Previous studies have shown that the color red can affect basic motor functioning. However, these studies utilized simple gross motor tasks rather than those assessing complex fine motor skills. Moreover, these empirical studies were theoretically based on the threat–behavior link in human and non-human animals, and neglected the relationship between arousal and motor performance. According to the Yerkes–Dodson law and the inverted-U hypothesis in sport psychology, for simple motor tasks, high arousal is more advantageous than low arousal ; for complex (...) motor tasks, low arousal is more advantageous than high arousal. The current research examined the effect of color on different kinds of motor skills based on the inverted U-hypothesis. In Experiment 1, we examined the effect of red and blue on dart-throwing performance, whereas in Experiment 2, we examined the effect of red and blue on grip strength performance. The results showed that performance of fine motor skill in the blue condition was better than in the red condition, and performance of gross motor skill in the red context was better than in the blue context. These results indicate that the type of motor skill assessed moderates the influence of red and blue on motor performance. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the asymptotic behavior of solutions to the Kirchhoff type stochastic plate equation driven by additive noise defined on unbounded domains. We first prove the uniform estimates of solutions and then establish the existence and upper semicontinuity of random attractors.

ABSTRACTUsing faces as the priming stimuli, the present study explored the influence of facial expressions on the activation of gender stereotypes using a lexical decision paradigm. Experiment 1 explored the activation of gender stereotypes when the facial primes contained only gender information. The results showed that gender stereotypes were activated. In Experiment 2, the facial primes contained both gender category and expression information. The results indicated that gender stereotypes were not activated. Experiment 3 required the participants to make emotion, gender, (...) or impression decisions concerning the facial primes before the lexical decision task. The results showed that gender stereotypes were not activated in emotion and impression decisions conditions, whereas stereotypes were activated in gender decisions condition. These finding suggest that facial expressions can inhibit automatic activation of gender stereotypes, unless the perceivers perform gender categorization processing to prime f... (shrink)

Previous studies have found a link between red and aggressive behavior. For example, athletes who wear red uniforms in sports are considered to have a competitive advantage. So far, most previous studies have adopted self-report methods, which have low face validity and were easily influenced by the social expectations. Therefore, the study used two implicit methods to further explore the association between red and aggressiveness. A modified Stroop task was used in Experiment 1 to probe college students’ differences between “congruent” (...) tasks and “incongruent” tasks. Result showed that participants responded more quickly to the congruent tasks than the incongruent tasks. Then, in order to adapt to the competitive context, Experiment 2 used an implicit association test with photos of athletes as the stimulus to college students and athletes to evaluate “congruent” tasks as well as “incongruent” tasks, respectively. According to the results, both college students and athletes respond faster to congruent tasks than to incongruent tasks. Besides, athletes’ reactions to the red–aggressiveness association are faster than college students, which may relate to the athletes’ professional experience. The athletes may be more aggressive and impulsive. Overall, the study has attempted to examine the association between red and aggressiveness through implicit methods, but in the future, researches are need to find a deep association from brain mechanism aspect. (shrink)

Women generally report greater religiosity and justify morally debatable behaviors less than men. This study examined if personal religiosity mediates the relationship of gender and justification of different types of morally debatable behaviors across societies with diverse religious heritages. We also explored how a society’s endorsement of preferred qualities in the socialization of children would moderate the links between personal religiosity and justification of morally debatable types of behavior. Using the World Values Survey Wave 7 data (47 societies; 66,992 respondents), (...) we identified three types of justifiable behaviors, namely, behaviors threatening human life and family values, dishonest-illegal, and interpersonally violent behaviors. Controlling for age and education, women scored higher in personal religiosity and justified dishonest-illegal and interpersonally violent behaviors less than men, but behaviors threatening human life and family values more than men. Personal religiosity only partially mediated the link between gender and the justification of behaviors threatening human life and family values, indicating that factors other than personal religiosity account for gender differences in justifying types of morally defensible behavior. The linkage strengths of personal religiosity to behaviors threatening human life and family values and dishonest-illegal behaviors were moderated by societal endorsement of preferred qualities in the socialization of children. Thus, both gender and the socialization of a society’s human capital impact on how different types of morally debatable behaviors are justified around the world. Possible explanations for these results are offered and future research directions suggested. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper we explore how a public national media outlet, the British BBC, represents an international legal case which has a highly political nature. The case is US versus Huawei/meng Wanzhou, which took place between 2018 and 2021. Accusations were that the Chinese technology company committed fraud, leading the global HSBC bank to breach US sanctions against Iran. The charges were made by the US using what is called an ‘extraterritorial law’, which, while rejected as law by governments (...) around the world, is policed by US economic powers and control over international finance. Using Critical Discourse Analysis we show that, while the BBC presents much detail of legal process, the actual nature of the law the US uses to bring criminal charges against international companies and banks, is neither considered nor questioned. Our interest is how such a law, which has a huge influence over global trade and politics, is presented to the public in this particular case. We contribute to the position that the nature of laws, how they are used and known, must always be understood within the prevailing discourses of the moment. (shrink)

Restricted and repetitive behavior is a core symptom of autism spectrum disorder characterized by features of restrictedness, repetition, rigidity, and invariance. Few studies have investigated how restrictedness is manifested in motor behavior. This study aimed to address this question by instructing participants to perform the utmost complex movement. Twenty children with ASD and 23 children with typical development performed one-dimensional, left-right arm oscillations by demonstrating varying amplitudes and frequencies. The entropy of amplitude and velocity was calculated as an index of (...) kinematic complexity. Results showed that the velocity entropy, but not the amplitude entropy, was significantly lower in ASD than in TD, suggesting restricted kinematics. Further analysis demonstrated that a significantly higher proportion of the velocity values was allocated at a low-speed level in the children with ASD. A qualitative comparison of the complex movement with movement at preferred frequency suggested that the children with ASD might be less likely to shift away from the preferred movement. However, our study can be improved in terms of recruiting a larger sample of participants, measuring the level of motivation, and collecting both complex and preferred movements of the same participant. (shrink)

Numerous studies have produced contradictory findings about whether static or animated format is the better instructional tool. With a comparison between graphs and animations that has a genuine impact on learning and teaching, this review provides a comprehensive examination of the theoretical foundations of visualized learning, influencing factors, and prospective future studies.

Although multimodal input has the potential to lead to more sound learning outcomes, it carries the risk of causing cognitive overload, making it difficult to determine the exact effects of multimodal input on the second language phrase learning. This study tests the efficacy of multimodal input on L2 phrase learning. It adopts a mixed-method approach by utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data. The experimental design is a 2 × 3 mixed model, with a group [the experimental group and the control (...) group ] as the between-subject factor and time as the within-subject factor. A total of 66 participants were divided into two groups. All materials incorporated three aspects of phrase knowledge, but the materials of the CG were unimodal in that they were offered only on paper, and of the EG were multimodal in that they included pictures, audio recordings, and video clips. After the treatment, a questionnaire and a semi-structured interview were given to the EG learners to explore their perceptions of using multimodal materials to learn L2 phrases. The results indicate that both groups had significant gains in learning phrases, but students with the multimodal input achieved significantly better results than those with the unimodal input. Moreover, the EG students had a generally positive attitude toward the use of multimodal resources. This study validates the efficacy of multimodal input on the acquisition of English phrases and shows that cognitive overload was avoided by sequencing the information. (shrink)

Communication can be risky. Like other kinds of actions, it comes with potential costs. For instance, an utterance can be embarrassing, offensive, or downright illegal. In the face of such risks, speakers tend to act strategically and seek ‘plausible deniability’. In this paper, we propose an account of the notion of deniability at issue. On our account, deniability is an epistemic phenomenon. A speaker has deniability if she can make it epistemically irrational for her audience to reason in certain ways. (...) To avoid predictable confusion, we distinguish deniability from a practical correlate we call ‘untouchability’. Roughly, a speaker has untouchability if she can make it practically irrational for her audience to act in certain ways. These accounts shed light on the nature of strategic speech and suggest countermeasures against strategic speech. (shrink)

It has been argued that affordances are not meaningful and are thus not useful to be applied in contexts where specifically meaningfulness of experience is at stake (e.g. clinical contexts or discussions of autonomous agency). This paper aims to reconceptualize affordances such as to make them relevant and applicable in such contexts. It starts by investigating the ‘ambiguity’ of (possibilities for) action. In both philosophy of action and affordance research, this ambiguity is typically resolved by adhering to the agents intentions (...) and concerns. I discuss some recent accounts of affordances that highlight these concerns but argue that they tend to adopt an ‘atomistic’ approach where there is no acknowledgement of how these concerns are embedded in the agents wider concerns, values, projects and commitments. An holistic approach that does acknowledge this can be found in psychological research on agents having a sense of what they’re doing. I will discuss this research in the second part of the paper and argue that agents can analogously have a sense of what is afforded. This is deemed the entry point for understanding the meaningfulness of affordances. In the final part of the paper I apply this analysis to recent attempts which seek to make sense of authentic and autonomous agency in terms of affordances. (shrink)

Affordances are possibilities for action offered by the environment. Recent research on affordances holds that there are differences in how people experience such possibilities for action. However, these differences have not been properly investigated. In this paper I start by briefly scrutinizing the existing literature on this issue, and then argue for two claims. First, that whether an affordance solicits action or not depends on its relevance to the agent’s concerns. Second, that the experiential character of how an affordance solicits (...) action depends on the character of the concern to which it is relevant. Concerns are conceived of as bodily forms of responsiveness, and solicitations are experienced through this responsiveness. The main aim of this paper is to make clear that an understanding of experiential differences in solicitations has to be based on a phenomenological appreciation of how one experiences one’s responsiveness to those solicitations. In the remainder of the paper I show how such a phenomenological appreciation reveals several characteristics of our responsiveness and I briefly explore three of them: valence, force and mineness. In the final section I discuss the self-referentiality of affordances in light of the current proposal, and argue that this self-referentiality is broader than is typically acknowledged. (shrink)

Orthodoxy in the contemporary debate on knowledge ascriptions holds that the truth‐value of knowledge ascriptions is purely a matter of truth‐relevant factors. One familiar challenge to orthodoxy comes from intuitive practical factor effects . But practical factor effects turn out to be hard to confirm in experimental studies, and where they have been confirmed, they may seem easy to explain away. We suggest a novel experimental paradigm to show that practical factor effects exist. It trades on the idea that people (...) retract knowledge attributions when practical factors shift. We also explain why the resulting data raise a serious challenge to orthodoxy. (shrink)

The article provides a conceptualization of self(-illness) ambiguity and investigates to what extent self(-illness) ambiguity is ‘special’. First, we draw on empirical findings to argue that self-ambiguity is a ubiquitous phenomenon. We suggest that these findings are best explained by a multidimensional account, according to which selves consist of various dimensions that mutually affect each other. On such an account, any change to any particular self-aspect may change other self-aspects and thereby alter the overall structural pattern of self-aspects, potentially leading (...) to self-ambiguity. Second, we propose that self-ambiguity comes in degrees and should be understood as a spectrum (as opposed to there being qualitative differences among instances of self-ambiguity). Third, we argue that complexity is the most useful dimension to organize cases of self-ambiguity, with mundane instances of self-ambiguity on the one end and self-illness ambiguity on the other end of the spectrum. Fourth, we address the promises and perils of narrativity with regard to self-ambiguity. Finally, we link our deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity to pattern theories of self. (shrink)

In the era of eLearning 4.0, many researchers have suggested that multimodal input helps to enhance second language vocabulary learning. However, previous studies on the effects of multimodal teaching have failed to yield definitive conclusions. Furthermore, only few studies on the multimodal input of vocabulary learning have aimed at junior high school students and have focused on explicit vocabulary instruction in class. To explore the effects of multimodal input on English as a foreign language learners’ vocabulary learning and summarize effective (...) methods, this study adopts a mixed-method approach. Based on dual coding theory and cognitive load theory, the teaching materials in this study were designed using the resources provided by the multimodal corpus iWeb and other websites. A total of 60 junior high school students who learned EFL and had a similar English proficiency level were divided into an experimental group and a control group. Target words were selected through questionnaire I. During the experiment, the CG learned from monomodal materials while the EG received multimodal input, and an immediate post-test was delivered to the two groups. Questionnaire II was distributed in the EG, and five students of the EG were randomly selected for an interview. One week later, a delayed post-test was conducted on the EG and CG. The results showed that the EG performed better in the post-test but did worse than the CG in the delayed post-test. The results of the questionnaire and the interview suggest that students held both positive and negative attitudes toward the multimodal input approach in vocabulary learning. The study concludes with some implications for choosing a multimodal input approach in vocabulary learning, along with a number of suggestions on how to optimize its positive influence and minimize its negative effects. (shrink)

Family socioeconomic status (SES) is known to have a powerful influence on adolescent depression. However, the mechanisms underlying this association are unclear. Here, we explore this issue by testing the potential mediating roles of social support (interpersonal resource) and optimism (intrapersonal resource), based on the predictions of the reserve capacity model (RCM). Participants were 652 adolescents [age range: 11–20 years old, M age = 14.55 years, SD = 1.82; 338 boys (51.80%)] from two junior and two senior high schools in (...) Wuhan, China. They completed questionnaires measuring family SES, perceived social support, optimism, and depression. Results showed, as predicted, (1) SES negatively predicted adolescent depression; (2) social support and optimism serially mediated the relations between SES and depression, consistent with the predictions by the RCM. Specifically, higher SES predicted greater social support and increased optimism, which in turn contributed to reduced depression. The implications of these data to the prevention and interventions of adolescent depression were discussed. (shrink)

The recent literature abounds with accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of so-called predicates of personal taste, i.e. predicates whose application is, in some sense or other, a subjective matter. Relativism and contextualism are the major types of theories. One crucial difference between these theories concerns how we should assess previous taste claims. Relativism predicts that we should assess them in the light of the taste standard governing the context of assessment. Contextualism predicts that we should assess them in the (...) light of the taste standard governing the context of use. We show in a range of experiments that neither prediction is correct. People have no clear preferences either way and which taste standard they choose in evaluating a previous taste claim crucially depends on whether they start out with a favorable attitude towards the object in question and then come to have an unfavorable attitude or vice versa. We suggest an account of the data in terms of what we call hybrid relativism. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss what I will call “skeptical pragmatic invariantism” as a potential response to the intuitions we have about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. SPI, very roughly, is a form of epistemic invariantism that says the following: The subject in the bank cases doesn’t know that the bank will be open. The knowledge ascription in the low standards case seems appropriate nevertheless because it has a true implicature. The goal of this paper is to (...) show that SPI is mistaken. In particular, I will show that SPI is incompatible with reasonable assumptions about how we are aware of the presence of implicatures. Such objections are not new, but extant formulations are wanting for reasons I will point out below. One may worry that refuting SPI is not a worthwhile project given that this view is an implausible minority position anyway. To respond, I will argue that, contrary to common opinion, other familiar objections to SPI fail and, thus, that SPI is a promising position to begin with. (shrink)

The term “know” is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no (...) consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. Alexander Dinges offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability. (shrink)

Many experiential properties are naturally understood as dispositions such that e.g. a cake tastes good to you iff you are disposed to get gustatory pleasure when you eat it. Such dispositional analyses, however, face a challenge. It has been widely observed that one cannot properly assert “The cake tastes good to me” unless one has tried it. This acquaintance requirement is puzzling on the dispositional account because it should be possible to be disposed to like the cake even if this (...) disposition has never been manifested. We argue that familiar response strategies on behalf of the dispositionalist fail. These include appeals to conversational implicatures, expressivism, semantic presuppositions and norms of assertion. Against this background, we propose a new analysis in terms of what we call tendencies, where a tendency is a disposition that has been manifested. The acquaintance requirement comes out as an entailment. We point out a hitherto unnoticed parallel to sentences ascribing character traits such as “Hannah is brave,” and extend our tendency-based analysis to this domain. (shrink)

The article proposes a theoretical model to account for changes in self due to Deep Brain Stimulation. First, we argue that most existing models postulate a very narrow conception of self, and thus fail to capture the full range of potentially relevant DBS-induced changes. Second, building on previous work by Shaun Gallagher, we propose a modified ‘pattern-theory of self’, which provides a richer picture of the possible consequences of DBS treatment.

The article proposes a theoretical model to account for changes in self due to Deep Brain Stimulation. First, we argue that most existing models postulate a very narrow conception of self, and thus fail to capture the full range of potentially relevant DBS-induced changes. Second, building on previous work by Shaun Gallagher, we propose a modified ‘pattern-theory of self’, which provides a richer picture of the possible consequences of DBS treatment.

Can affordances help in understanding psychiatric illness and psychopathological experience? In recent work on the philosophy of psychiatry and phenomenology, the answer appears to be a clear ‘yes’, but some recent worries have emerged that the affordance-concept might be “insufficiently discerning” and thus ill-suited to make sense of psychiatric illness and experience. In this paper I briefly review recent attempts to use the affordance-concept to make sense of psychopathology, as well as the worries voiced by the critics. I argue that (...) much of this criticism is, in fact, best understood as a call for more research and offer some exploratory considerations on how this research might proceed. Specifically, I argue that an improved understanding of the self-referentiality that is inherent to experiencing affordances can be useful for psychiatry. (shrink)

Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can (...) be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by advocating the following, somewhat deflationary account of the bank case intuitions: Readers of the bank cases assign different truth-values to the knowledge claims in the bank cases because they interpret these scenarios such that the epistemic position of the subject in question differs between the high and the low standards case. To substantiate this account, I will argue, first, that the bank cases are underspecified even with respect to features that should uncontroversially be relevant for the epistemic position of the subject in question. Second, I will argue that readers of the bank cases will fill in these features differently in the low and the high standards case. In particular, I will argue that there is a variety of reasons to think that the fact that an error-possibility is mentioned in the high standards case will lead readers to assume that this error-possibility is supposed to be likely in the high standards case. (shrink)

It seems to be a common and intuitively plausible assumption that conversational implicatures arise only when one of the so-called conversational maxims is violated at the level of what is said. The basic idea behind this thesis is that, unless a maxim is violated at the level of what is said, nothing can trigger the search for an implicature. Thus, non-violating implicatures wouldn’t be calculable. This paper defends the view that some conversational implicatures arise even though no conversational maxim is (...) violated at the level of what is said. (shrink)

Episodic memories can no longer be seen as the re-activation of stored experiences but are the product of an intense construction process based on a memory trace. Episodic recall is a result of a process of scenario construction. If one accepts this generative framework of episodic memory, there is still a be big gap in understanding the role of the narrative self in shaping scenario construction. Some philosophers are in principle sceptic by claiming that a narrative self cannot be more (...) than a causally inefficacious attributed entity anyway. Thus, we first characterize a narrative self in detail and second we clarify its influential causal role in shaping our episodic memories by influencing the process of scenario construction. This happens at three stages, namely at the level of the input, the output and the process of scenario construction. (shrink)

Moderate pragmatic invariantism (MPI) is a proposal to explain why our intuitions about the truth-value of knowledge claims vary with stakes and salient error-possibilities. The basic idea is that this variation is due to a variation not in the propositions expressed (as epistemic contextualists would have it) but in the propositions conversationally implicated. I will argue that MPI is mistaken: I will distinguish two kinds of implicature, namely, additive and substitutional implicatures. I will then argue, first, that the proponent of (...) MPI cannot appeal to additive implicatures because they don’t affect truth-value intuitions in the required way. Second, I will argue that the proponent of MPI cannot appeal to substitutional implicatures either because, even though they may have the required effects on truth-value intuitions, they don’t feature in the relevant cases. It follows that MPI is mistaken because whether the proponent of MPI appeals to additive or substitutional implicatures, at least one of the claims that make up her view is false. Along the way, I will suggest principles about implicatures that should be relevant not only to MPI, but to pragmatic accounts of seemingly semantic intuitions in general. (shrink)

Salience-sensitivity is a form of anti-intellectualism that says the following: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on which error-possibilities are salient to the believer. I will investigate whether salience-sensitivity can be motivated by appeal to bank case intuitions. I will suggest that so-called third-person bank cases threaten to sever the connection between bank case intuitions and salience-sensitivity. I will go on to argue that salience-sensitivists can overcome this worry if they appeal to egocentric bias, a general tendency to (...) project our own mental states onto others. I will then suggest that a similar strategy is unavailable to stakes-sensitivists, who hold that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on what is at stake for the believer. Bank case intuitions motivate salience- but not stakes-sensitivity. (shrink)

It is commonly held that retraction data, if they exist, show that assessment relativism is preferable to non-indexical contextualism. I argue that this is not the case. Whether retraction data have the suggested probative force depends on substantive questions about the proper treatment of tense and location. One’s preferred account in these domains should determine whether one accepts assessment relativism or non-indexical contextualism.

While many authors distinguish belief from acceptance, it seems almost universally agreed that no similar distinction can be drawn between degrees of belief, or credences, and degrees of acceptance. I challenge this assumption in this paper. Acceptance comes in degrees and acknowledging this helps to resolve problems in at least two philosophical domains. Degrees of acceptance play vital roles when we simplify our reasoning, and they ground the common ground of a conversation if we assume context probabilism, i.e., that the (...) common ground must be represented with probability spaces rather than possible worlds. (shrink)

Doxastic dualists acknowledge both outright beliefs and credences, and they maintain that neither state is reducible to the other. This gives rise to the ‘Bayesian Challenge’, which is to explain why we need beliefs if we have credences already. On a popular dualist response to the Bayesian Challenge, we need beliefs to simplify our reasoning. I argue that this response fails because credences perform this simplifying function at least as well as beliefs do.

The mentioning of error-possibilities makes us less likely to ascribe knowledge. This paper offers a novel psychological account of this data. The account appeals to “subadditivity,” a well-known psychological tendency to judge possibilities as more likely when they are disjunctively described.

Adverbialists propose to analyse sentences of the form ‘Jane has a blue afterimage’ as ‘Jane afterimages blue-ly’. One commonly raised objection to adverbialism is the many-property problem, the problem of accounting for sentences that seem to ascribe more than one property to an afterimage . Plausible responses to this objection may be on offer. In this note, however, I will argue that the many-property problem resurfaces at the level of relations and that, at this level, no solution for the problem (...) is in sight. (shrink)

Relativism entails that sentences like ‘Liquorice is tasty’ are used to assert relativistic propositions—that is, propositions whose truth-value is relative to a taste standard. I will defend this view against two objections. According to the first objection, relativism is incompatible with a Stalnakerian account of assertion. I will show that this objection fails because Stalnakerian assertions are proposals rather than attempts to update the common ground. According to the second objection, relativism problematically predicts that we can correctly assess beliefs as (...) false but faultless. I will show that it doesn't. Such assessments come out as incorrect because correct relativistic assertion requires the absence of a presupposition of non-commonality. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel understanding of the notion of calculability. In Gricean frameworks, calculability is defined in terms of how speakers can infer an implicature. The relevant inferences must e.g. be based on maxims of conversation or cooperation principles. Meanwhile, I suggest to define calculability in terms of when, or under which conditions, speakers can infer an implicature. An implicature is calculable if hearers can infer its existence even supposing that the implicature is not semantically encoded. This approach avoids (...) familiar challenges, including recently prominent challenges from pragmatic particularism. (shrink)

1. Imagine the following hypothetical scenario: Sarah is often called an expert on depression: after all, she graduated from medical school and has a PhD in neuroscience. She knows all theories of...