When the "human sciences" in the West followed the physical sciences in the 18th and 19th centuries with new measurements, methods, and language, the "metaphysics of infinity" lost its credibility. The response of Western religions was to retrench in a stronger authoritarianism, especially by the last half of the 19th century. While the new human sciences were being extended even to study the history and philosophy of religions, those religions themselves placed more emphasis on their understanding of the Absolute or (...) Unquestionable. That split became a burden both to those who were religious and to those who were not. Here, W. Royce Clark argues that humanity's survival may depend on the development of a universal or inclusive ethic in which religions move beyond their Absolutes. Clark poses the sharp challenge: Are religious communities ready to abandon the foundations that until now they have insisted were the only adequate foundation for ethics? (shrink)

In the case of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem und Bell's proof it is shown how, contrary to Kuhn and Lakatos, a "purely metaphysical" thesis became falsifiable and falsified by an "crucial" experiment in the strict sense so that the followers of an older paradigma changed their opinion on rational grounds and not by an "experience of conversion" or by "dying out".

In a simple economic decision problem with multi-tasking the dimensionality of the problem is neither a necessary nor a sufficient measure of complexity. Rather, dimension is good measure of complexity when there is an aggregate resource constraint that creates an interaction between the different activities, resulting in a problem with high algorithmic complexity.

In the issue of Nature for January 1, 1938, Professor Dingle has given us a remarkably clear and thorough analysis of what the physicist really means, or ought to mean, by the principle that only that which is observable is physically real, or has physical meaning.

The paper presents a simple but novel argument against the idea of abortion on demand – i.e. the situation where a woman does not need to justify an abortion. Rather than arguing from a theory of the Right to Life of the foetus, which many would regard as controversial, the paper argues from the point of view that the foetus has a certain (intrinsic) value – simply because it is human. Since the destruction of something of value must be justified, (...) it follows that the destruction of a foetus must be justified. This rules out abortion on demand. I believe that shifting emphasis from rights to values could make a major difference to the abortion debate and will make many people rethink their position on the subject. (shrink)