This ground-breaking book brings together researchers from a wide range of disciplines to discuss the control and coordination of processes involved in perceptually guided actions. The research area of motor control has become an increasingly multidisciplinary undertaking. Understanding the acquisition and performance of voluntary movements in biological and artificial systems requires the integration of knowledge from a variety of disciplines from neurophysiology to biomechanics.

The paper takes an expressivistic perspective, i.e., it takes conditionals of all sorts to primarily express conditional beliefs. Therefore it is based on what it takes to be the best account of conditional belief, namely ranking theory. It proposes not to start looking at the bewildering linguistic phenomenology, but first to systematically study the various options of expressing features of conditional belief. Those options by far transcend the Ramsey test and include relevancies of various kinds and in particular the so-called (...) “circumstances are such that” reading, under which also all conditionals representing causal relations can be subsumed. In this way a unifying perspective on the many kinds of conditionals is offered. The final section explains the considerable extent to which truth conditions for conditionals, which may seem lost in the expressivistic or epistemic perspective, may be recovered. (shrink)

The paper displays the similarity between the theory of probabilistic causation developed by Glymour et al. since 1983 and mine developed since 1976: the core of both is that causal graphs are Bayesian nets. The similarity extends to the treatment of actions or interventions in the two theories. But there is also a crucial difference. Glymour et al. take causal dependencies as primitive and argue them to behave like Bayesian nets under wide circumstances. By contrast, I argue the behavior of (...) Bayesian nets to be ultimately the defining characteristic of causal dependence. (shrink)

This series publishes outstanding monographs and edited volumes that investigate all aspects of Kant's philosophy, including its systematic relationship to other philosophical approaches, both past and present. Studies that appear in the series are distinguished by their innovative nature and ability to close lacunae in the research. In this way, the series is a venue for the latest findings in scholarship on Kant.

Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are new Gettier-type examples (...) which are grounded in “distant” epistemic luck. It is demonstrated that sensitivity and safety theories cannot handle such examples. (shrink)

One of the world's pre-eminent Max Weber scholars here presents a comprehensive analysis of Weber's ambiguous stance toward modernity considered from a normative, theoretical, and historical point of view. The book is in two parts. Part I scrutinises Weber's world view. On the basis of his thinking about the meaning and inter-relationships of science, politics, and ethics in the modern era, Weber is seen as the embodiment of a social scientist and political thinker who exposes himself to intellectual risks and (...) existential tensions while resisting final solutions. It includes a masterly analysis of Weber's two famous speeches 'Science as a Vocation' and 'Politics as a Vocation'. Part II considers Weber's unfinished project on the sociology of religion. Piecing together planned and partially completed works on Islam and Western Christianity, Schluchter locates them in the history and theory of Weber's overall work. This reconstruction of Weber's work on religion emphasises its interplay between religion, economy, politics, and law. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band enthalt sechs teilweise stark iiberarbeitete Aufsatze, die in der Zeit zwischen der Niederschrift des Buches Theorienstrnkturen und Theoriendynamik, Springer-Verlag 1973, im folgenden mit [Theoriendynamik] bezeichnet, und der Monographie The Strncturalist View of Theories. A Pos­ sible Analogue of the Bourbaki Programme in Physical Science, Springer-Ver­ lag 1979, im folgenden kurz [Strnkturalismus] genannt, entstanden sind. In diesen Abhandlungen werden jeweils gewisse Aspekte des strukturalistischen Theorienkonzeptes behandelt. Am starksten iiberarbeitet wurden die Auf­ satze II, IV, V und VI, die (...) urspriinglich in englischer Sprache erschienen waren. Vier der sechs Arbeiten, namlich I, III, IV und VI, bilden auBerdem erweiterte Fassungen von Vortragen. Obwohl das zweite Buch [Strnkturalismus] durch P. Feyerabends ausftihr­ liche Diskussion der strukturalistischen Auffassung im British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Dezember 1977, angeregt worden ist, stellt es seinem Ansatz und Aufbau nach eher den Versuch einer systematischen Kurzdarstel­ lung des strukturalistischen Vorgehens nach seinem letzten Stande dar. Dem­ gegeniiber entstanden die hier verOffentlichten Artikel stets aus einem ganz be­ stimmten AnlaB. Diese Anlasse konnte man schematisch in drei Klassen unter­ teilen: Entweder ging es darum, eine anschauliche intuitive Ein/iihrnng zu lie­ fern (I und V); oder die Aufgabe bestand darin, die Beziehung zu anderen philosophischen Positionen. wie z. B. derjenigen L. Wittgensteins, H. Putnams, K. Poppers oder T. S. Kuhns. zu analysieren (II. III und IV); oder es sollte zu den wichtigsten und bis dahin verOffentlichten Kritiken Stellung bezogen wer­ den (wie in VI). (shrink)

SummaryA simple and precise definition is offered of “term t of theory T being T‐theoretical” which can be applied to any formalized theory. The definition is in line with and emends traditional accounts of theoreticity. Its adequacy is demonstrated by application to three examples: exchange economics, classical mechanics and collision mechanics.

And this paper is an attempt to say precisely how, thus addressing a philosophical problem which is commonly taken to be a serious one. It does so, however, in quite an idiosyncratic way. It is based on the account of inductive schemes I have given in (1988) and (1990a) and on the conception of causation I have presented in (1980), (1983), and (1990b), and it intends to fill one of many gaps which have been left by these papers. Still, I (...) have tried to make this paper self-contained. Section 1 explains the philosophical question this paper is about; in more general terms it asks what might be meant by objectifying epistemic states or features of them and to which extent epistemic states can be objectified. The next sections introduce the basis I rely on with formal precision and some explanation; section 2 deals with induction and section 3 with causation. Within these confines, section 4 attempts to give an explication of the relevant sense of objectification and section 5 investigates the extent to which various features of epistemic states are objectifiable. The two most salient results are roughly that the relation "A is a reason for B" cannot be objectified at all and that the relation "A is a cause of B" can be objectified only under substantial, though reasonable restrictions. What has all of this to do with probability? A lot. The paper trades on a pervasive duality between probabilistic and deterministic epistemology, between a probabilistic representation of epistemic states together with a theory of probabilistic causation and another representation of epistemic states which I call deterministic because it lends itself, in a perfectly parallel fashion, to a theory of deterministic causation. Here I explicitly deal only with the deterministic side, but the duality should pave the way for further conclusions concerning objective probabilities and statistical laws. This outlook is briefly expanded in the final section 6. (shrink)

We define classes Φnof formulae of first-order arithmetic with the following properties:(i) Everyφϵ Φnis classically equivalent to a Πn-formula (n≠ 1, Φ1:= Σ1).(ii)(iii)IΠnandiΦn(i.e., Heyting arithmetic with induction schema restricted to Φn-formulae) prove the same Π2-formulae.We further generalize a result by Visser and Wehmeier. namely that prenex induction within intuitionistic arithmetic is rather weak: After closing Φnboth under existential and universal quantification (we call these classes Θn) the corresponding theoriesiΘnstill prove the same Π2-formulae. In a second part we consideriΔ0plus collection-principles. We (...) show that both the provably recursive functions and the provably total functions ofare polynomially bounded. Furthermore we show that the contrapositive of the collection-schema gives rise to instances of the law of excluded middle and hence. (shrink)

Counterpart theory is often advertised by its track record at solving metaphysical puzzles. Here I focus on puzzles of occasional identity, wherein distinct individuals at one world or time appear to be identical at another world or time. To solve these puzzles, the usual interpretation rules of counterpart theory must be extended beyond the simple language of quantified modal logic. I present a more comprehensive semantics that allows talking about specific times and worlds, that takes into account the multiplicity and (...) sortal-dependence of counterpart relations, and that does not require names to denote actual or present individuals. In addition, the semantics I defend does not identify ordinary individuals with world-bound or time-bound stages and thereby avoids the most controversial aspect of counterpart theory. Humphrey’s counterpart at other worlds or times is none other than Humphrey himself. (shrink)

Analogical reasoning addresses the question how evidence from various phenomena can be combined and made relevant for theory development and prediction. In the first part of my contribution, I review some influential accounts of analogical reasoning, both historical and contemporary, focusing in particular on Keynes, Carnap, Hesse, and more recently Bartha. In the second part, I sketch a general framework. To this purpose, a distinction between a predictive and a conceptual type of analogical reasoning is introduced. I then take up (...) a common intuition according to which analogical inferences hold if the differences between source and target concern only irrelevant circumstances. I attempt to make this idea more precise by addressing possible objections and in particular by specifying a notion of causal irrelevance based on difference making in homogeneous contexts. (shrink)

Dans l’histoire de la philosophie et des sciences, Aristote a été le premier à élaborer une théorie du temps. Cette théorie, telle qu’elle est présentée en Physique IV 10-14 et VI 2, soulève de nombreuses questions et semble comporter un certain nombre d’énigmes. Toute tentative de lui donner un sens est alourdie par sa complexité et sa présentation souvent cryptique. La plupart des spécialistes modernes pensent que la théorie du temps d’Aristote est imparfaite. Ils se plaignent notamment que cette théorie (...) est incohérente, qu’elle manque d’unité systématique, qu’elle échoue dans sa tentative de déduire les propriétés du temps à partir des propriétés de l’espace et du mouvement, et qu’elle n’explique pas la flèche du temps. Cet article cherche à montrer que ces objections ne sont pas fondées. Selon la nouvelle lecture de Physique IV 10-14 et VI 2 proposée dans l’article qui suit, la théorie du temps d’Aristote est logiquement cohérente, présente une structure logique sophistiquée qui n’est pas strictement déductive, éclaire la flèche du temps et fournit une synthèse du temps dit subjectif et objectif. L’annexe présente une comparaison entre la théorie du temps d’Aristote et la théorie du temps de la physique contemporaine sur la théorie objective du temps et de la psychologie cognitive contemporaine sur la théorie subjective du temps. (shrink)

David Lewis's position, often called analytic functionalism, was inspired by Ryle's analytic behaviorism, which took psychological predicates to express complex sets of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, the author reviews some tenets of Lewis's philosophy of mind and begins with some comments on the methodology Lewis employed in his analysis of psychological terms, which has become standard in functionalist accounts across philosophy. Then, he discusses the difference between what are often called “realizer functionalism” and “role functionalism,” and argues that Lewis (...) made the wrong choice. In Lewis's argument for the identity theory, the identity of mental states with biological states follows logically from folk‐psychological definitions and broadly physical facts. A central part of folk psychology concerns the interaction of beliefs, desires, and choices. The chapter presents Lewis's often misunderstood account of intentionality. It also presents few pessimistic remarks on the prospect of analyzing phenomenal truths in terms of functional role. (shrink)

There is a tacit assumption that interpretation comes naturally, that human beings live by constantly interpreting. In this sense, we might even rephrase Descartes by saying: We interpret, therefore we are. While such a basic human disposition makes interpretation appear to come naturally, the forms it takes, however, do not. In this work, Iser offers a fresh approach by formulating an "anatomy of interpretation" through which we can understand the act of interpretation in its many different manifestations. For Iser, there (...) are several different genres of interpretation, all of which are acts of translation designed to transpose something into something else. Perhaps the most obvious example of interpretation involves canonical texts, such as the Rabbinical exegesis of the Torah or Samuel Johnson's reading of Shakespeare. But what happens when the matter that one seeks to interpret consists not of a text but of a welter of fragments, as in the study of history, or when something is hidden, as in the practice of psychoanalysis, or is as complex as a culture or system? Iser details how, in each of these cases, the space that is opened up by interpretation is negotiated in a different way, thus concluding that interpretation always depends on what it seeks to translate. For students of philosophy, literary and critical theory, anthropology, and cultural history, Iser's elucidation of the mechanics by which we translate and understand, as well as his assessment of the anthropological roots of our drive to make meaning, will undoubtedly serve as a revelation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I give a brief account of the history of the debate on the problem of defining disposition concepts from its beginning in the late 1920s until today. This account is divided into four parts, corresponding with 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the paper, each of which deals with a major period of the debate. Section 2 reports up to the mid-1950s. Section 3 deals with important contributions to the discussion between 1955 (...) and 1958. However, the progress made around that time was far ahead of the logical theory and techniques which were needed for foundational reasons and for a better understanding of the basic notions. Some logical techniques appropriate for that aim were developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Though not uncontroversial, those logical techniques resulted in improvements of the insights gained in the mid-1950s; I shall report on those logical techniques and their application to the problem of defining disposition concepts in Section 4. In the early 1990s, however, the whole tradition of defining disposition concepts in terms of conditionals has been challenged by some strong counter-examples which are treated in Section 5. Finally, the second of the aims of this paper is explored in Section 6, in which I sketch very briefly the current stage of the debate by discussing and evaluating the most recent approaches to the subject. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Fichte" verfügbar.

It is shown that the class of Kolmogorov-Loveland stochastic sequences is not closed under selecting subsequences by monotonic computable selection rules. This result gives a strong negative answer to the question whether the Kolmogorov-Loveland stochastic sequences are closed under selecting sequences by Kolmogorov-Loveland selection rules, i.e., by not necessarily monotonic, partial computable selection rules. The following previously known results are obtained as corollaries. The Mises-Wald-Church stochastic sequences are not closed under computable permutations, hence in particular they form a strict superclass (...) of the class of Kolmogorov-Loveland stochastic sequences. The Kolmogorov-Loveland selection rules are not closed under composition. (shrink)

In his contribution to this special issue, Almaas is keen to distinguish the individual streams of consciousness from 'pure awareness'. Since the existence of the former is presumably quite uncontroversial in present-day philosophy, I wish to concentrate on the latter, in particular on Almaas's claim that pure awareness is non-individual and ultimately it is 'the true owner of all experiences of all streams'. In my contribution, I wish to make plausible, by a philosophical reflection on the puzzling nature of the (...) I, that the ultimate subject of experience is indeed not the individual but 'the pure ego of the universe'. (shrink)

This book addresses controversies concerning the epistemological foundations of data science: Is it a genuine science? Or is data science merely some inferior practice that can at best contribute to the scientific enterprise, but cannot stand on its own? The author proposes a coherent conceptual framework with which these questions can be rigorously addressed. Readers will discover a defense of inductivism and consideration of the arguments against it: an epistemology of data science more or less by definition has to be (...) inductivist, given that data science starts with the data. As an alternative to enumerative approaches, the author endorses Federica Russo’s recent call for a variational rationale in inductive methodology. Chapters then address some of the key concepts of an inductivist methodology including causation, probability and analogy, before outlining an inductivist framework. The inductivist framework is shown to be adequate and useful for an analysis of the epistemological foundations of data science. The author points out that many aspects of the variational rationale are present in algorithms commonly used in data science. Introductions to algorithms and brief case studies of successful data science such as machine translation are included. Data science is located with reference to several crucial distinctions regarding different kinds of scientific practices, including between exploratory and theory-driven experimentation, and between phenomenological and theoretical science. Computer scientists, philosophers and data scientists of various disciplines will find this philosophical perspective and conceptual framework of great interest, especially as a starting point for further in-depth analysis of algorithms used in data science. (shrink)

It is shown that the class of reduced matrices of a logic is a 1 st order -class provided the variety associated with has the finite replacement property in the sense of [7]. This applies in particular to all 2-valued logics. For 3-valued logics the class of reduced matrices need not be 1 st order.

The paper argues that the standard decision theoretic account of strategies and their rationality or optimality is much too narrow, that strategies should rather condition future action to future decision situations (a point of view already developed in my Grundlagen der Entscheidungstheorie, sect. 4.4), that practical deliberation must therefore essentially rely on a relation of superiority and inferiority between possible future decision situations, that all this allows to substantially broaden the theory of practical rationality, that a long list of points (...) attended to in the literature can be subsumed under the broadened perspective (including a novel view on the iterated prisoner's dilemma and on iterated Newcomb's problem, which, however, is revised in Spohn (2003) "Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation"), and that the task to complete and systematize this list indeed forms a fruitful research programme. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 3 Seiten: 436-455.

In his entire oeuvre Brentano defended a scientific conception of philosophy and advocated the adoption of a rigorous, scientific method. Given this background it might come as a surprise that in his reflections on aesthetics he firmly rejected the classic definition of aesthetics as the science of beauty. This must not be read as an expression of disinterest in – or a dismissal of – aesthetics, though. It is rather an expression of Brentano's view concerning the position of aesthetics in (...) his overall system. He conceived it – on a par with logic and ethics – not as a theoretical science, but as a practical discipline that was rooted in psychology: aesthetics, Brentano suggests, is not constituted by a set of intrinsically related propositions; it rather serves the practical purpose of instructing those who want to experience the beautiful with correct taste or to create works of art. The task of aesthetics is, in other words, to formulate a set of rules or instructions that teach us how to correctly experience beauty, how to come to prefer the more over the less beautiful, but also how to create beauty and how to produce works of art that have the power to bring about aesthetic pleasure in the beholder. (shrink)

This paper argues that social representations cannot be used as independent variables in causal explanations of social behaviour. It is shown that the structure of investigations often follows a causally explanatory design despite explicit statements to the contrary by the researchers. This fact is analyzed with three investigations. It is argued that verbal data used to assess the contents of a representation as independent variable are logically equivalent to data obtained from the “dependent” overt behaviour. Therefore these two kinds of (...) data must be seen as two illustrations of the same representational contents. The researchers’preference for using verbal data to assess the independent variable and the tendency to introduce a causal relationship between representation and behaviour is shown to result from misplacing folk-beliefs. Folk-beliefs about intentional causality, it is shown, pertain to the same level as other beliefs about the world on the part of the subjects. Hence they are part of the folk-representation itself and must be treated as such; their use in scientific accounts of the belief-action relationship is not implied by data on rational belief systems. It is suggested to conceptualize social representations as integral units of beliefs and action which may be used to explain causally subsequent contingent social events. The function of folk-beliefs in intentional causality for the self-concept of rational people and for social accountability is discussed. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that the _Physical Monadology of 1756 has to be seen as an attempt to evade the same paradox as the one given in the second antinomy of the _Critique of Pure Reason. Since this attempt presupposes the claim that space rests upon relations between substances, it contradicts the thesis that it is a mere form of intuition, presented by Kant in his dissertation of 1770. Therefore, at least since 1770 the paradox of the divisibility (...) of matter rose up again so that Kant had to deal with it once again in his first _Critique. Remarkably, his key to solve the second antinomy is the same which ruled out his earlier solution of 1756 and gave rise to the paradox again, i.e., the ideality of space and time. But, contrary to the dissertation, in the _Critique it is substituted by the doctrine that our knowledge of objects depends on and is restricted to intuitively given objects and this is crucial to the solution of the second antinomy. Finally, it will be shown how Kant deals with the problem of the divisibility of matter in the _Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. (shrink)