En esta entrevista con el Prof. Dr. Daniel Brauer, uno de los investigadores que ha dedicado importantes estudios al pensamiento de Hegel y ha contribuido a su recepción en Argentina, se ponen de manifiesto algunos momentos significativos de su experiencia como docente e investigador en las últimas décadas.

Relying on aesthetic testimony seems problematic. For instance, it seems problematic for me to simply believe or assert that The Velvet Underground's debut album The Velvet Underground and Nico (1964) is amazing solely because you have told me so, even though I know you to be an honest and competent music critic. But why? After all, there do not seem to be similar reservations regarding testimony from many other domains. In this paper, I will argue that relying on aesthetic testimony (...) seems problematic because we are attached to an ideal of aesthetic authenticity and feel that living up to this ideal is anathema to simply relying on aesthetic testimony. (shrink)

Many philosophers, following Williamson (The Philosophical Review 105(4): 489–523, 1996), Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford, Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2000), subscribe to the constitutive rule account of assertion (CRAA). They hold that the activity of asserting is constituted by a single constitutive rule of assertion. However, in recent work, Maitra (in: Brown & Cappelen (ed). Assertion: new philosophical essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), Johnson (Acta Analytica 33(1): 51–67, 2018), and Kelp and Simion (Synthese 197(1): 125–137, 2020a), Kelp and (...) Simion (in: Goldberg (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020b) aim to show that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, asserting is not an activity constituted by a single constitutive rule and that therefore CRAA is very likely false. To reach this conclusion, they all present a version of what can be dubbed the engagement condition objection. That is, they each propose a necessary condition on engaging in rule-constituted activities. Then they argue that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, one can make assertions without satisfying this condition. In response, I present a counterexample that shows that the proposed engagement conditions lead to coun- terintuitive results, and I propose an alternative that better captures our intuitions. Then I argue that this alternative engagement condition is compatible with all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion. (shrink)

Modal logic has been used to analyze potential infinity and potentialism more generally. However, the standard analysis breaks down in cases of divergent possibilities, where there are two or more possibilities that can be individually realized but which are jointly incompatible. This paper has three aims. First, using the intuitionistic theory of choice sequences, we motivate the need for a modal analysis of divergent potentialism and explain the challenges this involves. Then, using Beth–Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, we overcome those (...) challenges. Finally, we apply our modal analysis of divergent potentialism to make choice sequences comprehensible in classical terms. (shrink)

Modal logic provides an elegant way to understand the notion of potential infinity. This raises the question of what the right modal logic is for reasoning about potential infinity. In this article I identify a choice point in determining the right modal logic: Can a potentially infinite collection ever be expanded in two mutually incompatible ways? If not, then the possible expansions are convergent; if so, then the possible expansions are branching. When possible expansions are convergent, the right modal logic (...) is S4.2, and a mirroring theorem due to Linnebo allows for a natural potentialist interpretation of mathematical discourse. When the possible expansions are branching, the right modal logic is S4. However, the usual box and diamond do not suffice to express everything the potentialist wants to express. I argue that the potentialist also needs an operator expressing that something will eventually happen in every possible expansion. I prove that the result of adding this operator to S4 makes the set of validities Pi-1-1 hard. This result makes it unlikely that there is any natural translation of ordinary mathematical discourse into the potentialist framework in the context of branching possibilities. (shrink)

Recently, Jennifer Saul (“Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump”, 2017; “Racist and Sexist Figleaves”, 2021) has explored the use of what she calls “figleaves” in the discourse on race and gender. Following Saul, a figleaf is an utterance that, for some portion of the audience, blocks the conclusion that some other utterance, R, or the person who uttered R is racist or sexist. Such racial and gender figleaves are pernicious, says Saul, because, (...) among other things, they can shift the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable to think or say. This paper expands on Saul’s picture in a threefold way: It is first argued that appeals to statistics can function as figleaves. It is then argued that—as far as figleaves go—there is reason to believe that statistics-as-figleaves are especially pernicious. Finally, the paper explores some strategies for counterspeech. (shrink)

Which function is computed by a Turing machine will depend on how the symbols it manipulates are interpreted. Further, by invoking bizarre systems of notation it is easy to define Turing machines that compute textbook examples of uncomputable functions, such as the solution to the decision problem for first-order logic. Thus, the distinction between computable and uncomputable functions depends on the system of notation used. This raises the question: which systems of notation are the relevant ones for determining whether a (...) function is computable? These are the acceptable notations. I argue for a use criterion of acceptability: the acceptable notations for a domain of objects D\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {D}}$$\end{document} are the notations that we can use for the usual D\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {D}}$$\end{document}-activities. Acceptable notations for natural numbers are ones that we can count with. Acceptable notations for logical formulas are the ones that we can use in inference and logical analysis. And so on. This criterion makes computability a relative notion—whether a function is computable depends on which notations are acceptable, which is relative to our interests and abilities. I argue that this is not a problem, however, since there is independent reason for taking the extension of computable function to be relative to contingent facts. Similarly, the fact that the use criterion makes a mathematical distinction depend on practical concerns is also not a problem because it dovetails with similar phenomena in other areas of computability theory, namely the roles of notation in computation over real numbers and of Extended Church’s Thesis in complexity theory. (shrink)

This paper clarifies, revises, and extends the account of the transmission of truthmakers by core proofs that was set out in chap. 9 of Tennant. Brauer provided two kinds of example making clear the need for this. Unlike Brouwer’s counterexamples to excluded middle, the examples of Brauer that we are dealing with here establish the need for appeals to excluded middle when applying, to the problem of truthmaker-transmission, the already classical metalinguistic theory of model-relative evaluations.

Although much technical and philosophical attention has been given to relevance logics, the notion of relevance itself is generally left at an intuitive level. It is difficult to find in the literature an explicit account of relevance in formal reasoning. In this article I offer a formal explication of the notion of relevance in deductive logic and argue that this notion has an interesting place in the study of classical logic. The main idea is that a premise is relevant to (...) an argument when it contributes to the validity of that argument. I then argue that the sequents which best embody this ideal of relevance are the so-called perfect sequents—that is, sequents which are valid but have no proper subsequents that are valid. Church’s theorem entails that there is no recursively axiomatizable proof-system that proves all and only the perfect sequents, so the project that emerges from studying perfection in classical logic is not one of finding a perfect subsystem of classical logic, but is rather a comparative study of classifying subsystems of classical logic according to how well they approximate the ideal of perfection. (shrink)

This paper addresses a question that has sparked heated debate while mostly flying under the philosophical radar: Should people stop wearing merch of bands they don’t listen to? I respond affirmatively. People should stop wearing merch of bands they don’t listen to because (i) doing so can silence people who wear band merch to communicate their taste in music and (ii) this silencing threatens the valuable role that wearing band merch plays in the aesthetic lives of people who share a (...) taste in music: promoting aesthetic community between them. As will emerge throughout the paper, this argument is relevant to the debate on silencing as well as the debate on the value of aesthetic community. (shrink)

The problem of peer disagreement is to explain how you should respond when you and a peer have the same evidence bearing on some proposition and are equally competent epistemic agents, yet have reached opposite conclusions about. According to Christensen's Independence Thesis, in assessing the effect of your peer's disagreement, you must not rely on the reasoning behind your initial belief. I note that ‘the reasoning behind your initial belief’ can be given either a token or type reading. I argue (...) that the type reading is false, but the token reading is extremely weak. (shrink)

Free choice sequences play a key role in the intuitionistic theory of the continuum and especially in the theorems of intuitionistic analysis that conflict with classical analysis, leading many classical mathematicians to reject the concept of a free choice sequence. By treating free choice sequences as potentially infinite objects, however, they can be comfortably situated alongside classical analysis, allowing a rapprochement of these two mathematical traditions. Building on recent work on the modal analysis of potential infinity, I formulate a modal (...) theory of the free choice sequences known as lawless sequences. Intrinsically well-motivated axioms for lawless sequences are added to a background theory of classical second-order arithmetic, leading to a theory I call $MC_{LS}$. This theory interprets the standard intuitionistic theory of lawless sequences and is conservative over the classical background theory. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, that if it is metaphysically possible for it to have been the case that nothing existed, then it follows that the right modal logic cannot extend D, ruling out popular modal logics S4 and S5. I provisionally defend the claim that it is possible for nothing to have existed. I then consider the various ways of resisting the conclusion that the right modal logic is weaker than D.

Could age be a valid criterion for rationing? In Just health, Norman Daniels argues that under certain circumstances age rationing is prudent, and therefore a morally permissible strategy to tackle the problem of resource scarcity. Crucial to his argument is the distinction between two problem-settings of intergenerational equity: equity among age groups and equity among birth cohorts. While fairness between age groups can involve unequal benefit treatment in different life stages, fairness between birth cohorts implies enjoying approximate equality in benefit (...) ratios. Although both questions of fairness are distinct, the resolution of the one depends on resolution of the other. In this paper, I investigate whether Daniels’ account of age rationing could be defended as a fair way of setting limits to healthcare entitlements. I will focus on two main points. First, I will consider whether the age group problem could be resolved without appealing to a conception of the good. Second, I will demonstrate that the connection between the age group problem and the birth cohort problem runs deeper than Daniels initially thought—and that it ultimately suggests a method for prioritisation in problem solving strategies. (shrink)

Ignacio Jane has argued that second-order logic presupposes some amount of set theory and hence cannot legitimately be used in axiomatizing set theory. I focus here on his claim that the second-order formulation of the Axiom of Separation presupposes the character of the power set operation, thereby preventing a thorough study of the power set of infinite sets, a central part of set theory. In reply I argue that substantive issues often cannot be separated from a logic, but rather must (...) be presupposed. I call this the logic-metalogic link. There are two facets to the logic-metalogic link. First, when a logic is entangled with a substantive issue, the same position on that issue should be taken at the meta- level as at the object level; and second, if an expression has a clear meaning in natural language, then the corresponding concept can equally well be deployed in a formal language. The determinate nature of the power set operation is one such substantive issue in set theory. Whether there is a determinate power set of an infinite set can only be presupposed in set theory, not proved, so the use of second-order logic cannot be ruled out by virtue of presupposing one answer to this question. Moreover, the legitimacy of presupposing in the background logic that the power set of an infinite set is determinate is guaranteed by the clarity and definiteness of the notions of all and of subset. This is also exactly what is required for the same presupposition to be legitimately made in an axiomatic set theory, so the use of second-order logic in set theory rather than first-order logic does not require any new metatheoretic commitments. (shrink)

Drawing on sociological and anthropological studies, the aim of this article is to reconstruct how obstetric technologies contribute to a moral conception of pregnancy and motherhood, and to evaluate that conception from a normative point of view. Obstetrics and midwifery, so the assumption, are value-laden, value-producing and value-reproducing practices, values that shape the social perception of what it means to be a “good” pregnant woman and to be a “good” mother. Activities in the medical field of reproduction contribute to “kinning”, (...) that is the making of particular social relationships marked by closeness and special moral obligations. Three technologies, which belong to standard procedures in prenatal care in postmodern societies, are presently investigated: informed consent in prenatal care, obstetric sonogram, and birth plan. Their widespread application issupposed to serve the moral goal of effecting patient autonomy. A reconstruction of the actual moral implications of these technologies, however, reveals that this goal is missed in multiple ways. Informed consent situations are marked by involuntariness and blindness to social dimensions of decision-making; obstetric sonograms construct moral subjectivity and agency in a way that attribute inconsistent and unreasonable moral responsibilities to the pregnant woman; and birth plans obscure the need for a healthcare environment that reflects a shared-decision-making model, rather than a rational-choice-framework. (shrink)

Linnebo and Shapiro have recently given an analysis of potential infinity using modal logic. A key technical component of their account is to show that under a suitable translation ◊ of nonmodal language into modal language, nonmodal sentences ϕ 1, …, ϕ n entail ψ just in case ϕ 1 ◊, …, ϕ n ◊ entail ψ ◊ in the modal logic S4.2. Linnebo and Shapiro establish this result in nonfree logic. In this note I argue that their analysis of (...) potential infinity should be carried out in a free logic. I then extend their key theorems to the setting of negative free logic. (shrink)

Should environmental, social, and economic sustainability be of primary concern to engineers? Should social justice be among these concerns? Although the deterioration of our natural environment and the increase in social injustices are among today’s most pressing and important issues, engineering codes of ethics and their paramountcy clause, which contains those values most important to engineering and to what it means to be an engineer, do not yet put either concept on a par with the safety, health, and welfare of (...) the public. This paper addresses a recent proposal by Michelfelder and Jones (2011) to include sustainability in the paramountcy clause as a way of rectifying the current disregard for social justice issues in the engineering codes. That proposal builds on a certain notion of sustainability that includes social justice as one of its dimensions and claims that social justice is a necessary condition for sustainability, not vice versa. The relationship between these concepts is discussed, and the original proposal is rejected. Drawing on insights developed throughout the paper, some suggestions are made as to how one should address the different requirements that theory and practice demand of the value taxonomy of professional codes of ethics. (shrink)

People partaking in a conversation can add to the common ground of said conversation by performing different speech acts. That is, they can influence which propositions are presumed to be shared among them. In this paper, I am going to apply the common ground framework to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. In doing so, I am going to focus on two kindsof speech acts: making assertions and asking certain kinds of questions. And I am going to look at three varieties (...) of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, inquiring injus-tice and interpretative injustice.I am going to argue that what all these varieties of epistemic injustice have in common is that they unfairly inhibit the speaker’s ability to add to the common ground in the way intended by her. This in turn negatively affects which con-versational roles a speaker can play in a given conversation. Based on these results, I am going to end by looking at some of the harms that epistemic injustice inflicts upon its victims. (shrink)

Under which conditions are we epistemically justied to believe that what other people tell us is true? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist or anti-reductionist: Either our justication reduces to non-testimonial reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we are told. However, different cases pull in different directions. Intuitively, someone asking for the time is subject to different epistemic standards than a surgeon consulting a colleague before a dangerous operation. Following this line of thought, (...) this paper develops an account of testimonial justication that captures our reductionist as well as our anti-reductionist intuitions. It is argued that the speaker’s commitment to an epistemic norm, as well as the hearer’s understanding of that norm, gives the hearer a presumptive right to believe what she is told. However, this justication doesn’t apply to situations with high practical risks. Here, the hearer needs reductive reasons to believe that her interlocutor is especially qualied to give her the desired information. (shrink)

In this paper, I spell out a new challenge for epistemic internalism that emerges out of the current debate on testimonial justification. Based on recent developments within this debate, one might argue as follows: Epistemic internalism can’t account for the justification of our testimony-based beliefs, because (1) we should conceive of testimonial justification along anti-reductionist lines and (2) anti-reductionism is incompatible with epistemic internalism. In response to this challenge, I show that, despite initial appearances, epistemic internalism and anti-reductionism are compatible (...) after all. Therefore, being an anti-reductionist with regard to testimonial justification doesn’t force one to reject epistemic internalism. In order to argue for this result, I will make use of resources provided by speech act theory. (shrink)

Sowohl in der klinischen und rechtlichen Praxis als auch in der Medizinethik besteht Uneinigkeit darüber, was die (moralische) Verbindlichkeit von Patientenverfügungen begründet und wie mit ihnen in der Praxis zu verfahren ist. Dieser Artikel versucht, die ethisch-normative Basis von Patientenverfügungen näher zu beleuchten. Eine Bestimmung erfolgt in drei Schritten. Erstens wird analysiert, welche Autonomiekonzeption Patientenverfügungen zugrunde liegt. Patientenverfügungen, so meine These, sind Ausdruck eines relationalen, um den Aspekt der Persönlichkeit angereicherten Autonomiebegriffs. Eine moralische Verbindlichkeit ist mit dieser Analyse noch nicht (...) geklärt. Im Anschluss werden daher Argumente gesammelt, warum eine Patientenverfügung für Drittpersonen moralische Bindungskraft haben könnte. In der Achtung der Persönlichkeit sehe ich hier einen zentralen Punkt. Ob die Legitimität der in einer Patientenverfügung geäußerten Wünsche relativ zu einer bestehenden Rechtskultur, dem Allgemeinverständnis einer Gesellschaft oder der Kultur einer medizinischen Praxis ist, oder unabhängig vom soziokulturellen Kontext begründet werden kann, bleibt dabei eine offene Frage. (shrink)

The implicit commitment thesis is the claim that believing in a mathematical theory S carries an implicit commitment to further sentences not deductively entailed by the theory, such as the consistency sentence Con(S). I provide a new argument for this thesis based on the notion of mathematical certainty. I also reply to a recent argument by Walter Dean against the implicit commitment thesis, showing that my formulation of the thesis avoids the difficulties he raises.

Este artículo elucida el papel que asume la autobiografía en el pensamiento de Dilthey como paradigma para entender el pasado en general y su particular relación con la historiografía. Su teoría de la escritura histórica no puede identificarse, como lo hace Gadamer, con una forma de historicismo relativista. Se muestra el modo en que Dilthey concibe el pasaje de la primera a la tercera persona y por lo tanto de la “vivencia” y la “reflexión retrospectiva”, de allí a la biografía (...) y de esta al discurso histórico en general. El autor no reniega de la pretensión de cientificidad de la historia a la vez que reconoce en el arte en general y en la literatura en particular una contribución al conocimiento del pasado. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 419-436.

1. Bd. Moralia Horatiana; das ist, Die horazische Sittenlehre, von P. von Zesen.--2. Bd. La doctrine des moeurs, tiree de la philosophie des stoiques, par M. Le R. de Gomberville.