How do educators better reach their students, better capture their attention and imagination without sacrificing scholarship? Teachable Moments: Essays on Experiential Education examines the pedagogy of Prescott College, a school that has embraced experiential education and been finding success with it for over thirty years. These essays—from scholars in fields as wide ranging as religious studies, environmental science, psychology, dance, literature, adventure education, and peace studies—examine the challenges and, ultimately, the rewards of student-centered education.

Did you know that Hillary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS? Or that Mike Pence called Michelle Obama “the most vulgar First Lady we’ve ever had”? No, you didn’t know these things. You couldn’t know them, because these claims are false.1 But many American voters believed them.One of the most distinctive features of the 2016 campaign was the rise of “fake news,” factually false claims circulated on social media, usually via channels of partisan camaraderie. Media analysts and social scientists are still (...) debating what role fake news played in Trump’s victory.2 But whether or not it drove the outcome, fake news certainly affected the choices of some individual voters.Why were people willing to believe easily... (shrink)

Deepfakes are algorithmically modified video and audio recordings that project one person’s appearance on to that of another, creating an apparent recording of an event that never took place. Many scholars and journalists have begun attending to the political risks of deepfake deception. Here we investigate other ways in which deepfakes have the potential to cause deeper harms than have been appreciated. First, we consider a form of objectification that occurs in deepfaked ‘frankenporn’ that digitally fuses the parts of different (...) women to create pliable characters incapable of giving consent to their depiction. Next, we develop the idea of ‘illocutionary wronging’, in which an individual is forced to engage in speech acts they would prefer to avoid in order to deny or correct the misleading evidence of a publicized deepfake. Finally, we consider the risk that deepfakes may facilitate campaigns of ‘panoptic gaslighting’, where many systematically altered recordings of a single person's life undermine their memory, eroding their sense of self and ability to engage with others. Taken together, these harms illustrate the roles that social epistemology and technological vulnerabilities play in human ethical life. (shrink)

Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably-produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably-produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a (...) reliably-held belief is non-accidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability; an answer that holds interesting implications for the value and nature of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, one of which was leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. In that paper, Lackey argues that testimonial knowledge is problematic for the credit-worthiness theory because when person A comes to know that p by way of the testimony of person B, it would appear that any credit due to A for coming to believe truly that p belongs to (...) the testifier, B, rather than the hearer, A. If so, then knowledge would appear not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I think that the problem this raises actually has little to do with the fact that the knowledge comes by way of testimony, and that similar objections can be formulated in terms of perceptual and memorial knowledge. I will attempt to neutralize these objections by drawing a distinction between credit as praiseworthiness and credit as attributability. (shrink)

It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from (...) luck in the first place. I argue that the best explanation for the consensus that luck undermines knowledge is that knowledge is, complications aside, credit-worthy true believing. To make this case, I develop both the notions of luck and credit, and sketch a theory of knowledge in those terms. Furthermore, this account also holds promise for being able to solve the “value problem” for knowledge, and it explains why both internal and external conditions are necessary to turn true belief into knowledge. (shrink)

Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the ‘expertise defense’ of philosophical intuition. I argue that the use of familiar cases and principles constitutes a methodological problem. Since these items are familiar to philosophers, but not ordinary people, the two subject groups do not confront identical cognitive tasks. Reflection on this point shows that (...) these findings do not threaten philosophical expertise—though we can draw lessons for more effective empirical tests. (shrink)

A microaggression is a small insulting act made disproportionately harmful by its part in an oppressive pattern of similar insults. How should you respond when made the victim of a microaggression? In this paper I survey several morally salient factors, including effects upon victims, perpetrators, and third parties. I argue, contrary to popular views, that ‘growing a thicker skin’ is not good advice nor is expressing reasonable anger always the best way to contribute to confronting oppression. Instead, appropriately responding to (...) microaggression involves difficult application of practical wisdom that does not easily fall under a simple prescription. (shrink)

This paper presents a regress challenge to the selective psychological debunking of moral judgments. A selective psychological debunking argument conjoins an empirical claim about the psychological origins of certain moral judgments to a theoretical claim that these psychological origins cannot track moral truth, leading to the conclusion that the moral judgments are unreliable. I argue that psychological debunking arguments are vulnerable to a regress challenge, because the theoretical claim that ‘such-and-such psychological process is not moral-truth-tracking’ relies upon moral judgments. We (...) must then ask about the psychological origins of these judgments, and then make a further evaluative judgment about these psychological origins… and so on. This chain of empirical and evaluative claims may continue indefinitely and, I will argue, proponents of the debunking argument are in a dialectical position where they may not simply call a halt to the process. Hence, their argument cannot terminate, and its debunking conclusion cannot be upheld. (shrink)

It is a philosophical truism that we must think of others as moral agents, not merely as causal or statistical objects. But why? I argue that this follows from the best resolution of an antinomy between our experience of morality as necessarily binding on the will and our knowledge that all moral beliefs originate in contingent histories. We can address this antinomy only by understanding moral deliberation via interpersonal relationships, which simultaneously vindicate and constrains morality’s bind on the will. This (...) means that moral agency is fundamentally social. I model an attitude toward our causal nature on sociologist Erving Goffman’s concept of ‘civil inattention’; our social practice of agency requires that we give minimal attention to the contingent origins of moral judgments in ourselves and others. Understood this way, seeing ourselves as moral agents requires avoiding appeal to causal aetiology to settle substantive moral disagreement. (shrink)

Generative AI systems like ChatGPT and Midjourney can produce prose or images. But can they produce art? I argue that this question, though natural and intriguing, is the wrong one to ask. A better question is this: can generative AI yield distinct or novel forms of aesthetic value? And I argue that the answer is yes. Generative AI can be used to put us in contact with the artificial sublime – a type of aesthetic value that Kant famously argues is (...) impossible. Kant claims that sublimity (a fusion of trepidation and wonderment) can only arise from encounters with nature, or perhaps close artistic depiction of natural scenes. I show how generative AI can yield encounters both with incalculable profundity (Kant’s mathematical sublime) as well as overwhelming moral chaos (Kant’s dynamical sublime). There are lessons not only for art criticism, but also for the philosophical theory of value. (shrink)

This paper focuses on several issues that arise in Miranda Fricker?s book Epistemic injustice surrounding her claims about our (moral) culpability for perpetrating acts of testimonial injustice. While she makes frequent claims about moral culpability with respect to specific examples, she never addresses the issue in its full generality, and we are left to extrapolate her general view about moral culpability for acts of testimonial injustice from these more restricted and particular claims. Although Fricker never describes testimonial injustice in such (...) terms, I argue that the fundamental wrong done in acts of testimonial injustice is a form of negligence. Once we understand testimonial injustice in this way, it is easier to see when and why we are culpable for perpetrating such injustices. Indeed, explicitly recognizing testimonial injustice as a form of negligence solves several problems for Fricker?s view, which are elucidated briefly along the way. However, construing testimonial injustice as a form of negligence has a cost as well. It highlights the fact that the normative core of Fricker?s view is deontological, rather than virtue-theoretic. Fricker claims to be offering a theory of the virtue of testimonial justice along the model of current virtue theories in epistemology, yet it seems that there is no compelling reason to think of what she has offered as a virtue theory, at least not on the model of virtue theories that one finds in epistemology. This is not to say that her view is any less plausible for not being a virtue theory. But calling it a virtue theory affects how one interprets its various claims, and tends to lead one away from, rather than toward, a proper understanding of the deep deontological nature of her account. (shrink)

The debate between proponents and opponents of a role for empirical psychology in ethical theory seems to be deadlocked. This paper aims to clarify the terms of that debate, and to defend a principled middle position. I argue against extreme views, which see empirical psychology either as irrelevant to, or as wholly displacing, reflective moral inquiry. Instead, I argue that moral theorists of all stripes are committed to a certain conception of moral thought—as aimed at abstracting away from individual inclinations (...) and toward interpersonal norms—and that this conception tells against both extremes. Since we cannot always know introspectively whether our particular moral judgments achieve this interpersonal standard, we must seek the sort of self-knowledge offered by empirical psychology. Yet reflective assessment of this new information remains a matter of substantive normative theorizing, rather than an immediate consequence of empirical findings themselves. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it (...) looks as though there are circumstances in which a range of possible weightings of the two goals are all equally epistemically rational. (shrink)

It will startle no one to hear that there is widespread disagreement among philosophers about the nature and criteria of epistemic justification. There are many distinct notions of epistemic justification, distinguished from one another in a bewildering variety of ways. There are internalist justification, externalist justification, coherentist justification, foundationalist justification, deontic justification, consequentialist justification, propositional justification, doxastic justification, personal justification, situational justification, objective justification, subjective justification, cognitive justification, and structural justification. None of these is quite equivalent to another, yet each (...) is proposed as a way in which something can be epistemically justified. (shrink)

Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations.On such a view, (call it the TG view) the only evaluationsthat count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluatesomething (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitivetrait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to thesetwo goods. In particular, this view implies that all theepistemic value of knowledge must be derived from thevalue of the two goals cited in TG. I argue (...) thatthis implication is false, and thus that the TG view must be abandoned. I propose a candidate to replacethe TG view that makes better sense of the value ofknowledge. (shrink)

Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefact’s conventional use. Attention must reflect our understanding of (...) the function and appropriate ways to use these artefacts, understanding that requires possession of the relevant concept. As a result, we attend to the artefact’s relevant functional properties. In these cases, attention is structured by concepts. This discussion has a bearing on the dual visual stream hypothesis. While it is often held that the two visual streams are functionally independent, the argument of this essay is that the constraints on attention suggest a functional interaction between them. (shrink)

A popular argument form uses general theories of cognitive architecture to motivate conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. This paper highlights the possibility for modus tollens reversal of this argument form. If theories of cognitive architecture generate predictions for moral cognition, then tests of moral thinking provide feedback to cognitive science. In certain circumstances, philosophers' introspective attention to their own moral deliberations can provide unique data for these tests. Recognizing the possibility for this sort of feedback helps to illuminate (...) a deep continuity between the disciplines. (shrink)

The relevance of this topic is due to the fact that new processes of informatization of society are unfolding in the conditions of new technological breakthroughs, which requires the formation of the concept of digital economy and digital management as components of the creation of an ecologically balanced and socially oriented economy, which aims at increasing the well-being of the population and improving the ecology of the population. The purpose of the study is to conceptualize the digital economy and digital (...) management in the face of new technological breakthroughs as a factor in the emergence of an environmentally balanced and socially-oriented economy, as one of the biggest challenges facing developed countries is sustainable unemployment, growing property inequality, rapid climate change and stochasticity of information. An analysis of the latest research and publications that address this issue. In the works of Maxton Graham and Randers Joergen “In search of prosperity. Managing Economic Development for Reducing Unemployment and Climate Change ”. In the second half of the twentieth century evidence has emerged of the exhaustion of global natural resources and the limited assimilation capabilities of the planetary ecosystem. The revolutionary work of the new vision was the first report by the Roman Club "Limits of Growth" by Donnelly and Dennis Meadows and Jorgen Randers, which forced them to reflect on the physical limits of human growth. “The limits of growth. 30 Years Later ”is an updated study based on new data on trends in the development of human civilization, improvements in the model and methodology of system dynamics and modern computer capabilities. Scientific novelty of the research is the identification of problems of interaction of the person, society, information in the conditions of new technological breakthroughs and conditions of overcoming the problems of stochastic information that contribute to the formation of a new concept of digital economy and digital management. Research results. The conditions of formation of the concept of digital economy and digital management in the conditions of new technological breakthroughs, on the basis of which the creation of a digital society is revealed. A new mission of digital economy and digital management is revealed, which should change the dominant essence of social philosophy, which underlies the great role of scientific and technological achievements that transform our reality. Conclusion - The formation of the concept of digital economy and digital management challenges many economic and managerial notions of new technological breakthroughs that underpin the "boundaries of growth" and the formation of digital society. (shrink)

In the C case, the turnaround at SBM has been effected. Most significant is the company’s realization that it exists to serve the consumer and, through that service, the broader society. This brief case outlines the successes Hiwasa pushed SBM management to accomplish and introduces the challenges the company faced in 2009: primarily, continuing to build its corporate social responsibility approach and addressing environmental and social issues.

Behind the playful title of this book there is a serious theory about the origin of religions, as well as an argument concerning their usefulness and the truth claims they make. Anyone familiar with Shults's work will recognize this book as a companion to his Theology after the Birth of God—and, to a lesser extent, Iconoclastic Theology: Gilles Deleuze and the Secretion of Atheism—repeating the basic argument but adding an avalanche of more recent research, engaging some different interlocutors, and outlining (...) the virtues of computer modeling as an avenue of inquiry.1 The first and last chapters detail the core of Shults's theory and the evidence for it; the inner ten... (shrink)

Part I [sections 2–4] draws out the conceptual links between modern conceptions of teleology and their Aristotelian predecessor, briefly outlines the mode of functional analysis employed to explicate teleology, and develops the notion of cybernetic organisation in order to distinguish teleonomic and teleomatic systems. Part II is concerned with arriving at a coherent notion of intentional control. Section 5 argues that intentionality is to be understood in terms of the representational properties of cybernetic systems. Following from this, section 6 argues (...) that intentional control needs to be seen as a particular type of relationship between the system and its environment. (shrink)

I shall conclude with a methodological moral. I have tried to show that there are several fundamentally different kinds of fear. One is a pure propositional attitude, one is partially a bodily state, and one is a relation between a person and a nonpropositional object. Other emotions come in similar varieties, such as hope and happiness, but with significant differences. The state of happiness, for example, does not entail any particular bodily state or feeling. So one lesson is this: it (...) is hard to generalize about “the emotions.” Further detailed, analytical studies of particular emotions are needed before a “general theory of the emotions” can be fruitfully attempted. (shrink)

Also published in Representation in mind : new approaches to mental representation / Hugh Clapin, Phillil Staines, Peter Slezak (eds.) : ISBN 008044394X.

Contextualist theories of knowledge offer a semantic hypothesis to explain the observed contextual variation in what people say they know, and the difficulty people have resolving skeptical paradoxes. Subject or speaker relative versions make the truth conditions of “S knows that p” depend on the standards of either the knower’s context (Hawthorne and Stanley) or those of the speaker’s context (Cohen and DeRose). Speaker contextualism avoids objections to subject contextualism, but is implausible in light of evidence that “know” does not (...) behave like an indexical. I deepen and extend these criticisms in light of recent defenses by contextualists (including Ludlow). Another difficulty is that whether certain standards are salient or intended does not entail that they are the proper standards. A normative form of contextualism on which the truth of a knowledge claim depends on the proper standards for the context is more promising, but still unsatisfactory whether the view is speaker or subject relative. I defend alternative explanations for the observed linguistic and psychological data: a pragmatic account for some cases and a cognitive account for others. 1. (shrink)

Mithani et al. argue that bioethics should more actively resist racial injustice and expand the range of voices heard beyond those historically considered. We largely agree with the authors’...

Here is everything you ever wanted to know about community service. Ronald W. Poplau explores the major shortcomings of today's education and introduces community service as a viable means to correct them. The book is based on 11 years of a program that the State of Kansas enacted into law.

This chapter examines the biography of Hans-Georg Gadamer and explores his particular thoughts on musical philosophy. Gadamer was born on February 11, 1900, and on March 13, 2002 he was honored with numerous prizes, among them the Reuchlin Prize of the City of Pforzheim and the Hegel Prize of the City of Stuttgart. For his understanding of art, the three concepts—play, composition, and contemporaneity or simultaneity—were constitutive. His hermeneutic position attracted and continues to attract widespread attention among scholars, ranging from (...) agreement, to criticism, to reception. Additionally, his interpretation of art as a phenomenon that belongs to epistemology rather than to the world of practice meant that for him it can be a means of cognition and the expression of cognition, i.e. a means of truth. Gadamer's Truth and Method had a powerful effect on the philosophy of art and on literature and theology. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa tem como tema a prática da análise de necessidades de formação de professores, e como principal objetivo compreender as condições que favorecem essa prática a se tornar um referencial de saberes para a legitimação das práticas de formação continuada para professores. Para alcançar esse objetivo, serão utilizadas as ferramentas teórico-metodológicas foucaultianas próprias da genealogia e arqueologia na análise de documentos pertencentes ao âmbito da atual política educacional brasileira e de trabalhos científicos sobre a análise de necessidades de professores. (...) Como resultados parciais desta pesquisa, este texto apresenta o levantamento bibliográfico de trabalhos a respeito da temática investigada, nos programas de pós-graduação do Brasil e de Portugal. (shrink)

_Relevance_. The starting point for embedding CSR as part of the management culture is the vision and values. But first, you need to understand what 'values' means in CSR terms. Companies spend time and effort in creating their mission, vision and values statements, but these are often only from a commercial and internal viewpoint. To achieve CSR values, managers need to take an objective external vie", identifying their various stakeholders, and the company's impacts upon them [1]. Management culture is part (...) of an organizational culture that includes both formal and informal elements of the organizational culture. Management culture reflects the level of the organization’s managerial system development, modernity, efficiency and functionality. It depends on this level how innovations will be implemented in the organization’s management and whether they will be implemented at all, and how effectively the objectives will be solved and the aims will be implemented [2]. Summarizing the results of various research made in different countries, it becomes clear that large companies are not always inclined to coordinate their activities with stakeholders because of their institutional weakness. Research aim: assess the level of cultural and social responsibility of organisational management and discuss their links. Research methods. Analysis of scientific literature, questionnaire survey. Research results. The findings of the research carried out in other countries proved that organizations evaluate not all aspects of corporate social responsibility, and this is influenced by the lack of the employees, as one part of the stakeholders, strong institutional capacity. The quantitative research found that the administration of both groups of companies inadequately evaluate corporate social responsibility activities, there is no feedback guaranteed, there is insufficient care about the relations with employees who are one part of stakeholders, their physical environment and psychological condition. There is no effective internal audit system of social responsibility which should be developed to guarantee feedback, and corporate social responsibility has not become an inseparable part of organizational culture. Having evaluated the weaknesses and the positive trends of management culture and social responsibility characteristics of groups of companies, it should be stated that firstly, management culture expression has influence when aiming for corporate social responsibility; secondly, corporate social responsibility can be regarded as an integral derivative of management culture realized in organizations’ management practice. However, there are also significant differences. There were set personal managerial personnel culture and management knowledge significant amounts of estimates, associated with different approaches to other management work criteria according to which the management culture condition is diagnosed. The clearer dynamics of indicator estimates of the second group of companies leads to the conclusion that the management culture is still being formed, but without clear direction vector. Processes are not clearly focused and uncoordinated. The standards, regulations existing in the second group are not sufficiently linked to the activities practice, so they do not guarantee the optimality of processes, unlike in the first group of companies, where there is a standard peculiar management culture, although the estimates of indicators diagnosing it are not particularly high. In such a situation, the questions of investment in the modernization of management, optimization of working processes remain relevant, unresolved, but the effectiveness of their payoff remains uncertain. Human resources in management policy of both groups of companies are under-estimated; in order to create favorable conditions for their effective use, communication and the interrelationship functionality problems are acute. Organizations (larger problems fixed in the second group of companies) are not adequately prepared to implement corporate social responsibility organization-wide, as management work is not optimally organized, the managerial personnel lacks knowledge and skills working with human resources. Even in the evaluation of formal aspects of corporate social responsibility standards implementation possibilities, the situation existing in groups of companies and organizational abilities of leaders would not allow to realize them systematically and effectively. In this case, corporate social responsibility values would remain more as a declarative form and not the organization’s management culture inseperable part, and a natural, balanced way of functioning of processes based on this philosophy. Though in the second group of companies there is clearer dynamics according to separate management culture parameters, the apparent orientation to modernization of activities shows more open to innovation, in which the elimination of drawbacks and purposeful development can serve the realization of corporate social responsibility more effectively. In both groups of companies the highlighted declarative corporate social responsibility policy trends contradict the actual practice of social responsibility in relations with the organization's internal and external stakeholders. This partly confirms theoretical insights presented in Lithuanian scientific works, which emphasize marketing direction of corporate social responsibility as a general cultural dominant. However, this aspect has not been developed yet in the case of the discussed groups of companies, and the research results lead to the conclusion that organizations lack basic knowledge of corporate social responsibility and motivation to realize them in practice, and the high level of clustering and internal corruption impedes social responsibility transfer to the strategic level. The lack of development of dialogue culture between stakeholders (subjects) became apparent in management culture problem areas and can become a formidable obstacle to the implementation of both individual social responsibility initiatives and installing in complex. This is true in the sense that the organizations do not have universal support from employees, and the procedures are carried out in a superficial manner and have a formal character. Corporate social responsibility is a valuable organization's internal culture category, but this base is not strong enough and balanced. Corporate social responsibility in the activities of both groups of companies (and especially - the first) can be considered still developing and has not taken clear shapes yet. According Hoskins (2006) CSR is a means of developing a management culture. However, the fundamental CSR success factor is that it is a living management process. The strategy needs to be reviewed regularly, and implemented across business units and all CSR components. The delivery of CSR practice is a critical activity. If any of the components are weak, then they detract from the effectiveness of the other components. Like all cultural aspects, CSR is only as strong as its weakest link A CSR management system is essential for CSR to become embedded within the business culture. CSR should not be a separate central activity, but become part of the business process and practice for all business units. (shrink)

This article presents the contributions of Paulo Freire to think about children's education. It breaks with a certain understanding that Freire would have been concerned only with the education of young people and adults. It is an essay that discusses the concept of child and childhood in Freire and the proposition of a pedagogy forged with children, a “girl” pedagogy.

Entre os desafios postos para as pesquisas em ciências humanas e sociais está a compreensão do cotidiano como espaço para a captura das formas de apropriação da realidade objetiva por parte dos sujeitos e, ao mesmo tempo, a identificação das respostas dos sujeitos diante das condições postas. Como categoria analítica, destacamos as reflexões de Lukács acerca da categoria alternativa, tomando-a como mediação entre teleologia e reflexo, no processo de objetivação da teleologia em causalidade posta.

The aim of this study was to develop the concept of the dignified death of children in Brazilian pediatric intensive care units (PICUs). The Hybrid Model for Concept Development was used to develop a conceptual structure of dignified death in PICUs in an attempt to define the concept. The fieldwork study was carried out by means of in-depth interviews with nine nurses and seven physicians working in PICUs. Not unexpectedly, the concept of dignified death was found to be a complex (...) phenomenon involving aspects related to decisions made by the multidisciplinary team as well as those related to care of the child and the family. Knowledge of the concept’s dimensions can promote reflection on the part of healthcare professionals regarding the values and beliefs underlying their conduct in end-of-life situations. Our hope is that this study may contribute to theoretic and methodological development in the area of end-of-life care. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Adolph Goldschmidt, Ernst Meumann, Wilhelm Waetzoldt und Arnold Schering -- Bd. 2. Paul Frankl, Emilt Utitz, Gustav Johann von Allesch und Wilhelm Worringer.

Wayne Martin and colleagues argue that decisions about patients’ best interests must sometimes take into account the interests of others Doctors often find themselves in circumstances where they must make decisions on behalf of an incapacitated patient. As a matter of both ethics and law, such decisions must be taken in the best interests of the patient, but uncertainty remains about what is meant by best interests, especially in relation to the interests of others. Should the interests of others (...) enter into a determination of the patient’s best interests? We believe that they should and argue against a recent trend to focus solely on the patient. It only takes a moment’s reflection to appreciate that the interests of one person are often wrapped up with the interests of others. A patient has an interest in recovering from her illness, but so do her family, employer, care providers, etc. Sometimes these various interests can be independently specified, but in other cases they are inextricably intertwined. Suppose that I am a single parent whose overriding interest is to ensure the wellbeing of my children. In that case the proper specification of my best interest is a function of theirs; I simply cannot determine the one without considering the other. This can create an ethical problem in medical decision making. In circumstances where medical staff must make a decision in the best interests of an incapacitated patient, to what extent can or should they take account of the interests of other people whose lives are affected by the outcome? These ethical issues have taken on a concrete legal shape in the UK with the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which specifies that, “An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity …. (shrink)

In order to investigate cognition fundamental assumptions must be made about what, in general terms, it is. In cognitive science it is usually assumed that cognition is computational and representational. There have been well known disputes over these assumptions, with rival claims that cognition is dynamical, situated and embodied. In this paper I emphasize the relations between cognition and control. I present a model of cognition that makes the claim that it is a form of high-order control, and I argue (...) that viewing cognition as high-order control could be a useful framework assumption for cognitive science. Cognition has many aspects and different concepts can emphasize different aspects of it. Computational and representational assumptions have been very productive, and dynamical and embodied assumptions have also been productive, though to a much lesser extent so far. Control, however, has received insufficient attention in cognition science. The model I propose is based on a point that few will dispute, namely that control of behavior is the ultimate function of cognition. Bringing this to the foreground can be productive by highlighting the ways in which cognition is structured in relation to this control function. If this perspective is valuable it will be because the control function has a highly structuring effect on cognition. As a result a control-based perspective will predict many features of cognition and yield a coherent, integrated picture. (shrink)

We use the Newell Test as a basis for evaluating ACT-R as an effective architecture for cognitive engineering. Of the 12 functional criteria discussed by Anderson & Lebiere (A&L), we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of ACT-R on the six that we postulate are the most relevant to cognitive engineering.