Clarifying the nature of possibility is crucial for an evaluation of the phenomenological approach to ontology. From a phenomenological perspective, it is ontological possibility, and not spatiotemporal existence, that has pre-eminent ontological status. Since the sphere of phenomenological being and the sphere of experienceability turn out to be overlapping, this makes room for two perspectives. We can confer foundational priority to the acts of consciousness over possibilities, or to pre-set possibilities over the activity of consciousness. Husserl’s position on this issue (...) seems to change over time. Ultimately, the establishment of a phenomenological perspective must involve a rejection of any hypostatization of pre-set possibilities, but not all implications of this theoretical step seem to be drawn in Husserl’s texts. This paper is devoted to an illustration of how the phenomenological notion of possibility should change when we reject the hypostatization of possibility, that is, when we reject the idea that all acts of consciousness are to be conceived as realizations of pre-set “ideal forms”. We examine this question, first, by trying to clarify the conceptual constellation of “possibility” in Husserl’s texts. This leads to an overall classification of the features of constituted possibilities. Then we distinguish such constituted possibilities from their constituting conditions, which outlines a different sense of “possibility”. In the last instance two “possibilizing” dimensions are shown to lie at the root of all ontic possibilities. This leads to a final suggestion on the nature of the relation between experience and possibility. Actual experiences create the room for possibility: they are possibilizations. In this sense, experience is to be taken as a generative sphere which goes beyond the customary boundary between epistemic and ontological. From this point of view all experience is to be conceived as emergence. (shrink)

The essay discusses Donald Davidson’s concept of anomalous monism in the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. It develops in four stages. Section 1 is devoted to a critical presentation of the argument for anomalous monism. Section 2 succinctly examines those Husserlian notions that best provide the ground for a discussion parallel to Davidson’s. In Sect. 3, the aporetic status of “mental causation” is analyzed by providing a genetic-phenomenological account of efficient causation. Section 4 draws some general conclusions concerning the kind of (...) efficaciousness that must be attributed to consciousness and discusses the sense in which anomalous monism can be defended in a phenomenological framework, but not in a naturalistic one. (shrink)

Does the recent publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks require a re-evaluation of his thought? In the present text we will deal with this question and reach the conclusion that a change of theoretical perspective on Heidegger’s work is indeed justified. The franker and less cautious style of the Black Notebooks puts in the foreground stances that were already known, but were previously relegated to the background: it becomes possible thereby to establish that Heidegger’s philosophical views host a significant lot of (...) unwarranted prejudices, which are incorporated in his picture of the ‘history of being’. We argue that in his process of radical questioning Heidegger progressively drops all available rational methods and epistemic criteria, and that this paves the way to the unwitting reception of personal prejudices in his theoretical frame: Heidegger knowingly abandons all the theoretical instruments that could enable him to discriminate between deeply felt prejudices and proper philosophical intuitions. We conclude our analysis by proposing some criticisms that should be acceptable also to scholars sympathetic with Heidegger’s thought. Heidegger’s vindication of an ‘erratic’ way of thinking, where the journey is more qualifying than the result, turns out to be incompatible with the assertiveness of the many unjustified claims disseminated across the Black Notebooks. Moreover, Heidegger wants to show the narrowness of an overwhelmingly dialectical and argumentative attitude, while his late style of thinking unwittingly discredits an alternative philosophical style, that widely appeals to a ‘principle of charity’ in the collaboration between author and reader. (shrink)

Phenomenology has been defined by Husserl as “theory of the essences of pure phenomena,” yet the ontological status of essences in Husserlian phenomenology is far from a settled issue. The late Husserlian emphasis on genetic constitution and the historicity of the lifeworld is not immediately reconcilablewith the ‘unchangeable’ nature that is prima facie attributed to essences. However, the problem of the nature of ideality cannot be dropped from phenomenological accounts without jeopardizing the phenomenological enterprise as such. Through an immanent analysis (...) of Husserl’s meditation on essences a positive account of their ontological status is provided. Essences are interpreted as ontological thresholds, primordially rooted in our motivated confrontation with sensuous transcendence. Essences appear as emergent ontological features, which are not reducible to their particular realizations and which exhibit a fundamental continuity between consciousness and being. They manifest themselves as prospectively a priori (a precondition for further experiences), but retrospectively a posteriori (they are founded in experience). Finally, essences manifest the ‘co-essential’ nature of consciousness and sensuous transcendence: they are the way in which we are motivated and constitutively bound to articulate being, which in turn is apt to be thus articulated. (shrink)

Emergentist theories have never represented a "school" with an identifiable orthodoxy, however it is possible to isolate four basic traits, that characterize most emergent property theories. A property can be said to be "emergent" in the first place, if it is a natural property (and not a "supernatural" one), then if it supervenes on subvenient properties, if it is irreducible (i.e. it cannot be deduced from the mere knowledge of the subvenient properties), and if it displays downward causation (i.e. it (...) is capable of producing effects on the level from which it emerges). A theoretical interpretation of these four principles shows that there is never any basis for assuming that the behavior of the parts exhausts the potentialities of the wholes, those parts refer to. The "emergent" character of a property stands out as expression of the fundamentally "holistic" character of entities, which express their properties in forms essentially dependent on their relations. The relational essence of the properties coincides with their intrinsically emergent character. (shrink)

The notion of social practice and a family of notions akin to it play an essential role in contemporary philosophical reflection, with particular reference to the conceptualisation of historical processes. Stephen Turner's book A Social Theory of Practices has provided a major challenge to this family of notions, and our purpose is to outline a grounding account of the notion of social practice in the form of an answer to Turner's criticisms. We try to answer three questions: first, if it (...) is necessary to grant a tacit dimension to transmittable habits; second, if and how a tacit dimension of "meaning" could be intersubjectively transmitted; third, what is the possible role of rationality in changing social practices. Our discussion moves from Wittgenstein's argument on rule-following; in its wake we try to examine the nature of habits as a basis for rules and discuss their temporal sedimentation, inertia and modes of intersubjective transmission. In conclusion we support the idea that social practices must rely on a tacit dimension, that their tacit dimension does not represent a hindrance to intersubjective transmission, and that the possible dogmatism of social practices is not due to their "hidden" side, but to their explicit quasi-rational side. (shrink)

The search for spaces of cooperation between the methodology of natural sciences (cognitive sciences in particular) and the phenomenological approach has gained importance over time. However, it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that Husserlian phenomenology was first and foremost characterized by a profound critique of ontological naturalism, a critique crucial for understanding the ethical sense of the phenomenological operation. To clarify this point, it is necessary to clarify the problematic role that naturalism has played - and (...) continues to play - on the ethical level, and the way in which phenomenological criticism is able to neutralize it. In the following pages we will first try to illustrate the impact of ontological naturalism on the contemporary ethical vision and then to show how the phenomenological perspective is best understandable as a way to reveal the blind spots of naturalism, to denounce its implicit reductionism, and to reopen an ethical perspective that the historical establishment of a naturalistic worldview had artificially closed. (shrink)

This interview seeks to highlight some of the main characteristics of the new pandemic world, besides the main contradictions the philosophical thought runs into in this difficult time. Between a political world which is unable to react and the scientific world which is usually moved by political aims, this work tries to understand if there is any room for a role of a long range philosophical thought, which is able to defend its clarity prerogatives but it is also able to (...) speak with other disciplines which seem increasingly deafer. (shrink)

This text aims to show how some substantial ontological conclusions, consistent with the notion of ‘complexity’, can be demonstrated through elementary phenomenological analyzes. In particular, we will show that it is necessary to acknowledge an ontology where the forms of ontological efficacy cannot be reduced to efficient causality, the relations between properties are irreducible to deduction, irreducible qualities must exist originally, further qualities emerge from existing qualities, and no explanatory key less complex than the fullness of consciousness’ functions can account (...) for reality. (shrink)

The article aims at bringing to light the internal necessity that shapes Husserl’s concern with the issues of history and tradition. After discussing the role played by the teleology of reason and by genetic constitution in preparing the ground for Husserl’s reflection on the historical dimension, we specifically dwell on the idea of tradition. Tradition appears both as a hindrance in our pursuit of truth, and as an indispensable sense-bestowing factor. Against this ambivalent background, history emerges as an interpretive activity (...) charged with the task of defusing the threats implicit in the incontrollable efficaciousness of tradition, while preserving the sense-bestowing character of the formations of sense (Sinngebilde). (shrink)

The term ‘supervenience’ has acquired central status in contemporary philosophy in the wake of Davidson’s discussion of mental e physical properties. We want to recover Davidson’s original setting and to tackle the same problem by an alternative route, which resorts to a phenomenological approach. The notion of supervenience emerges at the crossroad between three theses: 1) the background of ontological monism; 2) the interpretation of monism as physicalism; 3) the dependence of mental events on physical events. ‘Supervenience’ bears the task (...) to express simultaneously the ontological dependence of the mental on the physical and the apparent irreducibility of the former to the latter. In this framework, we are going, first, to grant ontological monism while rejecting physicalism. We will argue for an ontological framework that acknowledges some of the reasons of classical idealism, without abandoning a materialist framework. Secondly, we are going to show why intentional phenomena can never be regarded as epiphenomena. This move recommends a renewed methodological ‘respect’ for phenomena, consistent with the phenomenological tradition. Thirdly, by reinterpreting the old notion of formal causality, we will make room for an understanding of ‘mental causation’ that avoids both dualism and any violation of the principle of conservation of energy. In conclusion, we are going to argue that the reasons that originally motivated the introduction of ‘supervenience’ are inconsistent and that, in the theoretical context that we argue for, resorting to the notion of supervenience is either superfluous or misleading. (shrink)

In Hannah Arendt's political theory, thinking does not precede action; instead, thinking follows from action, because thinking is ‘apolitical’. Arendt first determines politics (action) as the opposite of philosophy (thinking) and later explains the primacy of politics: politics, which follows from the reversal of the metaphysical hierarchy, can be reconstructed as anti-metaphysics. However, the method of reversing the metaphysical hierarchy is fraught with difficulties that justify the critique of the primacy of politics as the central condition of a political theory, (...) because the price of the primacy of politics is the loss of the individual’s autonomy. Because one cannot understand Arendt's political theory (in terms of content) without recognising the (systemic) dichotomy between politics and philosophy, this book contains a glossary which explains what meaning the terms listed have in her political theory. (shrink)

On a dreary spring morning in late October 2006, two policemen drove their cruiser up Nkonjane Road in the K Section of KwaMashu, a former “Africans only” township about fifteen kilometers northwest of Durban. As the cruiser passed over K Section’s softly sloping hills, two men sat handcuffed together in the back. The officers parked the car in front of a house where a woman had reported being raped a few days prior. Leaving the two suspects in the car, the (...) officers alighted and walked up to the home. After greeting the victim, they asked her to step outside to identify the men. The victim, upon seeing the two men seated in the squad car, loudly screamed that they were the rapists... The crowd... (shrink)

Is logic masculine? Is women's lack of interest in the "hard core" philosophical disciplines of formal logic and semantics symptomatic of an inadequacy linked to sex? Is the failure of women to excel in pure mathematics and mathematical science a function of their inability to think rationally? Andrea Nye undermines the assumptions that inform these questions, assumptions such as: logic is unitary, logic is independenet of concrete human relations, and logic transcends historical circumstances as well as gender. In a (...) series of studies of the logics of historical figures--Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Abelard, Ockham, and Frege--she traces the changing interrelationships between logical innovation and oppressive speech strategies, showing that logic is not transcendent truth but abstract forms of language spoken by men, whether Greek ruling citizens, or scientists. (shrink)

This multidisciplinary work departs from the Marxist materialist tradition by criticizing its logical flaws and its incapacity to work out a naturalistic materialism. Micocci argues that capitalism itself is based on a dialectical intellectuality enforced despite the non-dialectical potentialities present in the material in general. Capitalism, therefore, is a massifying system isolated from nature by an intellectual fiat, and has no capacity for theoretical and technical innovation.

Edmund Husserl is regarded as the founder of transcendental phenomenology, one of the major traditions to emerge in twentieth-century philosophy. In this book Andrea Staiti unearths and examines the deep theoretical links between Husserl's phenomenology and the philosophical debates of his time, showing how his thought developed in response to the conflicting demands of Neo-Kantianism and life-philosophy. Drawing on the work of thinkers including Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel, as well as Husserl's writings on the natural and (...) human sciences that are not available in English translation, Staiti illuminates a crucial chapter in the history of twentieth-century philosophy and enriches our understanding of Husserl's thought. His book will interest scholars and students of Husserl, phenomenology, and twentieth-century philosophy more generally. (shrink)

This article discusses Charles Taylor's analysis of the ‘politics of recognition’, which reveals that the major versions of the latter share an ideological conception of Eros as a binding, unifying force. Such striving for oneness is seen as key to forming harmonious, just communities and nations, and ultimately global cohesion. I refer to this as the ‘ideology of Eros’. However, Taylor highlights an ironically divisive opposition concerning how to realise such oneness, based on incompatible foundational principles: ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’. Instead (...) of a choice, Taylor opts for the demanding political task of ongoing negotiation between them. I augment Taylor's analysis by re-evaluating the figure of ‘non-recognition’ arising from Lacan's critique of the ‘ideology of Eros’, which is centred on Socrates’ encounter with Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium and to which he adds his notion of genuine love, which affirms an ethic of healthy ‘non-recognition’. I argue that this ethic supports the difficult political task that Taylor rightly calls for. (shrink)