In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Estelle R. Jorgensen, “Four Philosophical Models of the Relationship Between Theory and Practice”W. Ann StokesEstelle Jorgensen has written a most interesting paper contrasting four different concepts of the relationship between theory and practice, and pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of each. Each approach introduces insights that the others have missed, but is not sufficient in itself to explain all the relationships between theory and practice. In (...) response to the concept of "dichotomy," I am also sympathetic to the attempt to distinguish practice and theory because it identifies two important constituents of experience, and it provides a fruitful way of investigating the relationship between the two concepts. However, I believe that a concept of dichotomy may put the two categoriees in too distant a relationship with each other. This distance may prevent us from recognizing the "interconnections and cross-fertilizations" that are often possible between them.The idea of "polarity" opens up the possibility of focusing on the ground [End Page 102] between the two concepts. It also provides a framework for allowing "practice to bubble up into theory," and "theory to bubble up into practice." Given that a theory may bring about a range of different practices and that practices may be based upon a range of differing theories, one needs to be able to move easily between the two worlds. Imagination, intuition, and rational thinking all contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the two concepts. In this situation of polarity one should not expect to find "a theory perfectly translated into a particular practice, or a practice drawing entirely and fully on one particular theory."I am also sympathetic to the view that "theory without practice is mentalism," and that "practice without theory is activism or instrumentalism bare of guiding principles," but like Jorgensen I find the concept of fusion the least helpful of the four concepts. Given the fact that very rarely (if ever) is theory perfectly exemplified in practice, or practice based solely upon one specific theory, the concept of fusion in many instances is too absolute. I am open to the suggestion that moral principles as well as aesthetic ones should guide the practice of music education despite the difficulties that a multiplicity of perspectives opens up. I also agree that democratic ideals can offer us one way of guiding the decisions made in the classroom and can offer a rallying point for persons coming from different ethnic, religious, political, and cultural backgrounds.The dialectical approach opens up a way to negotiate among differences of opinion and beliefs that influence practice. It assumes that there is no one perfect perspective on the relationship between theory and practice. The dialectical approach provides (1)a framework to investigate the theories and practices of which practitioners are aware, (2)opportunities to examine how practitioners adjudicate them, and (3)explanations of how and why they decide to act "in their particular lived situations." In contrast to the ontological approach, I like Jorgensen's epistemological approach to the investigation of theory and practice. It offers another perspective in addition to the influence that ontological theories can have in guiding music education practice.My view of the ideal relationship between theory and practice is one that acknowledges the differences between the two concepts, but allows for a variety of relationships between the two. It is one that recognizes that theory should influence practice and that practice should influence theory in an ongoing and continuous reciprocal exchange. It entails being sensitive to a variety of theories and particular practices, and being skilled at being able to pick which particular theory or theories best explains the practice observed.In addition to the concepts of dichotomy, polarity, fusion, and dialectic, another possible concept of the relationship between theory and practice might be based upon Michael Lewis, Margaret Sullivan, and Linda Michalson's view [End Page 103] of the "cognitive-emotional fugue."1 This perspective has the advantage of being very flexible. The authors describe emotion and cognition as being neither separate nor independent processes. "Rather both are elements of a continuous, inseparable stream of behavior like the parts of a fugue in which the theme is often lost... (shrink)

Originally published during the early part of the twentieth century, the Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature were designed to provide concise introductions to a broad range of topics. They were written by experts for the general reader and combined a comprehensive approach to knowledge with an emphasis on accessibility. The Moral Life by W. R. Sorley was first published in 1911 and reissued as this third edition in 1920. The volume presents an account of the nature of goodness in (...) humanity, taking the perspective that morality is a spirit manifested in life rather than a body of rules. (shrink)

The most recent edition of these books is that of R. M. Ogilvie , which should be read in conjunction with his Commentary on these books . The other modern edition to which I have referred is that of W. Weissenborn and H. J. Müller = W.-M.

A severe critique of contemporary society as one in which there remains no significant class or group capable of radically opposing things as they are. Marcuse works on the assumption that advanced industrial society is indeed sick, much as some recent sociologists have depicted it to be. He sees evidence of alienation in political and cultural life, in the technical jargon of the bureaucracy, in the technological cult of "operationalism," and especially in contemporary analytic philosophy, which he sees as the (...) triumph of "one-dimensional thought." His conclusion is not optimistic: at this juncture in history, he believes, the only possible task for "critical philosophy" is to be negative.--W. L. M. (shrink)

A selection of the writings of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of logic and mathematics written in the years 1937-1944. There is no concern with the foundations of mathematics in the sense of metamathematics nor in the sense of investigation of the possibility of providing secure axiomatic foundations for such notions as that of "set." Indeed, the original motives for these latter investigations are rejected; instead, a clarification of the grammar of mathematical propositions is sought. The author discusses the notions of (...) mathematical proof at length and attacks both the Russellian view that mathematics is an appendage of logic and Hilbert's program of proof-theory.--W. T. (shrink)

An attempt to show the possibility of penetrating into the ultimate nature of things through the development of what the author calls "buddhi" or "philosophical" reason. Overcoming the limitations of "logical" or "scientific" reason as exemplified in classical physics, philosophical reason reconciles the dualism between knower and known and reveals the unity of the "within" and "without" of nature. This insight into ultimate reality occurs in a state of "dreamless sleep." The world of the "not-self" or of objects is disclosed (...) by philosophical reason to be in its essence spiritual. The external world is a configuration of the unified self.—L. W. (shrink)

The forty-three selections in this volume, three-fourths of which are from twentieth century authors, come from every corner of the philosophical world. They are grouped in five divisions, corresponding to those in the companion volume by the same author, Religion and Judgment, each of which has a brief introduction and selected bibliography attached. The whole is constructed on the principles by which the author distinguishes philosophy of religion from religious philosophy, namely that religion can be treated generically in relation to (...) other human concerns and modes of existence, and that it can be treated non-theologically, i.e. independently of the assumption that belief in a god or gods is the essential feature of religion.—M. W. (shrink)

This book's fourteen short essays are neither very technical nor definitive, as Schaff warns in his forward. They do, however, reveal the struggle of a sincere philosopher, who happens also to be a high official of the Polish Communist Party, against the absolutes that plague him—absolute determinism, total party discipline, the definitive revolution. Schaff here continues his debate with the existentialists, notably Sartre, and contributes some clarification to the problem of "Marxist ethics."—W. L. M.

A distinguished New Testament scholar turns his pen to the history of Israel. The result is a lucid and compact narrative, geared to the layman and student rather than the scholar. As the title suggests, the emphasis is on political rather than religious history. Much of this book's value will stem from its intentionally lopsided emphasis on the post-exilic period.--M. W.

The 1963 Aquinas Lecture will serve to link Weiss's recent The World of Art and Nine Basic Arts with his forthcoming treatment of religion. It also stands on its own merits as a fascinating examination of the relations between these two irreducibly "basic enterprises." Weiss begins by listing seven possible relations between religion and art: in terms of mutual independence, or the dominance, completion or qualification of one by the other. His most thorough examination, in the light of each of (...) the basic arts, is reserved for the final relation, art religiously qualified, "religious art." In this form God is faced not directly, but rather as qualifying Existence. Memorable short excursuses include discussions of the various ways of adjusting to Existence and of the special character of religious language. In the final paragraph, Weiss says that other basic enterprises should be intersected by art and religion to yield new areas of activity.--W. L. M. (shrink)

These posthumously published lectures are designed to sponsor a new root metaphor for reflection on Christian ethics. The familiar models of teleological ethics and deontological ethics are not abandoned, but a new one is added to meet their inadequacies. It is man-the-answerer, homo dialogicus, and in terms of the symbol the notion of a responsible self is delineated. That the new model lends itself more readily to phenomenology than to casuistry is wholly within the author's intention. A lengthy, but useful, (...) introduction by James Gustafson places these lectures in the broader context of Niebuhr's thought.--M. W. (shrink)

Based on the 1963 Storrs Lectures at Yale, these four related essays are an attempt to clarify Fuller's conception of a procedural, non-substantive natural law, which requires that such characteristics as generality, promulgation, non-contradiction, etc., be present in any genuine legal system. These requirements, he indicates, can never all be perfectly met, and hence the "inner morality of law" must remain largely a morality of "aspiration" rather than of "duty." The third essay, entitled "The Concept of Law," is rather disappointing (...) as an answer to possible criticisms and as a half-hearted attack on the book of the same title by Fuller's opponent, Hart; only Fuller's fundamental point, namely, that positivism neglects the notion of purpose in law, comes through very forcefully. In his final chapter, Fuller concludes, tentatively, that promoting communication would probably be the highest goal of any more substantive natural law conception; here, he is weakest of all. Nevertheless, his fine style, his excellent use of cases and other examples, and his sensitivity to crucial issues outweigh the book's inadequacies.—W. L. M. (shrink)

This selection of readings in ethics is divided into five parts: Classical and Medieval Intellectualist Thought; Dialectical Thought; American Naturalistic Thought; Analytic-Positivist Thought; Existentialist and Post-Existentialist Thought. An anthology such as this one is needed to balance the limited selections offered in the area of morality contained in the anthologies dealing with philosophy in general. For example Part II contains selections from Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, and Engels. And Part III features James, Dewey, Edel, Hook, Romanell, and Dennes. It would (...) not be possible to include the majority of these authors' writings on ethics in an anthology dealing with philosophy generally. This anthology could best be used in introductory courses in ethics. Some of the introductions given to each of the five parts are good and the rest are adequate. At the end of each reading there are questions designed to guide the reading and discussion. This could have been omitted without any loss to the anthology. At the conclusion of each part there is a limited list of recommended readings. For the beginning student of ethical theory Approaches To Morality offers a quick but fairly inclusive view of the various ways in which some individuals have approached the philosophical problems inherent in a study of morality.--W. P. G. (shrink)

This anthology is heavy on poetry and letters, light in the other categories. There are some anomolies: Seneca's philosophy is represented by a piece of little historical interest, Cicero is alloted only five letters, Ovid is correspondingly slighted in poetry. Here also, as in the volume above, the editor's contribution is slight. No translations are acknowledged.—W. G. E.

In this lecture to the British Academy, Strawson points to inter-personal, "reactive attitudes" such as those of resentment, gratitude and forgiveness, as the key to getting around the usual arguments between "optimists" and "pessimists" concerning the alleged moral consequences of the thesis of determinism. These calculative arguments, he thinks, over-intellectualize the facts; the moral sentiments are given along with human society, and are not to be externally justified.--W. L. M.

Shestov's name appears from time to time in existentialist literature. Camus, for example, refers approvingly to Shestov in The Myth of Sisyphus: "Shestov... tracks down, illuminates, and magnifies the human revolt against the irremediable." Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy was translated earlier into French and into Danish in 1947, and German in 1949. The Danes received Shestov's book with great appreciation, and were particularly happy about his attempt to relate Kierkegaard to such diverse thinkers as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Hegel, Spinoza, (...) Luther, and others. And that is what Shestov's work on Kierkegaard is fundamentally all about, an attempt to place Kierkegaard in the history of philosophical and theological thought. Shestov is appreciative of Kierkegaard as the great champion of the revelational character of the Christian faith. Revelation stands over against reason, and the truths of one cannot be reconciled with the truths of the other. Shestov attempts to set in opposition the proponents of a rationalistic philosophy, Socrates, Spinoza, Hegel, and Kant, and the advocates of Biblical faith, Job, Abraham, Paul, Luther, and Kierkegaard, arguing that a reconciliation is impossible. One must choose to live the life of "the knight of faith," rather than attempt to find answers to, or reasons for, life's ambiguities. The author employs a methodological device much in vogue among Kierkegaard scholars in the 30s and 40s, i.e., he employs Kierkegaard's own life and experiences as a model to analyze and clarify theological conundrums. Kierkegaard's unhappiness is related to the human problem of suffering, just as Kierkegaard attempts at knowledge fail because he had forgotten the Biblical truth that "all that is not faith is sin." Finally, man must reject Spinoza's injunction "Do not laugh, do not weep, do not condemn, but understand." Not understanding, but faith. Kierkegaard's own life reveals an alternation between those polar opposites.--W. A. J. (shrink)

Watt takes a somewhat fast and sketchy look at an extremely complex period of history, religion and philosophy from an equally complex viewpoint. He is interested in the place and role of the various kinds of intellectuals in classic Islamic religion and society and their own conceptions of that religious society and their place in it. The central figure is Al-Ghazali who personally embodies the tensions which beset the first six centuries of Islam, and whose attitudes and solutions most characteristically (...) reflect the broad consensus within historic Islam toward those tensions. Watt's book can be of profit as an encapsulation of six centuries of highly complex movements and sub-movements in the personality, career and ideas of one highly complex and brilliant intellectual figure.--W. G. E. (shrink)

Writing in French, the author points to Arnold Geulincx to explain the historical shift in the concepts of philosophic method and first principles. Geulincx' Methodus made use of the synthetic or expositive method, which Descartes had regarded as inferior to his own analytic one, but which he had employed, upon request, in Reply to Objections II. Spinoza, presumably inspired by Geulincx' example, was later to claim demonstrativeness for the mos geometricus.--W. L. M.

The title of this book is an unusually honest assessment of its contents. The initial conjunction accurately depicts an external relationship between the domains discussed, and the subtitle clearly predicts the level of exposition. The title does not promise, and the author does not give, an independent account of any real relationship between psychology and religion. What we are given is a fairly exhaustive, if sketchy and reportorial, exposition of a variety of psychological views of a variety of religious phenomena. (...) The honesty and directness of the title mirrors the honesty and directness of the exposition. Need we also point out that the obviousness of the title also mirrors the obviousness of the exposition?—W. G. E. (shrink)

Time's man at Vatican Council II has produced an informed and intriguing account of the men, trends and events before and during the first session of Vatican Council II. The book is not as detailed as Xavier Rynne's Letters from the Vatican, and is certainly more argumentative. But the things being argued for are well worth study. Kaiser does bring out some details not found in Rynne's book, notably the undercurrent of problems related to anti-semitism. Unfortunately, Kaiser does not share (...) the tolerance and charity of either Pope John or Rynne toward the person and motives of his conservative antagonists. The book is somewhat repetitive and structurally confused.--W. G. E. (shrink)

To state the central argument of this book would be to miss a great deal of the author's achievement. Munz is concerned with tracing the metaphysical foundations of ethics and furthermore the nature and roots of these, and all, metaphysical conceptions. He does all of this in a resolutely original and tough-minded way, exploring alternatives in the fullest possible manner, arguing with great resourcefulness and force. His originality can be seen in his serious and thorough oppositions to classical and contemporary (...) positions. He never scores off straw men, but takes the trouble to develop opposing positions fully so that his argument will strike at the most fundamental and stringent point. Thus, his thesis, that the basic ethical stances of absolute commitment to others and absolute detachment from others, are dialectically interdependent, is honestly and articulately supported. He is to be credited with developing concepts, arguments, and positions which derive their considerable force on their own merits, while encountering a full range of opposition. He has produced a book with which one can disagree, which may puzzle and even seem peculiar, but which must nonetheless be sincerely admired.—W. G. E. (shrink)

This is a collection of early essays. It ought to be read with The Future of Man before any of his other works, particularly before trying to stumble through such terms as the 'Noosphere,' 'forced coalescence,' 'Migh-Synthesis'. Teilhard does not argue in syllogistic form, which may be scandalous to Scholastics. But then he does not argue at all. He seems to assume that he is writing to a select group of cognoscenti, who know as much about science and philosophy as (...) he. He does not take issue with his contemporaries --nor with the great thinkers of the past. One senses something of his intellectual isolation, and one is awed all the more by Teilhard's accomplishments. There are some problems with Teilhard's use of familiar scientific terms, especially as they are presented to a non-scientific reader. Teilhard supports the mentality of the modern believing Christian. He argues that "at extreme degrees of physico-chemical complexity, attaining the order of a million atoms, particles become 'animate'. At the level of the viruses we meet an ill-defined function which separates living from non-living beings." It is that kind of world-view that is consonant with both modern theology and modern science, at least in a Christian context.--W. A. J. (shrink)

This book is made up of three rather superficial essays by Russell, hardly more than tapes of lectures given years and years ago. It's a pity that Russell, or someone, sanctions such bowdlerizing of what was once philosophical profundity. Russell is at his acerbic worst in these essays, shallow and intolerant.--W. A. J.

The eleven papers comprising this book were read at two Bergson Centennial celebrations in 1959--at Hollins College and in Paris. From Pelikan's discussion of Bergson's place in theology to Merleau-Ponty's account of his view of history, the contributions lay bare many more enigmas in Bergson's relation to subsequent thought than they solve. Starkie's paper on the literary merits and impact of the work of Bergson makes such a compelling case for its kinship to Symbolism and Proust that one is tempted (...) to accept the thesis that the Bergsonian Heritage is most alive in those who are not philosophers. Contains a bibliography of books and articles by and on Bergson.--W. H. C. (shrink)

The so-called "early Marx" comes in for sympathetic treatment from an Australian philosopher. Kamenka argues that Marx never lost his ethical vision of human dignity in future society, though "alienation" and related concepts are no longer relied upon in Das Kapital. Midway through the study an ethical position, based on the view that goods produce harmonious systems whereas evils cannot, is outlined and defended. Kamenka maintains that his "positive," non-normative ethic can be made compatible with a Marx purged of his (...) eschatology and of some Hegelian trappings. The concluding stigmatization of Soviet Marxist ethics as being "normative" is perhaps the weakest part of an uneven work. --W. L. M. (shrink)

This is one of those obviously worked-over doctoral dissertations. There is one chapter which reviews all previous studies dealing with Schweitzer, with copious footnotes in many languages. In spite of Clark's underlying attitude of adulation of the Master, his analysis of Schweitzer's thought is rather helpful. He places Schweitzer in the main stream of nineteenth-century German romantic thought and examines the impact that that thought had upon the theologians of the period. But he believes that Schweitzer is foremost an ethical (...) thinker, not a theologian, and that the true sources of his thought are in the ethicists of the nineteenth-century and not the theologians. Clark insists that Schweitzer's thought is characterized by two major emphases, one that ethics must be founded on rational thought, the second that human selfhood is fundamentally good. Clark finds the origins for these two notions in Kant's Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysics of Morals. Schweitzer's relationship to such diverse thinkers as Darwin, Schopenhauer, Spencer, and Nietzsche is also traced. The term "world-affirmation" emerges in Schweitzer's thought as a fundamental ethical category: it implies "ethical self-devotion to one's fellow-creatures." Hence, it is rather easy to make the jump from one's fellow-creatures, conceived solely as human fellow-creatures, to a "reverence for life" of all creatures, human and animal. Schweitzer owes a great deal to the social gospel movement of the latter half of the nineteenth-century. He believed in the "coming Era of Peace" and he spoke of the Kingdom of God as a possibility within history. "Sooner or later," he writes, "there must dawn the true and final Renaissance which will bring peace to the world." The result of Clark's work is that Schweitzer remains the enigmatic, other-worldly patrician Renaissance-man, but we now have at least a hint as to the sources of his unique and complicated philosophy of civilization. Clark mentions in passing that Goethe may be the major influence on Schweitzer's thought.--W. A. J. (shrink)

Three very urbane men talk to us about literature and criticism and how these are and are not related to Christianity. Connolly very adroitly sets out the problems and obstacles facing the very possibility of a Christian theory of literature, and as adroitly gets around and through them to argue for the necessity of some such all-encompassing Christian theory. D'Arcy and Ulanov have to get down to the more particular work of showing forth the details of "Literature as Christian Comedy," (...) and "The Rhetoric of Christian Comedy." Before them all looms the advice of the new critic, that the poem is its own end; the elaborate moves required to say otherwise and still be respectably academic are a sheer delight for the logically minded reader.--W. G. E. (shrink)

An original attempt at phenomenological description from a subjective starting-point, which Desan calls the totum genus humanum--i.e., the human race as a whole, surviving through time. From this standpoint, the "truth" of any individual's judgment or even philosophical system is seen to be "angular," or fragmentary. The planetary man is the exceptional person who attempts to coordinate various angular truths to arrive at the generic truth; but in the end his coordination, too, falls short of any Absolute Truth. The implications (...) of this position for language, a new logic, and the concept of God are explored. Some of the angular truths that the book offers and their mode of presentation are novel.--W. L. M. (shrink)

An interpretative introduction to the major themes of classic American philosophy and five of its major figures: Peirce, James, Royce, Dewey and Whitehead. Smith shows sympathy and insight into these men and their ideas, making an excellent choice of basic themes for discussion. Running throughout the book is a sustained argument for a renewal of the breadth of philosophic interest and the sound empirical basis displayed by Pragmatism at its best. Smith is concerned that this "Spirit of American Philosophy" be (...) rescued from the neglect it has suffered over the past decades and be recalled to the attention of the philosophic community. His book is an admirable step in that direction.--W. G. E. (shrink)

The author of this little but suggestive volume believes that the "Death of God" theologians answer questions no one is asking. And for that reason he rejects in toto the kind of theology advocated by this strange breed of Christian "apologist". But MacGregor believes that theologizing about the "absence of God" is salutary for the intellectual concerns of the modern Christian. He finds references to the notion of the "hiddenness of God" in all of the reformers and especially in those (...) theologians of this century who identified their position with that of the reformers: Barth, Bonhoeffer, Tillich and others. MacGregor wants to show the methodological similarities between the notion of the deus absconditus and the emotional and intellectual inability to find God as part of the human experience. And it is an evident truth that modern man hardly gives any credence to the traditional claims that Christians make about the nearness of God hovering over His creatures like a mother-hen. MacGregor argues that the sense of the absence of God in the contemporary mood is a positive sense of absence. It is not mere indifference, but a malaise, a God-forsakenness. And the God-forsakenness is a means by which the individual faces the world courageously. There is tragedy in this attitude, even wistfulness for the beliefs of the enchanted years, but the whole thing thrusts one out to face the world as a man. MacGregor's book is one of the most stimulating pieces of popular theology to appear in a long time. The author is precise and lucid, and profoundly philosophical, but he has the marvelous gift of couching his theologizing in language and categories that can be comprehended.--W. A. J. (shrink)

Das »Richtige und das Gute« (1930), das ethische Hauptwerk W. D. Ross’, enthält eine Vielzahl wichtiger moralphilosophischer Thesen und Argumente, die bis in die Gegenwart kontrovers diskutiert werden. Im Mittelpunkt steht seine pluralistische Deontologie, der zufolge sich die richtige Handlung aus einer Abwägung der in der jeweiligen Situation relevanten und unableitbaren Prima-facie-Pflichten ergibt, von denen nur ein Teil auf die Optimierung der Handlungsfolgen bezogen ist. Diese Deontologie wurde zu einem modernen Klassiker unter den normativen ethischen Theorien. Darüber hinaus stellt Ross’ (...) These, dass moralische Intuitionen eine Quelle selbstevidenten Wissens sein können, einen wichtigen Referenzpunkt in Debatten um den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus dar. Auch für die Handlungstheorie liefert Ross einflussreiche Argumente, wenn er die Ansicht vertritt, dass Pflichten nie ein bestimmtes Motiv des Handelnden zum Gegenstand haben können. Eine zentrale Stellung nimmt für Ross die Güterlehre ein, in welcher er von vier Grundgütern, Tugend, Wissen, Lust und Gerechtigkeit, ausgeht. Wurde Ross in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts im damaligen Großbritannien als ein herausragender Ethiker – einer der bedeutendsten des Jahrhunderts, auf Augenhöhe mit G.E. Moore – angesehen, wandelte sich das Meinungsbild in den folgenden Jahrzehnten unter dem Einfluss besonders des Logischen Positivismus und der Philosophie Wittgensteins. In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist jedoch wieder ein wachsendes Interesse an Ross’ Ethik festzustellen. Dabei wird »Das Richtige und das Gute« bisweilen sogar mit der »Nikomachischen Ethik«, Kants »Grundlegung« und Humes »Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral« verglichen. (shrink)

In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

The paper „F. W. Bessel and Russian science by K. K. Lavrinovich published in NTM-Schriftenreihe contains several errors coming mainly from re-translations of German names and texts from Russian into German. The correct spelling of names and original texts are given here. Beside this, some additional information from sources not mentioned by the author is presented, and the kind of relationship between Bessel and W. Struve is discussed on the basis of their correspondence.

The following is the transcript of a lecture taken in shorthand by Hans-Georg Backhaus. The transcript was originally published as an appendix in Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur marxschen Ökonomiekritik, a complete translation of which is forthcoming in the Historical Materialism book series.