"What is whole on earth? … [D]oesn't this building of the times upon each other make the whole of our species into a formless monstrous structure [zum unförmlichen Riesengebäude], where one carries away what another began to build, where what never should have been built remains standing and in centuries finally everything becomes One Ruin [Ein Schutt], amongst which, the more broken and crumbling it is, the more confidently the hesitating people live?" "Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte (...) der Menschheit1"With the subordination of Church to State introduced by the principle of “cuius…. (shrink)

Marx's rethinking of the combination between absolute surplus-value and relative surplus-value during the 1860s is very important in order to reconsider the co-presence of different forms of historical temporality and exploitation. Postmodernism presents a picture of a plurality of historical times in which the old lies beside the modern and the sweatshop beside the high-tech factory. Because it fails to provide an explanation of the relation between these forms, postmodernism produces a false image of an 'ahistorical' present. In this (...) article I want to show how the combination of differentials of surplus-value works and why a representation of a plurality of historical temporalities synchronised by the temporality of socially-necessary labour is the most adequate image to comprehend it. The theoretical task is to show how the mature categorial structure of Capital not only does not need an historicist philosophy of history, but is in fact incompatible with it. (shrink)

Mark Bevir raises the question of how genealogy, understood as a technique-based radical historicism, and the notion of the contingency of ideas, ground “critique.” His problem is to avoid the relativism of radical historicism in a way that allows for “critique” without appealing to non-radical historicist absolutisms of the kind that ground the notion of false consciousness. He does so by appealing to the notion of motivated irrationality, which he claims avoids the problem of relativism and the problems of “false (...) consciousness.” The genealogies of Nietzsche and Foucault, however, do not ground “critique.” The relevant normative judgments, of nobility in Nietzsche, for example, are presupposed. (shrink)

There are various permutations of theism: henotheism, pantheism, panentheism, a/theism, and nontheistic divinity. There is debate whether the idea of OmniGod was ever achieved in India. R. C. Zaehner argued that an evolutionary transition from pratenaturalism of the Vedas to Upaniṣad’s monism, culminated in monotheism with Purāṇas and the _Bhagavad Gītā._ I argue differently, beginning with ancient ritualistic polytheism, followed by unifying One Brahman, toward monistic panentheism and later non-dualism of _advaita_ Vedānta. Under the influence of Asaṅga, Buddhism elevated the (...) Buddha as the Great Divine Replacement. As a response or reaction, Brāhmaṇism forged Īśvara as God with the World as his Body. By 13th century, theistic dualism separated Īśvara from his _creatio._ Even Nyāya rational philosophy was persuaded by monotheism as demonstrated in their teleo-cosmological argument for the existence of Īśvara. I attribute all this to sectarian and doctrinal shifts rather than to any evolutionary teleology and/or predestined historicist movement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:148 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 199o David D. Roberts. BenedettoCroceand the Usesof Historicism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, a987. Pp. xii + 449- NP. This book is a remarkably good survey of Croce's enormous output on the general topics of philosophy, politics, and history. Roberts shows an outstanding mastery not only of Croce's voluminous writings, but of the whole secondary literature about (...) him since the first rebellion of his Italian "followers" in the early years of this century. Roberts's aim is to restore Croce to his proper place in the continuing dialogues and debates about historicism and hermeneutics. So far as one writer can achieve such a goal with one book, he has achieved it; if there are reasons to fear (nevertheless) that his achievement may not have the full effect that he hopes for, they are rooted in Croce's own personality and background, not in any failure on the part of Roberts. "[I]f we are to grasp the dominant concerns of Croce's intellectual life, we must approach him primarily as a Western intellectual who was seeking to address the central challenges facing our culture, not confine him to... his particular Italian, or Neapolitan context.... [O]n the deepest level he would have faced the same challenges had he been reared in The Hague or Philadelphia" (24). The final rhetorical flourish here is one of Roberts's rare tumbles into outright absurdity, for what is (perhaps) true in 1987 was not true in 1887. So we should be glad that the Italian background is never really lost sight of. Roberts's treatment of Croce's intellectual formation is rather impressionistic, but we do always have a vivid image of the mature Don Benedetto, the bourgeois Neapolitan worthy who was made a Senator of the Realm in 191o (a biographical fact that is not mentioned). The one serious fault in Roberts's account of Croce's formation--which is excellent on the influence of Vico and Marx--is his failure to take a properly European view of Hegel. He remains a prisoner of Croce's critique of Hegel, so that he is never able to see clearly how deeply Hegelian Croce was. He sees only the differences, and, as far as "historicism" is concerned, they are largely differences from a straw man. Having said that, almost nothing remains but praise. Croce maintained that philosophy was only the tool-bag of the historian. Roberts, who is an intellectual historian rather than a philosopher, takes Croce at his word, with the results that his book is the first (in English at least) to present Croce's thought in the way that Croce himself saw it. He gives us an insightful review of the "philosophy of the spirit" in about sixty pages, including the development of the concept of"utility" into "vitality" in Croce's last years. Then he embarks on a study of how Croce used his philosophical instruments in the theory and practice of historical and political interpretation. The theory of "absolute historicism" (and of how it can be "absolutely" true) is followed by "the religion of history." This was a kind of historicized Buddhism, in my view, until Croce startled everyone, in a942, by announcing that "we cannot but call ourselves Christians"; but it is only the comparison of Croce's historicism with Buddhism that enables us to see it as a "religion" at all. Roberts does not say this, but he does show clearly how far removed from any faith-religion Croce was. After this comes a long chapter on "Historicist Politics." I think this is the best thing in the book, because Roberts not only clearly displays the near-bankruptcy of Croce's BOOK REVIEWS ~49 actual politics as President of the Italian Liberal Party from 1944 to i947, but demonstrates through a study of Piero Gobetti that neither Croce's own conservatism nor his doctrinal rigidity was a necessary corollary of "absolute historicism" in politics. As the main intellectual beacon of opposition to Fascism during its twenty years of power, Croce enjoyed enormous prestige in 1944; but as Don Benedetto, with his great family estates... (shrink)

This essay tries to develop a thoroughly critical method of evaluating religious beliefs presented to us in classic texts, illustrating this method by critical interpretation of the Dao of the Daodejing and the God of the Gospel of Mark. -/- The essay treats religious beliefs "theologically," that is, as views about what finally matters in life. In its emphasis on critical reason, it departs from the dogmatism usually associated with theology. It is also historicist and pluralist, departing from the usual (...) association of theology with a focus on absolute truths transcending all culture. -/- In the first part, I trace modern difficulties in subjecting religious faith to rational critique, to the cognitive "imperialism" of traditional religious thought -- the tendency of believers to allow their religious beliefs to govern knowledge in many other areas we now recognize as non-religious, due to the modern development of physical and cultural sciences. This tendency has misled modern thinkers into regarding religious claims about literal facts and universal truths as the epistemological basis of religious faith, and therefore the claims that should be the focus of rational critique. I offer instead a pragmatist view, which focuses on the pragmatic implications believers draw from their beliefs, and tries to correlate these implications with contextually conditioned perceptions believers might plausibly have had that might support these implications. -/- The second part of the essay proposes a very revisionist version of Plato’s "Socratic" reasoning, as one way of subjecting theological beliefs to rational critique. This model of Socratic reasoning is broadly empiricist, regarding direct perceptions of what is admirable, illustrated in unproblematic concrete narratives, as the epistemological basis for moral knowledge. Platonic "Ideas" are the result of extracting the essence of what is admirable from these concrete perceptions, and gradually refining them through sustained questioning. This account differs fundamentally from "Platonism" as it is traditionally conceived, especially in that it allows for the existence of a very great many ways of leading a great human life, exemplified today in the many different cultures we have gained an appreciative awareness of. The multiplicity of these different ways prevents any one small set of concepts from being regarded as a singularly and exclusively authoritative norm for judging all people everywhere. At the same time, this approach to moral reasoning avoids nihilist relativism by providing a procedural way of distinguishing rationally between the essence of what is admirable, and mere concrete appearances that often accompany what is admirable, but which can exist separately and so mislead people into a focus on things that do not finally matter. -/- The final part of the article applies this approach to a critical interpretation of the Dao of the Daodejing and the God of the Gospel of Mark. In the case of Dao, for example, we must attend to the way that aphorisms in the Daodejing evoke life experiences in which we ourselves can perceive specific contrasts between what is admirable and what is not. Dao in the Daodejing should then be interpreted, following suggestions given in the Daodejing itself, as a summary reference to this kind of admirability in its most pure form, conceived of in contrast to accompanying appearances. Similarly, in the case of the Gospel of Mark, we must attend to the way that episodes in Mark’s Jesus-story evoke life experiences in which we can perceive specific contrasts between what is admirable and what is not. Mark’s God is a focus for personal commitment to this kind of admirability in its most pure form, conceived of in contrast to accompanying appearances. The historicist character of this critical method is evident in the fact that in the Daodejing the particular contrasts defining what is admirable differ so radically from the particular contrasts defining what devotion to God means in the Gospel of Mark. (shrink)

György Márkus’s post-Marxist writings on high culture are evaluated in terms of their possible contribution to a neo-Marxist theory of high culture. Because of the highly essayistic character of Márkus’s presentation, this necessarily involves investigation of their dependence on his previous work. According to Márkus, Marxism can be critically reconstructed and superseded on the basis of an independent theorization of the consequences of Marx’s most basic theoretical move: the identification of production as paradigmatic for social action in general. In section (...) 3 this idea of the production paradigm is criticized. In section 4 I show how in Márkus this idea is made the basis of an ostensibly historicist concept of critical theory, in which not only the theory’s object is historicized, but the theory is itself organized as an articulation of the needs of historically specific constituencies. I argue, however, that in reality the idea of the production paradigm stands in fundamental contradiction to this methodological ideal. Márkus’s theory of high culture likewise combines historicist ambitions and reliance on the dehistoricized ‘production paradigm’. I argue that his ‘systematically dialectical’ deployment of this notion allows a quasi-historicist conceptualization of modern high culture as a whole, but that this method simultaneously renders theorization of high culture’s connection with more ‘infrastructural’ social relations problematic, and tends to exclude reflection on the ‘utopian moment’ in high cultural practice today. Section 5, and some remarks at the end of Section 11 suggest horizons for a genuinely historicist theory of high culture, in relation to the constitutive failure of Marxism to confront its dependency on the institutions of high culture, and also suggest a possible confluence and conflict with Roy Bhaskar’s work. (shrink)

The specific nuances of what Gramsci names ‘the new dialectic’ are explored in this paper. The dialectic was Marx's specific ‘mode of thought’ or ‘method of logic’ as it has been variously called, by which he analyzed the world and man's relationship to that world. As well as constituting a theory of knowledge (epistemology), what arises out of the dialectic is also an ontology or portrait of humankind that is based on the complete historicization of humanity; its ‘absolute “historicism”’ (...) or ‘the absolute secularisation and earthliness of thought’, as Gramsci worded it (, p. 465). Embracing a fully secular and historical view of humanity, it provides a vantage point that allows the multiple and complex effects of our own conceptual heritage to be interrogated in relation to our developing ‘nature’ or ‘being’. The argument presented in this paper is that the legacy of both Hegel and Marx is manifest in the depth of Gramsci's comprehension of what he termed the ‘educative‐formative’ problem of hegemony. It is precisely the legacy of this Hegelian‐Marxist radical philosophical critique that is signified in his continuing commitment to the ‘philosophy of praxis’ and the historical‐dialectical principles that underpin this worldview. (shrink)

Abstract Antonio Gramsci?s philosophy of praxis is characterised by the spatialisation as well as historicisation of its analytical categories. These theoretical practices are deeply intertwined in his ?absolute historicism?. Highlighting the spatiality of Gramsci?s analysis not only enables us to recover the many geographical themes in his work but also provides a useful counterweight to the emphasis on the historical dimensions of his historicism. In addition to obvious references to Gramsci?s use of spatial metaphors and his discussion of the (...) Southern Question, it is shown that many of his key concepts are best interpreted from a spatio?temporal as well as social and material perspective. After introducing the concepts of space, place and scale, the essay shows that all three are relevant to Gramsci?s analyses of issues such as language, the historical significance of the Catholic Church, the role of intellectuals, cosmopolitanism, class and class struggle, Americanism and Fordism, the nature of the Italian state, the social bases of state power, Jacobinism, passive revolution and hegemony. The essay concludes that Gramsci?s interest in place, space and scale was not merely academic but had to do with his analysis of revolutionary conjunctures. (shrink)

Alain Badiou’s theory of the subject has consistently opposed a vision of History as meaning and totality, for the sake of an internal, subjective and discontinuous grasp of the periodisation of political “sequences.” This article examines the theoretical trajectory that leads Badiou to dislocate the historical dialectic, generating a comprehension of political time which is no longer bound to an ordered matrix of expression and development; it also considers Badiou’s relation tovarious strands of anti-humanist anti-historicism and tackles the theoretical tensions (...) that inhere in his disjunction of nature and history. The article concludes by discussing the effect of Badiou’s notion of periodisation on the very historicity and mutability of his own philosophical apparatus, and the immanent threat posed to his thinking of the event by an ‘absolute historicism.’. (shrink)

Heidegger’s philosophy has been interpreted as an absolute historicism, unable to point to a unhistorical standpoint from which history can be judged upon. K. Löwith, for instance, has indicated that the cause of this difficulty is to be found in the conception of time: whereas, in Greek thought, time was considered only as a manifestation of the essence, in modern thought time has the tendency to become the essence itself, as that which fulfills itself in time, up to Heidegger’s (...) identification of being and event. What is interesting in my critique is that the conception of time is strictly interwoven with a specific way of conceiving justice and, broadly speaking, ethics. In Plato’s philosophy, justice as measure corresponds to a cyclical and even retrogressive conception of time, the one enounced in the myth of Chronos, in the Politikos. The modern conception of time, spiritualistic and biologistic, is instead cyclical and irreversible, cumulative: its most significant expression is Hegelianism. The existential conception of time, instead, is neither cyclical nor cumulative. By commenting on Heidegger’s Anaximander’s Saying, I wish to show the possibility of conceiving temporality as disjunction and only as such capable of producing justice – which I understand as a new possibility of meaning that does not exclude, but carries within itself, emancipation. An ethics of the present developed on the basis of this conception of time – which Heidegger has not completely endorsed – would then be an ethics which accepts as its own ground the discontinuous, yet inventive, dimension of time. (shrink)

Benedetto Croce was the author of the most important and original theory of history in the 20th century. His theory was that of ‘absolute historicism’, and this necessarily entailed an acute critique of inherited ideas about the Enlightenment. This article studies both Croce's theoretical analysis of Enlightenment and his historical analysis of the Neapolitan Enlightenment. Croce's interest in the Enlightenment had political as well as philosophical roots. All over Europe in the 1920s and 1930s historical and theoretical research was (...) occurring into in the Age of Enlightenment. The broad goal of such research was to bring forth a new concept of reason, which would have purchase in the contemporary debate about rationalism and irrationalism. This debate, which flourished in the era of totalitarian regimes, raised a series of further questions: What was culture? What was the task of culture in the fight against political irrationalism? What was the relationship between culture and the growth of public opinion? With respect to the latter relationship an important role was played by intellectuals, as evinced by the works of Benda, Max Weber and Croce himself. The genealogy of the modern intelligentsia led again to Enlightenment. In the third part of the article Croce's position on this issue is discussed in the light of his historical researches on Enlightenment by reference to his correspondence with two young historians, Delio Cantimori and Franco Venturi. (shrink)

Benedetto Croce was a historian, humanist, political figure, and the foremost Italian philosopher of the early twentieth-century. A Croce Reader brings together the author's most important works across the fields of aesthetics, philosophy, history, literary criticism, and the Baroque and presents the "other" Croce that has been erased by scholarly tradition, including by Croce himself. Massimo Verdicchio traces the progress of Croce as a thinker, focusing on his philosophy of absolute historicism and its aesthetic implications. Unlike other anthologies, A (...) Croce Reader includes essays from the Aesthetics of 1902 and key studies on Vico, Hegel, and Pirandello. Verdicchio's masterful translation of the source material welcomes specialists and non-specialists alike to discover the "other" Croce for themselves. (shrink)

This study is a comparison of the development of the theories of reification and hegemony in the writings and political activities of Georg Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci during the years from 1918 to 1938. In demonstrating that reification and hegemony were formulated in response to the unsuccessful revolutionary movements in Hungary and Italy of 1919-1920, it becomes evident that the respective theories of Lukacs and Gramsci were meant to constitute critiques of bourgeois cultural domination. Thus, their problematic extends to analyses (...) of more specific issues, such as the role of positivist science as the prevailing "paradigm of rationality" and the instrumental function of "traditional" and "organic intellectuals." The solutions that both theorists sought in order to overcome reification and hegemony are embedded in their neo-Hegelian interpretations of Marxism, where historical materialism is defined as a methodology characterised by its utilisation of the conceptual tools of "dialectic," "totality," and "absolute historicism." However, Lukacs was forced by historical circumstances to retreat into the realm of aesthetics, although he continued the critique of reification by way of his theory of critical realism. Simultaneously, Gramsci began to elaborate more practical solutions to cultural domination through his theory of the "war of position," catharsis, and counter-hegemony. (shrink)

The present volume may be regarded as a sound introduction to Gramsci's philosophy. The work focuses primarily upon the Prison Notebooks from which Nemeth attempts to reveal Gramsci's "formidable epistemology" which is presumably phenomenological in character. According to Nemeth, "Gramsci's great originality within the Marxist tradition lies in his adumbration of a transcendental, indeed a phenomenological perspective". It seems highly peculiar that Husserl's ideas should be appropriated in a study that highlights a distinctive Italian philosophy of praxis. Nemeth's numerous references (...) to phenomenology, which are made in an attempt to demonstrate Gramsci's "absolute historicism," fail to reveal both the meaning of phenomenology per se and the significance of relating the Husserlian method of thought to Gramsci's revolutionary conception of action. That the thought of the Prison Notebooks "can only maintain its raison d'être by drawing ever closer to Husserlian phenomenology" remains a mere assertion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS ~49 actual politics as President of the Italian Liberal Party from 1944 to i947, but demonstrates through a study of Piero Gobetti that neither Croce's own conservatism nor his doctrinal rigidity was a necessary corollary of "absolute historicism" in politics. As the main intellectual beacon of opposition to Fascism during its twenty years of power, Croce enjoyed enormous prestige in 1944; but as Don Benedetto, with (...) his great family estates in the South, he could not bring himself to admit that, if Fascism was only an "interlude," it was precisely an interlude in the resolution of a social crisis. As Roberts says (233) Croce's philosophical liberalism validated his right to hold conservative views; but if he wanted to speak for a "pre-partisan" view, he should have avoided party involvements altogether. He undermined his own philosophical authority in a matter of months, and so lost his greatest cultural opportunity. When he died in 195~ he was already a back number, and it was no one's fault but his own. Roberts does a good job on Croce's historical works in the next chapter. Croce's conservatism, his ingrained personal prejudice against serious social change, explains the evident presence of an element of special pleading in the Historyofltaly x87I-I915, and the History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century. All of Croce's formal histories were written as part of his defence of the liberal spirit against Fascism. But in these two works, which dealt with the world in which Fascism was actually born, we can readily detect his anxiety to prove that Fascism was indeed an interlude--and that when it was over nothing important would be changed. His other works are more respectable examples of "ethico-political history," but that is only because they are more "ethical" and less "political," so to speak. Croce was in many ways fortunate to live and work in the great "interlude" between 1914 and i945. For the fact is that he was not himself very good at the sympathetic and humanely humble dialogue that his theory called for, and the worst of his many heritages from Hegel was precisely that identification of philosophy with the "logic of the pure concepts" which enabled him to defend himself against philosophical dialogue with such righteous certitude. Roberts has none of this righteous spirit, and I hope most earnestly that his book will help many readers to see past it in Croce. H. S. HARRIS York University Michel Haar. Le chant de la terre. Paris: Editions de l'Herne, 1987. Pp. 3oL FF 13o. In Le chant de la terre Michel Haar finds himself swimming upstream. Whereas many Parisian thinkers conclude that every possiblefundamentum inconcussumhas finally met its end, Haar holds "that the thought of Ereignisdoes not give way.., to a liberation of multiple and decentered forces. On the contrary, the turn from the oblivion of Being marks a reentry into the Simple and a concentration in the Same [l'Unique]" (a7)" Thus Haar's general concern is with foundations and origins. However, Haar's project is not a resumption of Cartesian philosophy, for he resumes Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in Being and Time, which undercuts Cartesian dualism and shows that man, as Being-in-the-world, is essentially finite, historical, and 150 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 1990 linguistic. Haar then undertakes the sisyphean task of showing that something called 'earth,' while itself ahistorical and "pre-linguistic," is at the basis of man's historical and thoroughly linguistic existence. Therefore it behooves Haar, given the abysmal difference between the historical/linguistic domain and the ahistorical/pre-linguistic domain, to show that the latter can have a foundation in the former--that is, how the ahistorical, prelinguistic earth makes a difference for man even though one can never "escape" the historical/linguistic realm in any practical or theoretical sense. To do this Haar initially appeals to two Heideggerian notions: Stimmung (roughly translated as 'disposition') and phusis. Following Heidegger, Haar argues that disposition, while rooted in Dasein's facticity, by nature is attuned to something beyond this facticity. Since "every Grundstimraung reveals the Grund [ground], the abysmal foundation... (shrink)

A dozen essays were initially presented at the 1972 conference of the Hegel Society of America. Two themes are treated. In the first three essays there is presentation and criticism of Hegel’s own evaluation of the relation between philosophic positions prior to his own, and philosophic truth; in the last nine there is more detailed discussion of Hegel’s dependence or influence of individual philosophers before and after his time. Of the first, for instance, A. R. Caponigri argues that there is (...) a dilemma within Hegel: either the history of philosophy is irrelevant or redundant, over and above the logical deduction of its stages, or the actual deduction is redundant, because of the well-ordered nature of the history of philosophy. Thus he claims that Hegel is finally committed to moving in the direction of an "absolute historicism." Joseph Flay discusses the vexed problem of relating the history of philosophy to the point of departure for the Logic which Hegel claimed the Phenomenology to be. He argues cogently that a familiarity with the history of philosophy is presupposed by the Phenomenology, in order that it might be recalled; if the history of philosophy is not known, the experience recounted in the Phenomenology would collapse into a series of discrete stances towards truth, external to the philosopher. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the shifts in Wilhelm Windelband’s ‘critical philosophy of values’ as it developed hand in hand with his understanding of relativism. The paper has two goals. On the one hand, by analyzing the role that relativism played in his philosophical project, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding of Windelband's intellectual development in the context of historicism and Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, by highlighting Windelband’s contribution to the understanding of relativism, it sheds light on an important (...) episode in the history of that problem. The paper distinguishes between three phases in Windelband’s thinking and shows that his views about relativism changed in close connection with his conception of history. The early Windelband thought that historicism was compatible with absolute validity because he was firmly convinced of historical progress. The mature Windelband rejected progress as a means for justifying validity and put the problem of relativism into sharp relief. In response to the failure of his mature philosophy to fend off relativism, the later Windelband strengthened the role of history again. The paper concludes that Windelband’s significance lies not in his arguments against relativism, but rather in having furthered philosophical understanding of the problems at stake. (shrink)

Using the work of Józef Bocheski as apositive example, this paper sets out the casefor a balanced use of historical knowledge indoing analytic philosophy. Between the twoextremes of relativizing historicism, whichdenies absolute truth, and arrogant scientism,which denies any constructive role for thehistory of ideas in philosophy, lies a viamedia in which historical reflection onconcepts and their history is placed at theservice of the system of cognitive philosophy.Knowledge of the history of philosophy, whilenot a sine qua non, can empower analyticphilosophy (...) to push forward to new and moresatisfactory solutions to old and new problems.Examples are adduced from Bocheski's oeuvreand from the author's own experience. (shrink)

The preoccupation with the "historicity" of thought and existence is central to thehermeneutic-phenomenological branch of modern philosophy. Its foremostrepresentative is Martin Heidegger, who in his main work Sein und Zeit (1927)developed a theory of historicity, according to which human beings not only exist inhistory, but are themselves historical. In subsequent writings Heidegger argued thatnot only man, but also truth and being, must be understood "historically" in aparticular sense. The meaning and the impHcations of Heidegger's "historicization" ofphilosophy are here analyzed along (...) two parallel tracks: as a theory of the conditions ofphilosophical understanding; second, as an incentive to new ways of respondingphilosophically to these conditions. The study focuses on the sense of belongingwhich Heidegger assigns to historicity, as a dialogical relation to an enigmatic originthat cannot be exhaustively articulated, but to which understanding must neverthelessrespond in repetition and critique. The idea of the "hermeneutic situation," and what itmeans to occupy such a situation, is shown to be central in this regard. Heidegger's"historicization" of the philosophical territory is inte reted as an exemplary attempt topreserve philosophy as a quest for "origins" in the explicit recognition of theinterminable historical mediation of thinking. His approach leads to a criticalquestioning of fundamental philosophical distinctions, such as the temporal and theeternal, the absolute and the relative, subject and object, and of truth as correspondence.Eventually he is led to question the ability of language to express thehistoricity of thought and of being, which can only be indicated by means of conceptssuch as "moment" (Augenblick) and "event" (Ereignis). In seven chapters the themeof historicity is explored from different angles, which together provide a guide toHeidegger's path from a philosophy of life to a thinking of being in the "otherbeginning." The study covers the full range of his writings, but it emphasizes thedevelopment from the earliest lectures, over Sein und Zeit, to the second major work,Beiträge zur Philosophie (1938, published posthumously in 1989). (shrink)

Collingwood’s account of re-enactment is often misunderstood as providing methodological guidance to historians. Williams’s chapter is perceptive in seeing through this erroneous interpretation. Williams is however very critical of Collingwood’s account of the relationship between philosophy and history. He reads Collingwood’s account of absolute presuppositions as embracing a form of ‘radical historicism’ and argues that, like many other philosophers who reject foundationalism, Collingwood tends to use the word ‘we’ in an evasive way, both in an inclusive sense “as implying (...) universalistic preconditions on interpretation and intelligibility” and in a contrastive sense “under which ‘we’ here and now are distinct from others elsewhere and elsewhen, who lived in others and different intelligible human formations”. William’s chapter appropriately introduces this volume since the question concerning the nature of absolute presuppositions, and in what sense they can be said to be constitutive of the forms of inquiry which they make possible, is a central concern of this collection and is discussed by several contributors. (shrink)

The story of eternity is not as simple as a secularization narrative implies. Instead it follows something like the trajectory of reversal in Kant’s practical proof for the existence of god. In that proof, god emerges not as an object of theoretical investigation, but as a postulate required by our practical engagement with the world; so, similarly, the eternal is not just secularized out of existence, but becomes understood as an entailment of, and somehow imbricated in, the conditions of our (...) practical existence. -/- The sections that follow discuss some of those central figures in modern European philosophy whose views prominently feature some consideration of eternity. I start with Kant in section I. Kant’s critique of speculative theology is well-known, and this hostility would appear to make it unlikely that the eternal, with all its theological baggage, would feature prominently in Kant’s critical philosophy. But in fact Kant’s transcendental idealism endorses no fewer than three different concepts of the eternal, including what turns out to be the most historically influential idea: that practical reason involves a kind of eternal, non-temporal action. Kant shifts this notion of a non-temporal act from its original theological context of god’s actus purus to a practical context, setting the stage for Schelling’s and Kierkegaard’s later development of this theme. Before detailing this trajectory however, section II is devoted to Hegel, the philosopher whose radical historicism is perhaps more than any other thinker responsible for making “the nineteenth century preeminently the historical century.”4 Hegel is not fertile soil for the concept of the eternal, but his historicism does turn out, at a crucial moment in the philosophy of nature, to presuppose a certain conception of eternity as an eternal present. Perhaps more importantly for the further development of eternity in nineteenth century thought however is that both Schelling and Kierkegaard situate their views of the eternal in the context of a collective rejection of Hegel. Section III discusses Schelling, who returns to Kant’s conception of non-temporal choice, seeing human capacities for free eternal self-creation as rivaling god’s. Such powers are required, Schelling argues, to resist the sublimation of the individual human person into the blankness of the Absolute. Section IV briefly consider Schopenhauer’s view that the in-itself of everything is an endlessly striving will. Section V concerns Kierkegaard who is strongly committed to the eternal, and indeed criticizes Hegel for compromising his conception of the eternal by thinking it temporally; but he is obsessed by the paradoxical question of our practical “access” to the eternal within a particular temporal moment: the decisive moment, imbued with significance that can turn life around and create a new person, pushing Schelling’s concerns even further. The remaining, shorter sections, present briefer accounts of more recent figures who make important use of some conception of the eternal: Nietzsche’s eternal return (section VI), Agamben’s (1942-) theory of sovereignty (section VII) and finally Alain Badiou’s unapologetic attempt to resuscitate eternity as the condition of revolutionary political change (Section VIII). I end with a concluding meditation (Section IX). (shrink)

Purpose. Based on the study of philosophical anthropological concepts, to highlight the project of personality in different historical periods, to reveal the meaning of humanistic issues in the postmodern epoch, to identify the essential features of the image of human of the second half of the XX the beginning of the XXI century. Theoretical basis. The methodological basis of the article is the principles of historicism, integrity, objectivity regarding the mastery of the issue of person’s image in postmodernism. The research (...) applied comparative-historical, culturological, analytical, axiological approaches to reveal the problem of individuality in the second half of the XX the beginning of the XXI century. The theoretical basis of the article consists of scientific works in the field of philosophical anthropology, history, cultural studies, and aesthetics. Originality. The author revealed the peculiarities of transformation of the personality model from antiquity to postmodernism, specified the image of man of the second half of the XX the beginning of the XXI century. Conclusions. The analysis of anthropological ideas of Western philosophy of different ages shows the variety of views about understanding the nature of the person, its complexity and ambiguity. In the epoch of postmodernism humanistic issues are of particular relevance, which is connected with social and political uncertainty, domination of mass consciousness, loss of national and cultural identity. The image of a person of this period is deprived of a solid foundation, it is blurred and relative. The destruction of faith in the absolute in the context of the second half of the twentieth century contributed to the formation of confidence in the interdependence of all things, raised the problem of the personality image to a new ontological level. Orientation in the achievements of European civilization, perception of its anthropological experience, intercultural dialogue contribute to the productive use of the achievements of mankind in order to understand the modern person and to form its adequate image. In its essence, postmodernism does not set the goal to realize a retrospection of subject type. However, separating from the cultural memory the excerpts of ideas about a person, by certain styles and directions, it builds on their formations its own eclectic image of the individual. (shrink)

The author analyzes the transformations of Hellenic theologys content and forms in the epoch of early antique classics. The general orientation of such transformations is the generalization of mythological gods meanings into the abstract implications of the Absolute, which is not yet sacral in its full sense and not transcendent. Besides, this period is the end of the decentralization of consciousness. Cognitive limitations to the development of abstract conceptual thinking and the rational component of consciousness are removed. This processs (...) main points transform mythology into artistic and aesthetic creativity, religious consciousness, and theology. Rationalism is always critical. Critical rationalism inevitably leads to historicism. Therefore, the formation of a historical attitude strengthens at the sight of the critical approach. The world's mythological image is increasingly being questioned. Its content is being transferred to the past. Finally, the era of early classicism comes into play. It is a time when theology becomes a field of philosophical and theoretical reflection on myth and an area of its artistic and aesthetic experience. The most influential form of such an understanding of myth was the theater. The ancient theater served as a spiritual and practical form of ancient theology, a subject embodiment of theology in stage action. (shrink)

Introduction: Kantian concepts, liberal theology, and post-Kantian idealism -- Subjectivity in question: Immanuel Kant, Johann G. Fichte, and critical idealism -- Making sense of religion: Friedrich Schleiermacher, John Locke, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and liberal theology -- Dialectics of spirit: F.W.J. Schelling, G.W.F. Hegel, and absolute idealism -- Hegelian spirit in question: David Friedrich Strauss, Søren Kierkegaard, and mediating theology -- Neo-Kantian historicism: Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf von Harnack, Wilhelm Herrmann, Ernst Troeltsch, and the Ritschlian school -- Idealistic ordering: Lux Mundi, (...) Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, Hastings Rashdall, Alfred E. Garvie, Alfred North Whitehead, William Temple, and British idealism -- The Barthian revolt: Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and the legacy of liberal theology -- Idealistic ironies: from Kant and Hegel to Tillich and Barth. (shrink)

It is true that Hegelian historicism has indeed led to a dominant ethos of moral relativism bound up with the belief that individual self-actualization is the highest value, thus creating a society that is, in the phrase of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. “after God.” Nevertheless, this egocentric and nihilistic relativism exists alongside a robust and militant moral totalitarianism enforced by the modern clerisy of the media, multi-national corporations, and government bureaucrats, that is, a “managerial elite.” This article argues that the (...) transcendental idealism of Kant and the subsequent historicization of Kant’s dialectic by Hegel has served to reconceptualize the older, Baconian view of science, creating the idea that scientific progress is moving toward the goal of a future perfection of absolute rational unity. The a priori rational structure of reality that makes science possible is not a Platonic Ideal, but something that unfolds within history. This is what allowed Marx to conceive of dialectical materialism as a science, and this is what allows the managerial elite of the present to claim a scientific and objective basis for their programs while at the same time using the tools of historical and cultural criticism to relativize and historicize the claims of all competing moral and social “constructs.”. (shrink)

In the writings of Husserl one can uncover what could be labeled a "critical" philosophy of history, as well as what some scholars have deemed a "speculative" philosophy of history. Concerning the former, Husserl offers three criticisms of historicism: the incapability of historicism to establish that any particular theory is false, the impossibility of demonstrating inductively that there are no absolute truths, and the paradox of the claim that there are no absolute truths, for it rests on an (...) assumption of apodicticity. However, Husserl's own notion of the historical character of the life-world seems vulnerable to the assertion that it falls into an historicist position. His defense relies on the third of the above criticisms: that historicism should recognize its own fundamental assumption of apodicticity. Regarding a "speculative" philosophy of history, if Husserl demonstrates one, it is of a very limited sort, and it relies on his reading of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse how Ernst Cassirer’s approach of a phenomenology of knowledge deals with the general question of disunity in science and society. By elaborating on the concept of functional unity, which presupposes difference, Cassirer’s work helps to revise foundational concepts of modern science and society, such as pluralism and truth. Relating Cassirer’s approach to the current interest in political epistemology, we show the implications of Cassirer’s theory of knowledge and analyses of modern science, particularly physics. In these (...) analyses, Cassirer carves out the relational logic of scientific knowledge and its consequences on epistemological and ethico-political levels. While this logic of relations relativises absolute claims on either level, it entails its distinct normative criteria as elements of the scientific ideal. Cassirer’s project defends this ideal and thus can simultaneously defend plurality _in_ science (including the humanities) in terms of methods, perspectives and aims, and preserve the unity _of_ science as a normative ideal and symbolic form in constant interaction with other forms. Thus, Cassirer’s pluralism must be distinguished from mere historicist or relativist conceptions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hegel and Herder on Art, History, and ReasonKristin GjesdalThe introduction of a historical perspective in aesthetics is usually traced back to Hegel's 1820 lectures on fine art. Given at the University of Berlin, these lectures were amongst Hegel's most successful and best attended.1 By then a recognized intellectual figure, Hegel sets out to salvage art from its subjectivization in Kantian and romantic aesthetics, but ends up declaring that art, (...) considered in its highest vocation, is a thing of the past. This judgment on art—that its greatness is a thing of the past—follows from Hegel's attempt to combine a notion of art's historicity with a conception of its absolute essence. Hegel, however, was not the first to think systematically about the historicity of art. For this aspect of art—and, indeed, of reason too—was explored philosophically a good sixty years before Hegel's Berlin lectures by a young and aspiring student of Kant's, namely Johann Gottfried Herder. In a series of essays and fragments, Herder develops an advanced and elaborate alternative to Hegel's conception, a fundamentally non-essentialist approach to art, history, and reason.Over the past twenty years or so, Hegel's attempt to combine an essentialist and an historicist approach to art has been revitalized, with increasing force and sophistication, by Arthur Danto.2 The attempts to rehabilitate Herder's aesthetics, however, have been few and far between.3 This is the aim of the present essay, which seeks to contrast the young Herder's non-essentialist understanding of the historicity of art with Hegel's essentialist views on the artwork's historicity, pleading for a rehabilitation of the former.4 I approach this task from three different directions. First, I offer a brief account of Herder's and Hegel's views on reason, history, and art. Second, I look closer at their conceptions of classical tragedy and sculpture, which, due to Winckelmann's studies, [End Page 17] were perceived at the time as the gateway to a historically sensitive conception of culture as such. Finally, I round off by looking at some of the hermeneutic implications of Herder's non-essentialist standpoint.IAccording to Hegel, a phenomenologically mature and accountable philosophy is distinguished by its readiness to reflect on its own, historical presuppositions. It must acknowledge the critical commitments of modern thinking, but also take into account how these commitments are the result of spirit's laborious journey through history. Only by combining the perspective of modernity with the resources of tradition may philosophy inhabit a place where systematicity and historicity concur. Reality may now be exhausted in the form of a speculative logic. This, according to Hegel, is the end of history, but as the end of history, it is also the dawn of a new era, that of free and self-determining spirit.Hegel's notion of the end of history testifies to a formidable optimism about the power of critical thought. In modernity, Hegel claims, art and religion no longer emerge as adequate media of self-reflection. It is philosophy that has taken on this task. Considered from the standpoint of modernity, religion and art are no longer appropriate forms of expression; now only the conceptual optics of philosophy adequately reflects our deepest truths and values.5Artistically speaking, this moment may well emerge as a loss. For even though Hegel never claims that art, as such, will no longer be produced,6 he reckons it will not be produced in the same spirit as before. No longer expressive of a shared, ethical and political commitment, art is not brought forth by necessity. Intellectually speaking, however, the end of art triggers a different response. Not only does the end of art represent another step towards the conceptual self-determination of spirit. It also follows that only when a phenomenon such as art has finally fulfilled its historical possibilities can it be brought to philosophical clarity about itself. Only after art can we know conceptually what art is. Aesthetics can only begin at the point when art, considered in its highest vocation, no longer holds a historical future.IIAs a young and... (shrink)

As long as we care about suffering in the world, says political philosopher Simona Forti, we are compelled to inquire into the question of evil. But is the concept of "evil" still useful in a postmodern landscape where absolute values have been leveled and relativized by a historicist perspective? Given our current unwillingness to judge others, what signposts remain to guide our ethical behavior? Surveying the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western philosophical debates on evil, Forti concludes that it is time (...) to leave behind what she calls "the Dostoevsky paradigm": the dualistic vision of an omnipotent monster pitted against absolute, helpless victims. No longer capable of grasping the normalization of evil in today's world—whose structures of power have been transformed—this paradigm has exhausted its explanatory force. In its place, Forti offers a different genealogy of the relationship between evil and power, one that finally calls into question power's recurrent link to transgression. At the center of contemporary evil she posits the passive attitude towards rule-following, the need for normalcy, and the desire for obedience nurtured by our contemporary mass democracies. In our times, she contends, evil must be explored in tandem with our stubborn desire to stay alive at all costs as much as with our deep need for recognition: the new modern absolutes. A courageous book, _New Demons_ extends an original, inspiring call to ethical living in a biopolitical age. (shrink)

Part one. Brahms and Bruckner : a radical historical, art-theoretical, and artistic contrast. Aspects and issues ; Art and personality ; The conflict ; Art-theoretical controversies ; On historical classification ; Parallelisms and antitheses ; The relation to historicism ; "Heirs" of Beethoven ; Parallelisms and antitheses once more ; Richard Wagner -- Part two. The unknown Brahms. Brahms : an autonomous composer? ; "Young Kreisler" ; Schumann's essay "Neue Bahnen" : a new interpretation ; Schumann and Brahms : Brahms' (...) Schumann variations (op. 9) and Schumann's Davidsbèundlertèanze ; The piano variations op. 23 : a monument to Robert Schumann ; "Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini" : on the "Mass quotation" in the Adagio of the Piano concerto op. 15 ; A special kind of father-son relationship -- Part three. The unknown Bruckner. Bruckner : "the most absolute of absolute musicians"? ; Bruckner and the program symphony ; On Bruckner exegesis : the "tone symbol of the cross" (Liszt) ; The program of the "Romantic" symphony ; The program of the Eighth symphony : musical semantics and historical contexts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel’s Idea of a “Phenomenology of Spirit” by Michael N. ForsterGünter ZöllerMichael N. Forster. Hegel’s Idea of a “Phenomenology of Spirit.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 661. Paper, $30.00.Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) has remained an enigmatic and controversial work. Typically it has been studied and appropriated selectively, by focusing on a few topics or sections of this immense opus. There are also several (...) commentaries on all or part of the work that immerse the reader in plenty of detail, but often with insufficient attention paid to the work’s overall design. Forster’s book is thematically focused but has sufficient scope to provide the reader with an overall orientation about the Phenomenology. Moreover, it is written in a clear, accessible language, with plenty of genuinely philosophical material to balance the more narrowly exegetical aspects of the study. Forster’s work stands in the tradition of a number of German and French studies that seek to unravel the “genesis and structure” (Hyppolite) of the Phenomenology as a key to understanding and assessing the import of Hegel’s singular work. Forster discusses those earlier readings, subjects them to a thorough critique, and develops original positions on a number of key issues in scholarship on the Phenomenology.The entire first half of the book (Parts One and Two) is concerned with the “official project of the Phenomenology,” which Forster reconstructs as three sets of philosophical tasks. First are the pedagogical tasks designed to introduce the reader to the superior viewpoint of Hegel’s system and its ability to overcome the ills specific to modern culture. In particular, Hegel is shown to further advance Herder’s and Schiller’s philosophical project of replacing the multiple, unreconciled dualisms of the modern intellectual and moral outlook with a unified, monistic account of natural and social reality. In a strong interpretive move, Forster attributes a naturalism of sorts to Hegel’s integrationist account of mind and body or self and world.Second are the epistemological tasks designed to justify the cognitive claims of Hegel’s [End Page 541] system (“science”) against those of all other philosophical and popular viewpoints. In particular, Forster shows Hegel’s indebtedness to the ancient (Pyrronic) skeptical strategy of equipollence, i.e., the method of setting into opposition equally strong arguments on both sides of any issue and thereby producing an equal balance of justification on all sides of the issue. Of all possible viewpoints only Hegel’s own, which is not subject to any external opposition, eludes the scope of the method of equipollence.The third, specifically metaphysical set of tasks of the Phenomenology centers around the work’s social and (on Forster’s reading) naturalist conceptions of God, meaning and truth, in which transcendent warrants are replaced by communal consensus. Forster concludes the first half of his study with a detailed consideration of the relation between the Phenomenology and Hegel’s system proper. He stresses that the work is only the “appearance” (Erscheinung) of the philosophical science itself and that it remains systematically independent of the latter.Part Three examines the role of history and historicism in the Phenomenology. Forster distinguishes between teleological or normative historicism and intellectual or descriptive historicism, and limits his investigation to the latter as the philosophically defensible of the two enterprises. He argues extensively for a one-to-one correlation between the various “shapes of consciousness” to be found in the core of the Phenomenology (from the chapter on Consciousness through the chapter on Reason) and specific periods in human history. This chronological history of consciousness is shown to be supplemented by two further accounts of the history of consciousness (in the chapter on Spirit and in the chapters on Religion and Absolute Knowledge, respectively), in which the first history’s focus on individual consciousness is enlarged to include supra-individual mind (“spirit”).In Part Four Forster explains the tripling of the history of consciousness with a shift in the plan of the Phenomenology, away from the more limited project of the original or “Ur-Phenomenology”—to lead individual consciousness to the viewpoint of (Hegelian) science—to the more ambitious goal... (shrink)

In 1964, when Danto first encountered Warhol's Brillo Box, Jasper Johns made a painting titled According to What. Danto's new book After the End of Art also provokes this question because in his restatement of Hegel's verdict on art's historical role he drops an essential part of the implied definition of art: the issue of adequacy between content and presentation. Why dispense with this crucial point of quality judgment? My critique falls into three parts. The first part shows how the (...) whole historical argument rests upon a shift of criteria. According to Hegel art reached its highest point of achievement in classical antiquity when adequate embodiment seemed indispensable to the presence of the spirit. It subsequently lost this exclusive rank-first through Christianity, then through modern philosophy-when a new spiritual self-awareness emerged which no longer seemed to need external manifestation. Although Danto disputes the concept of absolute self-possession as the metaphysical vanishing point of Hegel's construction, he nevertheless subscribes to its apparent evidence in late twentieth-century art and culture. In the second part I discuss the characteristic distortions of Hegelian-type historicism and confront them with both the obvious misrepresentation of the works of art themselves and the different code of conduct in practical art history. This leads to a rather disenchanting conclusion: according to an old, deeply ingrained philosophical prejudice there is no problem about quality in art, because the true yardstick and fulfillment of art is philosophy itself. The final part tries to unpick this tangle by showing that there was in fact, contemporaneous with Hegel, a remarkably different interpretation of the self-same auspices of modern art which comes much closer to its actual achievements, and this without denying the basic philosophical predicament of which Danto has reminded us. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Fragments THE GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM by Anthony J. Cascardi At SEVERAL POINTS in Philosophy and the Minor ofNature (1979) and in.the essays collected as Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), Richard Rorty mentions John Dewey as one of a group of "edifying" philosophers whose tutelary presence and audiority are invoked in the project which he elsewhere describes as die "circumvention" of Western metaphysics.1 Dewey joins the ranks of his (...) fellow American pragmatiste James and Peirce as well as those of two odier rather disparate groups: on die one hand, those philosophers like Davidson, Sellars, and Quine, who demonstrate from within diat analytical philosophy eventually transcends and cancels itself; and on the other, those "continental" philosophers like Foucault, Gadamer, and Derrida, who comfortably accept the image of philosophy as a subgenre of "literature" or "writing," a discourse with no privileged insights into the nature of rationality or claims to truth. Rorty's own project is a blend of all diree. Widi James he claims that truth is simply "what is good in die way of belief," not the proper or even fruitful object of theoretical speculation ("truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting dieory about.... Pragmatiste think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or the Good, or to define die word 'true' or 'good,' supports their suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area.... The history of attempts to do so, and of criticisms of such attempts, is roughly coextensive wim the history of that literary genre we call 'philosophy' — a genre founded by Plato," Consequences ofPragmatism, pp. xiii-xiv). Yet he shares widi Davidson, Sellars, and Quine the will to demonstrate the limits of analytical phdosophy while framing his own propositions in the language ofanalysis. 295 296Philosophy and Literature Foucault and Derrida in their turn complete the image of life in a "postphilosophical " culture, where the designation of "post" indicates a final refusal to regard pragmatism as yet another metanarrative ofthe history of philosophy. In this case, die historicist part of the Hegelian teaching, which is dieir common inheritance, the assimilation of logic to history, is accepted, while the assimilation of history to logic, which completes the Hegelian syndiesis, is rejected on account of its totalizing designs and its reliance on die notion of Absolute Spirit. So seen, the genealogy of pragmatism is of considerably broader scope than die initial intentions of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature would suggest. In diat book, Rorty claimed to be marshalling the various forces named above not so much in response to Platonism as in reply to a single episode in the history of philosophy — viz., that which begins in Descartes and receives its fullest expression in Kant, and considers truth as a matter of the accurate correspondence of ideas held inforo intemo to objects in the external world, and accordingly regards die world as a representation of the mind. Heidegger articulated a similar complaint when he spoke of the Cartesian age as that in which die world was first determined as a "picture" ("Die Zeit des Weltbildes") and noted diat from this time forward epistemology was determined as "first philosophy": "a dieory ofknowledge had to be erected before a theory of the world."2 Pragmatism is on mis more limited view primarily a response to the conditions of a technological age and to the conception ofreason as mathematical representation which sustains modern science. Thus Rorty should well be surprised at Dewey's claim to have applied a scientific and empirical method in die study of metaphysics, whose proper objects consist, in Dewey's description, of"die large and constant features of human sufferings, enjoyments, trials, failures, and successes together with the institutions of art, science, technology, politics, and religion,"3 for to have done so would have been to have countered the Cartesian division between science on the one hand and qualities and values ("experience") on die other. Instead, Rorty imputes a different claim to Experience and Nature and sees it as a way-station on the pam toward that hypothetical book called Nature and Culture, in which die idea of an empirical method... (shrink)

Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien. The skeptical consequences of the psychologist and historicist thinking prevalent in the intellectual climate of the beginning of the twentieth century made it impossible to establish morality, religion and other humanistic sciences on an absolute foundation. Husserl saw in this situation factors which were causing real illnesses of the human spirit. It is the thesis of this work that Husserl, though well-motivated by the best humanistic intentions, fails to furnish (...) an adequate cure for the ills of the human spirit. He fails because his phenomenology lacks a metaphysical foundation and because the aim he has in mind - to remedy the sickness of the human spirit - cannot be attained through the power of human reason alone. In St. Thomas Aquinas we find a more adequate remedy for curing the sickness of the human spirit because of a metaphysically sound doctrine on man and the absence of a purely - this-world orientation in thought. The conclusion of this work is that St. Thomas' thought is the more adequate one to respond to the Husserlian problem of the human spirit's sickness. Contents: Husserl's Humanistic Intent as Expressed in Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft - Husserl's Humanistic Intent in Die Krisis de europaischen Wissenschaften - Husserl's Concept of Science Compared with the Aristotelian-Thomistic one - Husserl's Understanding of Essence in Comparison with that of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas - Norms and Objectivity in Husserl and in St. Thomas Aquinas - Husserl's Concept of Human Being and his Lack of a Metaphysical Foundation in Comparison with St. Thomas - The Self-Sufficient Nature ofConsciousness in Husserl - The Sense of Human Life According to Husserl and St. Thomas.". (shrink)

_Abstract_: Here, I examine the main philosophical solutions to the mind-body problem distinguishing between “historicist” solutions that (more or less clearly) separate philosophy from science and solutions that instead result from a double “cognitive turn”, and see “continuity” between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. The “historicist” solutions include ontological dualism (together with “skepticism” and “new mysterianism”), epistemological dualism, subjective idealism, and absolute idealism. In this group, transcendental idealism, phenomenology, and neutral monism are the solutions most open to (...) a dialogue between philosophy and science. The “naturalistic” solutions can be divided into four groups: (1) behaviorism (psychological, logical, philosophical-analytical behaviorism); (2) materialism (identity theory, physicalism); (3) “weak naturalism” (functionalism, anomalous monism, “biological naturalism”, liberal naturalism, emergentism); (4) “strong naturalism” (“cognitive neo-evolutionism”, eliminativism). These offer a physicalist-eliminative solution to the mind-body problem (here called “soft physicalistic eliminativism”) that allows for more continuity between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. _Keywords_: Mind/Body-Problem; Cognitive Science; Cognitive Turn; Naturalism; Eliminativism _Il problema mente-corpo in filosofia e le scienze cognitive___ _Riassunto_: Vengono esaminate le principali soluzioni filosofiche al problema mente-corpo al fine di distinguere le soluzioni di origine storicistica che separano (più o meno chiaramente) filosofia e scienza da quelle che invece, nate da una duplice “svolta cognitiva”, favoriscono la “continuità” tra filosofia della mente e scienze cognitive. Le soluzioni del primo gruppo sono anzitutto il dualismo ontologico (insieme allo “scetticismo” e al “neo-misterianismo”), il dualismo epistemologico, l’idealismo soggettivo e l’idealismo assoluto. L’idealismo trascendentale, la fenomenologia e il monismo neutrale sono invece soluzioni più aperte al dialogo tra filosofia e scienza. Le soluzioni del secondo gruppo, quelle “naturalistiche”, vengono suddivise in quattro grandi gruppi: (1) il comportamentismo (psicologico, logico e filosofico-analitico); (2) il materialismo (teoria dell’identità e fisicalismo); (3) il “naturalismo debole” (funzionalismo, monismo anomalo, “naturalismo biologico”, naturalismo liberalizzato e emergentismo); (4) il “naturalismo forte” (“neo-evoluzionismo cognitivo” ed eliminativismo). In conclusion, una soluzione di tipo fisicalistico-eliminativo (qui chiamata “eliminativismo fisicalistico moderato”) al problema mente-corpo è quella che più di altre favorisce la continuità tra filosofia della mente e scienze cognitive. _Parole chiave_: Problema mente/corpo; Scienza cognitiva; Svolta cognitiva; Naturalismo; Eliminativismo. (shrink)

This work is driven by the attempt to criticise Phenomenology with the help of Levinas. Similar to the Frankfurt School, he characterises it as a “vision of essences”. These eidetical essences are, and can never be fully absolute, not only because several movements of Hegelian Dialectics are refuted in submitting knowledge either to the imago of mere immanence, or to normative structures which are postulated as invariant like in certain versions of Neoplatonism, but because they function as an apriori (...) of an eternally unfinished and fragmented Lebenswelt. Maybe it is to harsh to compare Husserl to the neoscholastic readings of Descartes and to the formalist interpretations of Kant. Husserl is well aware of the kinaesthetic foundations of consciousness and, contrary to Heidegger, he even promotes Spinozism in a certain phase of his work which excels his adolescent fervour of Berkeley. Nevertheless, Husserl incorporates a subject-based, “monadic” transcendentalism, that paradoxically leads to the dissolution of subjective identity. Traditional reasoning itself is exfoliated to perfection in Heidegger afterwards. Husserl's halfhearted formalism ignores the materialist theory of the simulacrum by Lucretius. Heideggers philosophy widens this overseen aspect in calling the Eidos an Aussehen in referring to the Presocratics, but it despises any kind of method and finally flees in to poetry, maintaining its fatalist errors which it committed right form the start: this is why it gained the name of pseudo-concreteness. Cursed through a specific anti-sociological tendency caused by an anti-empiricist vision of history, their theories virtually (not conceptually) exclude the influences of society on philosophy: they are the end result of the era of Kulturkampf, in which idealism tried to battle positivism, naturalism and historicism. Husserl even defines this philosophical battle as the very struggle of existence. The formulation of the Eidos becomes performance. Aristotle used Eidos synonymous to genus and species. Hence the amplitudes of these philosophies foster the metaphysical standpoint of race, that got out of hand in the Nazi Era and even later on. The “topic” of blood and soil appears in Husserl's definition of Heimwelt and his Eurocentrism. Phenomenology is in no case to blame for National Socialism, and it has very little to to with its causes. My work simply tries to make the same analogy that Marx had made for Hegel. It tries to describe, how two leading philosophers of the German Bourgeoisie are reproducing the categories of their surrounding society without even really observing it. (shrink)

This article aims at answering the following problem: since for Heidegger the historicity of Being presupposes the withdrawal of the transcendental source of such a historicity, then does Heidegger’s perspective lead to a form of relativism of the kind of an epochal historicism? If on the contrary one judges that for Heidegger there is after all, beyond the ordered unfolding of epochs in the history of Being, an ultimate transcendental or at least trans-epochal dimension, does Heidegger’s thinking lead back to (...) an ahistorical Absolute beyond historicity? In order to answer these questions, I propose to divide Heidegger’s philosophy in three stages, rather than the two stages that have usually been retained by commentators ever since the works of Richardson, in conformity with Heidegger’s own indications regarding the Turning (Kehre) of his philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger in the 1930’s develops the notion of machination (Machenschaft) and thus gives historicity a hegemonic function in Being’s essential occurrence (Wesung), itself understood as the intensification of the program of machination starting in the Greek inceptual thinking and developing itself until today’s planetary technological era. However, after 1945 Heidegger does not think anymore that the truth of Being is entirely determined by historicity and that Being essentially abandons Dasein to machination and to its gradual historical unfolding, because there is now according to him, beyond the epochs that are destined to Dasein, a trans-epochal giving (and perhaps generous) origin of presence that constitutes the supreme cause for thinking (Sache des Denkens). (shrink)

152 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:1 JANUARY 1996 knowing." Absolute knowing is "the human community's coming to a reflective nonmetaphysical understanding of what it must take as authoritative grounds for belief and action..." . Since this involves us in a continuous dialectic, dialectic "does not end in absolute knowing; it begins the task of renewing itself" . From Hegel we get "a new paradigm for philosophy..." . The final chapter offers an account of the Philosophy of (...) Right, and takes up the question of the nature of the institutionalized structure of our modern social space. This account focuses on the ambiguity of "rights" and of "autonomy" and the conflicts that these ambiguities foster. Pinkard offers a penetrating and useful analysis of our modern social and political existence. Pinkard's treatment of the relativist questions arising from such a historicist posi- tion deserves our attention. The book also offers a very clear statement of a "nonmetaphysicar' perspective on Hegel. Finally, if Hegelian philosophy is "open" as Pinkard argues, then the relevance of Hegel for our present human condition is unquestionable; for we have our own social space to examine, a social space that has developed since Hegel. The dialectic, as Pinkard understands it to work -- that is, very differently from the mystified, metaphysicalized, dogmatic understanding the text- book versions have given us -- is our most powerful tool in coming to.. (shrink)

This article is the first in a trilogy about the concept “science”. Section 1 considers the historical development of the meaning of the term science and shows its close relation to the terms “knowl­edge” and “philosophy”. Section 2 presents four historic phases in the basic conceptualizations of science science as representing absolute certain of knowl­edge based on deductive proof; science as representing absolute certain of knowl­edge based on “the scientific method”; science as representing fallible knowl­edge based on “the (...) scientific method”; science without a belief in “the scientific method” as constitutive, hence the question about the nature of science becomes dramatic. Section 3 presents four basic understandings of the scientific method: Rationalism, which gives priority to a priori thinking; empiricism, which gives priority to the collection, description, and processing of data in a neutral way; historicism, which gives priority to the interpretation of data in the light of “paradigm” and pragmatism, which emphasizes the analysis of the purposes, consequences, and the interests of knowl­edge. The second article in the trilogy focus on different fields studying science, while the final article presets further developments in the concept of science and the general conclusion. Overall, the trilogy illuminates the most important tensions in different conceptualizations of science and argues for the role of information science and knowl­edge organization in the study of science and suggests how “science” should be understood as an object of research in these fields. (shrink)

The emphasis that the modernity gives to disengagement and beginning leads one to think that the modernity itself is in fact a culture that initiares crisis. Even if there is no initial crisis, it can be created through the ambivalent nature of modernity. Behind the concept of crisis lies the notion that history is a continuous process or movement that opens the door to nihilistic understanding which stems from the idea of contemporary life and thought alienation through the pessimistic meaning (...) of the word. There is a dialectical relationship between the ideas of modernity and progress, and the decadence, and the main theme of Nietzsche's philosophical career. Since the death of Hegel, who made the idea of crisis plausible, everything is nothing but a counter-movement not only in Germany, but also in Europe. The first of these counter-movements is romanticism with its objection to the mind which is liberated from the bonds of tradition. The main thesis of the present article is, between reactiveness of romanticism -on the surface- and the modernity; from one side romanticism's consuming modernity, which is its mirror image, while at the same time feeding from it and modernity's manipulating the ideas developed against it and monopolizing them thanks to its ambivalent nature. For this purpose, following an an anti-enlightenment thinker Nietzsche's, anti-romantic footsteps which at the same time feeds from the romantic heritage, an attempt will be made to analyze the relationship between modernity and romanticism. Another goal of this article is to allow a comparison of how the intellectual development in the West finds its response on the modernization process of our country by probing how the modernization experience of early period Islamist's who experienced this process in a feeling of "backwardness" and with a wounded consciousness and anxiety has led to a shallow romantic worldview. SummaryRomance and romanticism are the main topics of this article. Romanticism is a period, whereas romance is a spiritual attitude not limited to this period, therefore, even today it’s existence is felt. In other words, it is not specific to the Germans. This term is often used to correspond to certain aspects of European intellectual life in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for instance between 1790 and 1850. In its extremely diverse definitions, the most "romantic" definition in our opinion, belongs to Novalis: “I'm romanticizing by giving a high meaning to ordinary things, a mysterious reputation to the ordinary, the honor of the unknown to the known, an infinite look to the finite.” The rejection of existing social reality, the experience of loss, the melancholic longing and the search for loss are the main components of the romantic motive. This study is based on the argument that there is a dialectical relation between romanticism and modernity, which is known as an opposing movement against enlightenment thought. The intellectual feature, which contains the opposite of modernity itself, makes this argument plausible. In addition, the view of modernity as a crisis culture due to the emphasis on disengament and beginnings offers us the possibility to establish a relationship between modernity, which accepts itself as decadence, and romance. Behind the concept of crisis lies the idea that history is a continuous process or movement opening the door to the nihilist understanding in which modern life and thought are alienated in a pessimistic sense. Thus, Allan Megill defines historicism as a prerequisite for nihilism. According to the author, Prophets of Extremity, if the history has no direction to be changed, maintained or lost when wandering in history, it also cannot have a "crisis". The suggestion of "God is dead" is the most concise expression of this crisis. In this crisis state of nihilism, it is a completely forlorn condition of living in the present. Today, which is in the absolute forlorn state; the savior declares his belief that he is devoid of all sorts of features, things that let us reconcile with the current situation of things. In the face of this situation, when people see that the present becomes completely forlorn, they move in two opposite directions with a desire to regenerate culturally: They either have to go back to the past or head for the future. However, every attempt to determine what the future or the past posess will require them to be real, belonging to the present. This will return us to the forlorn state. Nietzsche embraces both opposing sides, but does not attempts choose between them. This is the place where Nietzsche dictates that today is corrupt taking a radical attitude against romanticism fed by the notion of crisis. The fact that modernity has given up its critique of reason, which is revealed by its dialectic, had a great influence on Nietzsche's putting distance between himself and romantics. That is to say, in response to enlightened thought, although romantics speak of unity, apparently, they could not prevent emergence of emotion against mind, local against the universal, individual against social, in other words, the emergence of the second values, which they believed that these were belittled and despised by Enlightenment. Therefore, romantics seem like they could not save themselves from being caught in the web of dialectics in the account they entered that is based on the subject-object distinction in cartesian thought. It is because modernity acts with the consciousness that the life is established on the occurrence and decadence. Based on this, we can say that decadence is inevitable. This decadence (distortion) from the outside may be through movements developed against it, or experienced within itself (even if no one attempts to destroy it). Modernity, with the awareness that it cannot escape from the decadence, wants to arbitrate itself by turning this decadence in its favor by manipulating it. In other words, the modernity dramatizes the feeling of crisis considering itself decadence and the seemingly contradictory ideas of avant-garde and decadence become almost synonymous. It must be the reason why Nietzsche identifies modernity with decadence Modernity manages to put the decadence in its body at the center of attraction by producing self-opposing movements, monopolizing and manipulating. In short, both romanticism and avant-garde movements are the movements that are emerged not against modernity but from itself. Just like an apple worm, they both consume modernity and feed on it. They act as a mirror. Although they seem to criticize, as movements that have emerged from it, they allow the modernity to complete and correct the deficiencies. As a result of this, we can say that romantic critical movements are developed against the world and are shaped by modernity, beginning with the idea of enlightenment, and moved forward in the track of modernity.While romanticism developed in the West as opposed to modernity, in Ottoman-Turkish thought, it was seen as the rhetoric of retardation and regretting of backwardness from civilization. It is inevitable that the experience of modernization in a sense of backwardness, with a wounded consciousness and urgency, will open up space for romance. In our modernization adventure starting with Tanzimat, it is a fact that there has not been a drastic reckoning due to Enlightenment on an intellectual basis, industrialization on an economic basis, programs of revolutionary and nationalist formations on a political basis. Therefore, in Turkish thought, it is not possible to talk about a critical tradition developed against modern paradigm. The status of being audience to what was being experienced in Europe, resulting from superiority was transformed into grudge due to the defeats in the military field. Due to the decadence experienced in the present, inability to find the solution to the problems of its age, melancholic state of mind because of being stuck in the golden age experienced in the past, in the case of a preference, led to a romantic world view because of the appeal of its simplicity to imitate what was once lived in the past. Thus, it is very natural that the direction of Namık Kemal, the cult personality of Islamist-Turkish thought, is towards the past even when talking about progress and civilization. Seeing the 19th century Europe as a re-implementation of ideas and institutions that are actually Islamic, Namık Kemal, in our opinion, showed us a clear example of a typical Islamist romanticism and an example of occidentalist approach regarding that the West learned the civilization from Muslims. In fact, the exact equivalent of this approach displayed in Turkish cogito without even knowing that it is romantic, emerging in the personality of Namık Kemal and in the feeling of backwardness,with a hectic and injured consciousness, is kitschization. So much so that, the state of being kitsch also explains the current situation of Islamic geography which is far from creating a tradition for at least a century, and it clearly tells the usual romantic end. (shrink)

Contemporary thought has been profoundly shaped by the early-twentieth-century turn toward synchronic models of explanation, which analyze phenomena as they appear at a single moment, rather than diachronically as they develop through time. But the relationship between time and system remains unexplained by the standard account of this shift. Through a new history of systematic thinking across the humanities and sciences, The Writing of Spirit argues that nineteenth-century historicism wasn't simply replaced by a more modern synchronic perspective. The structuralist revolution (...) consisted rather in a turn toward time's absolutely minimal conditions, and thus also toward a new theory of diachrony. Pourciau arrives at this surprising and powerful conclusion through an analysis of language-scientific theories over the course of two centuries, associated with thinkers from Jacob Grimm and Richard Wagner to the Russian Futurists, in domains as disparate as historical linguistics, phonology, acoustics, opera theory, philosophy, poetics, and psychology. The result is a novel contribution to a pressing contemporary question--namely, what role history should play in the interpretation of the present. (shrink)

THE NATURE OF HISTORISM. THE MAIN CONCEPTS AND THESES OF ERNST TROELTSCH’S INTERPRETATION The article aims to present the main elements of Ernst Troeltsch’s conception of historism. Historism is understood here as a way of thinking (in science or worldview), which is directed to explain things as products of a historical process. In this view, there is no place for any absolute or universal solutions, causes and rules (thus historism is something completely different from historicism in K.R. Popper’s sense). (...) In the first step, the author tries to show the philosophical context of Troeltsch’s thought (Hegel, Dilthey, Neo-Kantianism, Fenomenology) and to present some of the most important ideas connected with historism (like irrationalism, subjectivism, relativism and individuality). The main part of the article discusses Troeltsch’s conception according to the first chapter of his “Historismus und seine Probleme.” This part presents Troeltsch’s opinion about the crisis of historism and his vision of the real philosophy of history, which should be based on a formal logic of history. Keywords: HISTORISM, ERNST TROELTSCH, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. (shrink)

We can, in view of what we have said, ask if Tugarinov is doing a sort of structuralism; and, however we answer that question, one will want to know if he is doing something that can succeed, at least better than other moderns who have attempted a similar enterprise.The answer is that Tugarinov is doing a sort of (quasi-Aristotelian) structuralism — at least in the sense of refusing any absolute fixity to history, and of asserting a multi-level poly-directionality to (...) the historical flow — an approach that suffers from most of the weaknesses of other such structuralisms.If Tugarinov succeeds better than other moderns — and we think that he does — this is because he refuses to make of historicism a relativism, maintaining a certain “categorial integrity” that is within history but not historical. In this he identifies with the best in the philosophic tradition; but it is not at all clear how he remains “Marxist”. (shrink)

A study of post-Hegelian German historicism. There are chapters on Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Weber, Spengler, Troeltsch, and Meinecke. The development of historicism as a form of Romanticism which treats history as a realization of an absolute principle, to its use as a justification for the relativity of values is traced, and its return to "the affirmation of the absolute" in the work of Troeltsch and Meinecke analyzed.--A. R.

As long as we care about suffering in the world, says political philosopher Simona Forti, we are compelled to inquire into the question of evil. But is the concept of evil still useful in a postmodern landscape where absolute values have been leveled and relativized by a historicist perspective? Given our current unwillingness to judge others, what signposts remain to guide our ethical behavior? Surveying the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western philosophical debates on evil, Forti concludes that it is time (...) to leave behind what she calls "the Dostoevsky paradigm": the dualistic vision of an omnipotent monster pitted against absolute, helpless victims. No longer capable of grasping the normalization of evil in today's world—whose structures of power have been transformed—this paradigm has exhausted its explanatory force. In its place, Forti offers a different genealogy of the relationship between evil and power, one that finally calls into question power's recurrent link to transgression. At the center of contemporary evil she posits the passive attitude towards rule-following, the need for normalcy, and the desire for obedience nurtured by our contemporary mass democracies. In our times, she contends, evil must be explored in tandem with our stubborn desire to stay alive at all costs as much as with our deep need for recognition: the new modern absolutes. A courageous book, New Demons extends an original, inspiring call to ethical living in a biopolitical age. (shrink)

This book explores R.G. Collingwood's concept of metaphysics. It traces the evolution of Collingwood's thought on metaphysics through his published work, posthumously published manuscripts, and recently discovered course notes. From 1933 to 1936, Collingwood's thought shifted considerably from the more orthodox Hegelian treatment of metaphysics as the study of the general nature of reality, to the more 'historicist' study of absolute presuppositions. This radical-conversion-hypothesis has been for a long time the single most important issue in the interpretation of Collingwood's (...) philosophy. This book provides a fresh reappraisal of his thinking on metaphysics during these crucial years. It argues that objective idealism is the key to unraveling the true scope of Collingwood's metaphysics. This theory takes a mid-position between mainstream interpretations in the secondary literature and forms the background to many of Collingwood's key ideas regarding metaphysics, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of history. The book also compares Collingwood's concept of metaphysics to that of his predecessors, contemporaries, and followers. The second part of the book focuses in detail on the similarities and differences between Collingwood's metaphysics and, in chronological order, the views on metaphysics of Dilthey, Whitehead, Ayer, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Berlin, Kolakowski, Strawson, and Taylor. Collingwood's Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and graduate students interested in Collingwood's philosophy, 20th-century philosophy, and metaphysics. (shrink)

Notre objectif est de montrer que la théorie de l’argumentation philosophique développée par Charles Taylor apporte une solution élégante, quoiqu’implicite, au problème de l’« historicisme transcendantal » dans la tradition herméneutique contemporaine (Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur). Ce problème consiste à se demander comment il peut être possible à la fois (1) de désavouer l’existence de vérités « absolues » ou « anhistoriques » et (2) de reconnaître au discours philosophique sur l’« historicité » (Geschichtlichkeit) de la pensée tous ses droits, puisque (...) ce discours demeure de facto et de jure une pensée de l’a priori. En ce sens, mes analyses se concentre-ront sur la façon dont Taylor parvient à justifier la thèse – en apparence contradictoire – selon laquelle la réflexion philosophique peut parvenir à des conclusions « apodictiques et pourtant ouvertes à un débat sans fin ». Our aim is to show that Charles Taylor’s theory of philosophical argumentation proposes an elegant, albeit implicit, solution to the problem of “transcendental historicism” in contemporary hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur). This problem consists in asking how it is possible both to (1) disavow the existence of “absolute” or “anhistorical” truths and (2) fully acknowledge the status of philosophical discourses on “historicity” (Geschichtlichkeit), since those discourses remain de facto and de jure properly a priori. The following discussion focusses on how Taylor manages to justify the seemingly contradictory thesis that philosophical reflection can reach conclusions that are “apodictic and yet open to end-less debate.”. (shrink)