El desarrollo de la tecnociencia en los últimos decenios ha sido vertiginoso y los problemas y dilemas bioéticos que plantea a la humanidad son incontables. Sin embargo, el pensamiento bioético está recién comenzando a analizar la trascendencia de los adelantos científico-técnicos; particularmente en relación a problemáticas de frontera, tales como: las tecnologías de fertilización asistida, las investigaciones con células madre, el mantenimiento de la vida con técnicas artificiales, entre otras. Temas cardinales como la humanización de la medicina, el derecho a (...) la salud, la influencia nociva de la comercialización y la medicalización excesiva no forman parte hegemónica del discurso bioético. Es preocupante que la formación de los profesionales de salud mayoritariamente ignora la importancia de la bioética secular fundamentada en los derechos humanos, que debiera ser el eje de la capacitación para prestar atención de salud. Éste artículo se focalizará en la genómica, una rama de la tecnociencia de gran predicamento actual. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability is widely used in bioethics, particularly in research ethics and public health ethics. The traditional approach construes vulnerability as inherent in individuals or the groups to which they belong and views vulnerability as requiring special protections. Florencia Luna and other bioethicists continue to challenge traditional ways of conceptualizing and applying the term. Luna began proposing a layered approach to this concept and recently extended this proposal to offer two new concepts to analyze the concept of vulnerability, (...) namely understanding external conditions that trigger vulnerability and layers of vulnerability with cascading effects. Luna's conception of vulnerability is useful, which we demonstrate by applying her layered view and the new analyses in multiple contexts. We begin by outlining Luna's view and we use vignettes from healthcare involving transgender patients, the care of patients in psychiatric contexts, and research involving prisoners to illustrate how each part of Luna's concept elucidates important moral issues. (shrink)

Experimental research in moral psychology can be used to generate debunking arguments in ethics. Specifically, research can indicate that we draw a moral distinction on the basis of a morally irrelevant difference. We develop this naturalistic approach by examining a recent debate between Joshua Greene and Selim Berker. We argue that Greene's research, if accurate, undermines attempts to reconcile opposing judgments about trolley cases, but that his attempt to debunk deontology fails. We then draw some general lessons about the possibility (...) of empirical debunking arguments in ethics. (shrink)

Sometimes Strauss argues as if he thought it possible to understand man without raising questions about his relations to other things, and hence about his place in the whole. But when they are viewed in their broader context, such arguments are seen not to be his final word. Man's humanity cannot be understood in its own terms alone. The human soul differs from everything else in that it is "... open to the whole and therefore more akin to the whole (...) than anything else is." In ordinary usage, "whole" implies completeness and autonomy. But the openness of the soul--i.e., of a part--to the whole can only mean that the whole is open to itself. The whole is, then, not, in the ordinary sense of the term, whole. Nor is the soul which is "open" to it. Stripped of myths, "... the human soul is... more akin to the whole than anything else is" because neither of them is whole. The same conclusion follows when one tries to understand the definition of the philosopher as the man animated by quest for knowledge of the whole. Qua philosopher he knows neither that there is a whole, nor what it might be if there were one. To define the philosopher as the man who knows that he does not know only paraphrases the difficulty. It does not solve it. For "know" is here used equivocally. The same equivocation is at play in the comment "... one cannot know that one does not know without knowing what one does not know". Admittedly "knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance." The philosopher believes and perhaps divines more than he actually knows. All men do. The essential difference between the philosopher and other men may well consist in the fact that the philosopher distinguishes more conscientiously than do others between what he knows and what he believes, and that he strives more single-mindedly than do they to transform as large a share of his beliefs as possible into knowledge. He may conceivably at some point be said to have reached the stage where his aspirations have become reasoned expectations. But that is as far as he can possibly go as long as he remains a philosopher and has not become a wise man or a god. Until and unless the philosopher knows, in the strong sense of the term, he can no more decide whether his aspirations could be fulfilled than he can swim before getting wet. (shrink)

Monica A. Coleman achieves remarkable rigor in bringing together in one volume her long-standing interests in process philosophy and theology, womanist theology and ethics, African diaspora studies, West African religions, and African American women’s literature. Making a way out of No Way (2008) is a tour de force in contemporary African American constructive theology and especially in womanist discourse on the religious experience(s) of African American women. Coleman insists on understanding black women’s religious experience through the lens of their complex (...) subjectivity, which is irreducible to singularity or totality. As typically found in academic womanist theology, Coleman does not begin her theology with .. (shrink)

Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative. In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many (...) cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts. (shrink)

resumed version of a Philosophycal Anthropology, a PhD Thesis.

The beginning of the 21st century witnesses a trend for business and leisure travelers to make accommodation decisions by referring to online reviews of hotel accommodation services and the hotel management’s responses to such reviews. The responses, termed review response genre in this study, have since attracted considerable research attention. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it aims to identify the moves present in the review response genre; second, it aims to explore how the hotel management attempts to (...) achieve service recovery with the moves of the genre. A total of three obligatory moves are identified: Acknowledging Problem, Expressing Feeling and Thanking Reviewer. The findings will have significant implications for the hospitality and wider service industry practitioners responsible for handling negative online reviews. (shrink)

Resumo:É pretendido, neste pequeno texto, mostrar como Leibniz se insere de modo bem peculiar na tradicional discussão filosófica acerca da liberdade do agente num mundo governado pelo princípio de razão suficiente. A questão posta por Arnauld, em carta de 13 de março de 1686, além de forçar Leibniz a dar esclarecimentos sobre a solução que adotou, também é importante por carregar certos resquícios do modo pelo qual Aristóteles abordou este tema. Também deve ser notado que, apesar da ruptura que a (...) solução leibniziana faz com a tradição aristotélica, vários outros pontos da filosofia de Aristóteles são aceitos para a construção e resolução do problema. (shrink)

The word “Hermeneutics” has an exotic aura that may seem uncharacteristic of Locke. It was not one that he employed, nor is it commonly used by his contemporary interpreters, which are reasons enough to require an explanation of its prominence in the title and in the discussion that follows. “Locke’s theory and practice of interpretation” may seem a plainer and more suitable choice of words to characterize the subject of this study, although it is a less convenient alternative, employing several (...) words to express what could be said well enough by one. However, my choice of “hermeneutics” has been prompted by other considerations than the mere economy of words. It is to be preferred, because of its rich associations, which, I believe, direct interpreters to themes in Locke’s philosophy that otherwise might go unnoticed. And this should lead to the discovery of a more fulsome and deeper, although perhaps more problematic wisdom, than is commonly supposed to be found in his writings, and perhaps also to a sense of greater, although here also more problematic, unity among them. The meaning of the word and its cognates afford us a more informative philosophical prospect than the more limited Early Modern, by harking back to Antiquity and pointing forward to Kant and beyond, facilitating the discovery in Locke’s writings of resonances with past tradition and anticipations of philosophical problems and solutions with which it is commonly supposed he had little to do. The aim of this exercise is not to fit Locke into new surroundings, but to consider him anew, hermeneutically, which necessitates that attention be paid to internal contexts of Locke’s several writings, and the “thread and coherence” of his various discourses. A comparison of these internal contexts should make it possible to decide whether there may not be a mode of thinking common to them all that, once identified and clarified, may serve as a trace or connector that unites them into a single expression of thought. (shrink)

This paper explores the thinking of some Salamancan theologians regarding the notion of pure nature. In particular, I address Suárez’s thinking on this subject and locate it within the context of the debate over whether human beings have a desire for the beatific vision. Insofar as a number of Thomists and Suárez think that there is no natural desire for a supernatural end, human beings are, by nature, left only with a desire for natural beatitude. The theoretical possibility of a (...) human nature created without any order to a supernatural end and also falling outside the economy of grace becomes a subject of speculation that serves to illuminate something about created nature itself. (shrink)

The writings of John Paul II are rich in meanings and analogies that enrich our understanding of human person and God. According to the tradition, what is specific to human person is reason, which means the ability to assume responsibility. Nevertheless, such responsibility is paradoxical, because it is only realized in relationship with events that depend on circumstances - which are manifested especially in relationships with others, specifically through love. Now, it is properly the paradox of such personal responsibility that (...) can give an analogical understanding of the mystery of God, one and triune. (shrink)

Germán Cano Gedisa Barcelona, 2023 149 páginas ISBN: 978-8419406002.

In this book the main emphasis is twofold: on autonomous machine intelligence, and on mind uploading. This chapter shows that, while science fiction (SF) has depicted the extreme embrace of the “prosthetic impulse,” most notoriously in Star Trek's“Borg,” this is used as a warning of the potential Faustian consequences of such tendencies. The Star Trek franchise has also highlighted the converse, the Pinocchio syndrome, a reverse prosthetic impulse, most notably in the android Commander Data. Data is a sentient android and (...) a full member of the Enterprise starship crew in Star Trek: The Next Generation. The inverse of the Pinocchio syndrome, the prosthetic impulse, is arguably exemplified by Star Trek's Borg, who constitute a relentless inhuman tide that threatens to overwhelm every species violently, assimilating all individual beings into the Borg collective, stifling their lan vital and incorporating them as part of a hive mind, with an inexorable “insect mentality”. (shrink)

This book explores three worlds shared by the humans in their collective experiences. It identifies and explores the world of commonsense, the world of religion, and the world of science as three essential dimensions of human experience. The book helps understand that humans can gain comfort and pleasure in commonsense, achieve meaning and purpose from religion, and attain truth and rationality through science. It actively applies theories to and develops theoretical explanations from different domains or situations of human existence. This (...) book is of interest to theorists, researchers, instructors, and students across major academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

There is now an established literature on the link between later Wittgenstein and enactivist approaches in cognitive science. However, is this link not just a matter for card carrying Wittgensteinians? Can enactivists not manage perfectly well without Wittgenstein? In this paper, I show why some enactivists should care about Wittgenstein. Focusing on the enactivist view, “Sensorimotor Identity”. I argue that proponents of this view can use Wittgensteinian considerations to resolve an issue confronting their view and thereby shore up their proposed (...) dissolution of the explanatory gap. Some enactivists thus have in fact much to gain by engaging with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of our (...) pre-theoretical conceptions, I propose, instead, a strategy to circumvent this rather unexpected result: to reject subject-specific de se contents in favour of subject-specific ways of thinking that do not enter into the content of one's attitudes. (shrink)

O presente artigo é uma discussão sobre a noção heideggeriana de Überwindung. Seu objetivo é duplo: por um lado, [1] mostrar a perspectiva que tal termo deve ser compreendido; por outro, [2] aprofundar esta perspectiva à luz de comentários ao aforismo I do texto Überwindung der Metaphysik. Para tanto, duas questões são postas: em que perspectiva e que questões estão implícitas quando Heidegger propõe o projeto da Überwindung der Metaphysik?; e por que uma Überwindung contém em si tantos problemas? De (...) modo a discutir e comentar tais questões, o artigo percorre dois caminhos: [1] faz-se uma análise da própria indicação heideggeriana da perspectiva de compreensão da Überwindung der Metaphysik, qual seja, revisitar, a partir de um olhar determinado, a construção da noção de história do ser. Esta, por sua vez, tem sua gênese antes mesmo da própria Kehre. Mais especificadamente, na reinterpretação que o próprio Heidegger faz de seu texto Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. A partir desta reconsideração feita por Heidegger e inserida em seu próprio texto, é possível detectar quatro teses fulcrais que traçam essencialmente a metafísica e que justificam a sua superação. São elas: [a] o fato de o ser, originariamente, se velar e provocar, historialmente, o seu esquecimento; [b] a relação entre a verdade do ser e a história, que se desenvolve como história do ser; [c] a ideia de que pertence ao ser um caráter originário de retração de si mesmo e que essa retração é um destino que pertence à história do pensamento metafísico e se configura na própria essência da metafísica; [d] afirmar que a certeza da manifestação da essência coincide com o seu fim. [2] Adentra-se, mediante uma aproximação pari passu, no aforismo I do texto Überwindung der Metaphysik, com intuito de comentar a problematicidade do termo Überwindung quando usado para repensar a metafísica à luz da perspectiva da história do ser. (shrink)