Selim Berker argues that epistemic consequentialism is pervasive in epistemology and that epistemic consequentialism is structurally flawed. is incorrect, however. I distinguish between epistemic consequentialism and epistemic instrumentalism and argue that most putative consequentialists should be considered instrumentalists. I also identify the structural problem of epistemic consequentialism Berker attempts to pinpoint and show that epistemic instrumentalism does not have the consequentialist problem.

Virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is a kind of performance normativity, according to which evaluating a belief is like evaluating a sport or musical performance. I examine this thesis through the objection that a belief cannot be evaluated as a performance because it is not a performance but a state. I argue that virtue epistemology can be defended on the grounds that we often evaluate a performance through evaluating the result of the performance. The upshot of my account is (...) that when a belief is evaluated under performance normativity, what we evaluate is not belief, but cognitive performance. My account of virtue epistemology offers a simple explanation of why knowledge is more valuable than true belief. (shrink)

To explain why we should be structurally rational – or mentally coherent – is notoriously difficult. Some philosophers argue that the normativity of structural rationality can be explained in terms of substantive rationality, which is a matter of correct response to reason. I argue that the psychological phenomena – positive illusions – are counterexamples to the substantivist approach. Substantivists dismiss the relevance of positive illusions because they accept evidentialism that reason for belief must be evidence. I argue that their evidentialist (...) stance would imply that we are caught in unsolvable dilemmas arising from positive illusions. (shrink)

如果機器人的發展要能如科幻想像一般，在沒有人類監督下自動地工作，就必須確定機器人不會做出道德上錯誤的行為。 根據行為主義式的道德主體觀，若就外顯行為來看，機器人在道德上的表現跟人類一般，機器人就可被視為道德主體。從這很自然地引伸出機器人的道德擬人主義：凡適用於人類的道德規則就適用於機器人。我反對道德擬人主義 ，藉由史特勞森對於人際關係與反應態度的洞見，並以家長主義行為為例，我論述由於機器人缺乏人格性，無法參與人際關係，因此在關於家長主義行為上，機器人應該比人類受到更嚴格的限制。.

Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that (...) virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief. (shrink)

A popular evidentialist argument against pragmatism is based on reason internalism: the view that a normative reason for one to φ must be able to guide one in normative deliberation whether to φ. In the case of belief, this argument maintains that, when deliberating whether to believe p, one must deliberate whether p is true. Since pragmatic considerations cannot weigh in our deliberation whether p, the argument concludes that pragmatism is false. I argue that evidentialists fail to recognize that the (...) question whether to φ is essentially the question whether one should φ. Furthermore, the question of whether one should believe p can be answered on pragmatic grounds. The internalist argument turns out to favor pragmatism. (shrink)

The Philosophical Forum, Volume 52, Issue 3, Page 211-220, Fall 2021.

It is widely maintained that doxastic norms that govern how people should believe can be explained by the truism that belief is governed by the correctness norm: believing p is correct if and only if p. This approach fails because it confuses two kinds of correctness norm: (1) It is correct for S to believe p if and only p; and (2) believing p is correct qua belief if and only if p. Only can (2) be said to be a (...) truism about belief, but it cannot ground doxastic norms. (shrink)

According to some philosophers, if moral agency is understood in behaviourist terms, robots could become moral agents that are as good as or even better than humans. Given the behaviourist conception, it is natural to think that there is no interesting moral difference between robots and humans in terms of moral agency (call it the _equivalence thesis_). However, such moral differences exist: based on Strawson’s account of participant reactive attitude and Scanlon’s relational account of blame, I argue that a distinct (...) kind of reason available to humans—call it _human-relative reason_—is not available to robots. The difference in moral reason entails that sometimes an action is morally permissible for humans, but not for robots. Therefore, when developing moral robots, we cannot consider only what humans can or cannot do. I use examples of paternalism to illustrate my argument. (shrink)

Gettier cases are scenarios conceived by philosophers to demonstrate that justified true beliefs may not be knowledge. Starmans and Friedman (2020) find that philosophers attribute knowledge in Gettier cases differently from laypeople and non‐philosophy academics, which seems to suggest that philosophers may be indoctrinated to adopt an esoteric concept of knowledge. I argue to the contrary: Their finding at most shows that philosophical reflection is fallible, but nevertheless able to clarify the concept of knowledge. I also suggest that their experiments (...) could be modified to help determine when philosophical reflection might yield plausible results. (shrink)

A virtue-based theory of right action aims to explain deontic moral principles in terms of virtue and vice. For example, it may maintain the following account of moral obligation: It is morally obligatory for an agent A to ϕ in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous and relevantly informed person V would characteristically ϕ in C. However, this account faces the so-called supererogation problem. A supererogatory action is an action that is morally praiseworthy but not morally obligatory. (...) Suppose John risks his own life to save a stranger, which is supererogatory rather than obligatory. However, a fully virtuous... (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that pain is an object located in bodily parts because the locative form of pain report is permissible in English. To examine this argument, Liu and Klein recently argue that the linguistic argument cannot work because the locative form is impermissible in Mandarin. They are wrong, however. I demonstrate that the locative form in Mandarin is not only permissible but also common.

This paper is to propose a new form of Kant’s anti-skepticism argument in light of John McDowell’s works on disjunctivism. I first discuss recent debates between McDowell and Crispin Wright on disjunctivism. I argue that Wright wrongly downplays McDowell’s disjunctivism, whose metaphysical claim that our perceptual faculties directly engage in the world has an epistemological implication that should be able to dismiss the skeptic’s imagery as fictitious. However, McDowell does not clearly offer such an argument. I will show that we (...) can derive from Kant’s Fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason—which many scholars regard as Kant’s implicit commitment to phenomenalism—the requisite argument that makes us able to dismiss skepticism. (shrink)

My contributions to the research on epistemic value can be divided into two parts: first, I pinpoint some causes of the problems about epistemic value which have not previously been identified; and, second, I offer novel accounts of epistemic value which offer better solutions to the problems about epistemic value. First, there are two trends in the literature on epistemic value that are rarely challenged: epistemologists tend to understand epistemic value in terms of intrinsic value from the epistemic point of (...) view, and the discussion of epistemic value tends to focus only on the values of properties of belief. I argue that both trends should be rejected if we want to solve several persistent problems about epistemic value: the value problems about knowledge, the teleological account of epistemic normativity, and the triviality objection that some true beliefs are too trivial to be epistemic goals. My account of epistemic value is in terms of goodness of epistemic kinds, which rejects. An epistemic kind is an evaluative kind—a kind that determines its own evaluative standards—whose evaluative standards are truth-directed: e.g. a belief is good qua belief if true. I argue that my account is immune from the triviality objection. Moreover, since the goodness of an epistemic kind is finally valuable, the account gives us simple solutions to the value problems of knowledge. I develop my own solutions through critically appropriating the virtue-theoretic account, according to which epistemic evaluation is a kind of performance evaluation, which rejects. I argue that the value of knowledge consists of the value of epistemic success and epistemic competence. Finally, I argue that approaches that focus on the evaluation of belief cannot explain epistemic normativity. Instead, we need an approach that focuses on the evaluation of person, which rejects. I argue that conforming to epistemic norms is part of what makes us good qua person. The goodness of person qua person is an intrinsic value and able to provide pro tanto reasons for a person to be epistemically good qua person, which is the ground of epistemic normativity. Overall, there are two main differences between my account and the mainstream account: first, the purpose of epistemic evaluation is about good cognitive performances rather than good beliefs; and, second, what grounds epistemic normativity is the goodness of a person qua person rather than the goodness of belief qua belief. The upshot of my account is that the focus of epistemology should be on questions such as ‘What is an epistemically good person?’ and ‘What makes a person epistemically good qua person?’ Furthermore, my account shows that epistemic normativity is not distinct from ethical normativity. That is, the question ‘What is an epistemically good person?’ is part of the question ‘What is a good person?’ and a reason why we should be an epistemically good person is consequently a reason why we should be a good person. (shrink)

This article reports on an inquiry that investigated the development of ba constructions in early childhood Mandarin. All cases of ba construction were extracted from the Early Childhood Mandarin Corpus collected from 168 preschoolers aged 2;6, 3;6, 4;6, and 5;6. Early Childhood Mandarin Corpus, University of Hong Kong. Data analysis indicated that: Mandarin-speaking children produced a repertoire of 11 types of ba construction, and the children in the youngest age group were able to produce six types of them; children at (...) 4 years old experienced a critical developmental period of pragmatic use, and at 5 years old they had attained cognitive and linguistic maturity in understanding the semantic and syntactic features of ba constructions; and there was a significant age effect on the production of three types of ba construction, but no significant association between the children’s gender and their production of ba constructions. These findings offer fresh insights into understanding Chinese children’s innate capacity to understand the co-occurrence constraints concerning the syntactic, semantic and verb features inherent in ba construction, and their developmental ability to denote telic events by resorting to the appropriate ba sentence patterns. (shrink)

Background: To evaluate the effectiveness of a multifaceted intervention in improving emergency department (ED) patient privacy and satisfaction in the crowded ED setting. Methods: A pre- and post-intervention study was conducted. A multifaceted intervention was implemented in a university-affiliated hospital ED. The intervention developed strategies to improve ED patient privacy and satisfaction, including redesigning the ED environment, process management, access control, and staff education and training, and encouraging ethics consultation. The effectiveness of the intervention was evaluated using patient surveys. Eligibility (...) data were collected after the intervention and compared to data collected before the intervention. Differences in patient satisfaction and patient perception of privacy were adjusted for predefined covariates using multivariable ordinal logistic regression. Results: Structured questionnaires were collected with 313 ED patients before the intervention and 341 ED patients after the intervention. There were no important covariate differences, except for treatment area, between the two groups. Significant improvements were observed in patient perception of "personal information overheard by others", being "seen by irrelevant persons", having "unintentionally heard inappropriate conversations from healthcare providers", and experiencing "providers' respect for my privacy". There was significant improvement in patient overall perception of privacy and satisfaction. There were statistically significant correlations between the intervention and patient overall perception of privacy and satisfaction on multivariable analysis. Conclusions: Significant improvements were achieved with an intervention. Patients perceived significantly more privacy and satisfaction in ED care after the intervention. We believe that these improvements were the result of major philosophical, administrative, and operational changes aimed at respecting both patient privacy and satisfaction. (shrink)

The meshed control theory assumes that cognitive control and automatic processes work together in the natural attention of experts for superior performance. However, the methods adopted by previous studies limit their capacity to provide in-depth information on the neuromotor processes. This experiment tested the theory with an alternative approach. Twelve skilled golfers were recruited to perform a putting task under three conditions: (1) normal condition, with no focus instruction (NC), (2) external focus of attention condition (EC), and (3) internal focus (...) of attention condition (IC). Four blocks of 10 putts each were performed under each condition. The putting success rate and accuracy were measured and electroencephalographies (EEGs) were recorded. The behavioral results showed that the NC produced a higher putting success rate and accuracy than the EC and IC. The EEG data showed that the skilled golfers’ attentional processes in the NC initially resembled those in the EC and then moved toward those in the IC just before putting. This indicates a switch from more automatic processes to cognitive control processes while preparing to putt. The findings offer support for the meshed control theory and indicate the dynamic nature of neuromotor processes for the superior performance of athletes in challenging situations. (shrink)

Japanese agricultural scholarship reached its peak in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). Most of its representative works were imbued with the Chinese metaphysical doctrine of yin-yang-wu-hsing. They used the ideas of yin-yang, wu-hsing, yun-ch'i, hexagrams, and feng-shui extensively to develop their views and to explain various practices. There were two different attitudes towards Chinese concepts among Tokugawa scholars. Some regarded Chinese ideas as universal principles, and faithfully introduced them to Japan, whereas some were faced with the problem (...) of national identity and attempted to accommodate Chinese metaphysical principles to Japanese agriculture. This article examines the adoption of the yin-yang-wu-hsing doctrine in Tokugawa agriculture through a careful and critical textual study of several major Tokugawa writings. (shrink)

Over the course of only a few decades during the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, part of mainstream Buddhist education underwent a striking shift in China. From being a secluded practice within monastery walls taught by monastics for monastics with a strict focus on Buddhist scripture, it became one where monastics and laypeople study together, guided by teachers, both monastic and lay, studying a curriculum of both Buddhist and secular subjects. Although general reforms within the Buddhist community of the (...) times received considerable scholarly attention, the topic of education development was discussed in only a few instances. Therefore, the present article sets out to explore why this radical methodological shift happened, and more concretely, how the individual learning trajectories of the reforms’ leading actors, and their involvement in specific communities, influenced the way the reforms unfolded. The author analyses the work and life of three generations of Buddhist reformers, namely the layman Yang Wenhui, and the monastic masters Taixu, Hsing Yun and Cheng Yen, employing Étienne Wenger’s social theory of learning. The theory’s main assertion that communities of practice provide the main fora of learning for individuals, and its description of the concrete ways in which this learning takes place can provide new insights regarding the specific unfolding of late-nineteenth to early-twentieth-century Buddhist education reforms in China. (shrink)

Wang Yang-ming’s philosophy of mind brings about some abuses with its spread, such as despising moral cultivation and upholding mysteries, which cause the school to be degenerated in the later Ming dynasty. Some scholars, who are worried about the situation, starting from the abuses, retrospect and rectify the theoretical defects in the doctrine of Wang Yang-ming and his disciples. The article reviews the rectifying movement of Wang’s school during the later Mingdynasty and the early Qing dynasty, and reflects (...) the relation between personality emancipation and moral rational spirit, hsin-hsing (mind-nature) and social achievements. (shrink)

Until recently epistemology in the Western sense was never a central issue in Chinese philosophy. Contemporary Chinese neo?Confucian philosophers, however, realize that in order to reconstruct some of the important traditional philosophical insights and make them meaningful in the present time, certain methodological and epistemological considerations are indispensable. The present paper undertakes to examine some of these efforts. Since most neo?Confucian philosophers today have been influenced by Hsiung Shih?li, in one way or another, his epistemological theory is presented first. Then (...) the further development of a neo?Confucian epistemological system in Mou Tsung?san's thought is discussed. Hsiung Shih?li has made an important distinction between what he calls the hsing?ehih and the liang?chih. The former may be translated as the original wisdom and is what we rely upon to grasp ontological reality; the latter may be translated as the measuring wisdom and includes both our commonsensical and scientific ways of understanding which postulate a real, external world. A dialectical relation holds between the two. Mou Tsung?san further develops a comprehensive epistemological system which confirms the basic insights of Hsiung Shih?li. He has attempted a synthesis of the philosophical insights which he learns from Kant in the West and the Confucian tradition in China. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-MingChenyang LiUnderstanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming. By Shu-hsien Liu. Westport and London: Praeger, 1998. Pp. xii + 273.Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming, by Shu-hsien Liu, a leading contemporary Neo-Confucian scholar, aims to present the Confucian tradition [End Page 312] from a contemporary Neo-Confucian perspective and purports to provide some background clues to what has led to the Third Epoch of Confucianism, (...) that is, the emergence of the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement.As its title suggests, the book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with Classical Confucianism, and part 2 is a study of Sung-Ming Confucian philosophy. The Classical period begins with an informative chapter on the historical background to the emergence of Confucian philosophy, which is particularly useful if the book is to be used as a university-level text. The historical chapter is followed by chapters on Confucius (Kong Zi), Mencius (Meng Zi), The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, and the Book of Changes. Part 1 ends with a chapter on the transformation of Confucianism since the Han dynasty. Compared with similar books on Confucian philosophy, the chapter on Confucius appears sketchy, but its treatment of Confucius' central concept, jen (ren), is first-rate, clear, and insightful. The chapter on Mencius is more elaborate. It surveys virtually every key concept of Mencius' philosophy. As with similar works by Chinese scholars, the sheer number of quotations in this chapter may appear excessive to Western readers. Hsün Tzu (Xun Zi), another key classical Confucian philosopher, is only mentioned in passing, although this is not surprising in a book written from a Neo-Confucian perspective; in the Neo Confucian tradition Hsün Tzu is considered unorthodox.The chapter on the Book of Changes is a breath of fresh air in that it has adopted a developmental point of view. The author argues that there are four layers of meaning in the work: it offers a system of mystical symbolism, a system of rational/natural symbolism, a system of cosmological symbolism, and finally a system of ethics/metaphysical symbolism. Professor Liu says of the four systems, "each one succeed[s] the other and yet interpenetrate[s] the other" (p. 74). Overall, Classical Confucianism is analyzed according to three inseparable aspects—spiritual, political, and popular—which define the heritage as well as the burden of this tradition.At first I was a bit surprised to see that the chapter on "The Characteristics and Contemporary Significance of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian Philosophy" is at the beginning, not at the end, of part 2 on Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy. But it turns out that this chapter contains a brief survey of some major Neo-Confucian philosophers of the period and serves well as an introduction to part 2. Recognizing Chu Hsi's (Zhu Xi) contribution to the movement of the Second Epoch, Liu spends two chapters out of six on this great Sung philosopher. The chapter on Wang Yang-ming aims "to destroy the myth once and for all that there is no discrepancy between Lu [Hsiang-shan] and Wang and that there is not a close relationship between Wang and Chu [Hsi]" (p. 198). This goes against a widespread (mis)conception that Wang and Chu represent two distinct lines of Neo-Confucianism.Part 2 ends with a chapter on Huang Tsung-hsi (Huang Zongxi), arguably the most liberal of all Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers. Liu regards Huang as the culmination of an unfinished Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophical tradition, from which the contemporary Neo-Confucian movement should take up the cause. Altogether, part 2 is not as systematic in introducing Sung-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy as is part 1 on Classical Confucianism. [End Page 313]As a synthesis of various articles previously published by the author over a twenty-five-year period, the book bears both the strengths and the weaknesses of works of this kind: there are in-depth studies focused on specific topics of particular interest in the Neo-Confucian movement, but there is occasionally a lack of smooth transition from one chapter to another or... (shrink)

_BMC Medical Ethics_ is an open access journal publishing original peer-reviewed research articles in relation to the ethical aspects of biomedical research and clinical practice, including professional choices and conduct, medical technologies, healthcare systems and health policies. _BMC __Medical Ethics _is part of the _BMC_ series which publishes subject-specific journals focused on the needs of individual research communities across all areas of biology and medicine. We do not make editorial decisions on the basis of the interest of a study or (...) its likely impact. Studies must be scientifically valid; for research articles this includes a scientifically sound research question, the use of suitable methods and analysis, and following community-agreed standards relevant to the research field. Specific criteria for other article types can be found in the submission guidelines. _BMC series - open, inclusive and trusted_. (shrink)

Standard animalists are committed to a stringent form of restricted composition, thereby denying the existence of brains, hands, and other proper parts of an organism . One reason for positing this near-nihilistic ontology comes from various challenges to animalism such as the Thinking Parts Argument, the Unity Argument, and the Argument from the Problem of the Many. In this paper, I show that these putatively distinct arguments are all instances of a more general problem, which I call the ‘Too Many (...) Candidates Problem’ . Given my formulation of the problem, it is evident that standard animalists are mistaken in believing that restricting composition is the only solution. I show that there is another option for solving the TMC. The advantage of such a position, which I call ‘unrestricted animalism’, is that it is compatible with unrestricted composition and the existence of brains and other proper parts of an organism. I conclude by sketching several strategies one can take regarding this latter solution to the TMC. (shrink)

In trying to establish the view that there are no non-living macrophysical objects, Trenton Merricks has produced an influential argument—the Overdetermination Argument—against the causal efficacy of composite objects. A serious problem for the Overdetermination Argument is the ambiguity in the notion of overdetermination that is being employed, which is due to the fact that Merricks does not provide any theory of causation to support his claims. Once we adopt a plausible theory of causation, viz. interventionism, problems with the Overdetermination will (...) become evident. After laying out the Overdetermination Argument and examining one extant objection to it, I will explicate the relevant aspects of an interventionist theory of causation and provide a characterization of overdetermination that follows from such an account. From this, I will argue that the Causal Principle that undergirds the Overdetermination Argument is false and hence the argument is invalid; and I claim that the only other available characterization of overdetermination would render a key premise in the argument false. Thus, the Overdetermination Argument fails to provide us with any reason to deny the causal efficacy of macrophysical objects, and therefore provides no reason to doubt their existence. (shrink)

We used social network analysis to examine a theoretical model exploring why, and under what circumstances, the perpetrators’ ostracizing behaviors are accurately perceived by the target employees. In turn, these perceptions of ostracism lead to the target employees’ counterproductive work behaviors. Adopting perspectives from both perpetrators and targets, we directly measured the ostracizing behaviors by all potential perpetrators and perceived workplace ostracism by target employees. We integrate Social information processing theory and conservation of resource theory to propose a moderated mediation (...) model, and found that employees who have a high level of need to belong are more likely to capture coworkers’ ostracizing behaviors, and those with low political skill are more likely to engage in counterproductive work behavior as their reaction to perceived workplace ostracism. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

In countries such as China, where Confucianism is the backbone of national culture, high-social-status entrepreneurs are inclined to engage in corporate social responsibility activities due to the perceived high stress from stakeholders and high ability of doing CSR. Based on a large-scale survey of private enterprises in China, our paper finds that Chinese entrepreneurs at private firms who have high social status are prone to engage in social responsibility efforts. In addition, high-social-status Chinese entrepreneurs are even more likely to engage (...) in social responsibility efforts as they become more politically connected and as the region becomes more market-oriented. These findings extend the upper echelons perspective of CSR into Chinese context by shedding light on antecedents of CSR from a new perspective and clarifying the boundary conditions of the social status–CSR link from the institutional perspective. (shrink)

The articles assembled in this volume present an important selection of Professor Jao Tsung-i’s research in the fields of comparative mythology, early Chinese hemerology and the interrelation between divination, morals and ritual in early Chinese thought.

Background Professional ethics is the regulation and discipline of nurses’ daily nursing work. Nurses often encounter various ethical challenges and problems in their clinical work, but there are few studies on nurses' adherence to professional ethics. Research Aim An analysis of nursing adherence to nursing ethics from the perspective of clinical nurses in the Chinese public health system. Research Design This study adopts the grounded theory approach proposed by Strauss and Corbin. Participants and research context Between July 2021 and January (...) 2022, Clinical nurses were recruited for online video interviews using purposive and theoretical sampling methods in seven hospitals in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanxi, Henan, Guangdong, and Fujian, China. Data analysis was conducted using Strauss and Corbin’s coding approach. Ethical considerations This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Sanming First Hospital (MingYiLun 71/2021) Findings A total of 27 participants were included. A theoretical model of nursing staff adherence to professional ethics was constructed. The main core was adherence to professional ethics and the other cores were (1) causal conditions: professional ethics code, individual conscience; (2) intervening conditions: personal growth, social support system, matching career compensation, prediction of adverse consequences; (3) action strategies: sticking to professional values, self-regulation, flexible response, post-event improvement; and (4) outcomes: self-harmony, reduced medical disputes. Conclusions This study provides an interpretive understanding of why clinical nurses adhere to professional ethics in China and describes the challenges and issues posed by nurses’ use of strategies to cope with ethical adversity. The findings can be used to develop future complex studies. (shrink)