As the primary value system in Chinese culture for almost 2,000 years, Confucianism has profoundly influenced the mindset of Chinese people. Cultural psychology studies have highlighted that individuals with different cultural backgrounds vary in their preferences for certain personality traits, such as self-construal, and their metacognitive characteristics, such as thinking modes. Compared with Western cultures, Chinese culture shows a preference for the interdependent self and holistic thinking. To investigate the relationship between the relational-interdependent self, holistic thinking, and traditional Chinese values, (...) we surveyed 327 Chinese adults using the Confucian Traditional Values Survey, Holistic Thinking Scale, and Relational-Interdependent Self-Construal Scale. The results show that Confucian values positively influence both holistic thinking and the relational-interdependent self, the latter of which partially mediates the positive relationship between Confucian values and holistic thinking. This study deepens the understanding of the psychological features of Chinese culture. (shrink)

In outdoor education discourse the notion of relation is often employed to convey basic connections between humanity and nature as human–nature relationships, yet the sense of relation itself is rarely questioned. Drawing on the work of Peirce and Dewey, I explore the ramifications of a more nuanced understanding of relation, specifically how relation works with and within differing senses of unity. These ramifications have consequences for how we understand human–nature relationships, which I argue are better (...) conveyed in terms of culture–place. The various forms of unity described by Peirce inform more nuanced understandings of culture–place as cultureplace, with implications for the notion of transculturality. My specific concern with outdoor education then enables me to show how cultureplace and culture–place may be considered to have relevance pedagogically, especially in relation to dealing with cultural and environmental crises. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Concepts, Judgments, and Unity in Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the Relational Categories CHARLES NUSSBAUM 1. INTRODUCTION TO ANY ATTENTIVEREADERof the section of the Critique of Pure Reason' known as the "Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories" (A67/B92-A83/B to9), one paragraph in that section stands out particularly by virtue of its special importance for Kant's developing argument: The same function Which gives unity to the various representations in ajudgment (...) also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general.... (CPR A79/B loS) The importance of this paragraph is, however, more than equaled by its difficulties, which center on the question of how the function which operates by means of analytical unity can be the same as one that operates by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general. Put shortly, the problem is this. If the functions are really the same, then how do we distinguish at all between analytic and synthetic operations? But if they are different, then how can these forms of judgment serve as a clue for the discovery of the categories? ' Immanuel Kant, Critiqueof Pure Reason, trans. Norman KempSmith (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1963).Hereafter CPR. [89] 9~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 1990 The results of this dilemma which can be observed in the literature are not surprising: commentators tend to grasp one horn or the other. They either emphasize the difference between analysis and synthesis, and reject or dilute the claims as to sameness of function; or they take seriously Kant's argument concerning sameness of functions, and try to minimize the difference between analysis and synthesis. The major twentieth-century representant of the former approach is Kemp Smith," and of the latter, Paton. 3 This latter approach has found a formidable contemporary champion in the person of Henry Allison. By Allison's own admission,4 however, his position on this controversial topic was suggested (in part) by arguments first put forward over fifty years ago by Klaus Reich in a most remarkable book entitled Die Volls~ndigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel, 5 a book, by the way, also greatly admired by Paton. 6 In the first section of this paper I will try to show that Reich's arguments are rather more subtle than Allison apparently takes them to be, and that Reich is one commentator who attempts to go between the horns of the dilemma described above, and who essays an interpretation of our crucial paragraph that unifies its seemingly divergent tendencies. In the second section of the paper I will introduce some interpretive elements of my own. 2. Let us begin by reacquainting ourselves with Kant's notion of analytical unity, one aspect of this debate which is not particularly controversial and is largely agreed upon by all parties. For Kant, analytical unity is the sort of unity achieved by all general concepts (conceptus communes) insofar as they abstract from all differences that subsist between the objects under them, or the lower concepts subordinated to them. 7 A general concept unifies these objects or concepts by means of a common mark or set of marks. Thus Kant's example at CPR A69/B94 of the unification of bodies under the concepts 'body' and 'divisible' is a perfectly representative instance of unification via analytical unity, as the function upon which such concepts "rest." Let us note that the " Norman KempSmith,A CommentarytoKant's "Cr/t~rueofPureReason"(NewYork:HumanitiesPress, 196~). 3 H.J. Paton, Kant's MetaphysicofExperience, 2 vols.(London:George Allenand Unwin,Ltd., 1936). 4 Henry Allison,Kant's TranscendentalIdealum (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress, 1983), 144 n. 3o. Hereafter KTI. 5 KlausReich,Die Vollst~ndigkeitderKantischenUrteilstafel,3rd. ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986). Hereafter VKU. 6 Paton, Kant's Metaphysic, 1:302. Kant, we should note, does not makethis important logicaldistinctionbetweensubordination... (shrink)

Different interpretations of Bradley’s regress argument are considered. On the basis of textual evidences, it is argued that the most persuasive is the one that sees the argument as primarily addressing the general issue of unity or connectedness.

The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold between the experiences of distinct subjects, considering three major arguments against the possibility of such ‘between-subjects unity’. The first argument, based on the popular idea that unity implies subsumption by a composite experience, can be deflected by allowing for limited forms of ‘experience-sharing’, in which the same (...) token experience belongs to more than one subject. The second argument, based on the phenomenological claim that unified experiences have interdependent phenomenal characters, I show to rest on an equivocation. Finally, the third argument accuses between-subjects unity of being unimaginable, or more broadly a formal possibility corresponding to nothing we can make sense of. I argue that the familiar experience of perceptual co-presentation gives us an adequate phenomenological grasp on what between-subjects unity might be like. (shrink)

relation between, say, a lump of clay and a statue that it makes up, or between a red and white piece of metal and a stop sign, or between a person and her body? Assuming that there is a single relation between members of each of these pairs, is the relation “strict” identity, “contingent” identity or something else?1 Although this question has generated substantial controversy recently,2 I believe that there is philo- sophical gain to be had from (...) thinking through the issues from scratch. Many of the charges and countercharges are based on the following dichotomy: For any x and y that are related as the lump of clay is to the statue that it makes up, either x is identical to y, or x and y are separate entities, independent of each other. By giving up this dichotomy, we will be able to begin to make sense, I hope, of an intermediate unity relation that holds promise for solving a raft of philosophical problems, including the problem of how persons are related to their bodies.3 And if I am correct, then this relation—constitution without identity—is ubiquitous and interesting in its own right, apart from the light that it sheds on human persons. (shrink)

Creative Unity This book is a result of an effort made by us towards making a contribution to the preservation and repair of original classic literature. In an attempt to preserve, improve and recreate the original content, we have worked towards: 1. Type-setting & Reformatting: The complete work has been re-designed via professional layout, formatting and type-setting tools to re-create the same edition with rich typography, graphics, high quality images, and table elements, giving our readers the feel of holding (...) a 'fresh and newly' reprinted and/or revised edition, as opposed to other scanned & printed (Optical Character Recognition - OCR) reproductions. 2. Correction of imperfections: As the work was re-created from the scratch, therefore, it was vetted to rectify certain conventional norms with regard to typographical mistakes, hyphenations, punctuations, blurred images, missing content/pages, and/or other related subject matters, upon our consideration. Every attempt was made to rectify the imperfections related to omitted constructs in the original edition via other references. However, a few of such imperfections which could not be rectified due to intentional\unintentional omission of content in the original edition, were inherited and preserved from the original work to maintain the authenticity and construct, relevant to the work. We believe that this work holds historical, cultural and/or intellectual importance in the literary works community, therefore despite the oddities, we accounted the work for print as a part of our continuing effort towards preservation of literary work and our contribution towards the development of the society as a whole, driven by our beliefs. We are grateful to our readers for putting their faith in us and accepting our imperfections with regard to preservation of the historical content. HAPPY READING! (shrink)

This report highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011: 1. What is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and sensory integration? 2. Are some of the basic units of consciousness multimodal? 3. How should we model the unity of consciousness? 4. Is the mechanism of sensory integration spatio-temporal? 5. How Should We Study Experience, Given Unity Relations?

The question of the unity of consciousness is often treated as the question of how different conscious experiences are related to each other in order to be unified. Many contemporary views on the unity of consciousness are based on this bottom-up approach. In this paper I explore an alternative, top-down approach, according to which (to a first approximation) a subject undergoes one single conscious experience at a time. From this perspective, the problem of unity of consciousness becomes (...) rather the problem of how we can distinguish a multiplicity of goings-on within our conscious experience at any time, given that it is unique. I will present three possible top-down approaches to unity of consciousness, which I call Priority unity monism, Existence unity monism, and Brentanian unity monism. Priority monism and Existence monism are defined in analogy with the homonymous metaphysical theories of object constitution. Brentanian monism retraces Franz Brentano’s view on unity of consciousness, and is defined by appeal to some of his mereological ideas. I will argue that the latter is the best top-down approach to unity of consciousness. (shrink)

I bring together social ontology and social epistemology by consideringsocial entities (``epistemic unities'') that are constituted by the holdingof epistemic relations between their members. In particular, I focus onthe relation of taking someone as an expert. Among the types of structuresexamined are ones with a single expert and one or more non-experts whomay or may not know of each other's situation; and ones with more thanone expert, including cases in which the relation between the experts ishierarchical and cases (...) in which it is symmetrical. These structures modela variety of social situations which can thus be given a unified treatment.Among the cases I discuss are persons, which I argue are multiple-expertunities of persons at times. Taking a person as a social unity like this offersa clear sense in which some groups can also be person-like. (shrink)

Grounding, understood as a primitive posit operative in contexts where metaphysical dependence is at issue, is not able on its own to do any substantive work in characterizing or illuminating metaphysical dependence---or so I argue in 'No Work for a Theory of Grounding' (Inquiry, 2014). Such illumination rather requires appeal to specific metaphysical relations---type or token identity, functional realization, the determinable-determinate relation, the mereological part-whole relation, and so on---of the sort typically at issue in these contexts. In that (...) case, why posit 'big-G' Grounding in addition to the 'small-g' grounding relations already in the metaphysician's toolkit? The best reasons for doing so stem from the Unity argument, according to which the further posit of Grounding is motivated as an apt unifier of the specific relations, and the Priority argument, according to which Grounding is needed in order to fix the direction of priority of the specific relations. I previously considered versions of these arguments, and argued that they did not succeed; in two papers, however, Jonathan Schaffer aims to develop a better version of the Unity argument, and offers certain objections to my reasons for rejecting the Priority argument. Here I consider these new arguments for Grounding. (shrink)

My scholarly approach is to consider and treat the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi as an integral text regardless of whether its composition is the result of many hands. I treat this in much the same fashion as Western biblical scholars study the Western bible for its meaning, whether or not it actually came into being over many years and was the result of the work of multiple authorship. It is my opinion that such an approach is more appropriate to (...) the eminent status of the text of the Zhuangzi in the traditional, Chinese cultural canon, to its philosophical and spiritual value as a testament to the idea of the union of heaven and earth in the Chinese cultural tradition, and to its actual functioning as a working guidebook to the understanding of how to achieve a practical expansion of the spiritual dimension of human experience. In essence, I will demonstrate that a proper academic, textual analysis of this seminal work is crucial to the understanding of how it functions as a document designed to explain, illustrate and point the way to spiritual freedom. What I would like to present is the argument that the attempt to achieve the union of heaven and earth is indeed the main theme of the Zhuangzi. My argument is that the inner chapters are a literary and philosophical model of the cosmic unity of heaven and earth. My method of showing this is to show the developmental nature of the inner chapters. I begin by arguing that the myth of K’un transforming itself into P’eng with which Zhuangzi commences his work prefigures the main theme of the Zhuangzi which is that of spiritual transformation. The unity and integrity of the text is shown by a close examination of the chapters which follow. The chapters form a developmental sequence. As the inner chapters develop, we are treated to a progression of “monster” types from the gentle and honorable form of the crippled military commander through physically crippled Shu to No-lips of triple deformity. Of Shu it is said, how much better if Shu, who is physically crippled, had crippled virtue. Then, as a philosophical development, Zhuangzi presents the madman whose conventional virtue is indeed crippled. Each character dialectically progresses, allowing the mind of the reader to expand with the progression of each monstrous character, until the mind of the reader can achieve the mental freedom that it longs for. Just as the pheasant longs to be free of its cage, so does the mind of the reader long for freedom from its cage of concepts. The mind is gradually prepared by the progressive development of the monster forms until it can break free of its conventional concepts to achieve the unity of heaven and earth. Each monstrous character shows itself in turn to be more physically limited or monstrous or different in kind than the previous example, but nonetheless capable of achieving a transcendental freedom. This is the teaching of the Zhuangzi, that regardless of form and of physical limitation, man can achieve the unity of heaven and earth. The gallery of monsters are metaphorical role models for the reader to learn the lesson that physical limitation does not hinder one from reaching heavenly unity, but the proper understanding of physical limitation is the key to unifying heaven and earth. The physical oddities of Zhuangzi’s messengers work together to function to break down conventional value judgments and enable the reader of the text to receive their message which is the message of the achievement of transcendental freedom. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant famously characterizes space as a unity, understood as an essentially singular whole. He further develops his account of the unity of space in the B-Deduction, where he relates the unity of space to the original synthetic unity of apperception, and draws an infamous distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition. Kant ’s cryptic remarks in this part of the Critique have given rise to two widespread and diametrically opposed readings, which (...) I call the Synthesis and Brute Given Readings. I argue for an entirely new reading, which I call the Part-Whole Reading, in part by considering the development of Kant ’s views on the unity of space from his earliest works up through crucial reflections written during the silent decade. (shrink)

It is common to hold that our conscious experiences at a single moment are often unified. But when consciousness is unified, what are the fundamental facts in virtue of which it is unified? On some accounts of the unity of consciousness, the most fundamental fact that grounds unity is a form of singularity or oneness. These accounts are similar to Newtonian views of space according to which the most fundamental fact that grounds relations of co-spatiality between various points (...) (or regions) of a space is the fact that these points (or regions) are parts of the same single space. In this paper, I sketch and defend an alternative account of unity of consciousness. Very roughly, the view holds that experiences are unified when they are connected in the right way. In this respect, the view is analogous to Leibnizian views of space according to which the oneness of space emerges from certain conditions over spatial relations. The Leibnizian alternative has significant implications for our understanding of the metaphysics of conscious experience, the cognitive architecture of the mind and our assessment of the conditions under which unity of consciousness breaks. (shrink)

While appeals both to nature and to sceptical tendencies are widely acknowledged as determining factors in Hume's thought, there is considerable divergence of opinion regarding the degree of importance that Hume attaches to each notion. In an attempt to resolve this traditional controversy, this dissertation explores the meaning of Hume's philosophy as a whole in the light of its naturalistic and sceptical character. ;Instead of maintaining their opposition, the argument of the dissertation is that these two sides are complementary--with nature (...) both originating and, afterwards, mitigating the scepticism and scepticism in its turn both reinforcing and subsequently mitigating the naturalism in Hume's thinking. Their symbiotic relationship thus appears as the unifying element of the Humean philosophy. ;The first chapter addresses the problem of the unity of the three parts of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's references to nature and scepticism in his treatment of epistemological and moral problems are singled out and discriminated. ;The second chapter is devised as an interval in which the scholarly response to the problem of a unity to Hume's philosophy is examined in detail. What is typical of that response is a tendency to locate the unity in the scepticism or the naturalism of Hume's epistemological or moral conclusions. As a result of the examination of the views of leading scholars of Hume's thought, our findings can be set against a horizon within which his philosophy is traditionally interpreted. Focus then turns to the meaning and significance of scepticism and naturalism for ethics and epistemology in Hume's mature philosophy. The third chapter is devoted to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and the fourth to An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In these chapters the dissertation's definitive view of Hume's solution to the philosophical problems of knowledge and morality is shaped. The thesis is advanced and defended that a dynamic relation obtains between Hume's notion of nature and his scepticism. Finally, in the conclusion this view is weighed against the preliminary findings of the Treatise and contrasted with the leading traditions of scholarly interpretation of Hume's philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

In this paper I do four things. (1) I explain one clear thing that ‘the problem of the unity of the proposition’ might mean. (2) I lay out a few different versions of the theory of propositions as cognitive acts, and explain why this problem arises for the version of that theory which has been defended in different forms by Peter Hanks and Scott Soames. (3) I argue that the natural ways in which the act theorist might try to (...) solve the problem fail to solve it; (4) I propose a way to fix the problem, and then I explain how the problem re-emerges in the act theorist’s treatment of propositional attitude relations. (shrink)

The ancient Greeks subscribed to the thesis of the Unity of Virtue, according to which the possession of one virtue is closely related to the possession of all the others. Yet empirical observation seems to contradict this thesis at every turn. What could the Greeks have been thinking of? The paper offers an interpretation and a tentative defence of a qualified version of the thesis. It argues that, as the Greeks recognized, virtue essentially involves knowledge ? specifically, evaluative knowledge (...) of what matters. Furthermore, such knowledge is essentially holistic. Perfect and complete possession of one virtue thus requires the knowledge that is needed for the possession of every other virtue. The enterprise of trying to reconcile the normative view embodied in this conception of virtue with empirical observation also serves as a case study for the field of moral psychology in which empirical and normative claims are often deeply and confusingly intertwined.1. (shrink)

commentary on Dainton, B. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. London: Routledge. ABSTRACT: Stream of Consciousness is a detailed and insightful analysis of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, especially its unity at a time and continuity over stretches of time. I find Dainton's approach to phenomenal consciousness in many ways sound but I also point out one major source of disgreement between us. Dainton believes that to explain phenomenal unity and continuity, no reference (...) to anything outside experience is required. Thus, he postulates a fundamental experiential relation called co-consciousness which is supposed to do all the explanatory work. On the contrary, I hold that to truly explain features of consciousness such as phenomenal unity and continuity, reference to mechanisms outside the phenomenal realm are necessary. (shrink)

The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. (...) I present my favored solutions to these problems. (shrink)

Some externalists have recently argued that the unity of theoretical and practical reason implies that epistemic justification is factive. It is argued that arguments for the factivity of epistemic justification either (i) equate two actions that are in fact different, or (ii) make the unwarranted assumption that the by-relation transmits justification. The unity of reason does not imply that epistemic justification is factive.

This article addresses the issue of Christian unity in relation to the Pentecostal and charismatic movements. Changing attitudes of Evangelicals and Pentecostals to ecumenism over the past century are noted, with a serious deterioration in the 1960s. Today there is a new situation. These movements have become larger and more influential, especially in the ‘global south’.These movements have contributed to a greater awareness of the Holy Spirit and have challenged the rationalistic reductionism of the Gospel opening the Churches (...) to a more holistic vision.The article closes with a series of challenges to these movements, biblical, pastoral and theological. (shrink)

Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as (...) external and contingent. I argue that an adequate account of unity would require internal or conceptual relations between the aspects of emotion, and I suggest that such an account can be found in Aristotle's metaphysics and theory of emotion, and specifically, in his form and matter distinction. After I show that emotions are intentional pleasures and pains or distresses, I argue that the characteristic intentional pleasure and pain of an emotion, along with its other intentional elements , are the form of the emotion, whereas the bodily feelings are its matter. Form and matter constitute a conceptual unity, which cannot be accounted for in conglomeration accounts that see emotions as mixtures of different parts related only through efficient causation. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Nietzsche’s claim that suffering is closely related to the realization of certain perfectionist values, such as artistic excellence. According to Bernard Reginster, creative achievement consists in overcoming suffering, and therefore, suffering is an essential ingredient of creative achievement. Because suffering forms an essential part of a valuable whole in this way, Reginster argues that we must in turn value suffering ‘for its own sake’. This paper argues that Reginster’s position is open to the following objection: from (...) the fact that suffering is an essential part of a valuable whole, it does not follow that suffering is itself valuable. Rather, by taking advantage of the principle of organic unities, it would have to form an essential part of a valuable whole in a particular way. The author considers two ways the principle might be attributed to Nietzsche’s views on suffering: first, as an ‘enabling condition’, in which suffering allows for a whole that outweighs its disvalue; and second, as ‘a contributor’, in which suffering positively contributes value to the whole. The paper explores how Nietzsche’s ethics turns out to be crucially informed by this conceptual distinction. (shrink)

Plato's "laches" is an investigation into the nature of courage with the intention of demonstrating the difficulty of singling out one virtue, namely courage, and defining it separately from the other cardinal virtues such as bravery, wisdom, justice, temperance, and piety. As the dialogue proceeds it becomes evident that socrates not only relates courage with the battlefield, but also with other spheres of life. Of special interest is his reference of being courageous regarding desires and pleasures where an overlap of (...) virtues is anticipated. This extension of the range of manifestations of courage indicates that his conception of courage transcends the traditional one in which he hints at a new sort of unity of courage and temperance, and on the other of courage and justice. One of plato's main aims in writing this dialogue was to mark out the intellectual limits of the two generals' positions, especially that of nicias, whose philosophical position could appear to be deceptively similar to the socratic one which he did not fully understand. (shrink)

Abstract.In contradistinction to the contemporary human sciences, recent theological accounts of the individual‐in‐relation continue to defend the concept of the singular continuous self. Consequently, theological anthropology and the human sciences seem to offer widely divergent accounts of the sense of self‐fragmentation that many believe pervades the modern world. There has been little constructive interdisciplinary conversation in this area. In this essay I address the damaging implications of this oversight and establish the necessary conditions for future dialogue. I have three (...) primary objectives. First, I show how the notion of personal continuity acquires philosophical theological significance through its close association with the concept of personal particularity. Second, through a discussion of contemporary accounts of self‐multiplicity, I clarify the extent of theological anthropology's disagreement with the human sciences. Third, I draw upon narrative accounts of identity to suggest an alternative means of understanding the experiential continuity of personhood that maintains the tension between self‐plurality, unity, and particularity and thereby reconnects philosophical theological concerns with human‐scientific analyses of the human condition. Narrative approaches to personhood are ideally suited to this purpose, and, I suggest, offer an intriguing solution to understanding and resolving the problem of self‐fragmentation that has caused recent theological anthropology so much consternation. (shrink)

This article investigates a critical yet underexplored structural aspect of consciousness in the context of the practical ethics of neural organoid research: the unity of consciousness. We advocate for the necessity of the unified field, which has garnered substantial support from both philosophical and empirical standpoints, although the debate remains unresolved. We highlight the brainstem as a potential source of the unified conscious field, a structure already under scrutiny in neural organoid research in relation to conditions such as (...) Parkinson’s disease and post-COVID-19 syndromes. We argue that if unity is a necessary feature of consciousness, consciousness is contingent upon a specific biological system without which consciousness cannot arise, thereby narrowing the range of neural organoids of ethical concern. Furthermore, the transplantation of neural organoids into animals has emerged as a practical concern, with ethical implications varying based on the necessity of the unity of consciousness. We argue that transplantation evades a significant ethical dilemma if unity is necessary and if the organoids to be transplanted lack the neural basis for the unified field of consciousness. (shrink)

In this commentary, I critically assess Rex Welshon’s position on the neural substrates of ownership unity. First, I comment on Welshon’s definition of ownership unity and underline some of the problems stemming from his phenomenological analysis. Second, I analyze Welshon’s proposal to establish a mechanistic relation between neural substrates and ownership unity. I show that it is insufficient and defend my own position on how neural mechanisms may give rise to whole subjects of experience, which I (...) call the neuro-integrative account of consciousness. Lastly, I comment on Welshon’s philosophical contribution and claim that it leaves the reader theoretically stranded. (shrink)

While agreeing with me on many issues, Revonsuo rejects my claim that phenomenal states could be co-conscious without being spatially related (in experience). In defence of my claim I described a thought-experiment in which.

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

It is not immediately clear from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus how to connect his idea there of an object with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Toward clarification on this matter, this paper compares Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s versions of the thesis of an atomic fact that it is a complex composition. The claim arrived at is that whilst Russell (at times at least) has one particular of the elements of a fact – the relation – responsible for the unity (...) of the whole, for Wittgenstein the unity of a fact is the product of copulative powers inherent in all its elements. All kinds of constituents of Tractarian facts – all kinds (forms) of object – are, to use Fregean terminology, unsaturated. (shrink)

This paper discusses the problem of the unity of moral good, concerning the kind of unity that moral good or the concept thereof constitutes. In particular, I am concerned with how Wittgenstein’s identification of various complex modes of conceptual unity, and his introduction of a methodology of clarification for dealing with such complex concepts, can help with the problem of unity, as it rises from the moral philosophical tradition. Relating to this I also address the disputed (...) question, whether Wittgenstein regards good as a family-resemblance concept, and make an attempt to characterize family-resemblance concepts generally by way of their similarities and differences from certain other complex modes of conceptual unity. I argue that whilst Wittgenstein does regard good as a family-resemblance concept, in the Philosophical Investigations he seeks to make a more general methodological point. I conclude with a suggestion of how Wittgenstein’s methodological points can help us to put into a broader perspective famous criticisms of the moral philosophical tradition by Michael Stocker and Bernard Williams, and how Wittgenstein's methods more generally can help to address the problem of the unity of good. This illustrates one way in which Wittgensteinian methods can help resolve disputes in moral philosophy, where the main approaches, Aristotelian, Kantian and utilitarian theories, seem to be locked in a stalemate. As I argue, this situation has to do with their assumptions about the unity of moral good. The response isn’t to reject those theories, however, but to re-interpret them in a way consistent with the Wittgensteinian methodology. (shrink)

Understanding the neuroanatomical correlates of individual differences in executive function (EF) is integral to a complete characterization of the neural systems supporting cognition. While studies have investigated EF-neuroanatomy relationships in adults, these studies often include samples with wide variation in age, which may mask relationships between neuroanatomy and EF specific to certain neurodevelopmental time points, and such studies often use unreliable single task measures of EF. Here we address both issues. First, we focused on a specific age at which the (...) majority of neurodevelopmental changes are complete but at which age-related atrophy is not likely ( N = 251; mean age of 28.71 years, SD = 0.57). Second, we assessed EF through multiple tasks, deriving three factors scores guided by the unity/diversity model of EF, which posits a common EF factor that influences all EF tasks, as well as an updating-specific and shifting-specific factor. We found that better common EF was associated with greater volume and surface area of regions in right middle frontal gyrus/frontal pole, right inferior temporal gyrus, as well as fractional anisotropy in portions of the right superior longitudinal fasciculus (rSLF) and the left anterior thalamic radiation. Better updating-specific ability was associated with greater cortical thickness of a cluster in left cuneus/precuneus, and reduced cortical thickness in regions of right superior frontal gyrus and right middle/superior temporal gyrus, but no aspects of white matter diffusion. In contrast, better shifting-specific ability was not associated with gray matter characteristics, but rather was associated with increased mean diffusivity and reduced radial diffusivity throughout much of the brain and reduced axial diffusivity in distinct clusters of the left superior longitudinal fasciculus, the corpus callosum, and the right optic radiation. These results demonstrate that associations between individual differences in EF ability and regional neuroanatomical properties occur not only within classic brain networks thought to support EF, but also in a variety of other regions and white matter tracts. These relationships appear to differ from observations made in emerging adults ( Smolker et al., 2015 ), which might indicate that the brain systems associated with EF continue to experience behaviorally relevant maturational process beyond the early 20s. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate composition models of incarnation, according to which Christ is a compound of qualitatively and numerically different constituents. We focus on three-part models, according to which Christ is composed of a divine mind, a human mind, and a human body. We consider four possible relational structures that the three components could form. We argue that a ’hierarchy of natures’ model, in which the human mind and body are united to each other in the normal way, and (...) in which they are jointly related to the divine mind by the relation of coaction, is the most metaphysically plausible model. Finally, we consider the problem of how Christ can be a single person even when his components may be considered persons. We argue that an Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which identity is a matter of function, offers a plausible solution: Christ’s components may acquire a radically new identity through being parts of the whole, which enables them to be reidentified as p. (shrink)

Although there are some common underlying mechanisms for many nonhuman behavioural asymmetries, the evidence at present is not compelling for commonalities in cerebral organisation across vertebrates. Phylogenetic analysis of detour behaviour in fish suggests that more closely related species are not particularly similar in the direction of turning; contingency and demands of ecological niches may better explain such asymmetries.

This book is about the work of the Holy Spirit in the world, as distinct from the Spirit’s work in the church. One traditional term for this work is ‘common grace’. The book argues that there are four kinds of unity that the Spirit is working to bring about, and it takes one example of each. After the first chapter which is introductory, the second chapter takes up the first kind of unity: unity between us and the (...) material world. The example chosen is our experience of the beautiful and the sublime, and Immanuel Kant’s treatment of how this experience takes us to a divine being who lies behind both our faculties and the beautiful and sublime things we experience. The chapter uses two pieces by Beethoven, including the first movement of his Eroica symphony, as illustrations of the kind of unity that Kant has in mind. The second kind of unity is unity within a human life, and the third chapter discusses the example of gender transition within the life of a person assigned female at birth. The third kind of unity is unity between human beings, and the fourth chapter discusses the example of love of our country (patriotism) and its relation to the ideal of cosmopolitanism. The fourth kind of unity is unity of human beings with God, and the fifth chapter discusses the unity we can achieve in contemplation. Finally, the sixth chapter discusses the nature of unity itself and its relation to the Spirit’s love. (shrink)

Grounding, understood as a primitive posit operative in contexts where metaphysical dependence is at issue, is not able on its own to do any substantive work in characterizing or illuminating metaphysical dependence---or so I argue in 'No Work for a Theory of Grounding' (Inquiry, 2014). Such illumination rather requires appeal to specific metaphysical relations---type or token identity, functional realization, the determinable-determinate relation, the mereological part-whole relation, and so on---of the sort typically at issue in these contexts. In that (...) case, why posit 'big-G' Grounding in addition to the 'small-g' grounding relations already in the metaphysician's toolkit? The best reasons for doing so stem from the Unity argument, according to which the further posit of Grounding is motivated as an apt unifier of the specific relations, and the Priority argument, according to which Grounding is needed in order to fix the direction of priority of the specific relations. I previously considered versions of these arguments, and argued that they did not succeed; in two papers, however, Jonathan Schaffer aims to develop a better version of the Unity argument, and offers certain objections to my reasons for rejecting the Priority argument. Here I consider these new arguments for Grounding. (shrink)

Much recent attention has been paid to Kant’s account of the unity of space in the Critique of Pure Reason, not least because of the significant implications of that view for other key critical-period doctrines. But far less attention has been paid to the development of Kant’s account of the unity of space. This paper aims to offer a systematic account of Kant’s pre-critical account of the unity of space. On the view presented herein, Kant’s early account (...) of the unity of space is deeply rooted in his pre-critical cosmological views. In particular, I argue that Kant sees the unity of space as grounded in the cosmological unity of the world of substances, which is itself rooted in the divine conservation of all substances in relations of mutual causal dependence. I contend that the seeds of this view are present in the late 1740s and 1750s, but that this view receives its fullest and most complete expression in the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. The final section of the paper considers the fate of Kant’s pre-critical account of the unity of space. I contend that the theory is excluded from the Critique of Pure Reason in light of the strict epistemological strictures adopted in that text. But considerable textual evidence shows that Kant continues to aver the theory throughout the 1770s and 1780s in the looser epistemic context of his lectures. I contend, then, that this theory is not abandoned at all. Rather, like Kant’s 1763 proof of the existence of God, it is epistemically demoted: it is Kant’s preferred view, but one that falls short of the demanding epistemic standards of the critical philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse how Ernst Cassirer’s approach of a phenomenology of knowledge deals with the general question of disunity in science and society. By elaborating on the concept of functional unity, which presupposes difference, Cassirer’s work helps to revise foundational concepts of modern science and society, such as pluralism and truth. Relating Cassirer’s approach to the current interest in political epistemology, we show the implications of Cassirer’s theory of knowledge and analyses of modern science, particularly physics. In (...) these analyses, Cassirer carves out the relational logic of scientific knowledge and its consequences on epistemological and ethico-political levels. While this logic of relations relativises absolute claims on either level, it entails its distinct normative criteria as elements of the scientific ideal. Cassirer’s project defends this ideal and thus can simultaneously defend plurality _in_ science (including the humanities) in terms of methods, perspectives and aims, and preserve the unity _of_ science as a normative ideal and symbolic form in constant interaction with other forms. Thus, Cassirer’s pluralism must be distinguished from mere historicist or relativist conceptions. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel view of unity in neuroscience. I set out by discussing problems with the classical account of unity-by-reduction, due to Oppenheim and Putnam. That view relies on a strong notion of levels, which has substantial problems. A more recent alternative, the mechanistic “mosaic” view due to Craver, does not have such problems. But I argue that the mosaic ideal of unity is too minimal, and we should, if possible, aspire for more. Relying on (...) a number of recent works in theoretical neuroscience—network motifs, canonical neural computations and design-principles—I then present my alternative: a “flat” view of unity, i.e. one that is not based on levels. Instead, it treats unity as attained via the identification of recurrent explanatory patterns, under which a range of neuroscientific phenomena are subsumed. I develop this view by recourse to a causal conception of explanation, and distinguish it from Kitcher’s view of explanatory unification and related ideas. Such a view of unity is suitably ambitious, I suggest, and has empirical plausibility. It is fit to serve as an appropriate working hypothesis for 21st century neuroscience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SUBSTANTIAL UNITY OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES ACCORDING TO JOHN POINSOT JOHN D. KRONEN The University of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota EVERY SUBSTANCE metaphysician must answer several difficult questions peculiar to his or her ontology. In this paper I will examine John Poinsot's answer to two of these questions, one concerning the nature of the form of substantial composites, and one concerning which material objects are substantial composites. (...) I shall argue that Poinsot's answers to these questions show the untenability of a structuralist view of substantial form and of a reductive materialist view of living beings. But before considering these questions I must briefly outline Poinsot's view of what the general nature of substance is, as explained in his treatise on material logic.1 Poinsot's Account of Substance in General In the section of his Material Logic concerned with the categories Poinsot gives a succinct account of the nature of substance 1 Cursus Philosophicus thomisticus; vol. I, Ars logicae prima et secunda pars, ed. P. Beato Reiser (Turin, Italy: Marietti, 1820), Q. XV, pp. 523-527. It should be noted that I am not concerned in this paper with describing either the psychological origin of the notion of substance, or of justifying it against phenomenalism. My only aim is to show how such a view of substance leads to a certain notion of form when it is applied, so to speak, to material objects. For an interesting account of the origin of the concept of substance in Poinsot see John Deely, Tractatus De Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot (Los Angeles, Berkeley, and London: The University of California Press, 1985), p. 86, n. 16. Deely takes it that Poinsot has a deeper categorial scheme than that of Aristotle from which the latter's scheme "emerges," as it were. In this article, then, I am not concerned with that deeper scheme which Deely refers to in this interesting note. 599 600 JOHN D. KRONEN in general and of its relation to the supposit and to the act of existing. He notes that by " substance " narrowly considered is meant that kind of essence to "which it is due to exist in itself as opposed to that kind to which it is due to exist in another" (i.e., an accident).2 He defends this as the primary " definition " 3 of substance against the other definition of it which is " that which stands under accidents," on the grounds that a thing must exist in itself, at least ontologically speaking, before it can support accidents 4 and that to define substance as that which supports accidents is to define it in relation to other things, not itself. This point is important because many modern and contemporary philosophers who have attacked the notion of substance have done so by arguing that there are no beings which stand under accidents. For Poinsot this attack, even if successful, would show that there are no accidents, not that there are no substances. Poinsot insists that " substance " connotes a quiddity to which to exist in itself is due since actual existence does not belong to the essence of any created thing.5 Further, Poinsot insists that to exist in itself " connotes more than a mere negation of existing in another; rather it connotes a positive perfection." This is because to exist in a dependent way is to exist in an imperfect way, so to exist independently must be to exist in a more perfect way.6 Finally, Poinsot distinguishes between the substance and the supposit. The substance is the complete nature of the thing, while 2 Ibid., p. 523. a " Substance " as a supreme genus cannot strictly be defined since it cannot be differentiated from any higher genus. 4 Haec autem proprietas existendi per se intelligitur vel secundum considerationem absolutam et in ordine ad se, et sic dicitur subsistens, quasi non indignes alio ut sustentetur, sed in se sistens; vel dicitur secundum habitudinem ad alia, quatenus ilia sustentat in esse, et sic dicitur non solum subsistens, sed etiam substans. Ibid., p. 523. 5 ••• esse actu per se vel in alio non est ipsa quidditas substantiae vel accidentis, quia esse seu existere in nulla quidditate creata... (shrink)

Since G. E. Moore introduced his concept of organic unity there has been some discussion of how one should best understand this notion and whether there actually are any organic unities in the Moorean sense. Such discussions do however often put general questions about part-whole relations to the side and tend to focus on interpreting our intuitive responses to possible cases of organic unity. In this paper the focus lies on the part-whole relation in valuable wholes and (...) it is suggested that we should distinguish between two kinds of wholes, collections and complex unities, where the latter can involve values that do not pass on their value to the greater whole in which they are included. Given this distinction we are then able to distinguish between two kinds of organic unity phenomena, the first involving a form of goodness that emerges on the level of the whole, the second involving a form of goodness that is embedded on the level of parts. In order to properly understand the latter form of goodness, there is also a need to distinguish final value from inherent value. (shrink)