In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Vagaries and Vicissitudes of WarRichard W Sams III remember standing in the kitchen of our home on Camp Pendleton—a United States Marine Corps base in Southern California—listening to National Public Radio (NPR) and doing dishes in the fall of 2002. President Bush announced to the world that he was considering a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq on the pretext of Saddam Hussein harboring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Three (...) months later, as a Navy Family Physician, I deployed with a surgical company in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Reflecting on the situation with a like-minded close friend, I was not sure— would this be a just war? A necessary war? In my mind, it did not rise to the level of conscientious objection, yet the rightness of invading another country with all the anticipated death and destruction was not clear.En route to Kuwait, we laid over in Spain. While fixed to a TV in a holding area, I watched the Secretary of State make a case to the United Nations (UN) and the world that removing Hussein from power would protect us from mobile anthrax labs that could kill tens of thousands. I thought to myself, Either he is absolutely right, and we are protecting our country and the rest of the free world, or he is terribly mistaken and we are embarking on a disaster.As we trained, prepared, and waited in our tents to invade, we listened to the news on “Voice of America” with a hand crank radio. Thousands of citizens from nations around the world protested. Pope John Paul II, a man well acquainted with the tragedy of war, even spoke out about the planned invasion. “War is not inevitable. It is always a defeat for humanity.” He admonished our leaders that war needed to be the very last option. As a man of faith, I was troubled by his resolute, thoughtful opposition to the crusade I was embarking on. As the day of the invasion approached, scud missiles flew over our camp and we scurried into bunkers, day and night, with our gas masks donned to protect us from possible WMD attacks. In March, with the announcement of a “shock and awe” missile attack on Hussein’s palace, the invasion commenced.Within a day of flying by helicopter into enemy territory to set up a surgical company, the fog of war set in. A series of mass casualties streamed in from nearby Nasiriya. We received dozens of injured enemy combatants and American soldiers. Most troubling were the civilians. An entire extended family fleeing for their lives stumbled into an Iraqi minefield meant for us: a mother dead, the men with shrapnel wounds, and an aunt lost both of her legs. Then there was the little boy. By doctrine, our leaders reassured us we would not care for children. Yet, out of instinct, the field corpsmen scooped up all injured, including children, and [End Page 170] brought them to us. The five-year-old’s legs were blown to bits. We had no pediatric supplies. The anesthesiologist heroically intubated the child’s tiny airway with a urinary catheter and placed an adult IV. The surgeons corrected the wounds the best they could. Hours later, in futility, we performed chest compressions on his tiny mangled body.A day later, the worst sandstorm in a decade struck the area. We struggled to keep the patient-filled tents erect. A Marine appeared on the scene out of the darkness (you could not see beyond your nose in the storm) exclaiming we were going to condition one—lock and load our weapons due to an imminent threat. As healthcare professionals, Geneva Conventions dictated we were to use weapons only in self-defense. We chambered our 9-millimeter pistols to defend our patients and ourselves while Marines formed a defensive perimeter. I thought to myself, Great I’m gonna be shot up and die during a freaking sandstorm in Iraq. Hours later, we were told to stand down. The threat was not from approaching enemy combatants but from shepherds running from the crossfire. I had a small nervous breakdown, sleep deprived and under duress... (shrink)

I might as well say at the outset that, although I can return Christensen’s compliment, and call his response “thoughtful,” I am most interested in those places where the fullness of his thought, and particularly of his own language, has paralyzed his thought in compulsively repetitious patterns, and led him into interpretive maneuvers that he would surely be skeptical about in the reading of a literary text. Even more interesting is the way Christensen’s antipathy to the film, and the violence (...) of the language in which eh expresses the antipathy, has prevented him from registering the plainest sensory and perceptual elements of the film text. In a rather straightforward and literal sense, Christensen has neither seen nor heard Do the Right Thing, but has screened a fantasy film of his own projection. To say Christensen has projected a fantasy, however, is not to say that his response is eccentric or merely private. On the contrary, it is a shared and shareable response, a reflex in the public imaginary of American culture at the present time. As such, it deserves patient and detailed examination. W. J. T. Mithcell, editor of Critical Inquiry, is Gaylord Donnelly Distinguished Service Professor of English and art at the University of Chicago. His most recent book is Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. (shrink)

Einleitung, von A. Ruge.--Die prinzipien der logik, von W. Windelband.--Prinzipien der logik, von J. Royce.--Die prinzipien der logik, von L. Couturat.--Die aufgabe der logik, von B. Croce.--Die probleme der logik, von F. Enriques.--Die umgestaltung der bewusstseinsbegriffes in der modernen erkenntnistheorie und ihre bedeutung für die logik, von N. Losskij.

This book centers around a new translation of Aristotle’s small treatise, On Memory. It is preceded by three essays by Sorabji and is followed by a section of notes. The treatise treats of the distinction between memory and recollection and what each is. Memory is "the having of an image regarded as a copy of that which it is an image" and it belongs to "the primary perception part [of the soul] and that with which we perceive time." Here the (...) key ideas, finely modulated, are image as in itself and as copy, and time perception. Recollection is distinct from memory; it is the natural or habitual succession of given image: starting from one image and moving to something similar, opposite or neighboring, until the required image is present. Recollecting is "a sort of search" requiring deliberation and peculiar to men, whereas remembering is common to many higher animals. An interesting point regarding the act of remembering is, besides the succession of images, the attendant perception of proportioned time-lapses, so much so, that "when exercising his memory a person cannot think he is not doing so and fail to notice that he is doing so." The section of notes contains many illuminative remarks on the translator’s choice of words for all the major phrases as well as helpful explanations of the structure and meaning of the textual arguments. The three essays by Sorabji, on memory, mnemonic techniques and recollection, are critical accounts of Aristotle’s doctrine, taking into account the teachings of thinkers ranging from Plato and Berkeley to the Australian materialists and William James. Here Sorabji is most helpful in demonstrating the importance and relationship of the doctrines of On Memory to the larger Aristotelian teaching on thinking and on dialectical reasoning. The essay on recollection centers around Aristotle’s relationship to Plato on the same topic and on the systematic problem of association of ideas. All in all, Aristotle on Memory is an excellent little book, illuminating the larger context and satisfying in itself.—W. A. F. (shrink)

A selection of the writings of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of logic and mathematics written in the years 1937-1944. There is no concern with the foundations of mathematics in the sense of metamathematics nor in the sense of investigation of the possibility of providing secure axiomatic foundations for such notions as that of "set." Indeed, the original motives for these latter investigations are rejected; instead, a clarification of the grammar of mathematical propositions is sought. The author discusses the notions of (...) mathematical proof at length and attacks both the Russellian view that mathematics is an appendage of logic and Hilbert's program of proof-theory.--W. T. (shrink)

Das »Richtige und das Gute« (1930), das ethische Hauptwerk W. D. Ross’, enthält eine Vielzahl wichtiger moralphilosophischer Thesen und Argumente, die bis in die Gegenwart kontrovers diskutiert werden. Im Mittelpunkt steht seine pluralistische Deontologie, der zufolge sich die richtige Handlung aus einer Abwägung der in der jeweiligen Situation relevanten und unableitbaren Prima-facie-Pflichten ergibt, von denen nur ein Teil auf die Optimierung der Handlungsfolgen bezogen ist. Diese Deontologie wurde zu einem modernen Klassiker unter den normativen ethischen Theorien. Darüber hinaus stellt Ross’ (...) These, dass moralische Intuitionen eine Quelle selbstevidenten Wissens sein können, einen wichtigen Referenzpunkt in Debatten um den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus dar. Auch für die Handlungstheorie liefert Ross einflussreiche Argumente, wenn er die Ansicht vertritt, dass Pflichten nie ein bestimmtes Motiv des Handelnden zum Gegenstand haben können. Eine zentrale Stellung nimmt für Ross die Güterlehre ein, in welcher er von vier Grundgütern, Tugend, Wissen, Lust und Gerechtigkeit, ausgeht. Wurde Ross in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts im damaligen Großbritannien als ein herausragender Ethiker – einer der bedeutendsten des Jahrhunderts, auf Augenhöhe mit G.E. Moore – angesehen, wandelte sich das Meinungsbild in den folgenden Jahrzehnten unter dem Einfluss besonders des Logischen Positivismus und der Philosophie Wittgensteins. In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist jedoch wieder ein wachsendes Interesse an Ross’ Ethik festzustellen. Dabei wird »Das Richtige und das Gute« bisweilen sogar mit der »Nikomachischen Ethik«, Kants »Grundlegung« und Humes »Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral« verglichen. (shrink)

To give concrete meaning to the phrase "Art for Life's Sake," Jenkins assumes that "the general purpose that animates all of man's activities and artifacts is adaptation to the environment and satisfaction of the conditions of life." A phenomenological survey of human experience reveals three basic modes of viewing or adapting to the world--the affective, the cognitive, and the aesthetic. Each is intertwined with the others, and all three are necessary if man is to adapt to his environment; but as (...) one or another mode dominates experience, attention is focused on the self, the relatedness of entities, and the particular entities themselves. The view of art that emerges is a reformulation of the imitation theory; skillfully and systematically applied to the persistent facts of aesthetic life, it offers solid, common-sense illumination of traditionally obscure problems.--D. W. S. (shrink)

Beardsley's aim is "to see whether the problems [of aesthetics] cannot be formulated better than they usually are." Though he relies heavily upon the techniques of logical analysis in this study he does not make analysis the substance of inquiry, but utilizes it to render manageable the problems involved in evaluating art. Each chapter is followed by extensive "Notes and Queries" liberally sprinkled with references to books and articles bearing on the problems discussed. --D. W. S.

In fascicles 9 through 12 of this volume, Weiss continues his analyses of art and begins to develop themes for his discussion of history and religion. There are also significant and lengthy sections devoted to metaphilosophy with critiques of Kant, Hegel, and Wittgenstein. The discussion of the arts reaches a degree of insight and breadth of synthesis not matched in the earlier fascicles, nor in The World of Art and The Nine Basic Arts. For here Weiss achieves a systematic relation (...) between fundamental concepts of Modes of Being and those of his aesthetic theory that is both less strained and schematic and more fruitful than any found elsewhere. The discussions of history are less happy, too quickly generalized and formalized in cosmic terms. The sections on religion are, however, excellent. Predominantly Christian themes are discussed at length. Weiss's metaphysics seems naturally sympathetic in their analysis. The metaphilosophy provides a valuable insight into Weiss's working habits and reveals what is, paradoxically, both a major strength and weakness-his appreciation of the formal and schematic demands of systematic thought. This appreciation can lead to productive analysis and insight, but also beyond experience and understanding. It is to Weiss's credit that these working journals show the dangerous side of his philosophic technique far more often than his regular, published work does. Now that we have the entire first volume of these journals, a few words must be said about their value as published works. They are, first, a useful, two-way bridge joining Weiss's formal, metaphysical works and his more descriptive, phenomenological works, such as The World of Art, Nine Basic Arts, History: Written and Lived, The God We Seek, etc.). Such a bridge is not absolutely necessary for one reasonably familiar with the whole of Weiss's published work, but it is helpful, especially to one beginning a study of Weiss with the more speculative formal writings. As independent works, the journals frequently provide valuable insights, suggest previously unsuspected avenues of analysis and inquiry, and demonstrate a level of argument and mode of explanation all too often ignored by contemporary philosophers. They should be read as what they are, journals, much as one would read Pepys' Diary. The Index is a thorough, accurate, and necessary tool for reference.—W. G. E. (shrink)

This work is intended to be a "philosophical analysis" of certain problems encountered by the social sciences. The aim of the book is to "help redirect modern social science from some important theoretical mistakes." According to Kaplan most of our knowledge rests on common sense. It is the mark of common sense knowledge that it is not self-conscious, that it does not engage in a critique of its own possibility. The realm of the philosophy of history, of social science, and (...) of science is opened up through the attempt at "self-consciousness concerning the limits of the various processes by which knowledge is obtained." Kaplan accepts the proposition that the "framework within which knowledge occurs can never be included in knowledge itself," that the framework within which knowledge is acquired cannot be transcended. It might appear from his acceptance of this proposition that Kaplan would accept radical historicism. This is not the case. It is a primary intention of Kaplan to suggest that we can state the standpoint from which perspectival knowing exists, what it depends upon, and what it leaves out of account. Kaplan sees a measure of transcendence being achieved through the comprehension of different perspectives. However, he explicitly rejects the possibility of a true consciousness which would be the result of a single correct perspective on the world. The book has several major flaws. The greatest is the absence of sustained argument. The author fails to give evidence for the major propositions of the book. Usually a footnote to previous writings of his is offered as substitute for argument. Another major flaw of the book stems from Kaplan's understanding of what is characteristically human in the terms of systems analysis. To one not convinced in advance of the adequacy of this language to the task of understanding man, Kaplan's work will appear to suffer from an ill-conceived use of technical jargon.--J. W. S. (shrink)

A book whose primary concern is to show the possibility of making objective value judgments within a context that acknowledges the inescapable historicity of the human situation. Mr. Stern discusses problems such as the nature of historical reality, the difference between past and present history, the questionable presuppositions of a teleological philosophy of history, and the confrontation in modernity between a doctrine of natural right and that of historicism. While accepting a kind of relativism consequent upon an historicist position, the (...) author finds a locus for objective moral evaluation in the universality of the human project. That men of all times are born, live, suffer, die, and welcome that which conduces to human well-being, enables us to condemn civilizations that have thwarted the human endeavor to conserve life. Although the means at the disposal of men to carry out the human project differ in different historical periods, what remains unalterable, according to Mr. Stern, is that at all times men praise what conduces to health and relieves suffering. While the author gives many cogent arguments in favor of his position, the "ontological status" of the universal human project remains, in the last analysis, problematic. To overcome historicism in the way that Mr. Stern sets out to do requires a more rigorous theory of knowledge and being than he offers us.—L. W. W. (shrink)

Finally—a full length treatment of the Phenomenology of Mind in English. Its strengths and weaknesses stem from its not being a commentary. The author has set himself to the task of "capturing without its letter the spirit of the humanism pervading the Phenomenology." Avoiding the letter involves 1) the attempt to get free from Hegel's terminology, 2) the attempt to see the argument at the level of chapters rather than paragraphs or sentences, and 3) the complete abstraction from historical questions, (...) i.e., from questions about Hegel's life and times relevant to understanding the text. While the first two attempts are ably carried out and extremely instructive, the reader is often left with the frustrating need for the historical treatment of a commentary. The assumption "that the heart of Hegel's thought is to be found more in the method than in the results achieved by it..." is dubious, but it fortunately remains for the most part in the preface. The use of dialogue form in a quasi-commentary is as refreshing as it is unusual. The price of the book is unfortunate.—M. W. (shrink)

Religion in the generic sense is presented as an irreducible mode of human judgment. By emphasizing the generic character of religion Arnett sets himself against the "sectarians," those who would claim unique worth for a particular tradition. By arguing for the irreducible nature of religious judgment he opposes himself to the "secularists," those who would reduce religion to some other mode of judgment, or to a non-cognitive status. The strongest chapters are the third and fourth, which deal with the relation (...) of religion to morality and art, respectively. While vigorous arguments are presented against those who tend to identify religion with one or the other, e.g., Dewey and Santayana, the problems are not oversimplified, and careful attention is given to the affinities as well as the discontinuities involved. The discussion of religion and truth deals more with the generic value of religious judgment than with the question of the truth of particular religious judgments.—M. W. (shrink)

A leading British historian brings considerable philosophical insight to bear in criticizing the cult of facts, treatments of great men in isolation from their societies, and the view that historians should make moral judgments upon their subjects. His esteem for Collingwood and other idealists is tempered by a warning against their excessive subjectivism. Carr upholds the reality of historical causation, and the belief in some progress.--W. L. M.

Sir David Ross, now nearing his eightieth birthday has published another of his valuable critical texts, provided, like its predecessors, with a commentary. He has made full use of the contributions of Drossaert Lulofs, Forster and Nuyens, at the same time judging them with an independent mind and adding views and arguments of his own. This book greatly facilitates the study of these physiological-psychological treatises which form so indispensable a supplement to the De Anima. --R. W.

This is a marvelous book. Although billed as a Dogmatics, it is really a rambling and magnanimous presentation of the Christian faith-theology as well as practice. It is guided by the attempt to be systematic and comprehensive. It is filled with wonderful human insights into the nature of the Christian posture in a wayward world. It is part philosophical theology, part a theology of culture, and part practical theology. But it is more than all of its parts. What we have (...) is Hartt's mature ruminations on a vast number of subjects germane to Christian thinking. Hartt is a Barthian with humor, a neo-Reformation theologian with pizazz, a Methodist who has drunk deeply of American culture. Hartt divides his book into three parts: The Vocation of the Church as a Critic of Culture; The Dogmatic Content of Practical Theology; and Applications. The first part is an attempt to work the church into the role of a cultural interrogator, conscious on the one hand of its historic roots in that theological tradition known as the Christian faith, and on the other of its iconoclastic role, relativizing all absolutistic pretensions that civilization may attain, and in general, lose itself in the world, but not to the world. It is in this section that Hartt gives credence to the title of his book, A Christian Critique of American Culture. Part II emphasizes the "preachability" of the Gospel. Part III demonstrates what Hartt means by the applicability of the Gospel, its critique of art, politics, and mass culture. A chapter on "The Holy Spirit and 'Revolution'" concludes the work. There are no footnotes, no bibliography and no index. But none is needed. In the end what the reader has is Hartt and not a conglomeration and distillation of the thoughts of the theological luminaries of our day. Hartt's writing is the best among living theologians--and that fact alone ought to make anyone who is interested in great theologizing buy this book.--W. A. J. (shrink)

These essays were originally presented at the first of an annual series of seminars in the humanities at John Hopkins. To avoid imposing an artificial unity on the subject, the contributors were deliberately left unguided in their choice of subject and method. The result of this policy is a rich and stimulating collection ranging from gardens to musicology. Reproductions of paintings and copious printings of musical scores show that no expense was spared to make the book as useful as possible. (...) Of greatest interest to philosophers are George Boas's witty demolition of "the age of reason" as a description for the period, J. A. Passmore on "the malleability of man," Isaiah Berlin's long reconsideration of Herder, Alfred Cobban on "the Enlightenment and the French Revolution," and Henry Guerlac on Newton's place in intellectual history.—W. B. K. (shrink)

Lakoff is writing the history of an idea, and he writes very professionally. He begins by identifying three basic approaches to the concept, which he later equates with liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. A chapter on pre-Reformation thought deals too briefly with Plato and Aristotle, and too insensitively with the Medievals. Thereafter, the development proceeds smoothly to the expected conclusion that each approach might well benefit from the others. Lakoff's exegeses and criticisms are satisfactorily subtle, though his basic classification schema is (...) not.—W. L. M. (shrink)

Elaborates a system of logic designed to provide an adequate framework for the extreme empiricist principles of Logical Positivism--a task which, the author argues, klassische Logistik is incapable of fulfilling. Interesting features of this system include its lack of type distinctions and its departure from the usual theory of propositional functions and quantifiers--there is, in particular, no negation, and no analogue either of material implication or of universal quantification, though, in certain cases, the effect of the universal quantification of an (...) implication can be obtained.--W. T. (shrink)

This little volume, by the Director of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at the University of California is a splendid work. Lynn White, who considers himself a Christian and a humanist, has written an important book linking together cultural changes in the modern world with those events in earlier periods which precipitated the changes. His major thesis is that the alienation of the humanist from technology is unfortunate, and that a rapprochement between the two is possible if one (...) reads history accurately. Technology developed, White argues, in the fertile cultural and intellectual soul of the Christian middle ages. It was the Christian view of reality that allowed man to take nature seriously and to permit him to think in terms of measuring and analyzing it. The Christian saw the world as a manifestation of the working of the mind of God, and his science was an attempt to decipher God's thought by exploring the nature of his handiwork. The technological innovations of the Middle Ages were possible because of the Christian's conviction that God had given man power and dominion over all creation: "The men who worshiped the Virgin also developed water wheels to perform all kinds of tasks that previously had been done by hand." To medieval man, the machine came from God. What White seems to be saying is that the Christian view of reality is one which produces a full-blown humanism, one in which man is free to develop his natural capacities, in a world which has been created by God for man to enjoy and in which man can best fulfill himself as a human. "Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia's religions, not only established a dualism of man and nature but insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends."--W. A. J. (shrink)

For Hartnack, British philosophers of ordinary language have changed our conception of philosophy. This movement has one significant contemporary rival, however, in logical positivism, which has had little impact in Britian. He proceeds to discuss four "typical" philosophical problems, the external world, knowledge, the mind, and ethics. The decreasing length of the last two discussions corresponds to their decreasing value. This book is intended primarily for tyros in philosophy; it is not bad for that purpose, though the style is occasionally (...) simplistic, and the proof-reading sub-standard.--W. L. M. (shrink)

This is an introductory reader containing a generous, carefully edited selection from most of the philosophically important works of Marx, Engels, and, to a lesser extent, Lenin. There are seven somewhat arbitrarily divided sections, each preceded by a brief introduction, and two appendices. Selections from the 1844 Manuscripts and other early writings have been relegated to the first appendix, while the second contains excerpts from Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks. The philosophy is emphasized at the expense of the economic theory.--W. L. M.

This is one of those obviously worked-over doctoral dissertations. There is one chapter which reviews all previous studies dealing with Schweitzer, with copious footnotes in many languages. In spite of Clark's underlying attitude of adulation of the Master, his analysis of Schweitzer's thought is rather helpful. He places Schweitzer in the main stream of nineteenth-century German romantic thought and examines the impact that that thought had upon the theologians of the period. But he believes that Schweitzer is foremost an ethical (...) thinker, not a theologian, and that the true sources of his thought are in the ethicists of the nineteenth-century and not the theologians. Clark insists that Schweitzer's thought is characterized by two major emphases, one that ethics must be founded on rational thought, the second that human selfhood is fundamentally good. Clark finds the origins for these two notions in Kant's Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysics of Morals. Schweitzer's relationship to such diverse thinkers as Darwin, Schopenhauer, Spencer, and Nietzsche is also traced. The term "world-affirmation" emerges in Schweitzer's thought as a fundamental ethical category: it implies "ethical self-devotion to one's fellow-creatures." Hence, it is rather easy to make the jump from one's fellow-creatures, conceived solely as human fellow-creatures, to a "reverence for life" of all creatures, human and animal. Schweitzer owes a great deal to the social gospel movement of the latter half of the nineteenth-century. He believed in the "coming Era of Peace" and he spoke of the Kingdom of God as a possibility within history. "Sooner or later," he writes, "there must dawn the true and final Renaissance which will bring peace to the world." The result of Clark's work is that Schweitzer remains the enigmatic, other-worldly patrician Renaissance-man, but we now have at least a hint as to the sources of his unique and complicated philosophy of civilization. Clark mentions in passing that Goethe may be the major influence on Schweitzer's thought.--W. A. J. (shrink)

Well written and excellently documented, this is both a scholarly reconstruction and a forceful statement of the case against the possibility of systems. Of considerable interest is the discussion of the religious motivation of many of the sceptics and Popkin's argument that Descartes was a "sceptique malgré lui."--W. L. M.

A careful analysis of the relevant passages. The good is both a cause and a quality; as a quality, it is used only in reference to moveable things. Aristotle's treatment here is seen to differ from that in the Ethics.--W. L. M.

Structuralism, in so far as its essence can be pinned down, seems to be the view that the surface aspects of social phenomena are best explained in terms of complex, elusive, below-the-surface "structures," patterns, or model systems. Examples of such underlying structures are the unconscious motivation schemes of individuals, a taken-for-granted economic order, customs of social strata, ingrained moral philosophies, and religious institutions. The De Georges’ pioneer sourcebook [[sic]] presents selections, infused with the structuralist viewpoint, from the writings of Marx, (...) Freud, and the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who are structuralism’s patriarchs; Claude Lévi-Strauss, its present high priest; Roman Jakobson, teacher of structural linguistics at Harvard and M.I.T.; Louis Althusser, who rejects affiliation with structuralism; and four others. Some of these selections include extremely difficult passages, in which the authors seem to be striving to squeeze a deep disclosure out of a surface act or function. Other selections are clearer, somewhat smoother, and more convincing. A well-made index concludes the volume.—W. G. (shrink)

A description and critical estimate, by faculty and alumni, of the famous St. John's New Program in the liberal arts, covering the first 17 years of its operation.--W. C.

In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

The paper „F. W. Bessel and Russian science by K. K. Lavrinovich published in NTM-Schriftenreihe contains several errors coming mainly from re-translations of German names and texts from Russian into German. The correct spelling of names and original texts are given here. Beside this, some additional information from sources not mentioned by the author is presented, and the kind of relationship between Bessel and W. Struve is discussed on the basis of their correspondence.

The following is the transcript of a lecture taken in shorthand by Hans-Georg Backhaus. The transcript was originally published as an appendix in Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur marxschen Ökonomiekritik, a complete translation of which is forthcoming in the Historical Materialism book series.

In C.Q. xliii , p. 126, Messrs. Klos and Minio-Paluello write: ‘Burnet's and Robin's collations of W… differ for the text of the Phaedo in about 130 readings of a more than orthographical interest. A new inspection of the manuscript has shown that Robin very often corrected Burnet, but added some twenty mistakes.’ As this may give a false impression of Burnet as a collator, it will be well to recall Burnet's own statement in C.Q. xiv , p. 132: ‘He (...) [Wilamowitz] says that my collations of W are inadequate, and have been shown to be so by Schoene for the Symposium, and by Hensel for the Theaetetus and Politicus. As he refers his readers to my Prefaces , he has presumably read them, and ought to have known that I never collated W at all or even saw it.’. (shrink)