summary of just war theory, where she brilliantly recovers some of its forgotten features. On the other hand, her concluding chapter considering the Arab Spring's potential for just revolution would have been stronger if she extended beyond a comparison to South Africa to incorporate similar features found in other successful revolutions. The 1986 Philippine People Power Revolution, the 1989 collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes, and the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal come to mind. Moreover, important for South Africa's success was the durability of the [End Page 213] political institutions the British left behind. These institutions provided the framework that handled the transition of power from the pro-apartheid National Party to the post-apartheid African National Congress government. This feature could have been brought to light, as many recognize this structure as contributive to the peaceful transition of power in other countries that won independence through revolution, from the United States in the eighteenth century to India and the Caribbean in the twentieth.Ramon LuzarragaBenedictine University at MesaCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Nothing about Xenophon's Hellenica is more outrageous than his treatment of the relations of Persia and the Greeks. It was orthodoxy in the circle of Agesilaus that Theban medizing, barbarismos, had sabotaged the plans for a glorious anabasis and recalled him to the defence of his city . Not until the Thebans woo and win the fickle favour of the King , does anything like detail emerge. In the regrettable interlude, the less said the better. If the third speech of (...) Andocides had not survived, there would have been some tangled theorizing about a note in Didymus , especially as regards ‘the ambassadors who in Sparta consented’, but sober historical judgement would never have transgressed so far from the text of Xenophon as to postulate a Peace Congress in Sparta as well as in Sardis in 392. Likewise, the merest chance of epigraphic survival assures us that the oaths, which the ‘Athenians and the Spartans and the other Greeks’ swore in 387/6, ‘the King swore’ — and so on. If we did not have the reflection of Ephorus in Diodorus, albeit a mirror cracked and blemished, we would be sadly astray in 375 and 371. When, however, the despicable Thebans become the King's favoured power, disgraceful scenes unfold. ‘Pelopidas very much had things his own way with the Persian; he could say that the Thebans alone of the Greeks had fought on the King's side at Plataea, that they had never afterwards campaigned against him, that the Spartans were at war with them because they would not join Agesilaus…etc.’ . A Persian is found at Thebes reading out the contents of a Royal Rescript, after displaying the Royal seal ; at Sparta twenty years before, such details had been left to the imagination. The cause of Xenophon's method in this matter is not for the moment under discussion, but rather the consequence, viz. our uncertainty about what precisely the King's Peace said. There was a document, inscribed on stone pillars and displayed in the national shrines . If ever a copy turns up, what can we expect to find? The measure of our uncertainty was provided by Wilcken, who produced a curious hypothesis which found little sympathy; that he could do so shows the state of the evidence. Some effort of the imagination is needed, and those who gravely disapprove of conjectures of what might have been the case need read no further. At the end one can be sure of very little. Conjectures, however, have been uttered, en passant, elsewhere. What may prove to be a chorus of disdain has begun. A formal confession may be welcome. (shrink)

In any given historical period, the fate of human beings is determined directly by their modes of existence and their ways of understanding to the future. In our time, the process of modernization leaves us uncertain about the future. This situation of uncertainty gives a new way of philosophizing and understandingphilosophy that must be appropriate to our new way of experiencing the future. We must recognize that the future has its own reality: that it transcends us and is also (...) impact within us, and that it is inherently unpredictable. Therefore, the mission of philosophy in our time is to embody this new way of experiencing the future and help people to see the future from the future. This way of living does not rest on the assumption that history has a given aim, but instead seeks to buildthe future that focuses on dialogue among people with different viewpoints. (shrink)

In existential thought the thinking subject includes itself in its own thinking; this subject is not conceived as a substance that may be objectively determined, for its being lies in a making or constituting itself. Choice is thus the crucial concept of existential thought. Since choice involves awareness of the uncertainty of itspossible outcomes, anguish is inherent in it. Hence anguish in the face of our own freedom is essential to the human reality, and authenticity lies in facing anguish (...) rather than fleeing it. The term metaexistential refers, (1) to those systems that acknowledge absolute authenticity and truth to consist in going beyond existence in all its manifestations—those which are more unauthentic and less conflictive and distressful, as well as those which are less unauthentic and more conflictive and distressful—and (2) to those Paths of Awakening possessing the means for effectively going beyond existence and thus achieving absolute authenticity and truth. In fact, (1) only the Contemplation state of higher bodhisattvas and the state of Buddhahood, which are free from the subject-objectduality and thus beyond the bounds of existence and of the human reality, constitute a genuine surpassing of alienation and delusion, and hence only these conditions are true to our innermost nature; and (2) only a really effective practice of metaexistential methods such as Buddhist Paths can be conducive to these realizations. (shrink)

Philosophy today is undergoing a transformation away from modernism. The problem is that it is far from clear what this transformation is moving toward. I examine the transition from the premodern to the modern philosophical world and contrast it with our current situation. While the moderns were clear in their rejection of Aristotelian scholasticism and sure of their methods, in our own time we are neither clear about the extent to which we reject modernism nor our methodology moving forward. I (...) argue that the uncertainty of the postmodern philosophical world is, in an important sense, a necessary consequence of the rejection of modernism itself. (shrink)

The world (specifically the universe in which modern mankind, the same below) there is no absolute essence. The world's primitive also has uncertainty; the existence of all is possible. On the universe in which modern human live, the unity and distinction of material and spirit constitute the world's basic contradiction. (1) The unity of material and spirit. Many have a negative in the overall delicate generation: the material includes the spirit, the spirit depends on the material, among them under (...) certain conditions can be transformed into each other. (2) The material and spirit is distinct: The material is essentially an objective system, the objective freedom is the essence of the spirit.The collection system is the unity of opposites; freedom is relative to the state system. (3) The spirit and awareness are two different concepts, it is necessary to distinguish between. Material and the sense of confrontation: the material is an objective reality, subjective consciousness is reflected. (4) The material and the sense of unity: the material is the source of awareness, consciousness is a product of material; material decides consciousness, awareness counterproductive in the material. Material and a sense of the unity of opposites minor contradictions in the world. (5) World of certainty and uncertainty, know and unknown, relative and absolute, as well as activity problems are dialectical. (6) Dialectics generally applicable to the entire world, but also dialectical view of its own, it should be the development of a multiple, three-dimensional, not the sleek dialectics. (shrink)

Practically all the countries require the highly skilled staff. It is natural, that it is necessary to prepare them in higher educational institutions. In many high schools students were enlisted and are enlisted on the basis of knowledge and skills. It not an optimum variant because the second integrated parameter of an entrant, his mental potential and fundamentality of knowledge, is not taken into account. The specified very important parameter of an entrant is opened in the best way with sums (...) with parameters, that is sums with parameters serve some kind of a litmus piece of paper in definition of quality of the future student. It is the first reason to increase in number of sums with parameters on entrance examinations. The second, not less important reason, is connected with the following:these sums promote better development of the personality of a pupil, its individual propensities and abilities; they help to learn to work in conditions of small and significant uncertainties which are in abundance in our today's life. They develop variative and creative thinking and by those promote development of intelligence and increase of a level of fundamentality of knowledge. Existing textbooks and educational supplies do not contain adequate volume of a material doing of mathematical sums with parameters: there is no system, there are only separate examples, some of them are rather unsuccessful. The author leads ordering of sums with parameters, the technique of doing such sums is developed and corresponding educational supplies on paper and electronic carriers are published. (shrink)

There are three results in this study. First, redefinition of "Being". I've classified and redefined the concept of "being" into "Being", "Existence", "Reality" which have been used confusingly. And the definition of God has been also renewed. So we came to understand what "a triangle exists", "a sharp pencil exists", "the God exists" mean. Also I proved that the mean of "I will be who I will be" which is the name of God in Bible equals to the mean of (...) almightiness. Second, trinitarianism. I proved that the essence of God does not belong to the "the world of idea" which the essence of triangle belongs to and also to the "the physical world" which the essence of sharp pencil belongs to. This is the same to physical rules like "E=mc²". And I refer to the world which includes "the God" and"physical rules" as "the world of causes". In this way, a view of world suggested in this study is not dualism but trinitarianism. Third, the new cosmological argument. I've suggested "the new cosmological argument" using modern science's imperfection which inferred from "Werner Karl Heisenberg's uncertainty principle". The conclusion of this proof is that a man who recognizes the reality of "physical rules" should recognize the reality of "God". In other word a rational man who believes causality should recognize the reality of "The cause which is cause of every causes but don't need any cause" "the God". (shrink)

One enduring legacy of the twentieth century will be the slow, certain transformation of the world from insular civilizations to interactive societies enmeshed in global systems of electronic communication, economics, and politics. Financial news from Thailand or Brazil is often more important globally than political events in the old centers of power. Some bemoan the uncertainty and flux of all this. However, the mutual definition of the world’s societies presents an extraordinary opportunity to humanize a situation that all too (...) quickly could degenerate into a Weberian ‘iron cage’ of truly global proportions. What contribution can the world’s great philosophical traditions make toward humanity’s common task of civilizing the rise of globalization? Here the ancient concept of paideia walks upon the stage of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

I argue that autonomy should be interpreted as an educational concept, dependent on many educative institutions, including but not limited to government. This interpretation will improve the understanding of autonomy in relation to questions about institutional and societal legitimate authority. I aim to make plausible three connected ideas. Respecting individual autonomy, properly understood, is consistent with an interest in institutions in social and political philosophy. Such interest, however, does require a broadening of questions about institutional and societal legitimacy. Individual autonomy (...) can and should be re-conceived as a multi-institutional educational notion. We must appreciate the manifold institutional process. There are diverse questions about legitimacy as institutional and societal authority that generate normative demands binding on the individual. There is some uncertainty about which institutions do or should educate for autonomy. The shift to an educational, multi-institutional model of autonomy renders more questionable and probably de-emphasizes the role of blame and punishment as paradigmatically institutionalized expressions of respect for autonomy in educating for autonomy. Nonetheless, such an educational model does not eliminate concern about autonomy, blame and punishment. Rather, it broadens questions about the legitimacy of the normative function of various institutions, and of society as a whole. (shrink)

In her introduction to this collection, Tymieniecka presents her phenomenology of life - the leitmotif of the three-volume anniversary publication of Analecta Husserliana - as something that stands out from preceding historical attempts to investigate life in an 'integral' or 'scientific' way. After an incubation lasting throughout the 2000 years of Occidental philosophy, this scientific phenomenology/philosophy of life at last uncovers the entire area of the 'inner workings of Nature', exposing the way in which the 'sufficient reason' and the 'ground' (...) of beingness as such crystallise out of the 'onto poietic' process. This onto-poietic process, continuing as it does in the human creative condition, also reveals the authentic genius of the works of the human spirit. This new and original philosophy, free of fallacious simplifications, speculations and reductionism, opens up a basic starting point for all philosophy. Life, 'the theme of our times', at last receives a profound philosophical treatment. (shrink)

As we can see, the side effects caused by the continuous development of science and economy have gradually brought human society into a risk society. While currently, the power of globalization is unceasingly forming a world risk society. German renowned philosopher and sociologist Ulrich Beck has opened a unique and novel researching angle to review science difficulty and abuse of modern world risk society, and has made comprehensive and profound analysis. World risk society has three main characters: First, the emergence (...) of the world risk society is linked to the two fundamental changes still influencing our lives, which is the so-called “end of nature” and “end of tradition”. Second, in world risk society, mankind lose their dependence on “expert system”. The religion is replaced by the concept uncertainty and uncontrollable. In addition, there are other series of problems and abuses between world risk society and traditional society. The prime mover of social changes in world risk society exists in the side effects instead of the instrumental ration in traditional times, etc. The problem in world risk society’s science ethics are as follows: First, expansion of ration. It is mankind’s extreme confidence in ration that causing unlimited development of technology and exploitation of resources. Thus almost everywhere in nature becomes man‐made nature. Second, rupture of knowledge. From “knowledge is virtue and virtue isknowledge” (Socrates) to “knowledge is power” (Bacon), now “knowledge is money” (Bacon). Third, displacement of science value. In traditional society, science research is scientists’ personal interests. Now science research turns its target to meeting social needs, and scientists gain more profits from the technologicalproducts directly. Beck has raised the theory of risk society, and attempted to use “reflexive modernity” as the strategic plan to respond the global consequence of modern science crisis, and expressed revelatory viewpoint on diagnosis of the essential of “reflexive modernity”. Similarly, Lash emphasizes risk culture toremind human to pay attention to the ecological threat and risk. In addition, Bauman and Habermas also have some statements, etc. So my conclusion is, we should consider the autonomy of science development and its inherent relationship with economic interests. In addition, what we concern is the science dual identity of both defendant and expert. Also, the public’s understanding of the uncertainty provides a space for democratization. (shrink)

Wild Ideas is a collection of essays that brings a fresh and refreshing perspective to the wilderness paradoxically at the center of our civilization.

I investigate whether degreed beliefs are able to play the predictive, explanatory, and modeling roles that they are frequently taken to play. The investigation focuses on evidence—both from sources familiar in epistemology as well as recent work in behavioral economics and cognitive psychology—of variability in agents' apparent degrees of belief. Although such variability has been noticed before, there has been little philosophical discussion of its breadth or of the psychological mechanisms underlying it. Once these are appreciated, the inadequacy of degrees (...) of belief becomes clear. I offer a theoretical alternative to degrees of belief, what I call the filter theory. (shrink)

This collection is the final volume of a four book survey of the state of phenomenology fifty years after the death of Edmund Husserl. Its publication represents a landmark in the comprehensive treatment of contemporary phenomenology in all its vastness and richness. The diversity of the issues raised here is dazzling, but the main themes of Husserl's thought are all either explicitly treated, or else they underlie the ingenious approaches found here. Time, historicity, intentionality, eidos, meaning, possibility/reality, and teleology are (...) the main concerns of this collection devoted to studies in aesthetics, metaphysics and literary interpretation, written by such authors as, among others, R. Cobb-Stevens, C. Moreno Marquez, J. Swiecimski, Sitansu Ray and M. Kronegger. These original studies of phenomenological aesthetics and literary theory by scholars from all parts of the world were gathered by the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learn ing during the year 1988/89 during its assessment of the phenomeno logical movement, fifty years after Husserl's death. IX A -T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXVII, ix. (shrink)

Charles James William Pfoundes (1840?1907), a young emigrant from Southeast Ireland, spent most of his adult life in Japan, received a Japanese name ?Omoie Tetzunostzuke?, first embraced and then turned against Theosophy and, from 1893, was ordained in several Japanese Buddhist traditions. Lacking independent means but educated, intellectually curious, entrepreneurial, fluent in Japanese and with a keen interest in Asian culture, Pfoundes subsisted as a cultural intermediary, explaining Japan and Asia to both Japanese and foreign audiences and actively seeking involvement (...) in global expositions and congresses, in Asia and beyond. Drawing on a previously unstudied collection of Pfoundes' personal documents, this paper first outlines Pfoundes' unusual career and then focuses on his engagement, in the last 15 years of his life, in actual or proposed international congresses and expositions in London, Chicago, Japan, Hanoi, St Louis and Oregon. The paper thereby draws attention, through the forgotten figure of Charles Pfoundes, to the distinctive nineteenth century phenomenon of great international expositions and their associated congresses, viewing these complicated events as another kind of crossroads; innovative nodes and material stimuli to the kinds of travel, cultural communication and interaction which, like monastic, trade, political and ethnic networks, helped to exchange and promote modern representations of Buddhism. (shrink)

Using formal systems to represent and reason about uncertainty.

orbit and far beyond it. Indeed, the immense, painstaking, indefatigable and ever-improving effort of Husserl to find ever-deeper and more reliable foundations for the philosophical enterprise (as well as his constant critical re-thinking and perfecting of the approach and so called "method" in order to perform this task and thus cover in this source-excavation an ever more far-reaching groundwork) stands out and maintains itself as an inepuisable reservoir for philosophical reflec tion in which all the above-mentioned work has either its (...) core or its source. In fact, in his undertaking to re-think the entire philosophical enterprise as such and to recreate philosophy upon what he sought to be at least a satisfactorily legitimated basis, Husserl, through his already systematised and "authorized" work, and his courses, and later on in his spontaneous reflection (which did not find its way into a definitive corpus but was nevertheless sufficiently coherent with his previously established body of thought to be considered a continuation of it), uncovers perspectives upon the universe of man and projects their new philosophical thematisation that brings together all the attempts by philosophers (e. g., Merleau-Ponty, who drew upon this material and found there his own inspiration) who succeeded him with foundational intentions; it also gives a core of philosophical ideas and insights for the youngergenerationofphilosophers today. (shrink)

The asymmetry is the view in population ethics that, while we ought to avoid creating additional bad lives, there is no requirement to create additional good ones. The question is how to embed this intuitively compelling view in a more complete normative theory, and in particular one that treats uncertainty in a plausible way. While arguing against existing approaches, I present new and general principles for thinking about welfarist choice under uncertainty. Together, these reduce arbitrary choices to (...) class='Hi'>uncertainty-free ones, regardless of how the latter should be made. I illustrate these principles by developing two theories of the asymmetry, reflecting different views about the non-identity problem. In doing so, I clarify some other major choice-points, presenting new arguments that creating additional good lives can justify (but not require) doing harm. Finally, I consider what the developed theories have to say about the importance of extinction risk and the long-run future. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study investigated the effect of conspiracy ideation, moral disengagement, and intolerance of uncertainty on compliance with the anti-SARS-COV-2 social distancing rules and two other facets of people’s reactions toward the coronavirus crisis. A convenience sample of 245 Romanians completed an online survey in March 2020. Results indicate that conspiracy ideation is associated with lower assessments of virus risk and lower compliance with the confinement measures. Moral disengagement had a parallel effect of undermining personal compliance to the social (...) distancing regulations, highlighting the need to define social distancing as morally relevant and prevent individual justifications for noncompliance. (shrink)