Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of (...) free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God. (shrink)

The distinction between moral values and others is not an easy one. There are easy extremes: the value that one places on his neighbor's welfare is moral, and the value of peanut brittle is not. The value of decency in speech and dress is moral or ethical in the etymological sense, resting as it does on social custom; and similarly for observance of the Jewish dietary laws. On the other hand the eschewing of unrefrigerated oysters in the summer, though it (...) is likewise a renunciation of immediate fleshly pleasure, is a case rather of prudence than morality. But presumably the Jewish taboos themselves began prudentially. Again a Christian fundamentalist who observes the proprieties and helps his neighbor only from fear of hellfire is manifesting prudence rather than moral values.1 Similarly for the man with felony in his heart who behaves himself for fear of the law. Similarly for the child who behaves himself in the course of moral training; his behavior counts as moral only after these means get transmuted into ends. On the other hand the value that the child attaches to the parent's approval is a moral value. It had been a mere harbinger of a sensually gratifying caress, if my recent suggestion is right, but has been transmuted into an end in itself. · 1. Bernard Williams, Morality , pp. 75-78, questions the disjointedness of these alternatives. I am construing them disjointedly. W.V. Quine, Edgar Pierce professor emeritus of philosophy at Harvard University, is the author of many influential works, including The Roots of Reference. "A Postscript on Metaphor," his previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, appeared in the Autumn 1978 issue. The present essay is being published in a festschrift, Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankenna, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt. (shrink)

Although the notion of spatiality has always lurked in the background of discussions of literary form, the self-conscious use of the term as a critical concept is generally traced to Joseph Frank's seminal essay of 1945, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature."1 Frank's basic argument is that modernist literary works are "spatial" insofar as they replace history and narrative sequence with a sense of mythic simultaneity and disrupt the normal continuities of English prose with disjunctive syntactic arrangements. This argument has been (...) attacked on several fronts. An almost universal objection is that spatial form is a "mere metaphor" which has been given misplaced concreteness and that it denies the essentially temporal nature of literature. Some critics will concede that the metaphor contains a half-truth, but one which is likely to distract attention from more important features of the reading experience. The most polemical attacks have come from those who regard spatial form as an actual, but highly regrettable, characteristic of modern literature and who have linked it with antihistorical and even fascist ideologies.2 Advocates of Frank's position, on the other hand, have generally been content to extrapolate his premises rather than criticize them, and have compiled an ever-mounting list of modernist texts which can be seen, in some sense, as "antitemporal." The whole debate can best be advanced, in my view, not by some patchwork compromise among the conflicting claims but by a radical, even outrageous statement of the basic hypothesis in its most general form. I propose, therefore, that far from being a unique phenomenon of some modern literature, and far from being restricted to the features which Frank identifies in those works , spatial form is a crucial aspect of the experience and interpretation of literature in all ages and cultures. The burden of proof, in other words, is not on Frank to show that some works have spatial form but on his critics to provide an example of any work that does not. · 1. Frank's essay first appeared in Sewanee Review 53 and was revised in his The Widening Gyre . Frank's basic argument has not changed essentially even in his most avante-garde statements; he still regards spatial form "as a particular phenomenon of modern avante-garde writing." See "Spatial Form: An Answer to Critics," Critical Inquiry 4 : 231-52. A useful bibliography, "Space and Spatial Form in Narrative," is being complied by Jeffrey Smitten .· 2. This charge generally links the notion of spatial form with Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound, the imagist movement, the "irrationality" and pessimistic antihistoricism of modernism, and the conservative Romantic tradition. Frank discusses the complex motives behind these associations in the work of Robert Weimann and Frank Kermode in his "Answer to Critics," pp. 238-48. W. J. T. Mitchell, editor of Critical Inquiry, is the author of Blake's Composite Art, and The Last Dinosaur Book: The Life and Times of a Cultural Icon. The present essay is part of Iconology: The Image in Literature and the Visual Arts. "Diagrammatology" appeared in the Spring 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. Leon Surette responds to the current essay in "‘Rational Form in Literature’". (shrink)

The author argues that Thomas Hobbes anticipates a set of questions about meaning and semantic order that come to fuller expression in the 20th century, in the writings of W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. Despite their different points of departure, these 20th-century writers pose a number of profound questions about the conditions for the stability of meaning, and about the conditions that govern the use of the term “language” itself. Though the more recent debate (...) benefits from a set of philosophical tools unavailable in the seventeenth century, the author further argues that Hobbes performs a number of maneuvers in his texts from which his 20th-century successors would profit. (shrink)

Ethics is freedom in Christ to pursue the good, true, and beautiful. Pastors regularly face concrete ethical questions. And they, too, pursue a moral life. In the busyness of ministry, it can be tempting to think pragmatically or derive one's ethics from the latest cultural concerns. But standard approaches to ethics, whether deontological, utilitarian, or virtue-ethical, all fall short of being distinctly Christian. Ethics ought to be grounded in the gospel and in our triune God. In Pastoral Ethics, W. Ross (...) Hastings provides pastors an evangelical and trinitarian framework for moral formation and ethical discernment. For Hastings, ethics must be reclaimed as theological. Theology without ethics becomes gnosticism. Ethics without theology leads to legalism and death. Christian ethics participates in God's life and God's work. This communion with God leads to obedience to his commands as summed up in the Decalogue, and over several chapters Hastings provides a rich exposition for pastoral formation. Pastors find their identity in God, and this inspires right thinking and acting with regard to authority, life and death, sexuality, work and rest, speech, and desires. An approach to ethics that prompts faith, hope, and love, Pastoral Ethics is an essential guide for Christians in all ministry contexts. (shrink)

In Theological Ethics theologian, pastor, and ethicist W. Ross Hastings gives pastors, ministry leaders, and students a guide designed to equip them to think deeply and theologically about the moral formation of persons in our communities, about ethical inquiry and action, and about the tone and content of our engagement in the public square. The book presents a biblical perspective and a gospel-centered framework for thinking about complex contemporary issues in ways are life-giving and that will lead readers into greater (...) flourishing as human persons in community. (shrink)

It may seem a bit perverse to argue that pluralism is a kind of dogmatism, since pluralists invariably define themselves as antidogmatists. Indeed, the world would seem to be so well supplied with overt dogmatists—religious fanatics, militant revolutionaries, political and domestic tyrants—that it will probably seem unfair to suggest that the proponents of liberal, tolerant, civilized open-mindedness are guilty of a covert dogmatism. My only excuse for engaging in this exercise is that it may help to shake up some rather (...) firmly fixed ideas about dogmatism held by those who advocate some version of pluralism. Dogmatism, I want to argue, has had a very had press, some of it deserved, some of it based in misunderstandings and ignorance. Much of that bad press stems, I will suggest, from the dominance of pluralism as an intellectual ideology since the Enlightenment. If “dogmatism” is a synonym for irrationality, infelixibility, and authoritarianism, the fault lies as much with pluralism as it does with any actual dogmatism. I’d like to begin, therefore, with a definition of dogmatism that comes, not from its pluralist foes, but from a historian of religion who treats it as a fairly neutral term, describing a complex and ancient feature of social institutions. This definition comes from E. Royston Pike’s Encyclopedia of Religion and Religions:DOGMA . A religious doctrine that is to be received on authority—whether of a Divine revelation, a Church Council, Holy Scripture, or a great and honoured religious teacher—and not, at least in the first instance, because it may be proved true in the light of reason. Almost always there is associated with dogma the element of Faith. The term comes from the Greek word for “to seem,” and it meant originally that which seems true to anyone, i.e. has been approved or decided beyond cavil. In the New Testament it is applied to decisions of the Christian church in Jerusalem, enactments of the Jewish law, and imperial decrees, all of which were things to be accepted without argument. A little later it had come to mean simple statements of Christian belief and practice; and it was not until the 4th century, when the heretics were showing how far from simple the basic Christian beliefs really were, that it acquired the meaning of a theological interpretation of a religious fact. Then came the division of the Church into a Western and an Eastern branch, and never again was it possible to frame a dogma that might be universally held. The 39 Articles of the Church of England, the principles deduced from Calvin’s “Institutes” and John Wesley’s “Sermons,” and the items that compose the Mormon creed may all be classed as dogmas.1 W. J. T. Mitchell, editor of Critical Inquiry, is professor of English and a member of the Committee on Art and Design at the University of Chicago. His most recent book is Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. (shrink)

This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value revolve, for most theories of value may be divided into those that treat it as a quality and those that treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else ; Ross says that it seems clear that any view that treats (...) goodness as a relation between that which is good and something else denies that anything is intrinsically good. The chapter first discusses R. B. Perry's relational view of value—in the sense of good, and other theories that also identify goodness with some relation, either as a relation between that which is good and some or all of its elements, or as a relation between some or all of its elements, or as a relation between it or some or all of its elements and something else. Next, the psychological theories of good are discussed; these, as a rule, hold that a thing being good means either that some person or persons have some feelings towards it, or some person or persons think it to be good; this is an objective view of good. The rest of the chapter looks at both R. B. Perry's and G. E. Moore's arguments on these theories, at Ross's own views, at badness as incompatible with goodness or as an element of a good thing, at W. M. Urban's work on the question of values, and at B. Croce's arguments on value judgements. Ross concludes that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, and presents a lengthy validation of his conclusion, based largely on discussion of beauty and goodness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Estelle R. Jorgensen, “Four Philosophical Models of the Relationship Between Theory and Practice”W. Ann StokesEstelle Jorgensen has written a most interesting paper contrasting four different concepts of the relationship between theory and practice, and pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of each. Each approach introduces insights that the others have missed, but is not sufficient in itself to explain all the relationships between theory and practice. In (...) response to the concept of "dichotomy," I am also sympathetic to the attempt to distinguish practice and theory because it identifies two important constituents of experience, and it provides a fruitful way of investigating the relationship between the two concepts. However, I believe that a concept of dichotomy may put the two categoriees in too distant a relationship with each other. This distance may prevent us from recognizing the "interconnections and cross-fertilizations" that are often possible between them.The idea of "polarity" opens up the possibility of focusing on the ground [End Page 102] between the two concepts. It also provides a framework for allowing "practice to bubble up into theory," and "theory to bubble up into practice." Given that a theory may bring about a range of different practices and that practices may be based upon a range of differing theories, one needs to be able to move easily between the two worlds. Imagination, intuition, and rational thinking all contribute to our understanding of the relationship between the two concepts. In this situation of polarity one should not expect to find "a theory perfectly translated into a particular practice, or a practice drawing entirely and fully on one particular theory."I am also sympathetic to the view that "theory without practice is mentalism," and that "practice without theory is activism or instrumentalism bare of guiding principles," but like Jorgensen I find the concept of fusion the least helpful of the four concepts. Given the fact that very rarely (if ever) is theory perfectly exemplified in practice, or practice based solely upon one specific theory, the concept of fusion in many instances is too absolute. I am open to the suggestion that moral principles as well as aesthetic ones should guide the practice of music education despite the difficulties that a multiplicity of perspectives opens up. I also agree that democratic ideals can offer us one way of guiding the decisions made in the classroom and can offer a rallying point for persons coming from different ethnic, religious, political, and cultural backgrounds.The dialectical approach opens up a way to negotiate among differences of opinion and beliefs that influence practice. It assumes that there is no one perfect perspective on the relationship between theory and practice. The dialectical approach provides (1)a framework to investigate the theories and practices of which practitioners are aware, (2)opportunities to examine how practitioners adjudicate them, and (3)explanations of how and why they decide to act "in their particular lived situations." In contrast to the ontological approach, I like Jorgensen's epistemological approach to the investigation of theory and practice. It offers another perspective in addition to the influence that ontological theories can have in guiding music education practice.My view of the ideal relationship between theory and practice is one that acknowledges the differences between the two concepts, but allows for a variety of relationships between the two. It is one that recognizes that theory should influence practice and that practice should influence theory in an ongoing and continuous reciprocal exchange. It entails being sensitive to a variety of theories and particular practices, and being skilled at being able to pick which particular theory or theories best explains the practice observed.In addition to the concepts of dichotomy, polarity, fusion, and dialectic, another possible concept of the relationship between theory and practice might be based upon Michael Lewis, Margaret Sullivan, and Linda Michalson's view [End Page 103] of the "cognitive-emotional fugue."1 This perspective has the advantage of being very flexible. The authors describe emotion and cognition as being neither separate nor independent processes. "Rather both are elements of a continuous, inseparable stream of behavior like the parts of a fugue in which the theme is often lost... (shrink)

A history of the history of philosophy. Smart deals with representative thinkers in short chapters, expounding and criticizing their doctrines and methods. All of them are found inadequate, though perhaps Bergson and Jaspers less so than the others. In his concluding chapter Smart outlines a view of his own which seems to incorporate the major stresses of the criticized views. He views philosophy as a continuing dialectical play of sometimes antithetical ideas of the past and present: a dialectic which makes (...) the history of philosophy an integral part of philosophy but not the whole of the enterprise. Every philosophy makes its contribution and all reveal their short-comings in the trans-historical dialectic of philosophy itself.--W. G. E. (shrink)

In addition to serving as a competent and sympathetic text for classical Indian philosophy, this book is meant to show that it was the universally presupposed concern of Indian speculation to defend the possibility of human freedom as a liberation from worldly determinism. Early chapters introduce the topics of bondage, self-knowledge, and liberation in a way attractive to the Western point of view. There is a helpful chapter introducing Indian logic. The author's "fresh classification of India's philosophical systems" evolves as (...) a systematic comparison of the alternative Indian theories of relations, and especially those relations of dependence or causality which constitute bondage, and whose reversal would effect liberation.--E. W. (shrink)

The first half of this careful little book defends the "analytic" interpretation of psychological science, and refutes "a priori" type arguments which would impose or eliminate certain theories in advance of science's proper estimate of their empirical usefulness. The criticism is almost always directed against the Gestalt school, for both its general conceptions of science and its particular theories. The second half, after refuting some rather unimpressive philosophical attacks upon psychoanalysis, goes on to state the latter's relevance for the philosophical (...) problem of responsibility.--E. W. (shrink)

A translation of the earlier books of Galen's On Anatomical Procedures, extant in the original Greek text, was published by Charles Singer in 1956. The remainder, surviving in an Arabic translation, is here presented in a handsomely published English translation. A welcome supplement to the meagre Loch Galen.--R. W.

Sir David Ross, now nearing his eightieth birthday has published another of his valuable critical texts, provided, like its predecessors, with a commentary. He has made full use of the contributions of Drossaert Lulofs, Forster and Nuyens, at the same time judging them with an independent mind and adding views and arguments of his own. This book greatly facilitates the study of these physiological-psychological treatises which form so indispensable a supplement to the De Anima. --R. W.

In this 1964 Saint Augustine Lecture, Callahan shows how Augustine refashioned three major doctrines which he inherited from his Greek and Christian predecessors. By far the most interesting doctrine that Callahan presents deals with the evolution of the concept of perfection. The author traces the development of the concept from its most anthropomorphic appearance in Homer and the pre-Socratics to its most famous expression in the ontological argument of Anselm. He shows how Anselm had derived his own argument for God's (...) perfection from an argument which Augustine used in the seventh book of the Confessions to establish God's incorruptibility. Callahan also examines Augustine's presentation of the ancient theme of the "flight of the soul" from the evils of this earth to the sanctuary of holiness or wisdom. In this portion of his lecture and in the final portion that deals with Augustine's psychological approach to the problem of time, Callahan is not at his best. His speculation on the extent of Augustine's indebtedness to Gregory of Nyssa provides the reader with little insight into Augustine's own viewpoint. This tendency toward distraction flaws the book because it fails to point out how Augustine infused inherited philosophical abstractions with the baroque vitality of his own genius.--W. D. T. (shrink)

The title of Hopkins’ book is apt in at least two ways. First, it is a "companion"—a book which is best read in conjunction with a serious reading of Anselm’s works. Hopkins states that his book is "envisioned primarily as a handbook for students", but that is true in the sense that Taylor’s book on Plato or Gilson’s books on Augustine, Bonaventure, and Aquinas could be said to be intended for students. Secondly, it is a study of practically all of (...) Anselm’s philosophical and theological contributions. The only significant work that is not treated in some detail is De Grammatico, a lacuna which is understandable in light of the complex and recondite nature of that dialogue: one either says nothing or very much about it. There are chapters on the unity and chronology of and the historical influences on Anselm’s works; the role of faith and reason in Anselm; the Ontological Argument; Anselm’s writings on the nature of the Trinity and the relations between the three persons; Anselm on human nature, truth, freedom of choice, and evil; and Anselm on the necessity of the Incarnation, Christology, and original sin. There are two appendices: one consisting of a translation of Ein neues unvollendetes Werk..., and the other on "Anselm’s Methods of Arguing." There is also a very helpful sixteen-page bibliography. One of the valuable side features of the book is the wealth of references to the works of Augustine. Southern’s Saint Anselm and His Biographer, Henry’s The Logic of Saint Anselm, and Hopkins’ Companion all approach Anselm from different perspectives, and lay emphasis on different issues, but they are the three most important books on the historical, philosophical, and theological Anselm in English.-W.E.M. (shrink)

This selection of readings in ethics is divided into five parts: Classical and Medieval Intellectualist Thought; Dialectical Thought; American Naturalistic Thought; Analytic-Positivist Thought; Existentialist and Post-Existentialist Thought. An anthology such as this one is needed to balance the limited selections offered in the area of morality contained in the anthologies dealing with philosophy in general. For example Part II contains selections from Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, and Engels. And Part III features James, Dewey, Edel, Hook, Romanell, and Dennes. It would (...) not be possible to include the majority of these authors' writings on ethics in an anthology dealing with philosophy generally. This anthology could best be used in introductory courses in ethics. Some of the introductions given to each of the five parts are good and the rest are adequate. At the end of each reading there are questions designed to guide the reading and discussion. This could have been omitted without any loss to the anthology. At the conclusion of each part there is a limited list of recommended readings. For the beginning student of ethical theory Approaches To Morality offers a quick but fairly inclusive view of the various ways in which some individuals have approached the philosophical problems inherent in a study of morality.--W. P. G. (shrink)

This is essentially a textbook for an introductory course written in basic English of the primer type with a drastic simplification of exposition. The simplification often makes the exposition inaccurate and the readings confusing or misleading. The authors cover literally scores of positions and authors, some few major ones and many very minor ones, in almost every conceivable area of philosophy.--W. G. E.

This anthology is heavy on poetry and letters, light in the other categories. There are some anomolies: Seneca's philosophy is represented by a piece of little historical interest, Cicero is alloted only five letters, Ovid is correspondingly slighted in poetry. Here also, as in the volume above, the editor's contribution is slight. No translations are acknowledged.—W. G. E.

This is a nonsense book. It summarizes essential tenets of Pölätüöism, which is the definitive reconciliation of modern science and Roman Catholicism, and chronicles the long and eventful life of its founder. Although neither the cleverness nor the taste maintains a uniform excellence, there is much delightful satire on recent philosophy and religion. Pölätüö's interview with Russell, and his paper "On the Reality of the Soul and on the Reality of Onion," are two of the highlights.--W. L. M.

Reilly approaches his topic by presenting the spirit of science and the phases of scientific inquiry as Peirce saw it, keeping before the reader, at all times, Peirce’s overarching view of man and the universe. The two prevailing themes guiding Peirce’s thought are 1) that there is a special conformity of the human mind to nature and of nature to God, and 2) that there is an architectonic qualifying all the various types and levels of treatment which occupy the philosopher’s (...) interest. The first question examined is the nature of the scientific concern. For Peirce, the scientist’s spirit is marked by the pure love of knowledge. It is important to note the theoretical aspect because it explains the possibility of holding belief in abeyance while examining nature: the purity of motive allows that proper questions will be asked and errors will be readily corrected. The scientist’s purpose is the real truth of things; he begins with questions about the world. There are four stages of scientific method: 1) The scientist observes nature as a thinking, analytic inquirer. Observation presupposes that nature is intelligibly structured. 2) He formulates an explanatory hypothesis which is a process of bringing a manifold of characters to a unified whole. 3) By deduction, the inquirer gathers experiential consequents of the hypothesis. 4) By induction the question is put to nature and observed phenomena are matched to the predicted phenomena, resulting in either truth or a modified hypothesis. Peirce’s principle of the kinship of man’s mind to nature supports his dictum to follow instinct over reasoned likelihood in choosing hypotheses. Also important is the doctrine of moderate fallibilism which holds that there is a convergence upon the truth founded upon the regularity of nature, but that chance is a real factor due to nature’s evolution. Reilly’s book gives an adequate account of the aspects of Peirce’s scientific method sacrificing specific and detailed analysis to a more general approach wherein he shows the unity operative throughout Peirce’s thinking. A good index and copious notes are provided.—W. A. F. (shrink)

In tribute to Peter A. Bertocci on his retirement from Boston University as Bowne Professor of Philosophy, 15 American and British scholars prepared essays on aspects of idealism, at the request of the editors. These essays, together with an introduction by the editors, a list of Bertocci’s writings, and an index, comprise the present volume. The British contributors are H. D. Lewis of London and W. M. Pittenger of Cambridge. Among the Americans are John N. Findlay, Errol E. Harris, Charles (...) Hartshorne, Richard Hocking, and John E. Smith. (shrink)

Allen begins with a general survey of "atheism and atheists" in the Renaissance, gives brief sketches of six individual "atheists"—Pomponazzi, Cardano, Vanini, Montaigne, Charron, Bodin—devotes chapters to rational theology against atheism and to reason and immorality, and closes with a portrait of the "atheist redeemed" in the person of the Earl of Rochester, the arch-rake of the Restoration who was converted during his final illness. He points out that during this period "atheist" usually meant no more than a person whose (...) theology did not agree fully with that of the name-caller, and that none of the thinkers he mentions merited the term in any strict sense. The book is a wide-ranging, erudite survey without much attempt at either analysis in depth or synthesis, but Allen's somewhat Voltairean point of view helps give it form.—W. B. K. (shrink)

This book is part of Prentice-Hall's new Central Issues in Philosophy series, and seems a welcome addition. The editor's introduction does little more than state the problem and review some of the ways with which it has been dealt. We are then brought immediately to the meat: the first section of the book contains selections from Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes intended to acquaint us with some of the more classical solutions to the problem. The second part, entitled "The Identity Thesis," (...) contains one of J. J. C. Smart's influential essays for this thesis and two replies, one by Jerome Shaffer and one by James Cornman. Part three, entitled "Theoretical Materialism," contains essays by Jaegwon Kim, in which he denies the validity of having only physical property descriptions; and Thomas Nagel and Keith Gunderson, who both argue that the case for materialism is stronger than the case against it. The fourth part, containing essays by Jerry Fodor, Hilary Putnam, and David Lewis, focuses on functional materialism. The fifth section of the book is devoted to the rather radical view of the eliminative materialists. There is a short note by Paul Feyerabend, a full length essay by Richard Rorty, a reply by Richard Bernstein and a rejoinder by Rorty. All of the essays in this book are well-written pieces of solid philosophy, but none is so technical that it can not be understood by a relative beginner. After finishing this book and thoroughly digesting its contents, the reader will be well versed in modern thought on this problem and well capable of continuing his research in any of several directions. To aid the student in this task there is a large bibliography included.--W. de V. (shrink)

The introduction and six essays in this book originally appeared as a continuing series in the Southern Journal of Philosophy, and are gathered together here for the first time in one volume. In the introduction, E. M. Adams briefly touches upon the major questions of the philosophy of mind and how they have been dealt with in the past; his suggestion for the future is that philosophers give themselves a little more "categorial room" in which to handle these problems. In (...) the first essay Douglas Browning argues for the essential privacy of the verbal and adverbial functionings of feeling. This is followed by an essay by Charles Hartshorne in which he argues that feelings are by no means essentially private, and that in fact God shares all of our feelings in their full totality. The essay by Donald F. Gustafson continues the non-privacy argument in a different mode. He argues that there is an essential connection between feeling and the expression of that feeling, and that keeping feelings to oneself is something that is learned and by no means necessary. I am not sure his rather narrow notion of privacy keeps the argument philosophically interesting, however. In contrast, the fourth essay, by Erwin W. Straus, is basically phenomenological, and, unfortunately, sounds more like a polemic than a clear description of the incommensurability between the lived world and the "scientific world." In the fifth essay Edward H. Madden gives a synoptic view of the recent work in the philosophy of mind by C. J. Ducasse. Madden sees in his work an extremely promising analysis of the problems in this field, and attempts to show why this is so. The most interesting essay in this book is, I found, the last, by the editor, in which he adds another discussion of Strawson's concept of a person. Van de Vate argues that the analogy upon which Strawson launches his account is misleading. Rather than seeing the concept of a person allied with a tool of the sort Wittgenstein described, Van de Vate would have us understand it in the light of public tools like parliaments. From here, Van de Vate argues that persons are not natural facts, but social facts. I should like to see a more complete handling of this idea and its problems at some future date.--W. de V. (shrink)

A collection of essays written from a Christian perspective, including a good critique of Marxist educational theory, a comparison of Marx with Gentile, and valuable studies of less prominent figures. --W. L. M.

The relevance of utopian speculation to the social sciences is Krysmanski's central concern. Through an analysis of eight 20th century German utopian novels and a briefer examination of related literary forms, he tries to determine the peculiar features of the modern utopian method. He finds it to be of value in uncovering new possibilities for altering society on the basis of new technology.--W. L. M.

This number of the continuing series is extremely rich and quite densely written. Much of the writing is reminiscent of Modes of Being in its formality. The major concern is togetherness as a human product, especially political organization. Fully one half of the fascicle is devoted to an extensive and very intricate analysis of the state. Two other sections demand attention: one short and pointed comment on possible kinds of approach to the art object, and a lengthy statement of an (...) "urphilosophy" for Modes of Being, giving the basic positions and moves which can be applied analogously to each of the four modes.—W. G. E. (shrink)

This fascicle is devoted entirely to aesthetics. Some sections are tentative and anticipatory to Weiss's The World of Art, others supplementary to earlier papers. But there are long sections which cover new ground: the discussion of play and art, the examination of the concept of beauty as a transcendental and the important analysis of the relation between perception and aesthetic experience. Weiss develops a highly complex, parallel analysis of the work of art and its observer according to various levels or (...) aspects of their respective reality and activity. The extremely rich context thus developed provides fertile insights into many of the traditional problems of aesthetics and offers clues for more general philosophical discussions. Aesthetics has too often been a partisan, polemical affair. Weiss's open and comprehensive approach is an apt-reminder that the complexity and variety of art cannot be caught in one-dimensional, monochromatic accounts.—W. G. E. (shrink)

The first of twelve fascicles to be published quarterly and as a single volume at the end of the series. This fascicle presents Weiss's philosophic journal from June 24th to September 21st, 1955. The main problem worried with in these pages is that of the togetherness of the basic modes of being, a central issue for a systematic pluralist such as Weiss. We see him approaching the problem from different angles, pushing ideas as far as they will go, testing them (...) against other parts of his system, revising, rejecting and refining. At times Weiss sketches out the logical permutations and combinations of his leading themes and then seeks out applications in more concrete subject matter. At other times a seemingly unrelated analysis of something as concrete as the relations between men and women is used to illumine highly abstract problems. The fascicle as a whole is a study in the logic of opposition and togetherness, though many other points are touched along the way, such as the problem of simple location. Weiss's analysis is more mathematical and logical than linguistic. It is remarkably thorough and radical, free and original. But precisely because of this, it is also difficult to follow, at times even frustratingly opaque. But the fascicles do provide two things: a valuable dialectical key to Modes of Being, and a clear insight into the working methods and style of thought of one of the most creative of contemporary philosophers.--W. G. E. (shrink)

This is a collection of seventeen articles, beginning with the 1945 essay, "De la Justice." Repeatedly emphasized are Perelman's opposition to "the absolutist ideal" and his insistence on the importance of linguistic considerations in reasoning. The theme of the final article, "what a reflection on law can contribute to the philosopher" epitomizes the spirit of the volume as a whole. The better part of this collection, it should be noted, has been published in English under the title, The Idea of (...) Justice and the Problem of Argument.—W. L. M. (shrink)

Translations, from French, German, and Polish originals, of most of Tarski's prewar papers on the subjects mentioned in the title, including the well-known "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen." Tarski has provided, for this volume, a number of cross-references among the papers included, and some footnotes indicating later developments in the subjects treated. In two of the papers, the text itself has been added to.--W. T.

The essays which comprise this collection made their first appearance in 1948 to celebrate the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the British science journal, The Philosophical Magazine, which initially published many monographs in which distinguished scientific discoveries were announced. The present edition is a reprint of the supplement to the regular issue of 1948 and is now put out in book form to be more available for students of the history of science. The "natural philosophy" in (...) the title reflects the way in which the meaning of the term "philosophy" has changed over the past two centuries, for all the essays are devoted to science as we now know it, even as The Philosophical Magazine has itself become a journal now devoted mainly to solid-state physics. Thus a succession of chapters details the history of astronomy, physics, chemistry, mathematics, and engineering through the eighteenth century; other topics include the history of The Philosophical Magazine and histories of scientific periodicals generally, of scientific instruments, and of scientific societies throughout the same era. The concluding essay, by F. Sherwood Taylor, is entitled "The Teaching of the Physical Sciences at the End of the Eighteenth Century"; this is a well documented study of syllabi for courses taught in the universities, as well as an account of the educations received by men who figured prominently in eighteenth-century science. The essays, whose authors include such notables as Sir H. Spencer-Jones, Herbert Dingle, J. R. Partington, J. F. Scott, and Douglas McKie, are uniformly good. They will interest mainly historians of science for their detailed coverage of both internalist and externalist aspects of eighteenth-century thought. They will also appeal to philosophers, however, if only to remind them how their own discipline gave birth to the "new science," and indeed gave it a unity in its early stages that it would do well to recover in the present day.—W.A.W. (shrink)

The crisis of our day is epitomized by Paul Kurtz in two propositions: -"Theistic religions... are in retreat." "Most traditional moral and philosophical guideposts seem to be crumbling." On the basis of these findings, Kurtz asks incisively what new directions need to be taken in order that we may sight more promising guideposts. He develops, in the final pages of his book, a series of proposed answers to that question. In the section in which he depicts the crumbling of traditional (...) guideposts, he elaborates on, first, "the death of theism," marshaling what he considers the most persuasive objections to the standard arguments for theism; secondly, the "perversion of Marxism" as seen in "man’s spiritual death and a new kind of suffering" in Marxist countries; and, thirdly, excesses of the New Left, the mindlessness of certain viewpoints of the counter-culture, and continuing hypocrisy in the political establishment. Among the upbeat principles which Kurtz offers at the end as more humane guideposts are promotion of the idea that life can be meaningful, worthwhile, and full; application of rationality and the ideal of moderation to problems of sexual and other forms of libertarianism; recognition of tolerance as a major value; respect for equality of opportunity for individuals; strengthening of "the democratic ethic;" and redirecting of "the promise of technology." On the prospects for widespread adoption of these guideposts, Kurtz declares: "Whether we will be able to realize these potentialities cannot be determined beforehand. Our future is contingent and precarious..." Our future can be one of "human greatness," he concludes, "if we will but give full vent to the highest within us-our intelligence, our capacity for compassion, our audacious spirit."—W.G. (shrink)

A description and critical estimate, by faculty and alumni, of the famous St. John's New Program in the liberal arts, covering the first 17 years of its operation.--W. C.

Das »Richtige und das Gute« (1930), das ethische Hauptwerk W. D. Ross’, enthält eine Vielzahl wichtiger moralphilosophischer Thesen und Argumente, die bis in die Gegenwart kontrovers diskutiert werden. Im Mittelpunkt steht seine pluralistische Deontologie, der zufolge sich die richtige Handlung aus einer Abwägung der in der jeweiligen Situation relevanten und unableitbaren Prima-facie-Pflichten ergibt, von denen nur ein Teil auf die Optimierung der Handlungsfolgen bezogen ist. Diese Deontologie wurde zu einem modernen Klassiker unter den normativen ethischen Theorien. Darüber hinaus stellt Ross’ (...) These, dass moralische Intuitionen eine Quelle selbstevidenten Wissens sein können, einen wichtigen Referenzpunkt in Debatten um den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus dar. Auch für die Handlungstheorie liefert Ross einflussreiche Argumente, wenn er die Ansicht vertritt, dass Pflichten nie ein bestimmtes Motiv des Handelnden zum Gegenstand haben können. Eine zentrale Stellung nimmt für Ross die Güterlehre ein, in welcher er von vier Grundgütern, Tugend, Wissen, Lust und Gerechtigkeit, ausgeht. Wurde Ross in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts im damaligen Großbritannien als ein herausragender Ethiker – einer der bedeutendsten des Jahrhunderts, auf Augenhöhe mit G.E. Moore – angesehen, wandelte sich das Meinungsbild in den folgenden Jahrzehnten unter dem Einfluss besonders des Logischen Positivismus und der Philosophie Wittgensteins. In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist jedoch wieder ein wachsendes Interesse an Ross’ Ethik festzustellen. Dabei wird »Das Richtige und das Gute« bisweilen sogar mit der »Nikomachischen Ethik«, Kants »Grundlegung« und Humes »Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral« verglichen. (shrink)

In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

The paper „F. W. Bessel and Russian science by K. K. Lavrinovich published in NTM-Schriftenreihe contains several errors coming mainly from re-translations of German names and texts from Russian into German. The correct spelling of names and original texts are given here. Beside this, some additional information from sources not mentioned by the author is presented, and the kind of relationship between Bessel and W. Struve is discussed on the basis of their correspondence.

The following is the transcript of a lecture taken in shorthand by Hans-Georg Backhaus. The transcript was originally published as an appendix in Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur marxschen Ökonomiekritik, a complete translation of which is forthcoming in the Historical Materialism book series.