The article critically analyzes the conservative conception of passive or static human dignity in accordance with which human’s value is seen as value coming from the exterior (from God or from a biological human’s nature), or value seen as existing per se. In opposition to this conception, a conception of active or created dignity is being developed, which aims at treating human’s dignity not like a social relationship, but rather like a person’s individual ability to live (...) properly in the society (participate in barter relations on the ground of equivalence) and using this propriety to create own individual social value (dignity), as a personal contribution towards maintenance of concord and collaboration in the society. (shrink)

Fairness is a normative ideal that runs through sports. After all, what defines our cultural evolution in general is a conception of morality, whether thought of in the context of the state, tribe, team, or individual. Human dignity is also one of the important features of sport. Sport is reality for the better part of our nature. We find inspiration for the meaning of life in sport; dignity, social contact, rising to show the “better angel” overcoming adversity, managing (...) defeat, the wondrous sense of well-earned and arduous victory, graciousness toward others in their defeat. While human dignity and solidarity are particularly expressed in the context of the Special Olympics, adaptation, well-being, and the role of sport are important elements in the context of all sporting events. Sport remains timeless while being a lifelong activity for many. (shrink)

This essay argues that Islam, understood as a historically produced body of knowledge, contains resources from which we can reconstruct a conception of human dignity understood as a human right. This reconstruction requires a critical reinterpretation of some of these resources. Pursued with historical sensitivity and a comparative lens, this interpretative activity can bring about considerable benefits. It can help us overcome the religious/secular and Islam/West binaries which have limited the human rights debate. It can help us envision a (...) human rights agenda that is universal and yet appreciative of cultural difference. (shrink)

Questions about the dignity of the human person give rise to many of the most central and hotly disputed topics in bioethics. In _A Defense of Dignity: Creating Life, Destroying Life, and Protecting the Rights of Conscience_, Christopher Kaczor investigates whether each human being has intrinsic dignity and whether the very concept of "dignity" has a useful place in contemporary ethical debates. Kaczor explores a broad range of issues addressed in contemporary bioethics, including whether there is (...) a duty of "procreative beneficence," the ethics of ectopic pregnancy, and the possibility of "rescuing" human embryos with human wombs or artificial wombs. _A Defense of Dignity_ also treats issues relevant to the end of life, including physician-assisted suicide, provision of food and water to patients in a persistent vegetative state, and how to proceed with organ donation following death. Finally, what are the duties and prerogatives of health care professionals who refuse in conscience to take part in activities that they regard as degrading to human dignity? Should they be forced to do what they consider to be violations of the patient's well being, or does patient autonomy always trump the conscience of a health care professional? Grounded in the Catholic intellectual and moral tradition, _A Defense of Dignity_ argues that all human beings from the beginning to the end of their lives should be treated with respect and considers how this belief should be applied in controversial cases. "_A Defense of Dignity_ provides a skillful, informed, and clear philosophical analysis, from a natural law perspective, of a range of controversial, and sometimes complex, bioethical questions concerning the beginning and end of life. Few authors approach bioethics from a natural law perspective, and few do it as well as Christopher Kaczor. The book should be of interest not only to natural law philosophers and their students, but also to anyone interested in bioethics." —_John Keown, Georgetown University__ "Moral questions at the beginning and ending of life and controversies over liberty of conscience are among the most vexing and important issues of our day. Christopher Kaczor brings his characteristic moral seriousness and philosophical good sense to his treatment of these issues, all of which implicate the key concept of human dignity. This eminently readable collection will provide an invaluable resource for educators and students alike." — Christopher Tollefsen, University of South Carolina_ “Indispensable. Kaczor untangles the various meanings of human dignity to undertake a reexamination of the most serious and difficult issues in medical ethics. The book combines clarity with philosophical precision, faithfulness to Catholic teaching with a thorough engagement with critics." —_J. Budziszewski, University of Texas at Austin_. (shrink)

In light of recent criticisms of the concept of human dignity, this contribution offers a proposal for the continued relevance of the concept for tertiary chaplaincy. It is important to consider the concept of human dignity in tertiary chaplaincy because: many higher education institutions continue to identify human dignity as a key value; the kinds of ethical issues that tertiary students face will often involve appeals to human dignity; and the religious connotations that have come to (...) be associated with the concept fall within the scope of chaplains. Nevertheless, there have been recent calls for the concept of human dignity to be dismissed from ethical discourse as unhelpful. In ethical debate, dignity can be unhelpful when it leads to ‘dignity talk’, when there is disagreement about whether it is something human beings always already have or something that is realised through human activity, or when it conceals what people think is really at stake. In response to these criticisms, this contribution proposes a model for understanding human dignity that affirms the value of the human person as a multi-dimensional, historically-situated being in relationship to all that is, a being who is faced with difficult moral choices through which he or she makes meaning in his or her life. This model has both descriptive value in helping us to understand why people do what they do, and normative value in helping us evaluate what should be done. (shrink)

This article explores the issue of girls’ concerns about sexual activity in a liberal Nordic context. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork among young people in Denmark, the article identifies three types of concerns girls can have about sexual activity: social expectations, relational expectations and dignity. Whilst contemporary research has tended to focus on the influence different sexual morality discourses have in shaping different expectations and concerns about these, little attention seems to be paid to girls’ normative concerns about sex related (...) to well-being. This article sheds light on how these normative concerns are related to girls’ sense of dignity based on Andrew Sayer’s work on dignity and moral sentiments. Finally, the article argues that tension between sexual morality discourses and moral sentiments may be the source of resistance that girls practise with a new ‘fuckboy’ discourse. (shrink)

The article analyzes the dignity of a person in secular and Orthodox aspects. The authors argue that every phenomenon of the material and spiritual world is objectively inherent in internal contradictions, so it is not an exception and an idea of human dignity in secular and religious contexts. The research methods are comprehensive and based on the philosophical, anthropological and philosophical and cultural analysis of human dignity in secular and Orthodox dimensions. Discussion. The concepts of «secular» (universal) (...) and «Christian» morality are characterized and distinguished. The authors argue that the latter comes from a supernatural source, from a moral law, the basis of which is the belief in the immortality of the human spirit. Christian morality provides such norms of behavior of people in which the biblical moral commandments are observed.The roots of the universal morality are in a culture that has produced a humanistic outlook, within which a person is recognized as self -sufficient value, capable of asserting his dignity, transforming himself and the world without the intervention of a transcendental super -sensory nature (God). The universal morality is the principles and norms that regulate the behavior of people, the activities of their communities, associations in terms of universally recognized ideas about good and evil, honesty and disobedience, honesty and dishonesty. Finally, the article suggests that, despite the differences, and sometimes contradictions in the understanding of the essential manifestations of human dignity between secular and Christian contexts, quite obvious to both aspects is the understanding that the leading place should be occupied by the personality that manifests itself manifestation and individual aspiration, in the depths of its own consciousness and in its desire for free self -determination and creativity, as a prerequisite for the affirmation of one’s dignity. (shrink)

Dignity is one of the essential values and central concepts in nursing care. Dignity can be threatened due to radical life changes; therefore, this idiographic case study aimed to explore the sense of dignity experienced by a woman with multiple sclerosis. An interpretative phenomenological analysis was adopted, using data collected through a face‐to‐face semistructured interview with Emily, a 45‐year‐old woman. The study was approved by the local ethics committee. Six personal experiential themes were identified: To be ruled (...) by a sick body; Silent progression; Loss of independence as a burden for the family; Will to fight for the meaning of life; Maintaining dignity‐in‐relation; Dignified care in a period of greater vulnerability. Emily's dignity is based on the effort to fight for a meaningful life, utilization of her full potential, maintain independence in activities of daily living and support in relationships. Continuous changes in functional ability, loss of self‐control and an uncertain future have a negative impact on the experience of her dignity. In the context of dignified health care, she considers individual care and maintaining autonomy important. The idiographic case study can contribute to a better understanding of the experience of a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis. It is possible to carry out interventions that aim to support her dignity, improve her quality of life and contribute to individually oriented health care. (shrink)

Dignity is a value inherent to all human beings, guaranteed to every individual from birth, and influenced by culture and society. It is protected by various laws and declarations, and represents one of the fundamental human rights. Preserving human dignity is an essential aspect of nursing practice and a central element of care. Dignity is a highly subjective and personal concept; there may be variations in the way that patients perceive it and in the ways that nurses (...) can guarantee it. A systematic review of the qualitative literature was conducted to obtain a comprehensive understanding of adult patients’ perceptions of dignity in a hospital setting. This review adhered to the PRISMA Statement for reporting systematic reviews, and the results were reported in accordance with the Enhancing Transparency in Reporting the Synthesis of Qualitative Research (ENTREQ) guidelines. Major databases (PubMed, CINAHL, Scopus, and PsycINFO) were consulted and resulted in the inclusion of 21 studies. Methodological quality was assessed using the Critical Appraisal Skills Program (CASP) Checklist for Qualitative Studies. Six main themes emerged from the data analysis: (1) The concept of dignity and its various dimensions; (2) The significance of maintaining one’s own privacy and confidentiality; (3) The hospital environment’s influence on patients’ dignity; (4) Healthcare professionals’ characteristics and behaviours that affect dignity; (5) The role of communication and the relationship with healthcare providers; and (6) The patient’s ability to make choices and be involved actively in their care. These findings underscore the importance of understanding caregivers’ perspectives on dignity to ensure that they provide respectful and dignified care and treatment that prioritizes the patient’s mental and physical needs. (shrink)

Background With the deepening trend of global aging, the issue of dignity of older adults has received widespread attention. The research on the dignity of older adults in nursing homes in China has only just begun, and it is necessary to further explore the dignity experience of older adults in nursing homes. Research Objective To investigate the thematic features of dignity experiences of older adults residing in nursing homes in mainland China. Furthermore, it may serve as (...) a starting point for further research that formulates intervention strategies. Research Design This is a qualitative descriptive study. Twenty older adults living in one of two private nursing homes between September and November 2022 were selected as participants. For each patient, we conducted semi-structured interviews, from which we extracted and assessed information using qualitative content analysis method. SRQR reporting guidelines were used. Ethical considerations ‘Ethical considerations' with information regarding ethical review, informed consent process and confidentiality. Results Five themes and eight subthemes emerged from the transcripts: (1) self-esteem (sense of self-worth and becoming a burden), (2) perceived value to society (being respected and belonging), (3) interpersonal relationships (relationships with others and respectful behavior toward others), (4) autonomy (control of daily life and participation in decision-making), and (5) acceptance and adaptation. Conclusion Dignity in older adults can be preserved by realizing self-worth, relieving the burden of self-perceived, promoting belonging, strengthening social ties, enhancing autonomy, and engaging in activities. (shrink)

The permissibility of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is actively debated worldwide. Writers such as Ruth Macklin and Steven Pinker have argued that dignity is not a useful concept in bioethics and cannot be used legitimately by either side in the debate. In this essay, the author expands on a defense of the human person based in dignity and rooted in the work of Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) and Gabriel Marcel. He defends the idea, introduced by John (...) F. Crosby, that a human person has dignity because of her “unrepeatableness,” a concept known as incommunicability. The author argues that the concept of dignity—far from being abstract, useless, or dangerous, as some writers have recently claimed—is a practical and vital protection for persons. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.3 (Autumn 2010): 529–546. (shrink)

This paper examines how the intercultural conception of human rights, fueled by the modes of reciprocal recognition associated with Hegel’s social philosophy, draws on traditional understandings of human dignity while avoiding the essentialism associated with those understandings. Part 1 summarizes core elements of an intercultural theory of human rights while addressing the general question of how that theory accommodates an understanding of the relationship of human dignity and human rights. Part 2 presents the intercultural approach as committed to (...) a view of human dignity focused on the intrinsic worth of individuals, but understood, not—with Kant—as an anthropologically inherent property, but as one forged in relations of intersubjective recognition. Part 3, critically engaging arguments of C Beitz and J Habermas, claims that an intercultural approach entails a status-based conception of human dignity, one that construes the latter, not as a metaphysically conceived inherent quality, but as a function of membership in a social order supportive of both liberal right claims and a republican commitment to rights systems generally. Drawing on the work of Hegel and critically engaging the position of A Sangiovanni, Part 4 construes human dignity in terms of a doctrine of human rights expressive of a common humanity, one understood, however, not as an essential attribute of human beings, but in terms of a globally realized legal-political order whose members are dispositionally committed to the worth of all members of the human community and the value of human community itself. Critically appropriating the work of H Arendt for the intercultural theory, Part 5 considers the centrality of actual politics to a dignitarian account of human rights. Part 6 construes human dignity, again with Kant, in terms of the principle of autonomy, but one understood, not abstractly, but—engaging Pico della Mirandola—as the fallibilistically conceived process of social learning on the part the members of the human community. Part 7 considers how the intercultural view, with the idea of social practice expressive of collective human agency, accommodates a concept of human dignity understood as the “foundation”—nuanced and variegated—of human rights. Part 8 details the specific normativity of an intercultural conception, asserting that despite and even because of its attention to the empirical realities of social, historical, and political life, that conception remains committed, as with essentialist views, to context-transcending norms capable of calling into question actual practices and policies. Here, recourse is had to a concept of recognition understood both as a principle of evaluation and as a social practice encompassing the activity of individuals and groups engaged in the discourse on human rights. (shrink)

Apart from being a pervasive concept of present-day law, human dignity is a phenomenon regularly experienced by people in their lives. Yet before any protection for it can be advanced, it is imperative that an explanation of how human dignity is at all possible be established, including a description of its constitutive figures. Paul Ricoeur made a significant contribution to the lacking phenomenology of human dignity. Despite only rarely using the term dignity directly, he identified and (...) described its three constitutive and interdependent figures—self-esteem, self-respect, and recognition—and embedded them amongst such notions as self, identity, narrative, passivity, bodiliness, fragility, morality, and law. He activated the phenomenological, existentialist, and hermeneutic legacies in understanding human dignity and succeeded in modifying certain sharp-edged structures that have periodically been associated with the notion of human dignity. In this paper I argue that human dignity is a high-ranking topic in Ricoeur’s writings, identify and synthesize the phenomenology of human dignity scattered throughout his works, and reveal the profound existential aspects he attributed to it. Finally, I discuss and evaluate his phenomenological-existentialistic account of human dignity, particularly taking into consideration the contemporary use of human dignity in law and its associated discourses. (shrink)

The objective of the present study is to examine the ethical grounding and process-relational nature of meaningful work through the relationship of dignity and meaningfulness. Adopting a practice lens, we show how a shift from methodological individualism to a process-relational worldview allows meaningful work to be understood through organizational activities rather than individual characteristics. Building on practice-based theorization, we present a process-relational model of meaningful work that 1) examines meaningfulness as a flow of experience in the stream of work (...) activity events; 2) highlights how experiencing meaningfulness is embedded in social practices, distinguishing it as a social phenomenon that is defined by this embeddedness; 3) delineates situationality, historicity, and contextuality of meaningfulness; and 4) shows how meaningful work is grounded in the prioritization of dignity in the logic of practice. Accordingly, our model enables a more holistic understanding of how dignity functions as the ethical basis for the experience of meaningfulness in the context of work and organization. (shrink)

This paper articulates dignity as relational engagement in concrete care situations. Dignity is often understood as an abstract principle that represents inherent worth of all human beings. In actual care practices, this principle has to be substantiated in order to gain meaning and inform care activities. We describe three exemplary substantiations of the principle of dignity in care: as a state or characteristic of a situation; as a way to differentiate between socio-cultural positions; or as personal meaning. (...) We continue our analysis by presenting cases on dignity in care related to us in focus groups with medical professionals. Our empirical ethical lens is in this paper is to analyse, not the meaning of dignity, but the way in which it emerges in practices where it is pursued, within relationships between people, technologies, places, regulations, and the values cherished by or embedded in them. We show that professional caregivers recognize in the dignity of the person they care for their own dignity; giving up on the one implies no less than giving up on the other. This ‘mirrored experience’ of dignity expresses itself in professional’s engagement with the situation. The value of this engagement, we argue, lies not primarily in realizing the particular content of the values at stake. We point to the importance of engagement itself, even if the values engaged with cannot be realized to the full, and even if competing versions of dignity are at stake simultaneously. In this way the caregivers provide us with interesting examples of moral actorship in situations of conflicting values. (shrink)

Background: Maintaining dignity is important for successful aging, but there is lack of validated research instruments in the nursing literature to investigate dignity as perceived by the old people. Objective: This is a methodological study aiming to investigate the psychometric properties of the Greek version of Jacelon Attributed Dignity Scale as translated in the Greek language. Research design: A methodological approach consisting of translation, adaptation, and cross-cultural validation. A sample of 188 Greek-speaking old Cypriot persons drawn from (...) the Hospital outpatient departments was asked to complete the Greek versions of Jacelon Attributed Dignity Scale and the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living. Data analyses included internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient), item analysis, and exploratory factor analysis using principal component method with orthogonal varimax rotation. Ethical considerations: The study protocol was approved by the National Bioethics committee according to the national legislation. Permission to use the research instrument was granted from the author. Information about the aim and the benefits of the study was included in the information letter. Findings: Cronbach’s alpha for Greek version of Jacelon Attributed Dignity Scale was 0.90. Four factors emerged explaining 65.28% of the total variance, and item to total correlation values ranged from 0.25 to 0.74 indicating high internal consistency and homogeneity. Mean item score in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living was 5.6 (standard deviation = 1.7) for men and 6.7 (standard deviation = 1.7) for women, and the correlations between demographics, Instrumental Activities of Daily Living, and the four factors of the Greek version of Jacelon Attributed Dignity Scale were low; also in multiple linear regression, the values of R2 are presented low. Discussion: Demographic characteristics and degree of functionality seem to be associated with some of the dimensions of dignity but with low correlations; therefore, they cannot predict attributed dignity. Conclusion: The Greek version of Jacelon Attributed Dignity Scale is a valid and reliable tool to measure attributed dignity in Greek-speaking older adults, but further testing of the psychometric properties and other potential factors that may affect the attributed dignity is needed. (shrink)

Background A psychosocial problem faced by people with early-stage dementia (PwESD) is the perception of threats to personal dignity. Insights into its dynamics are important for understanding how it changes as dementia advances and to develop suitable interventions. However, longitudinal studies on this change in PwESD are lacking. Aims To determine how perceptions of dignity and selected clinical and social factors change over 1 year in home-dwelling PwESD and the predictors associated with changes in perceptions of dignity (...) over 1 year. Research design and methods A longitudinal study was conducted. The sample included 258 home-dwelling Czech PwESD. Data were collected using the Patient Dignity Inventory (PDI-CZ), Mini-Mental State Examination, Bristol Activities of Daily Living Scale, Geriatric Depression Scale and items related to social involvement. Questionnaires were completed by the PwESD at baseline and after 1 year. Ethical considerations The study was approved by the ethics committee and informed consent was provided by the participants. Results People with Early-Stage Dementia rated the threat to dignity as mild and the ratings did not change significantly after 1 year. Cognitive function, self-sufficiency, vision, and hearing worsened, and more PwESD lived with others rather than with a partner after 1 year. Worsened depression was the only predictor of change in perceived personal dignity after 1 year, both overall and in each of the PDI-CZ domains. Predictors of self-sufficiency and pain affected only some PDI-CZ domains. Conclusions Perceptions of threat to dignity were mild in PwESD after 1 year, although worsened clinical factors represented a potential threat to dignity. Our findings lead us to hypothesise that perceived threats to personal dignity are not directly influenced by health condition, but rather by the social context. (shrink)

With robots being introduced into caregiving, particularly for older persons, various ethical concerns are raised. Among them is the fear of replacing human caregiving. While ethical concepts like well-being, autonomy, and capabilities are often used to discuss these concerns, this paper brings forth the concept of social dignity to further develop guidelines concerning the use of robots in caregiving. By social dignity, we mean that a person’s perceived dignity changes in response to certain interactions and experiences with (...) other persons. In this paper, we will first present the concept of social dignity, and then identify a niche where robots can be used in caregiving in an ethical manner. Specifically, we will argue that, because some activities of daily living are performed in solitude to maintain dignity, a care recipient will usually prefer robotic assistance instead of human assistance for these activities. Secondly, we will describe how other philosophical concepts, which have been commonly used to judge robotic assistance in caregiving for the elderly so far, such as well-being, autonomy, and capabilities, are less useful in determining whether robotic assistance in caregiving is ethically problematic or not. To conclude, we will argue that social dignity offers an advantage to the other concepts, as it allows to ask the most pressing questions in caregiving. (shrink)

Kant has famously argued that human beings or persons, in virtue of their capacity for rational and autonomous choice and agency, possess dignity, which is an intrinsic, final, unconditional, inviolable, incomparable and irreplaceable value. This value, wherever found, commands respect and imposes rather strict moral constraints on our deliberations, intentions and actions. This paper deals with the question of whether, as some Kantians have recently argued, certain types of (physician-assisted) suicide and active euthanasia, most notably the intentional destruction (...) of the life of a terminally-ill, but rational and autonomous patient in order to prevent certain serious harms, such as enduring or recurring pain or the loss of the meaning in life, from befalling him really are inconsistent with respect for the patient’s human dignity. I focus on two independent, though interrelated explications of the rather vague initial idea that the patient (as well as the doctor), in intending and bringing about his death, treats his person or rational nature merely as a means and so denigrates his dignity: (i) that in doing what he is doing, he does not act for the sake of his person, but for the sake of something else; (ii) that, by trading his person for pain relief, he engages himself in an irrational and hence immoral exchange. After critically discussing some suggestions about how to understand this charge, I eventually find Kantian objections to suicide and (active) euthanasia, based on the idea of human dignity, less than compelling. For all the paper proves, suicide and (active) euthanasia may still be morally impermissible, but then this must be so for some other reason than the one given above. (shrink)

Background: Identifying, maintenance, and promotion of dignity in different patients of various cultures is an ethical responsibility of healthcare workers. Research questions: This study was conducted to investigate factors related to dignity in patients with heart failure and test the validity of Dignity Model. Design: The study had a descriptive-correlational design, and data collection was carried out by means of four specific questionnaires. Participants and context: A total of 130 in-patients from cardiac wards in hospitals affiliated with (...) Tehran and Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences participated. Ethical consideration: This study was approved by the Research Committee of Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences. Findings: Significant correlation showed the following: between illness related worries with dignity conserving repertoire score, between illness related worries with social dignity, between illness related worries with dignity conserving repertoire score, and between social dignity with dignity score. Goodness Fit Index and Comparative Fit Index were calculated greater than 0.9. Discussion: This study affirms the importance of careful evaluation of individual patients to determine their needs related to dignity. Conclusion: According to the results, the necessity of using appropriate tools to assess various aspects of patients’ dignity by clinical healthcare staff and design activities with particular focus on the main factors affecting dignity such as illness related worries and social dignity is recommended. Attention to this issue in everyday clinical practice can facilitate health professionals/nurses to potentially improve their patients’ dignity, develop quality of care and treatment, and improve patients’ satisfaction. (shrink)

Suppose that a young athlete has just become quadriplegic. He expects to live several more decades, but out of self‐interest he autonomously chooses to engage in physician‐assisted suicide (PAS) or voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). Some of us are unsure whether he or his physician would be acting rightly in ending his life. One basis for such doubt is the notion that persons have dignity in a Kantian sense. This paper probes responses that David Velleman and Frances Kamm have (...) suggested to the question of whether participating in PAS or VAE to benefit oneself, as the young man might, respects the dignity of persons, specified in an orthodox Kantian way. Velleman claims that it does not, while Kamm insists that, in certain circumstances, it does. I argue against Kamm's position. I go on to contend that while orthodox Kantianism might provide a basis for moral concern regarding the case of the young quadriplegic, it suffers from two serious shortcomings. First, it implies that terminally ill patients are wrong to request VAE or engage in PAS to avoid intense suffering, at least when this suffering has not yet overwhelmed their reason. Second, orthodox Kantianism implies that it is wrong for physicians to withdraw such patients from life‐sustaining treatments, even if they request it. To remedy these shortcomings, I sketch an unorthodox Kantian account of respect for the dignity of persons. This account promises to capture the idea that it would be morally problematic for doctors to help the young quadriplegic to die, but to avoid the shortcomings of an orthodox Kantian account. (shrink)

Background: Body touch and close physical proximity are inevitable in some healthcare procedures and can evoke feelings of shame, humiliation, and anger in patients. Given the increasing recognition of human dignity, exploring the occurrence of these negative emotional experiences and identifying mechanisms for their prevention are crucial.Aim: To develop and define the concept of “patient’s sexual dignity discomfort.” Design: A hybrid model of concept development was utilized.Methods: In the theoretical phase, a scoping review was conducted to establish a (...) working definition of patient’s sexual dignity discomfort. This definition was refined and validated using qualitative data collected during the fieldwork phase. In the analytical phase, a final conceptual model of patient’s sexual dignity discomfort was proposed by integrating findings from both the theoretical and fieldwork phases.Ethical considerations: All participants completed an informed consent process, and interviews were conducted via Zoom or phone by a certified psychiatric nurse to ensure confidentiality, anonymity, and comfort.Results: Four themes describing attributes of patient’s sexual dignity discomfort were explored: experiencing shame and embarrassment, vulnerability-induced loss of control, dehumanization and objectification, and uncertain sexual autonomy. Patient’s sexual dignity discomfort occurs when patients perceive care procedures as sexually inappropriate or as involving unnecessary sexual activity, particularly when healthcare providers display unprofessional attitudes or when patients lack consent or are not mentally prepared for the procedure because of insufficient information. This discomfort leads patients to refuse or avoid healthcare treatments and prioritize finding better healthcare services over their health. It can also prompt providers to avoid patients, resulting in a compromised quality of care and poor health outcomes.Conclusions: Patient’s sexual dignity discomfort poses a significant threat to the quality of patient care and preservation of dignity. Nurses can trigger this intentionally or unintentionally, highlighting the need for comprehensive education and training to prevent it. (shrink)

The article discusses human dignity in the aspect of modern challenges of technological civilization, which has entered a new stage of its development. Human dignity as a category of ethics remains underestimated, since in the first row of ethical values humanitarians, as a rule, put the categories of freedom and justice. Today, “dignity” acquires a special and higher status, the concept of human dignity is being rethought, going beyond the ethical category itself as a virtue. In (...) the global world, human dignity is a response to such contemporary challenges as the formation of a communicative world community with a focus on digital civilization, the anthropological problem of the future of humanity, the ecological situation on a global scale, the reorientation of the ethical and legal relations of a globalizing world. Human dignity is a problem of national-ethnic and national-state relations in the transition to transnational regulatory interactions. In the interpretation of the nation, the authors do not share the well-known two approaches to understanding the nation, on the one hand ethnocultural, and on the other - national-civil. Both approaches lead, whenever possible or necessary, to the transnational posing of the question, when human dignity becomes a priority regardless of nationality. In this connection, the utopian idea of the possibility of a global ethos is touched upon. The authors focus on the anthropoxy-axiological approach to the understanding of human dignity, where the cosmological principle of human existence is determined by his creative power. The urgency of the problem of human dignity is due to the fact that, as it were, in the modern life world a person did not put the economy above morality, the basis of human dignity in its being is a value moral consciousness, in the depth of which basic human values of transnational nature “work”, contradicting values consumer society driven by practical interests. Human dignity in this regard should be interpreted as an absolute value and at the same time one should take into account the multidimensionality of the problem of dignity in the context of modern globalization processes. Based on the ontological understanding of globalization as megatrends in the self-movement of the natural historical process, the authors substantiate the anthropological value of human dignity, which has universal, transcultural significance. The use of an anthropoxy-axiological approach and interdisciplinary methods reveals the universal value of virtue, based on the anthropo-social moral nature and the creative value of man. The creative transformational activity itself will not be worthy in quality without moral responsibility. The modern concept of human dignity is addressed to the ethics of responsibility, which means responsibility, which highlights the moral and axiological attitude to life, the adoption of responsible decisions in modern conditions of sociocultural interactions. In the context of globalization, the philosophy of human dignity becomes the dominant of all conscious-volitional activities, the core of the moral rethinking of the transnational and national ratio in the light of tolerance, the ability to non-violence. At the same time, the authors indicate in the formulation of the main issue of the philosophy of human dignity the possibility of going beyond the ethical category of human dignity, since the unchanging core of the universal human values of goodness-beauty-truth does not lose its meaning in the global, changing world. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive study of Plato’s conception of justice. The universality of human rights and the universality of human dignity, which is recognised as their source, are among the crucial philosophical problems in modern-day legal orders and in contemporary culture in general. If dignity is genuinely universal, then human beings also possessed it in ancient times. Plato not only perceived human dignity, but a recognition of dignity is also visible in his conception of (...) justice, which forms the core of his philosophy. Plato’s Republic is consistently interpreted here as a treatise on justice, relating to an individual and not to the state. The famous myth of the cave is a story about education taking place in the world here and now. The best activity is not contemplation, but acting for the benefit of others. Not ideas, but individuals are the proper objects of love. Plato’s philosophy may provide foundations for modern-day human rights protection rather than for totalitarian orders. (shrink)

The author poses a question: which of the two fundamental, constitutional values – common good or human dignity – can be considered to be the cornerstone, the unifying value in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland from 1997. The paper shows the crucial reasons for accepting each of these values as primary and also presents the underlying relationships between these values . The prominence of a given value for defining the aim of the constitution and the legal order (...) based on it was accepted as the most important aspect for determining the order of primacy. In respect of the direct aims of activities of public authorities and more broadly – of the aims of subjects whose activities are defined by the constitution – the primary value should be common good understood as certain social conditions of life which support human development. It defines the space in which other constitutional values, also human dignity, are integrated. Human dignity, however, the primary value defining human being, gives the reason why human development is a first and autonomous aim of the constitutional order. In this respect dignity has priority before common good. -/- Autor stawia pytanie o to, którą z fundamentalnych wartości konstytucyjnych – dobro wspólne czy godność człowieka – można uznać za wartość pierwszą i stanowiącą podstawę spójności aksjologicznej Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku. Wskazane są zasadnicze racje przemawiające za uznaniem każdej z tych wartości za wartość pierwszą i identyfikowane są zasadnicze relacje zachodzące między tymi wartościami. Za aspekt najistotniejszy dla ustalenia pierwszeństwa którejś z tych wartości uznana jest doniosłość danej wartości dla określenia celu konstytucji i opartego na niej porządku prawnego. Z punktu widzenia bezpośredniego celu działań władzy publicznej i szerzej – podmiotów, których działanie wyznaczone jest porządkiem konstytucyjnym, wartością tą jest dobro wspólne wyznaczające przestrzeń, w której integrowane są inne wartości konstytucyjne, z godnością włącznie. Dobro wspólne jest celem porządku konstytucyjnego ze względu na godność człowieka, która czyni jego rozwój pierwszym i szczególnym – autotelicznym dobrem. W tej perspektywie godność ma pierwszeństwo przed dobrem wspólnym. (shrink)

Background: Maintaining patient dignity is an important aspect of nursing care. No instrument is currently available to measure nurses’ behaviours for maintaining patient dignity in clinical care. Objectives: To develop and test an instrument to measure activities nurses perform to maintain patient dignity in clinical care settings, guided by the literature and face-to-face interviews. Research design: A quantitative cross-sectional descriptive survey collected data from the developed scale, which was analysed by descriptive statistics and factor analysis. Participants and (...) research context: Convenience samples of nurses participated in the interviews (n = 40) and examined face validity of the scale (n = 20). A purposive sample of 610 nurses was recruited from four regional hospitals in the northern, southern and eastern areas of Taiwan to test the developed scale. Ethical considerations: Research was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the study hospital. Information about the study was provided to nurses and those willing to participate provided written informed consent prior to data collection. Findings: The 36-item Dignity in Care Scale for Nurses had acceptable content and face validity. Factor analysis identified six factors necessary for maintaining dignity of patient care: communication skills, confidentiality of patient information, prompt response to patient needs, respect for patient’s autonomy, providing a safe environment and protecting the patient’s well-being. The reliability coefficient for the total scale was 0.93; alpha coefficients for the subscales ranged from 0.70 to 0.94. Discussion: The Dignity in Care Scale for Nurses was demonstrated to be a reliable and valid tool for assessing how nurses maintain dignity in care for patients in the clinical setting. The questionnaire can be used to provide feedback to nurses regarding patient dignity. Conclusion: Data gained from this instrument could be used to design nursing education programmes to help nurses enhance their abilities for maintaining patient dignity in clinical practice. (shrink)

Mechanistic explanation is the dominant approach to explanation in the life sciences, but it has been challenged as incompatible with a conception of humans as agents whose capacity for self-direction endows them with freedom and dignity. We argue that the mechanical philosophy, properly construed, has sufficient resources to explain how such characteristics can arise in a material world. Biological mechanisms must be regarded as active, not only reactive, and as organized so as to maintain themselves far from thermodynamic (...) equilibrium. Notions from systems biology make key contributions, particularly Gánti’s chemoton, Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno’s basic autonomy, and Barandiaran and Moreno’s adaptive autonomous agents. The reconstrual is then extended to mental life by conceiving of cognitive mechanisms as control components in inherently active systems, as illustrated in models offered by Randall Beer and Cees van Leeuwen. (shrink)

Frederick Douglass (1817?–1875) is a monumental American figure. As a runaway slave and leading black thinker, speaker, and writer in the abolitionist movement and during Reconstruction and its tragic collapse, his legacy in American history is singular. His ideals and scorching criticisms have marked American political thought about democracy, religion, race, racism, liberty, and equality. American political parties claim him, especially the Republican Party, with which he has an early connection and which has used his figure as cover for their (...) less than egalitarian projects, as do different ideological camps. One can find accounts of Douglass as an existentialist, revolutionary, proto-libertarian, liberal, civic republican thinker. His North Star continues to guide those who welcome its light, although it may lead them down different political-ideological paths.In all of this, one can imagine that those not familiar with the details of Douglass’s narratives and deeds might, in the context of all of that national hagiography, lose track of the fact that he was a black man. Frederick Douglass was a black man born into slavery, survived that brutal regime for twenty-one years, and then escaped and became a principal leader of the American abolition movement and leading black political thinker. Shortly after escaping slavery, he wrote his first famous autobiography, The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, and subsequently two more, in addition to volumes of speeches, articles, and a novel. It is as if his monumentality, like marble, alabaster, or bronze—the stuff of civic memorials—would obscure that irreducible fact in its grand monotones.Nick Brommell’s The Powers of Dignity: The Black Political Philosophy of Frederick Douglass reminds readers that that irreducible fact is a nontrivial, essential element of Douglass’s life and work. Bromell argues that this includes the political theory, a product of Douglass’s black political philosophy that runs through it all. He contends that Douglass argued for an inclusive conception of personhood and active citizenship, which America’s founding public philosophy, distorted by white supremacy, purposefully did not. Its elements include a defense of the moral personhood of blacks and their full and equal citizenship and a view of political community enlivened by group solidarities and active citizenship in defense of justice.In the course of his analysis, Bromell, a literary theorist, draws on an assortment of contemporary philosophical, rhetorical, and political theories, all of which have a critical theoretical bent, to explicate Douglass’s ideas. This method bears fruit in an instructive analysis of the rhetorical structure of Douglass’ his arguments. Brommell’s analysis of Douglass’s My Bondage and My Freedom usefully explains how it stands out, not only in terms of updated autobiographical details, but also style and analytical and argumentative intent. This is a reading that other scholars have pioneered, but his rhetorical analysis fleshes out, for example, the role of moral sentiments, care, and intimate and social relations in Douglass’s narrative.A central feature of Bromell’s analysis is that Douglass employs what he and others call a “fugitive rhetoric” that comprises an emphasis on the perspective of his and other black Americans’ standpoints, the holding of opposite ideas in tension, and the use of the rhetorical technique “chiasmus,” where a statement is repeated in reverse order in successive phrases or clauses. It is an illuminating analysis, but Bromell goes further by claiming that Douglass was committed to the tenets of contemporary standpoint epistemology. Douglass certainly referenced and employed his experience and viewpoint as a black man and former slave in his work, just as he directly addressed the viewpoints and interests of black Americans. However, whether this means that Douglass was committed to the set of ideas that we now call standpoint epistemology is another matter. This concern applies to Bromell’s reading of Douglass’s method of holding seemingly contrasting ideas in tension and his use of chiasmus. Contemporary philosophical theories of chiasmus carry particular metaphysical and epistemological implications, and those theories might shed light on Douglass’s political projects. However, their incidental utility does not mean they definitively describe Douglass’s intent or public philosophy. This is a specifically important point because those theories lead to subjective conceptions of truth, especially relating to ethics and politics, while Douglass, as Bromell recognizes, repeatedly and emphatically endorsed what he took to be universal normative truths.In the same vein, Bromell makes several additional claims regarding the conceptual distinctiveness of Douglass’s view of power, dignity, rights, and citizenship. Douglass employed conceptions of each and other important ideas specific to his style, approach, and ends. As other black political thinkers did before him, he used these concepts to condemn slavery, racism, and the hypocrisy of American Republicanism and Christianity to assert the equal moral personhood and dignity of blacks and demand equal rights and citizenship. Bromell rightly emphasizes the role of “power,“ as an individual capability, in Douglass’s view of natural rights, moral dignity, and citizenship. It is an emphasis that is in keeping with both Douglass’s personal narrative and his national political projects. Douglass did not think that Americans—that Black Americans or abolitionists—should passively wait for deliverance from either God or national political leadership. Likewise, Bromell is correct to push back on reductions of Douglass’s views to Lockean, Rousseauian, or Kantian interpretations. Douglass is more than an incarnation of standard deontological, liberal, or civic republican philosophy. As a nineteenth-century black radical thinker, he stood in relation and contributed to those moral and political philosophical traditions. However, Bromell’s claim that Douglass’s conceptions of power, natural rights, and citizenship are conceptually distinct from the large host of major philosophical, theological, and political theoretical accounts that preceded him and influenced those ideas in his time is suggestive but not decisive.Like other writers and theorists before him, Bromell offers us another Douglass—as a black critical political theorist. This is a testament to the fecundity of Douglass’s black political-philosophical legacy. It is a legacy that leads to competing interpretations of him; all the same and for all their differences, his scorching prophetic vision of liberty, equality, citizenship, and progress unites them all. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Active Euthanasia and Assisted SuicidePat Milmoe McCarrick (bio)Although the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in its 1983 report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, described the words and terms "euthanasia," "right to die," and "death with dignity" as slogans or code words—"empty rhetoric," (I, p. 24), the literature reviewed for this Scope Note continues to use these terms. (...) Therefore, to discuss the termination of a patient's life by a physician at the patient's request, the phrase active euthanasia is used, and the supplying of a means by a physician whereby a patient can end his or her life is referred to as assisted suicide.Euthanasia, either as the "good death" from classical Greek or "mercy killing" to end unbearable suffering in the dying, has long been a topic of interest in western civilization (III, Brody 1989). In recent years, public awareness of this discussion about control over the time of one's death has been informed by a series of well-publicized events. They include the November 1991 rejection by a vote of 54 percent to 46 percent of the Washington state Initiative 119, which would have allowed the option of requesting one's physician to "aid-in-dying" for adult patients in a "medically terminal condition" (V, Gross 1991); two medical journal articles describing physician's actions in helping bring death to two patients (V, Anonymous 1988; V, Quill 1991); Dr. Jack Kevorkian's assistance in the suicide of three women (V, Belkin 1990; V, Wilkerson 1991); and the best seller status of a how-to book on committing suicide with opiates obtained from a physician (III, Humphry 1991).For the most part, material included in the annotated bibliography in Scope Note 18 has been chosen from works published in the four years since "It's Over, Debbie" (V, Anonymous 1988) appeared in early January 1988 in the Journal of the American Medical Association.Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino (V, 1991, pp. 3118-19) presented opposing views about active voluntary euthanasia as follows:Those who favor voluntary euthanasia argue that it is a beneficent and compassionate act; it respects autonomy by preserving the patient's control of the manner, method, [End Page 79] and timing of death; it takes the matter outside the reach of "medical power" (accessed in this Scope Note's bibliography at V, Fletcher 1973; V, Nowell-Smith 1989) and scrupulosity; and it prevents the injustice that allows some patients to choose death by refusal of life-support measures, while denying others the right to do so by active euthanasia....The opponents of active euthanasia argue that it undermines the value of, and respect for, all human life (V, Kass 1989; V, Coyle 1990; V, Singer 1990). They fear that guidelines cannot avoid sliding down the "slippery slope" to involuntary euthanasia and selective devaluation of the lives of the most vulnerable among us.... If euthanasia is legal, it is predicted that patients will feel subtle pressure to conform so as to relieve the economic and emotional burdens they impose on family and friends.Euthanasia, its opponents further argue, is socially destructive: it undermines trust in physicians, desensitizes society to killing, and imperils the ground already gained in legitimating passive euthanasia(IV, Wolf 1989).Physicians were not particularly involved with a patient's death until after World War II when participation grew in proportion to the growth of technology. Since the complex, life-sustaining equipment that could forestall death was located in a hospital, death itself became almost completely medicalized (V, Dagi 1991). For terminally ill persons who would like to die a painless death, either by their own hand or with assistance, physicians have almost a monopoly on obtaining strong drugs for distribution to patients (V, Abrams 1990).Active euthanasia for human beings is not legalized anywhere in the world (V, VonDrehle 1991). It is classified as homicide or murder in all fifty states and in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and the Phillippines (V, Nerland 1989). Twentysix states in the United States prohibit assisted suicide by statute (V, Rosenblum 1990).In 1969 in the Netherlands, a physician named Jan Hendrik van... (shrink)

I examine the standard view of dignity in Western literature and Metz’s African community view of dignity as a capacity for communal harmonious living. I argue that moral dignity is not just having a capacity for harmonious communal living, but the moral use of such capacity for the promotion of love, friendship, positive identity and active solidarity, which involves normatively prescriptive and evaluative elements. Thus, a plausible African communal conception of moral dignity, which is founded (...) on a moral conception of personhood and community, involves a combination of capacity and agency that is conceptually tied to communal responsibility and respect for self and others. This indicates that human capacities do not have an inherent moral worth. Capacities are instrumentally good and their worth depends on how they are used to promote the moral good of communal well-being, on which individual well-being or dignity depends. This view captures the various use-senses of dignity, addresses many of the problems with many of the analyses of dignity in the literature, and also indicates its relevance. (shrink)

Contents 1 Introduction / 2 The Timaeus on dignity: the Demiurge’s speech / 3 Justice as a virtue / 4 The content of just actions / 5 Justice of the law and justice of the state / 6 Equality / 7 Some key issues in Plato’s conception of justice / 7.1 What is more excellent—justice of the soul or justice of action? / 7.2 Which activity is best and what is its best object? / 7.2. Just actions over contemplation (...) / 7.2. The Timaeus and Plato’s teaching on justice / 7.2. The elderly Cephalus on justice: foreword as epilogue / 7.3 The sharing of wives: testing the interpretation on a ‘hard case’ / 8 Conclusions. (shrink)

This article aims to present the problem of the impact of artificial intelligence on respect for human dignity in the sphere of care for people who, for various reasons, are described as particularly vulnerable, especially seniors and people with various disabilities. In recent years, various initiatives and works have been undertaken on the European scene to define the directions in which the development and use of artificial intelligence should go. According to the human-centric approach, artificial intelligence should be developed, (...) used and monitored with people in mind, their needs and rights. It is artificial intelligence that should adapt to the rules set by people, not the other way around. The source of all human rights and freedoms is respect for human dignity. This is evidenced by numerous European, international, national regulations and documents. Respecting this value is also one of the works on the AI development. One of the areas of our life into which AI enters more and more boldly and which in the near future, due to demographic reasons and aging population, may be almost dominated by modern technologies, is the medical and care system. The usefulness of industrial co-robots made us think about the possibility of using similar devices in the non-industrial sphere, including in the sphere of care, nursing and therapy. Actually, despite the impressive development of technology and AI, intelligent robots/devices used for care, nursing or therapy (so-called care/nursing or therapy robots) perform rather simple activities. They provide information, navigate, bring something and give it (e.g. medicines, food), help to get up. They are an important support for medical staff in this respect. Performing tasks that are more complex in terms of technology and movement, such as feeding, washing, intimate hygiene, dressing or undressing, is still beyond the reach of the currently used robots. The question we must ask ourselves is whether, in the future, care robots will be able to perform such tasks, and should they do so? Will this lead to the replacement of human medical personnel in the performance of the above-mentioned activities with such robots. Would anyone want to be "looked after" by a soulless machine? Should potential wards/patients, in other words all of us in fact, have the right to object to being taken into the care of an intelligent robot? There is no doubt that intelligent robots have great potential, especially when it comes to ensuring or maintaining the independence or mobility of people with various health limitations. However, we must not forget about the risks and dangers they may generate. Even a simple robot generates serious legal and ethical problems. Who should be liable for damage caused in connection with improper care performed with the participation of a robot? Robots based on AI systems are able to collect a significant amount of sensitive data, for example through the face and speech recognition function. There is considerable scope for abuse in this area, not only in terms of personal data protection but also in terms of informational self-determination, privacy and dignity. Bearing in mind the above risks, the creation of a new right to object to being looked after by a robot should be considered. (shrink)

Background Social justice is recognized by reputable international organizations as a professional nursing value. However, there are serious doubts as to whether it is embodied in Catalan nursing education. Objectives To explore what nursing students take away from two teaching activities led by expert patients (one presentation and three expert patient illness narratives) on the topics of social justice, patient rights, and person-centered care. Research design Qualitative study using a content analysis approach. The research plan included (1) think-pair-share activities (additional (...) faculty-assisted presentation and three faculty-assisted, semi-structured scripted narratives); (2) paired reflections; (3) focus groups; and (4) content analysis of paired reflections and focus groups. Participants and research context Fourth-year nursing degree students at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), Spain. Convenience sampling was used. Ethical considerations The UAB Research Ethics Committee did not deem it necessary to apply any specific measures. We fully explained to patients that they could decide what medical information they would share with the students that was relevant to their learning, and we provided students with guidelines about patient confidentiality, dignity, and respect. Findings/results The students engaged in reflection about their education (recognizing that it had been centered on the professional and not the patient) and their relationship with the patient, in which they reproduced low-involvement patient care by modeling behaviors of their nurse educator. Moreover, they valued a person-centered care model with an emphasis on the emotional part but left out decision-making as an individual right of people. Conclusions The think-pair-share activities were useful to spark self-reflection among students, who identified aspects to change in their own practice, and reflected about their own education process, both of which promote change. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity has remained surprisingly absent from philosophical discussions about the ethics of childhood so far. Likewise, children as a group are mostly neglected in the ongoing discourse on human dignity. In this paper, we attempt to close this double gap by showing that there is, first, a meaningful way to speak of children’s dignity, and that, second, considering children as a group can be illuminating for dignity theorists in general. After an analysis (...) of the reasons why the debates on human dignity and the ethics of childhood have been conducted almost entirely separately, we develop a concept of respecting children as respecting their dignity. Drawing upon personhood accounts of human dignity, we suggest that respecting a child’s dignity means respecting her activity, which means essentially developing and maintaining a perspective of one’s own. Construed in that way, respecting children’s dignity is in some important respects different from concerns about their well-being and their autonomy. In the last section, we will take a step back from the debate about the ethics of childhood and point to some possible conclusions for the debate about human dignity in general. (shrink)

This article offers a Kantian account of dignity violations in the context of contemporary migration to western states. It considers three major issues: “modern slavery,” statutory detention, and lack of rights to engage in economic activity. While most Kantian accounts emphasize the dignity violations of treating people as “mere means,” we point out that this does not capture the central issue: the “hostile environment” that so many migrants face. The first part of the article briefly sets out a (...) Kantian account of dignity violations. The second part highlights two key differences between modern slavery and its historical forebears. It emphasizes the interpersonal rather than institutional character of modern slavery, and distinguishes trafficking from smuggling. The third part argues that migrants who lack formal rights to remain and work face institutional exclusions that violate human dignity. Policies that aim to discourage and restrict immigration demean people’s status as ends in themselves. Moreover, they do so by actively denying opportunities to act as means for others. As such, the article draws a link between Kant’s well-known cosmopolitan right not to be treated with hostility and his less well-known ethical duty, “to be a useful member of the world.” Dignity can be found in acting as a means for others; hostility and exclusion can violate dignity just as much as instrumentalization. (shrink)

This paper explores the value of respect for personal autonomy in relation to clearly immoral and irrational acts committed freely and intentionally by competent people. Following Berlin's distinction between two kinds of liberty and Darwall's two kinds of respect, it is argued that coercive suppression of nonautonomous, irrational, and self-harming acts of competent persons is offensive to their human dignity, but not disrespectful of personal autonomy. Irrational and immoral choices made by competent people may claim only the negative liberty (...) to be left alone. Lives disposed to autonomy are worthy of solidarity and active support in addition to the right of free choice and action. Autonomous premeditated desires (distinguished from mere consent) may embody transcendental choices, which transcend consideration of physical and psychological well-being. Choices made by incompetent persons (e.g., children and the mentally disabled) are not related to autonomy, but to self-directedness. The value of human dignity confers protection to self-directedness, but not at the expense of other vital interests. (shrink)

The desire for dignity informs an individual’s daily activities. Human beings, driven by a universal desire to be recognised and to be seen as dignified people within a society, conduct their actions according to values that are considered dignified. Society informs our disposition toward the dignity of one another. This evokes the question of the true nature of dignity: what is dignity? This chapter seeks to explore and engage with the question of the nature of (...) class='Hi'>dignity in African society, drawing on African philosophers’ conceptions of human dignity in personhood within moderate and strict communitarian positions. Is dignity an intrinsic or an instrumental value? Can dignity be both an instrumental and an intrinsic value? These distinctions are very important in moral theory. Is dignity value in itself (an end in itself) or instrumental value (means to an end) or both? Responses to these questions shed light on African conceptions of dignity. (shrink)

This essay proposes that Socrates practiced various spiritual exercises, including meditation, and that this Socratic practice of meditation was habitual, aimed at cultivating emotional self-control and existential preparedness. Contemporary research in neurobiology supports the view that intentional mental actions, including meditation, have a profound impact on brain activity, neuroplasticity, and help engender emotional self-control. This impact on brain activity is confirmed via technological developments, a prime example of how technology benefits humanity. Socrates attains the balanced emotional self-control that Alcibiades describes (...) in the Symposium because of the sustained mental effort he exerts that directly impacts his brain and his emotional and philosophical life. The essay concludes that Socratic meditative practices aimed at manifesting true dignity as human beings within the complexities of a technological world offer a promising model of self-care worthy of embracing today. (shrink)

No laws or official guidelines govern medical assistance for dying in Japan. However, over the past several years, cases of assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia, rarely disclosed until recently, have occurred in close succession. Inspired by these events, ethical, legal, and social debates on a patient’s right to die have arisen in Japan, as it has in many other countries. Several surveys of Japanese people’s attitudes towards voluntary assisted dying suggest that a certain number of Japanese prefer active euthanasia. (...) Against this background, it is important to discuss voluntary assisted dying cases in Japan and the Japanese views on them and to consider their implications. We review three recent Japanese voluntary assisted dying cases and discuss the various objections to voluntary assisted dying that have been published in response to these in various media outlets. Our counterarguments include the double suffering of people who are unable to give up their desire to die, individuality of death, variability of culture, problem of being an annoyance to (burden on) others, a slippery slope argument supporting voluntary assisted dying, and unfair claims about responsibility and excessive burden on people who are unable to give up their desire to die. We also point out the psychocultural and social problems in Japanese society that these objections reflect, and argue that voluntary assisted dying can be ethically acceptable under certain conditions. We conclude that Japanese society must change in order to enable those who sincerely wish to die to do so in a better way. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the visual representation of dignity, through the particular example of the seventeenth century Spanish painter Diego Velázquez. Velázquez works at a point in Western history when modern conceptions of dignity are beginning to be formed. It is argued that Velázquez' portraits of royalty and aristocracy articulate a tension between a feudal conception of majesty and a modern conception of the dignity of merit. On this level, modern conceptions of (...) class='Hi'>dignity of merit are understood in terms of a struggle to excel in particular activities, and thus to overcome the risk of failure. More radically, Velázquez' portraits of dwarfs and the mentally disabled are argued to be expressive of dignity, not by finding a positive representation of the sitter's dignity, or to find scales of activities by which they can be positively assessed, but rather by grounding their dignity, negatively, in a protest against indignity and humiliation. Drawing on Honneth's analysis of dignity in terms of a theory of recognition, it is argued that the indignity of the court dwarf lies in the fracturing of their communication with the rest of society. The task of repairing that fractured communication is achieved, not by representing a dignified ideal, but rather by drawing attention to the prejudices that serve to exclude the humiliated from full participation in society. In conclusion, it is suggested that the conceptualisation and representation of the elderly today finds effective exemplars in Velázquez' portraits of court dwarfs, rather than in his portraits of the elderly. (shrink)

With good reason, Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power is considered the focal point of his thinking. It allows for exploring the essential features of Nietzsche’s philosophical project, and for critically looking into its viability. Is Nietzsche right to claim that striving for power has to be regarded as the one and only pivotal drive that grounds human activity? Or do we have to assume counterforces, perhaps ethical counterforces in particular, that oppose or ought to oppose power and striving (...) for power?1 Seeking an answer to this question appears to be challenging and puzzling, not least because Nietzsche’s philosophy of power includes and even highlights the aspect of “plurality,” a... (shrink)

Cohen-Almagor's book represents a remarkable contribution to the discussion of the right to die with dignity. It offers the discussion of a wide range of topics. They include: the terminology respectful of human dignity ; the question of autonomy; the sanctity-of life – quality of life debate; criticism of some extreme quality-of-life position; criticism of Ronald Dworkin's distinction between critical and experiential interests and the consequences this author draws from it; active and passive euthanasia; the Dutch experience (...) and the Oregon Death with Dignity Act; and many others. The book is discussed from a basically sympathetic view, where some details are focused on as meriting some further examination. Some remarks are offered to indicate the complexity of the definition of autonomy; a defense of Dworkin's argument is offered; an insistence on the necessity to rely on moral conferring features is remarked. (shrink)

The problem of the values of Ukrainian society is one of the most important and debatable problems in modern scientific discourse. This is due to the transition of our state from the traditional model of the state, in which there is authoritarianism, secrecy, to a socially oriented society and a democratic, open state.Accordingly, there is a change in values, which is an integral part of the existence of any society and state. To replace the Soviet system of declaration of surrogatecollective, (...) paternalistic values, which existed for several decades, a new system is formed, which provides a clear orientation of Ukrainians to European values, the significant achievements of the Ukrainian people, the moral recovery of society, increasing values and culture of civil society. Honor and dignity of Ukrainians, which is an indispensable basis for the development of moral culture of society.The purpose and objectives of the article. Based on the achievements of modern science and philosophy, to analyze the essence of the moral culture of the people, the place of human dignity and its importance in moral culture; to characterize and classify the main factors of dignity formation in the moral culture of the people. The research methodology is complex and is based on philosophical-anthropological and philosophical-cultural analysis of the problems of formation of moral culture of the Ukrainian people and its structural element - human dignity. Research results.The most important, synthetic, integral consequence of human development is moral culture. Moral culture is the level of assimilation by an individual or a group of people of existing moral values in society, the degree of their involvement in the moral aspects of activity, a measure of personal moral development. Practical and spiritual factors include, first of all, ethnic stereotypes specific to a certain people (traditions, customs, rituals, typical traits of character and behavior, dominant emotions, folk crafts, entertainment, games), as well as historical memory, established symbols, folk shrines. Historical memory, preserving every page of life, the people’s struggle for social, political and national rights at all stages of its development, serves as a solid foundation on which national self-consciousness is successfully formed.Institutional factors are important for the formation of dignity in the moral culture of the people. These include nation- and state-building activities of public authorities, national elite, political parties, religious and public organizations. If the state creates conditions in society for the assimilation of the historical and cultural experience accumulated by the nation, it contributes to the education of national self-esteem, ie awareness of community members of their belonging to the nation, their duty to the community of like-minded people. Conclusions. Summarizing the results of the study, we can formulate the following conclusions. Human dignity in the moral culture of the Ukrainian people is the result of the interaction of a combination of many factors that determine its structure and content. The process of its formation is quite long, complex and contradictory. This is due to the fact that it is human dignity that provides the spiritual, ideological foundation for the functioning of national communities, contributing to the development of promising guidelines for the development of the nation and the state. (shrink)

Historically, culture has been treated as an object in international documents. One consequence of this is that cultural rights in international law have been understood as rights of access and consumption. Recently, an alternative conception of culture, and of what cultural rights protect, has emerged from international documents treating indigenous peoples. Within these documents culture is treated as an activity rather than a good. This activity is ascribed to peoples as well as persons, and protecting the capacity of both peoples (...) and persons to engage in culture is taken to be as basic a component of human dignity as are freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and freedom from torture. It is not an accident that this treatment of culture has emerged from international documents treating indigenous peoples. However, the value of this treatment of culture extends beyond the human rights of indigenous peoples. Treating culture as an activity establishes an understanding of what cultural rights protect that clarifies the relationship between cultural rights and other mechanisms for protecting minorities and frames the role of cultural communities in the realization of human dignity as an important physical and political issue, not just a psychological one. For these reasons, the norms regarding cultural rights that are emerging from international documents treating indigenous peoples are a much-needed step forward for peoples' rights more generally. (shrink)

The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, founded as the Mental Health Law Project by a group of attorneys and mental health professionals, has been a major advocacy force promoting the civil rights of persons with mental disabilities since the 1972 New York Willowbrook litigation.Named for D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge David L. Bazelon, whose opinions first articulated the principles that the mentally disabled have a right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative setting, the Center has actively (...) pursued greater rights for the mentally disabled in housing, education, and federal entitlements such as Medicaid, as well as in treatment-related issues. (shrink)

Definition of the problem. Voluntary active euthanasia is, in certain circumstances, morally permissible and should be permitted by law. Autonomous persons may have a fundamental interest in experiencing ”death in dignity” in accordance with their own preferences. This interest is protected by the concept of human dignity assumed by German law. Some prerequisites being met, the moral and legal autonomy right to determine the time and manner of one’s own death includes a right to secure active (...) euthanasia from a willing physician, and a physician’s acceding to the patient’s request be may morally the right thing to do. Arguments and conclusion: Most arguments against the justifiability of voluntary active euthanasia unveil their weakness when scrutinized. However, insofar as legalized voluntary active euthanasia would be subject to intolerable abuse, our policy options are dilemmatic, and the concept of human dignity as it has been taken for granted in German legal discourse, is questioned. There is no option other than seeking safety in legal procedures for every single case. (shrink)