This paper concerns Philippe Van Parijs’s case for an unconditional basic income. It argues that given central egalitarian commitments-to wit, (i) equal concern and respect; (ii) endowment-insensitivity (which can be seen to include Van Parijs’s project of maximizing or leximinning real freedom); (iii) ambition-sensitivity; and (iv) neutrality-endorsed by Van Parijs, a basic income does not appear to be a requirement of justice. The core claim defended is that there is a serious tension between (iii) and the idea of (...) an unconditional basic income. (shrink)

Descartes set for himself the ambitious program of accounting for the functions of the Aristotelian vegetative and sensitive souls without invoking souls or the faculties or powers of souls in his explanations. He rejects the notion that the soul is hylomorphically present in the organs of the body so as to carry out vital and sensory functions. Rather, the body’s organs operate in a purely mechanical fashion. That is what is involved in “mechanizing” these phenomena. The role of the soul (...) is restricted to properly mental functions: to the conscious aspects of sensations and other mental operations; to intellectual acts; and to acts of volition. In effect, soul becomes mind. In order to understand the extent of Descartes’ ambition, this chapter first considers more fully the functions attributed to the soul or to the vital faculties in the Aristotelian and Galenic traditions, and especially the functions of the sensitive soul or power. It draws attention to the cognitive aspects of these functions, beyond the mere operation of the external senses. Then it turns to Descartes’ mechanistic explanations for these cognitive functions. Finally, it situates Descartes’ new mechanistic psychology within the larger context of his novel anthropology, or theory of the human being. (shrink)

Many organizations, companies, and so on are committed to certain representational aims as regards the composition of their workforce. One motivation for such aims is the assumption that numerical underrepresentation of groups manifests discrimination against them. In this article, I articulate representational aims in a way that best captures this rationale. My main claim is that the achievement of such representational aims is reducible to the elimination of the effects of wrongful discrimination on individuals and that this very important concern (...) is, in principle, compatible with the representation of various groups diverging widely from their share of the overall population. The discussion also shows that we should ensure that a preoccupation with groups' numbers in relation to the population as a whole does not lead us away from our real aim, for example because we are blinded to the effects of discrimination against numerically overrepresented groups, or overlook the innocently different ambitions of some numerically underrepresented groups. In relation to the latter point, I appeal to the fact that many luck egalitarians think justice should be ambition sensitive. Also, the time-relative account of representational aims expounded shows that, and how, representational aims should accommodate the changing composition of populations over time. (shrink)

While companies are increasingly convinced of the relevance of CSR, many are still struggling to define their responsibility. Part of the answer to this question can be found in the dual approach towards CSR. The authors unravel the concept of CSR into two components: responsibility and responsiveness. Regarding the firm's responsiveness towards society, companies can adopt two positions. They might adopt an inside‐out approach towards CSR and emphasise their own ambitions. Alternatively, they can approach stakeholders from an outside‐in perspective, wherein (...) stakeholder claims dominate. The authors argue that both perspectives are inadequate with regard to complex societal issues. Therefore, a third approach towards societal interaction is proposed. This is characterised by a process of collective sensemaking, aimed at understanding the issue and defining responsibilities. (shrink)

Systems change requires complex interventions. Cross-sector partnerships face the daunting task of addressing complex societal problems by aligning different backgrounds, values, ideas and resources. A major challenge for CSPs is how to link the type of partnership to the intervention needed to drive change. Intervention strategies are thereby increasingly based on Theories of Change. Applying ToCs is often a donor requirement, but it also reflects the ambition of a partnership to enhance its transformative potential. The current use of ToCs (...) in partnering efforts varies greatly. There is a tendency for a linear and relatively simple use of ToCs that does limited justice to the complexity of the problems partnerships aim to address. Since partnership dynamics are already complex and challenging themselves, confusion and disagreement over the appropriate application of ToCs is likely to hamper rather than enhance the transformative potential of partnerships. We develop a complexity alignment framework and a diagnostic tool that enables partnerships to better appreciate the complexity of the context in which they operate, allowing them to adjust their learning strategy. This paper applies recent insights into how to deal with complexity from both the evaluation and theory of change fields to studies investigating the transformative capacity of partnerships. This can serve as a check to define the challenges of partnering projects and can help delineate the societal sources and layers of complexity that cross-sector partnerships deal with such as failure, insufficient responsibility taking and collective action problems at four phases of partnering. (shrink)

Systems change requires complex interventions. Cross-sector partnerships (CSPs) face the daunting task of addressing complex societal problems by aligning different backgrounds, values, ideas and resources. A major challenge for CSPs is how to link the type of partnership to the intervention needed to drive change. Intervention strategies are thereby increasingly based on Theories of Change (ToCs). Applying ToCs is often a donor requirement, but it also reflects the ambition of a partnership to enhance its transformative potential. The current use (...) of ToCs in partnering efforts varies greatly. There is a tendency for a linear and relatively simple use of ToCs that does limited justice to the complexity of the problems partnerships aim to address. Since partnership dynamics are already complex and challenging themselves, confusion and disagreement over the appropriate application of ToCs is likely to hamper rather than enhance the transformative potential of partnerships. We develop a complexity alignment framework and a diagnostic tool that enables partnerships to better appreciate the complexity of the context in which they operate, allowing them to adjust their learning strategy. This paper applies recent insights into how to deal with complexity from both the evaluation and theory of change fields to studies investigating the transformative capacity of partnerships. This can (1) serve as a check to define the challenges of partnering projects and (2) can help delineate the societal sources and layers of complexity that cross-sector partnerships deal with such as failure, insufficient responsibility taking and collective action problems at four phases of partnering. (shrink)

Systems change requires complex interventions. Cross-sector partnerships face the daunting task of addressing complex societal problems by aligning different backgrounds, values, ideas and resources. A major challenge for CSPs is how to link the type of partnership to the intervention needed to drive change. Intervention strategies are thereby increasingly based on Theories of Change. Applying ToCs is often a donor requirement, but it also reflects the ambition of a partnership to enhance its transformative potential. The current use of ToCs (...) in partnering efforts varies greatly. There is a tendency for a linear and relatively simple use of ToCs that does limited justice to the complexity of the problems partnerships aim to address. Since partnership dynamics are already complex and challenging themselves, confusion and disagreement over the appropriate application of ToCs is likely to hamper rather than enhance the transformative potential of partnerships. We develop a complexity alignment framework and a diagnostic tool that enables partnerships to better appreciate the complexity of the context in which they operate, allowing them to adjust their learning strategy. This paper applies recent insights into how to deal with complexity from both the evaluation and theory of change fields to studies investigating the transformative capacity of partnerships. This can serve as a check to define the challenges of partnering projects and can help delineate the societal sources and layers of complexity that cross-sector partnerships deal with such as failure, insufficient responsibility taking and collective action problems at four phases of partnering. (shrink)

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility, primary goods, property rights and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with (...) respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights as the most fundamental principle of morality, and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined. (shrink)

In 1981, Ronald Dworkin published a two-part article entitled “What Is Equality?”. In it, he considers what egalitarians should aim to equalize. Dworkin argues in favor of equality of resources rather than equality of welfare, and in particular, he maintains that a proper egalitarian theory of distributive justice should be “ambition-sensitive” but not “endowment-sensitive.” That is, it will allow inequalities that reflect the fact that some people “choose to invest rather than consume, or to consume less expensively rather than (...) more, or to work in more rather than less profitable ways,” but it will not allow the distribution of resources to be affected by “differences in ability of the sort that produce income differences in a laissez-faire economy among people with the same ambitions”. (shrink)

Colburn’s ambition in this book is to defend a ‘political morality of autonomy-minded liberalism’. Colburn defines autonomy as the ability to live in accordance with what one has deemed valuable, and to bear responsibility for this decision. There is a traditional debate that forces liberalism either to identify itself as anti-perfectionist and thus as neutral on the question of autonomy’s value , or as pro-autonomy and perfectionist. Colburn alleges that this debate is premised on a logical error. In Chapter (...) 1, Colburn proposes a content-neutral account of autonomy in the tradition of liberal individualism espoused by Wilhelm von Humboldt and John Stuart Mill, and more recently by Joseph Raz and Steven Wall. In Chapter 2, Colburn offers an account of autonomy as a global phenomenon ; lives, rather than episodes of individual choice and action, are at issue. Colburn’s account is an amalgam of ideas defended by Gerald Dworkin, Harry Frankfurt, Mill, and philosophers who defend some form of a social-historical relational account of autonomy. The autonomous agent has values she would hypothetically endorse under conditions of independence, free of factors such as hypnosis or coercion that might derail her critical faculties. Colburn helpfully develops the independence condition by specifying that one’s general commitments to a way of life must be ‘content-sensitive’; they must not ‘depend on something other than the nature of that thing’ deemed valuable. Moreover, the agent must perceive the reasons for her endorsement of a value. The final condition of autonomy might be labelled the relational one of actually ‘living life in accordance with values’ and ‘putting one’s decisions into effect’ . The heart of the book lies in Colburn’s argument for his ‘Equivalence Claim’ in Chapter 3, and in his discussion of the relationship …. (shrink)

Soames thinks the dependencies show up in the semantics if they are generated by variable binding. That will only partially overlap with Pinillos's ambitions for the notion of de jure codesignation. This chapter contributes towards 'domesticating' the kind of predicates that fans of de jure codesignation are friendly to, that is, making them seem less alien and somewhat less 'magical'. It surveys a novel kind of semantic structure that has been posited by Mark Richard, Kit Fine, Ángel Pinillos, and others. (...) It focuses on anaphora, especially cases that cannot be handled by a 'bound‐variable' analysis, and distinguishes our target view from other treatments of anaphora. The chapter discusses the semantics of attitude reports and discusses two kinds of complex anaphoric dependency. It explains a difference in how functions in a programming language can be sensitive to the identity of their operands. (shrink)

Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as (...) intuitionism – which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly less sublime conception of virtue. (shrink)

Recognized in his day as a man of letters equaling Rousseau and Voltaire in France and rivaling Samuel Johnson, David Hume passed from favor in the Victorian age--his work, it seemed, did not pursue Truth but rather indulged in popularization. Although Hume is once more considered as one of the greatest British philosophers, scholars now tend to focus on his thought rather than his writing. To round out our understanding of Hume, M. A. Box in this book charts the interrelated (...) development of Hume's literary ambitions, theories of style, and compositional practice from his Treatise in 1739 through the Enquiries. In so doing, Box makes the case for Hume's career-long concern with the presentational modes of reaching an audience for his philosophical writings. Hume reacted to the popular failure of his masterpiece, A Treatise of Human Nature, Box suggests, by self-consciously exploring strategies in his subsequent works for agreeably bringing his readership to participate in the act of philosophizing. Combining a sensitive grasp of the ways Restoration period and eighteenth-century writers conceived the relations between rhetoric and philosophy with sound readings of particular texts, Box shows how Hume's literary concerns went beyond matters of style to involve persona, structure, and doctrine. While this book helps explain long-standing ambiguities surrounding Hume, especially by pointing out the tension between his created persona and his own voice, it also serves as an excellent introduction to his philosophy. (shrink)

BackgroundHuman genome editing technologies offer much potential benefit. However, central to any conversation relating to the application of such technologies are certain ethical, legal, and social difficulties around their application. The recent misuse, or inappropriate use, by certain Chinese actors of the application of genome editing technologies has been, of late, well noted and described. Consequently, caution is expressed by various policy experts, scientists, bioethicists, and members of the public with regard to the appropriate use of human germline genome editing (...) and its possible future effect on future generations.Main textAs concerns about the applications of heritable genome editing have grown, so too have the questions around what is to be done to curtail ‘rogue actors’. This paper explores various ways in which to regulate genomic editing that are socially beneficial, while being cognisant of legal and ethical principles and rights values. This is done by evolving regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions in an attempt to raise issues, address common principles, and set responsible standards for stewardship of the novel technology.ConclusionsIt is suggested that robust and concrete regulatory measures be introduced that are culturally and contextually sensitive, inclusive, appropriate, and trustworthy – and are based on public empowerment and human rights objectives. Doing so will ensure that we are perfectly positioned to harness and promote the benefits that novel technologies have to offer, while safeguarding public health and curtailing the ambitions of rogue actors. This it is acknowledged is no easy task, so, as a point of departure, this paper sets out a path forward by means of certain, practical recommendations – by constructing genome editing regulation in a manner that both fulfils the desire to better progress human health and that can withstand legal and ethical scrutiny.The following observations and recommendations are made: Firstly, that a solution of effective, legitimate governance should consist of a combination of national and supranational legislative regulation or ‘hard’ law, in combination with ‘soft’ ethics, firmly anchored in and underpinned by human rights values. Second, that efforts to support legal and ethical solutions should be rigorous, practical, and robust, contribute to a reaffirmation of human rights in a contextually sensitive manner, and be transnational in reach. Lastly, that greater harmonisation across jurisdictions and increased public engagement be sought. This it is proposed will address the question of how to implement a normative framework which in turn can prevent future rogue actors. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of the important role which an obligation to provide reasons can play in avoiding some of the systematic difficulties encountered in the theory of rational social choice. The paper builds on some of the insights offered by theories of structure-induced equilibrium. It argues that the obligation to provide reasons for certain choices, reasons which must be articulated and structured around a set of generally shared and publicly comprehensible categories of thought, can serve to make the (...) space of possible choices "concept-sensitive" in a very useful way. Concept-sensitivity has the effect of restricting certain movements within the choice space so that some of the difficulties for achieving an equilibrium in social choice, difficulties which arise out of an excess of rational doing, are avoided. The resulting equilibrium is path dependent, of course, but because it is dependent on a choice path which "makes sense" (or is ordered by thought precisely because it is concept-sensitive), it is not the sort of arbitrary path dependent social choice which was of such concern to Kenneth Arrow in his original Nobel prize winning work. The paper illustrates its points with examples taken from the law. The law is a method of making social choices which emphasizes (in a very self-conscious way, and one which has no parallel either in politics or the market) the justificatory significance of the obligation to give publicly accountable reasons which attend to those issues arising in an ordered way out of a highly structured adjudicative process. Thus, the paper has as one of its ambitions the bringing together of two accounts of rational decision-making which, to this point at least, have not had much contact, namely, the theory of rational social choice and the theory of legal reasoning. (shrink)

Business students early on should be offered a course presenting and analyzing ethical dilemmas they will face as human beings both in the business world and in society. However, such a course should use literature, plays, and novels to illustrate ethical norms and values in the intertwined relationships of human activities. Better than business case studies, literature offers portraits of characters as leaders, employees, consultants, and other professionals, as ordinary human beings with conflicting desires, drives, and ambitions. Literary texts offer (...) excellent descriptions of the circumstances or the organizational settings in which people find themselves. I believe this is the best way to sensitize students without business experience when they are still open to such a formative learning process. At the same time, this pedagogical method linking ethics and literature may help to critically expose some of the weak or missing aspects of various management theories students encounter in their business curriculum and make them more observant and critical. (shrink)

Just as there are people who are born with certain sensory limits or altered sensitivity (+/-) and perceive the outside world differently, so there are several ‘stimuli’ that alter our subjective perception (+/-) of reality (re)giving a different/distorted image of it, the religious faith being one of those. This role is played, for example, by a strong emotional motivation: when someone who strongly believes that he resists fire [or mentally ignores this factor] to save his/her child becomes unaffected by (...) fire in an extreme situation of ambition and elimination of logical reasons for self-preservation; or someone religiously strongly motivated on thinking that he is ‘divinely sent’ to identify and eliminate opponents of divine forces, will attempt all possible steps (violence, terrorism, genocide) to stop these factors, regardless of human ‘reality’ put into play. Therefore, we initiate a series of articles focusing on the dialogue between several domains for the same purpose: What are the factors involved in altering the image of reality, how is a mentally constructed the image of reality in the stages of psychic development, what are the ‘stimuli’ that can distort that image and who can ‘manipulate’ them, but also who can be the ‘correctors’ of these image distortions. (shrink)

The artistic work of photographer Gudio Baselgia focuses on landscapes formed by nature s forces and, more recently, on the sky with the stellar and solar movements and phenomena as we see them from earth. Celestial mechanics have fascinated mankind in all known cultures, the Babylonians and ancient Egyptians as well as the Greek and Celts, the Maya, or the ancient Indians and Chinese. Until the present day we look at the sky and keep being amazed, and try to read (...) what it tells us. Many artists throughout history have been captivated by the spectacle we observe above us day and night. The modern term astrodynamics describes all movements of celestial bodies, in particular the solar system including the moon and other satellites, asteroids and comets, but also movements of stars within a stellar system or galaxy, or of galaxies towards each other. They are well understood today and depicted in coordinate systems and elaborate visualizations. Guido Baselgia s artistic project on astrodynamics and celestial phenomena has no scientific or didactic ambition. His analogue camera is used as a recorder inscribing the movement of stars on the light-sensitive surface of photographic paper. Thus Baselgia s images make traceable the trajectory of celestial bodies invisible to the human eye and show us astounding occurrences of light and shadow. Baselgia has been captivated in particular also by the phenomenon of the umbra, planet earth s shadow thrown into space. It becomes visible occasionally on a clear evening at sunset when a slight mist lies at the horizon: looking in opposite direction to the sun, a dark and sharply marked band of shadow can be seen rising while sun sets behind the observer. But also by recording sunrise and sunset at the polar circle or the tropic, Baselgia visualizes the geometry of celestial mechanics and the concurrence of forces, as well as the miracle of light as such that leaves us awestruck today as much as it did our ancestors. The new book "Guido Baselgia Light Fall" presents 80 outstanding black-and-white images from the artist s Light Fall project taken in Norway, the Tierra del Fuego archipelago in Argentina, in Ecuador, and the Swiss Alps. The brilliant tritone plates are complemented with essays by the German scholar Andrea Gnam and Swiss photography critic Nadine Olonetzky. ". (shrink)

In this paper I aim to examine some problematic implications of the fact that individuals are prone to making systematic reasoning errors, for resource egalitarianism. I begin by disentangling the concepts of preferences, choices and ambitions, which are sometimes used interchangeably by egalitarians. Subsequently, I claim that the most plausible interpretation of resource egalitarianism takes preferences, not choices, as the site of responsibility. This distinction is salient, since preference-sensitive resource egalitarianism is faced with an important objection when applied to situations (...) in which the empirically reasonable assumption that individuals have different degrees of computational abilities is introduced. I first show that this objection can be raised in cases involving individuals who have incomplete information, but that it ultimately fails for such cases since we can appeal to higher order insurance markets in order to mitigate any initial concerns. I further claim, however, that the objection is much more powerful in cases involving individuals who have different reasoning skills, since the appeal to higher order insurance markets is no longer tenable. Consequently, the ideal principle of justice proposed by Dworkin is met with a new feasibility challenge. Finally, I claim that the problem of reasoning errors and various forms of cognitive biases also affect Dworkin’s non-ideal principle of justice, skewing the outputs of the hypothetical insurance mechanism in an unjustifiable manner. (shrink)

Extraversion has two central characteristics: (1) interpersonalengagement, which consists of affiliation (enjoying and valuing close interpersonal bonds, being warm and affectionate) and agency (being socially dominant, enjoying leadership roles, being assertive, being exhibitionistic, and having a sense of potency in accomplishing goals) and (2) impulsivity, which emerges from the interaction of extraversion and a second, independent trait (constraint). Agency is a more general motivational disposition that includes dominance, ambition, mastery, efficacy, and achievement. Positive affect (a combination of positive feelings (...) and motivation) is closely associated with extraversion. Extraversion is accordingly based on positiveincentivemotivation. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are value and design-based problems in current ambitions for the Metaverse. With the Metaverse deepening longstanding commercial surveillance practices, the paper focuses on data protection harms from biometric and emotion data, the gauging of first-person perspectives, and sensitivities around profiling of avatars. The paper advances two notions to address harms and data protection: _surveillant physics_ and _virtual realist governance_. _Surveillant physics_ refers to surveillance informing the laws of how that reality operates: this is a useful (...) concept given the granular control that platforms have over virtual worlds and the laws by which they function. _Virtual realist governance_ builds on the longstanding principle of virtual realism and David Chalmer’s recent theorising of Reality+ that demands that the virtual is taken to be real, meaning that experiences of virtual objects and what occurs in-world are treated as meaningful. The paper progresses to further consider governance questions, both around technical and ethical standards, but also data protection ideas such as personal data stores, and data trusts, that were not conceived as Metaverse-based ideas, but have greater chance of being realised as basic premises of the Metaverse are being designed. Although this paper is regretfully pessimistic, finding that a root problem of current ambitions for the Metaverse is that the public good and the commons are missing, it sees virtual realist scope for modes of resistance unseen in other digital realms. (shrink)

Love and loyalty, hatred and revenge, fear, deprivation, and political ambition: these are the motives which thrust the characters portrayed in these three Sophoclean masterpieces on to their collision course with catastrophe. Recognized in his own day as perhaps the greatest of the Greek tragedians, Sophocles' reputation has remained undimmed for two and a half thousand years. His greatest innovation in the tragic medium was his development of a central tragic figure, faced with a test of will and character, (...) risking obloquy and death rather than compromise his or her principles: it is striking that Antigone and Electra both have a woman as their intransigent 'hero'. Antigone dies rather neglect her duty to her family, Oedipus' determination to save his city results in the horrific discovery that he has committed both incest and parricide, and Electra's unremitting anger at her mother and her lover keeps her in servitude and despair. These vivid translations combine elegance and modernity, and are remarkable for their lucidity and accuracy. Their sonorous diction, economy, and sensitivity to the varied metres and modes of the original musical delivery make them equally suitable for reading or theatrical peformance. (shrink)

David Hume and Adam Smith are often regarded as founding fathers of modern social science and champions of self-interested material acquisitiveness. Against this view I argue that their moral and political philosophies are better understood as modern installments in the classical tradition of virtue ethics. By focusing on Hume and Smith's conception of self-love and particularly on their distinction of self-love from self-interest, I demonstrate their dedication to encouraging virtues beyond the instrumental virtues of the market. ;Hume and Smith regard (...) egoism as a natural and inescapable element of human nature, but they also believe that egoism is educable. Untrained egoism manifests itself in such basic forms of selfishness as vanity and ambition, but a properly educated and elevated egoism heightens our sensitivity to the well-being of others. Through a careful analysis of their dialectical rhetoric, I show how Hume and Smith educate the egoism of their readers in their moral works. By so doing I demonstrate that the Scots understood themselves not merely as advocates of the pursuit of wealth, but as moral educators aspiring to introduce their readers to a life beyond the furious pursuit of external goods. Their portraits of magnanimous statesmen and wise and virtuous sages serve as models of this higher life, a life distinguished by the pursuit of moral nobility through beneficent activity. By tracing the Aristotelian and Ciceronian origins of their understanding of the relationship of self-love to benevolence, I thus show that far from celebrating commercial self-interest and denigrating virtue, Hume and Smith draw on classical sources in their attempts to ennoble modern liberalism and encourage decency and respect for the dignity of others. And by focusing particularly on their conception of the proper magnanimity for modernity, that of the wise and virtuous man, I argue that Hume's and Smith's practical writings on history, politics and economics are best regarded as attempts to discharge the beneficent duties they describe in their moral philosophy, and thereby claim wisdom and virtue for themselves. (shrink)

In response to critical discussions of my book, Moral Literacy, by Stephen Engstrom, Sally Sedgwick and Andrews Reath, I offer a defence of Kant's formalism that is not only friendly to my claims for the moral theory's sensitivity to a wide range of moral phenomena and practices at the ground level, but also consistent with Kant's high rationalist ambitions.

This is a meditation on love and suffering, pleasure and pain. Despite common sense, public discourse and scholarship narrating these states as diametrically opposed, the lived experience of queer romantic love cannot be disarticulated from the social realities of loss and pain. Suturing love and suffering is the metaphysic of indeterminacy, with the unexpected and uncertain marking romantic encounters and ambitions with precarity and impermanence. Drawing from vignettes gained through an ethnography on queer erotics in Sri Lanka in 2016, I (...) explore how queer love manifests and perishes in the most inexplicable fashion, against the backdrop of structural violence and the vagaries of intersubjective relationalities. A sensitivity to indeterminacy enables an excavation of the elsewheres that inhere to and are conjured by queer romantic love, from the entanglements that live outside of the binaries of heterosexual-homosexual to the utopic futural imaginaries that are made possible at this site. Meanwhile, the suffering engendered by indeterminacy gestures to the precarities of elsewhere, and the transient nature of queer futurity. I engage scholarship on social suffering and romantic love to demonstrate how both corpora of literature are united at the site of the Sri Lankan queer figure, and how centring indeterminacy troubles epistemic projects that seek to know love and the lover with certainty. (shrink)

Business students early on should be offered a course presenting and analyzing ethical dilemmas they will face as human beings both in the business world and in society. However, such a course should use literature, plays, and novels to illustrate ethical norms and values in the intertwined relationships of human activities. Better than business case studies, literature offers portraits of characters as leaders, employees, consultants, and other professionals, as ordinary human beings with conflicting desires, drives, and ambitions. Literary texts offer (...) excellent descriptions of the circumstances or the organizational settings in which people find themselves. I believe this is the best way to sensitize students without business experience when they are still open to such a formative learning process. At the same time, this pedagogical method linking ethics and literature may help to critically expose some of the weak or missing aspects of various management theories students encounter in their business curriculum and make them more observant and critical. (shrink)

Recognized in his day as a man of letters equaling Rousseau and Voltaire in France and rivaling Samuel Johnson, David Hume passed from favor in the Victorian age--his work, it seemed, did not pursue Truth but rather indulged in popularization. Although Hume is once more considered as one of the greatest British philosophers, scholars now tend to focus on his thought rather than his writing. To round out our understanding of Hume, M. A. Box in this book charts the interrelated (...) development of Hume's literary ambitions, theories of style, and compositional practice from his Treatise in 1739 through the Enquiries. In so doing, Box makes the case for Hume's career-long concern with the presentational modes of reaching an audience for his philosophical writings. Hume reacted to the popular failure of his masterpiece, A Treatise of Human Nature, Box suggests, by self-consciously exploring strategies in his subsequent works for agreeably bringing his readership to participate in the act of philosophizing. Combining a sensitive grasp of the ways Restoration period and eighteenth-century writers conceived the relations between rhetoric and philosophy with sound readings of particular texts, Box shows how Hume's literary concerns went beyond matters of style to involve persona, structure, and doctrine. While this book helps explain long-standing ambiguities surrounding Hume, especially by pointing out the tension between his created persona and his own voice, it also serves as an excellent introduction to his philosophy. (shrink)

‘Gender’, understood as the social construction of sex, is a key concept for feminists working at the interface of theory and policy. This article examines challenges to the concept which emerged from different groups at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, September 1995, an important arena for struggles over feminist public policies. The first half of the article explores contradictory uses of the concept in the field of gender and development. Viewpoints from some southern activist women at (...) the NGO Forum of the Beijing Conference are presented, Some of them argued that the way ‘gender’ has been deployed in development institutions has led to a depoliticization of the term, where feminist policy ambitions are sacrificed to the imperative of ease of institutionalization. ‘Gender’ becomes a synonym for ‘women’, rather than a form of shorthand for gender difference and conflict and the project of transformation in gender relations. ‘Gender sensitivity’ can be interpreted by non-feminists as encouragement to use gender-disaggregated statistics for development planning, but without consideration of relational aspects of gender, of power and ideology, and of how patterns of subordination are reproduced. A completely different attack on ‘gender’ came from right-wing groups and was battled out over the text of the Platform for Action agreed at the official conference. Six months prior to the conference, conservative groups had tried to bracket for possible removal the term ‘gender’ in this document, out of opposition to the notion of socially constructed, and hence mutable, gender identity. Conservative views on gender as the ‘deconstruction of woman’ are discussed here. The article points out certain contradictions and inconsistencies in feminist thinking on gender which are raised by the conservative backlash attack on feminism and the term ‘gender’. (shrink)

This article explores the ethics of world heritage (WH) through a cosmopolitan lens. It proposes that cosmopolitanism provides fertile ground for the study of WH, in particular if combined with sensitivity to distinct indigenous ethical and political claims. Underpinning my article is the question of whether the politics of WH, despite its peaceful and universalist intensions, obscures local disputes and subaltern voices. The empirical emphasis is placed on the WH site of Laponia in the North of Sweden – a (...) location of Sami indigenous communities and commercial mining interests. I provide a narrative analysis of the inconsistencies between the Swedish ‘good state’ narrative defined by support for human and indigenous rights globally and the protection ambition of WH and its generally favourable attitude towards mining, despite its potentially damaging effects on the WH site of Laponia and the cultural heritage and land rights of Sami people living there. My study also provides an analysis of Sami narratives on Laponia – storylines that are rarely included in the Swedish ‘good state’ narrative. The study seeks to contribute to scholarly understandings of indigenous peoples’ ability to lay claims to the cosmopolitan protection logic that prevails in WH. (shrink)

The use of philosophy in educational programmes and practices under such names as philosophy for children, philosophy with children, or the community of philosophical enquiry, has become well established in many countries around the world. The main attraction of the educational use of philosophy seems to lie in the claim that it can help children and young people to develop skills for thinking critically, reflectively and reasonably. By locating the acquisition of such skills within communities of enquiry, the further claim (...) is that engagement with philosophy can foster the development of moral reflection and sensitivity and of social and democratic skills more generally. Claims like these provide a set of arguments for the inclusion of philosophy in the school curriculum that goes well beyond philosophy as just another curricular subject or body of knowledge. The aim of this article is to raise some questions about the conception of education that appears to inform the discussion about the educational use of philosophy. My ambition is to suggest an additional rather than an alternative view about the educational use of philosophy in the hope that this may act as a reminder of a different way in which one can engage with philosophy in educational settings which, in turn, might also act as a reminder of how philosophy might engage with us. The philosophical distinction in which my argument is phrased is that between humanism and post-humanism and the guiding educational concept is that of exposure. (shrink)

From the book Difference and Repetition, I intend to discuss the extent to which Deleuze's proposal to restore difference in sensibility, preventing difference from being confused with the diverse, as proposed by Kant, in order to remove difference from submission to representation in the ambit of sensibility. This sets up a new perspective to think about the issue of difference in sensitivity, reformulating notions of transcendental thinking and ontology, through an unusual alliance between science and philosophy. Therefore, the proposed (...) objectives are: I) expose Deleuze's critique of Kant's transcendental philosophy, regarding difference as the diverse in sensibility and question the very concept of transcendental as a condition for experience; II) to argue Deleuze's way out of the problem of the representation of difference in sensitivity from the notion of being of the sensible; III) explore Deleuze's appropriation of Gilbert Simondon's concept of individuation: IV) to express why the notions of will to power and eternal return, from Nietzsche's philosophy, contribute, together with individuation, to compose the concept of difference in response to the limits of transcendentalism. (shrink)

In 2015, the world's first self-defined feminist government was formed in Sweden with the explicit ambition of pursuing a feminist foreign policy. This essay seeks to unpack and highlight some of the substance and plausible future directions of a feminist foreign policy. The overarching ambition is three-fold: to probe the normative contents of feminist foreign policy in theory and in practice; to identify a number of potential challenges and ethical dilemmas that are detrimental to gender-sensitive global politics; and (...) to advance a research agenda that can deepen the normative and ethical notions of a feminist foreign policy. Sweden's feminist foreign policy is still in the making. Its conduct is mostly incremental and focused on international agenda setting and normative entrepreneurship, which is guided by an ethically informed framework of cosmopolitanism and human rights. Yet, this essay argues that this reorientation is distinct for two reasons: First, by adopting the “F-word” it elevates politics from a broadly consensual orientation of gender mainstreaming towards more controversial politics, which explicitly seeks to renegotiate and challenge power hierarchies and gendered institutions that hitherto defined global institutions and foreign and security policies. Second, it contains a normative reorientation of foreign policy, which is guided by an ethically informed framework based on broad cosmopolitan norms of global justice and peace. The article concludes by advancing a research agenda that draws upon feminist IR theory and enhances the ethical and transformative contents of the English School by making it more gender-sensitive and appropriate for the study of feminist foreign policy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas Aquinas and Cognitive TherapyChristopher Megone (bio)Keywordsemotions, rationality, cognitivism, Aristotelian psychology, powersGiuseppe butera has written a stimulating and persuasive defence of the view that Aquinas’s philosophical psychology (APP) can provide “a profound and cogent philosophical framework for cognitive therapy (CT).” In this short commentary, I respond to Butera’s claims from the perspective of one possible reading of the moral psychology of Aristotle, one of Aquinas’s major philosophical influences. Given (...) the general debt that Aquinas owes to Aristotle, as noted by Butera, this may provide a helpful slant on Butera’s interpretation of Aquinas.Indeed although Butera offers Aquinas as an alternative source for a philosophical underpinning of CT, rather than the Stoics cited by Beck, one might think that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle could in any case be put forward as equally fruitful areas for inquiry in this context. Thus, one might think that Socrates’ moral psychology, which led him to the cognitivist claim that virtue is knowledge, provides a commitment to a CT-related perspective that both predated and itself influenced the Stoics. And one might then expect to learn things of relevance to CT from the ways in which Plato and Aristotle responded to that Socratic cognitivist outlook.From such an Aristotelian perspective, then, Butera’s approach is very welcome. He makes a strong case for considering Aquinas’s broadly Aristotelian conception of the human person as a desirable alternative to any account that depends on Cartesian substance dualism (of mind and body). On the Aristotelian account, by contrast, the human person is itself a single substance comprised of form (the soul) and matter (the body), the ensouled body constituting a substantial unity. The soul is a set of essential powers, the powers each human has which makes him/her a human being. These powers are necessarily linked in such a way as to comprise that unity and enmattered in a body, each enmattered set of powers constituting an individual member of the species.As Butera also notes, Aquinas follows Aristotle in supposing there to be five basic kinds of human essential powers—vegetative or nutritive, locomotive, sensitive or perceptual, appetitive or desiderative, and rational. Taken together, these distinguish humans from other species. And broadly speaking Aquinas thinks of the distinctively human motivational features as having three parts, non-rational appetites or desires, appetites or desires open to reason, and the purely rational intellect.Within this broad framework, Butera offers an account of APP and in particular of the emotions whose treatment is so important with CT. Given that this account is broadly congenial from an Aristotelian perspective, I offer three main comments. First, Butera makes interesting methodological claims, which I briefly explore. Second, and most [End Page 373] substantially, I examine Butera’s claims about emotions in APP in terms of some Aristotelian points about the acquisition of emotions. Third, I suggest that these latter points bring out a slight tension between the way in which Butera endorses CT at the outset of his paper and his slightly more qualified remarks at the end of it.MethodIn footnote 1, Butera talks of “the differences and complementarity of the methods employed by philosophers and scientists.” However, although he fairly notes that the ambitions of his paper far exceed its scope, so he cannot be expected to have elaborated this theme, his methodological comments do raise some questions as to how exactly we might understand the relation between the two modes of inquiry. He suggests, as noted, that APP can provide the philosophical underpinnings for CT. He goes on to indicate that APP can provide a deeply rooted and highly articulated philosophical explanation for the effectiveness of CT (347). This consists in showing that the principles and methods of CT can be philosophically grounded by APP (348), which he exemplifies by identifying seven points of contact between CT and APP.Butera contrasts this approach with that of Beck, who is content for CT to be “an empirically grounded system of psychological principles and therapeutic methods” (347). So what does the philosophical material add? According to Butera, “employing the rational, dialectical method of the philosophers, [Aquinas] is able to sound depths inaccessible... (shrink)

Il est courant d’opposer, à propos des images en art, une herméneutique symbolique et une phénoménologie du sensible (ou une esthétique du sublime), une logique de la signification et une logique de la sensation. L’ambition de cet article est double. Il consiste, d’une part, à justifier la pertinence d’une herméneutique de l’image, dans une parenté avec le courant iconologique, en montrant qu’interpréter plus permet de ressentir davantage. Il consiste d’autre part à montrer les limites d’une herméneutique de l’image lorsqu’elle (...) se réduit à la recherche d’un sens caché et prétend toujours transformer le sensible en intelligible. (shrink)

Philosophical aesthetics is to some extent beholden to what I will call personal aesthetics. By personal aesthetics, I mean the phenomena of individual aesthetic sensitivity: how each of us discerns and responds to elements of experience. I take that sensitivity to be finely woven into feeling to some degree at home in the world. There is something extremely local, and in a certain sense unreflective, about personal aesthetics – it is hard to notice one's own, historically specific aesthetic (...) formation. Philosophical aesthetics, meanwhile, aspires to understand aesthetic life in a more reflective and general way. Aesthetic theories in the Western tradition, like most philosophical theories, try to articulate universally relevant and illuminating theoretical concepts and values. But can a theory of this kind acknowledge what is important at the level of personal aesthetics? Can aesthetic theories find fruitful application while also respecting the locality and variability of aesthetic sensitivity? What kinds of theoretical ambition and humility are called for in philosophical aesthetics? (shrink)

Empathy is a familiar form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective taking. In this dissertation I offer an account of empathy’s moral importance that emphasizes the special value of its unique epistemic functions. Specifically, I defend what I call the humane understanding thesis: empathy is the source of a distinct epistemic good, humane understanding, which consists in the appreciation of the intelligibility of others’ emotional perceptions, and humane understanding is necessary for fully virtuous relations with other people. Adam Smith held that (...) empathy is the unique means by which we judge the propriety of other’s emotions. I draw out the kernel of truth in this surprising claim. Emotions inevitably present the world in a certain evaluative light. When I see my situation as calling out for my anger, or fear, or adoration, my emotion appears to me to be properly responsive to my situation. I can judge my emotion to be inappropriate, all things considered. However, I cannot both be angry at your betrayal and be totally mystified by my own anger, or resent you but see no absolutely nothing in your conduct that appears to call out for my resentment. This insight applies to empathy. When we empathize, we feel genuine emotions. And when we feel these emotions, we cannot fail to appreciate the intelligibility of the other’s original emotion first-hand. This appreciation constitutes humane understanding of the other’s emotion. I further clarify the nature of this epistemic achievement by distinguishing it from two other nearby forms of understanding, one that is achieved through narrative rather than perspective taking, and one that is achieved through unemotional perspective taking. Empathy has recently come in for some heavy criticism. It has been described as not only morally unnecessary, but positively morally corrosive. Recognizing that empathy is the unique means by which we secure humane understanding of others’ emotional perceptions enables us to appreciate aspects of empathy’s moral significance that its most prominent detractors have neglected. Humane understanding is a powerful way of being close to another person, and closeness is something that social beings like ourselves crave, not for any further or deeper purpose, but just because it is valuable to us in and of itself. People have a powerful need to be empathized with because empathy relieves a painful form of loneliness. Empathy can be a way of caring, rather than just a means of getting us to care. In further defense of empathy’s moral significance, I also argue that empathy has a meaningful role to play in the development of both our reflective beliefs about moral properties and our emotional sensitivity to those same properties. Empathy can allow us to discover new moral distinctions through imaginative emotional experience, and it can also help us to shape and sharpen our moral emotional perception. Finally, I round out my review of empathy’s moral significance with an argument that empathy with others makes it very difficult to intend to treat them in certain immoral ways. We cannot both empathize with someone and see them as unfeeling, as unthinking, or as lacking a normative perspective on the world. Consequently, empathizing with someone is at least not compatible with treating them as a mere object. I offer my Smithian picture of empathy’s moral and epistemic functions as an alternative to the popular Humean view that empathy moves us from our default position of solipsism and egoism to knowledge of and care for other’ inner lives. That view’s ambition is tantalizing, but it distorts both the nature of empathy and the nature of our other-oriented concern and understanding. Hume’s account of empathy’s significance, and the more recent accounts that take after it, end up making it look as though empathy simply contributes to the expansion of egoism, and/or as though empathy depends for its motivational efficacy on a kind of epistemic mistake. (shrink)

Anthony Grafton, like Jacob Burckhardt before him, begins his appreciation of Leon Battista Alberti by reviewing how the fifteenth‐century Italian author created a many‐faceted identity through willful self‐fashioning. Grafton, however, offers the reader a much richer Bildungsroman than the older portrait and exposes many forces undercutting the monolithic character of Burckhardt's Renaissance, the same forces that may provide a key to the contrary and doubt‐ridden persona frequenting Alberti's writings. Alberti's ambitions and the leitmotifs of his life from his youthful aspirations (...) to their later glorious fulfillment are laid out in stunning detail.Moving well beyond the unrelenting brightness of Burckhardt's presentation, Grafton also attempts to fuse what have become for scholars the dramatic polarities of Alberti's enigmatic personality. An ambitious scholar and writer on academic subjects, on the visual and practical arts, Alberti was a lover of nature and a sensitive commentator on aesthetic, familial, and cultural ideals. He was also given to irony, despair, and bitter isolation. Grafton makes a strong case for Alberti's dependence on an unwavering determination that compelled him to assume many guises and foster numerous strategies to achieve his literary, social, and economic goals. As his friend Cristoforo Landino once noted, Alberti was like a chameleon. In Grafton's hands, however, Alberti remains dazzlingly inventive and radically humanist, and he endures as appropriately leonine and the hero of his own tale.With a predictable outpouring of references, Grafton evokes Alberti's social, political, and intellectual world and, reprising his earlier writings, develops several themes. These include Alberti's literary erudition and the high price he paid to achieve it; how Alberti applied the lessons of ancient sources to the problems of his own world, and in so doing subverted those lessons to create something new; how the humanist author developed special vocabularies for writing about such novel subjects as the visual arts, instruments of measure, and other current technologies; and, perhaps most surprisingly for a man given to bitterly mocking his contemporaries, how Alberti became involved in the creative energy of early modern life with apparent enthusiasm and accomplished the astonishing feat for a humanist of becoming a practicing architect.Grafton finds Alberti's confidence in a material culture driven by technology, theoretical knowledge, and careful observation expressed forcefully in the dedicatory letter of his essay On Painting addressed to the builder Filippo Brunelleschi. Brunelleschi deserved to be praised not for slavishly drinking from the fountain of the ancients, but for the brilliance of his intelligence and the successful application of his knowledge. Further, by requesting that the architect emend his essay, Alberti, the scholar, is shown to have treated Brunelleschi, the builder, as an equal and thereby to have elevated all technical knowledge. Alberti cleverly places himself within the circle of the ingenious engineers who were masters of practical knowledge based on underlying principles and therefore at the forefront of an intellectual parade led by its most renowned practitioner. One wonders, perhaps, what Brunelleschi at the height of his fame might have desired to learn from the audacious savant.As Alberti masters how to make his way in Florence and among the elegant courts of his day, he is seen to revisit the themes of his youthful writings with ever‐deepening insight. Grafton's reflections on Alberti and Florence, though generally convincing, have been greatly enriched by Luca Boschetto's recent book devoted to that subject . In addition, some of Grafton's notions about the influence of On Painting as centered in courtly art seem to reach beyond the evidence and the explicit directives found in Alberti's writings.The reader interested in Alberti's involvement in science and technology will still want to consult Joan Gadol's Leon Battista Alberti: Universal Man of the Early Renaissance , and the lack of a general bibliography will be an irritation to those who like to follow an author's research trail, the trekker in this case having to stumble through a thicket of footnotes. Nonetheless, Grafton has created a richly drawn portrait of Alberti. Scholar and student alike will garner much that is important about this immensely gifted and mercurial man whose writings continue to influence our understanding of the beginnings of early modernity. (shrink)

Solitary Travelers takes its place alongside other revisionary works that assess the contribution of women writers to nineteenth‐century fields of study and disciplines of learning identified as male and associated with science. Lila Harper foregrounds the role of travel narratives in her analysis, arguing that they facilitated access to a scientific vocation for women writers and, indeed, that some women gravitated to travel writing “in a common quest for the professional recognition which seemed to be promised within a territory marked (...) ‘natural philosophy,’ ‘natural history,’ and, finally, ‘science’” . In an interesting and well‐written introduction to her subject, Harper demonstrates her sensitivity to basic historical issues of what constituted “science” in nineteenth‐century England and makes appropriate distinctions not just between the amateur and the professional but also between science as practice, hobby, vocation, and mode of observation.Harper is interested specifically in natural history travel narratives, her introduction tells us, and she chooses for her subjects Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Martineau, Isabella Bird Bishop, and Mary Kingsley. In separate chapters studying each of these key figures, she uses biographical data to undergird her analyses of the rhetorical strategies that each woman invoked in her travel writing. Her thorough examination of Wollstonecraft's Short Residence in Sweden adds much‐needed dimension to a writer known mainly for her Vindication of the Rights of Man and Vindication of the Rights of Woman . Locating within Wollstonecraft's text evidence of her interest in the Scandanavian landscape and wilderness, Harper stresses her close observation of the natural world and her apparent commitment to natural history. The subsequent attention in this chapter to Wollstonecraft's relationship with Gilbert Imiay, however necessary it may be to understanding her motivations for travel and need for authority, short‐circuits the analysis of Wollstonecraft's contributions to natural history at the turn of the century.Harper's chapter on Harriet Martineau examines her “ability to shape travel writing into an investigative tool for scientific observation while substantiating her influence on others and her intellectual stature” and to this end is geared also to basic issues of rhetorical strategy and authoritative voice, particularly as they surface in Society in America , Retrospect of Western Travel , and Eastern Life, Present and Past . Martineau is arguably the most written about of the women studied in Solitary Travelers, and consequently much of the material and perspective that Harper presents will be familiar to her readers.The chapter on Isabella Bird Bishop takes note of a crucial shift in the audience of this famous traveler, who began by writing for ladies' magazines but eventually addressed an audience of geographers, explorers, and members of colonial government. Harper sees Isabella Bird Bishop and Mary Kingsley, her final subject, as driven by the ambition to gain access into “the scientific community” , but her analysis is nevertheless far more focused on the content of their respective travel books than on any more tangible activity linked to professionalized science. Harper finds in Kingsley's prose, as in that of her other subjects, evidence of her manipulation of “a feminine discourse” and a corollary concern with “masculine scientific discourse” ; more provocative to my mind is her claim that Kingsley adopted the role of “martyr … both for scientific endeavors and for the future of developing colonial Africa” .This book's chief virtue is its readability. With each of her subjects, Harper provides a comprehensive and yet relatively succinct overview of the ways they used travel to undertake work construed, however loosely, as “science.” Although she claims that Kingsley's travel writing represents the culmination of a tradition of “women's naturalist travel writing,” I found myself somewhat suspicious of the term and yearning for more nuanced investigations of generalized categories such as “masculine scientific discourse.” Although each of the women Harper studies undertook travel writing and incorporated descriptions of the natural environments she encountered into her accounts, does it necessarily follow that they were working within, even helping to construct, a tradition of “naturalist travel writing”? Kingsley would probably have been the only one of these four to identify herself as a naturalist. The introduction to Solitary Travelers seems to promise a study of women using travel to work in natural history, but the book itself looks far more broadly at the rhetoric of authority and the appeal of “science” to these women. (shrink)

Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of (...) Bayesian confirmation-theoretic enthymemes, and a brief analysis of some recent attempts to resolve the problem of measure sensitivity. (shrink)

The debate about the credentials of sociobiology has persisted because scholars have failed to distinguish the varieties of sociobiology and because too little attention has been paid to the details of the arguments that are supposed to support the provocative claims about human social behavior. I seek to remedy both deficiencies. After analysis of the relationships among different kinds of sociobiology and contemporary evolutionary theory, I attempt to show how some of the studies of the behavior of nonhuman animals meet (...) the methodological standards appropriate to evolutionary research. I contend that the efforts of E. O. Wilson, Richard Alexander, Charles Lumsden, and others to generate conclusions about human nature are flawed, both because they apply evolutionary ideas in an unrigorous fashion and because they use dubious assumptions to connect their evolutionary analyses with their conclusions. This contention rests on analyses of many of the major sociobiological proposals about human social behavior, including: differences in sex roles, racial hostility, homosexuality, conflict between parents and adolescent offspring, incest avoidance, the avunculate, alliances in combat, female infanticide, and gene–culture coevolution.Vaulting Ambitionthus seeks to identify what is good in sociobiology, to expose the errors of premature speculations about human nature, and to prepare the way for serious study of the evolution of human social behavior. (shrink)

The principle of clinical equipoise requires that, aside from certain exceptional cases, second generation treatments ought to be tested against standard therapy. In violation of this principle, placebo-controlled trials (PCTs) continue to be used extensively in the development and licensure of second-generation treatments. This practice is typically justified by appeal to methodological arguments that purport to demonstrate that active-controlled trials (ACTs) are methodologically flawed. Foremost among these arguments is the so called assay sensitivity argument. In this paper, I take (...) a closer look at this argument. Following Duhem, I argue that all trials, placebo-controlled or not, rely on external information for their meaningful interpretation. Pending non-circular empirical evidence that we can trust the findings of PCTs to a greater degree than the findings of ACTs, I conclude that the assay sensitivity argument fails to demonstrate that placebo-controlled trials are preferable, methodologically or otherwise, to active-controlled trials. Contrary to the intentions of its authors, the fundamental lesson taught by the assay sensitivity argument is Duhemian: the validity of all clinical trials depends on external information. (shrink)

Increased technological and pharmacological interventions in patient care when patient outcomes are uncertain have been linked to the escalation in moral and ethical dilemmas experienced by health care providers in acute care settings. Health care research has shown that facilities that are able to attract and retain nursing staff in a competitive environment and provide high quality care have the capacity for nurses to process and resolve moral and ethical dilemmas. This article reports on the findings of a systematic review (...) of the empirical literature (1980 — February 2007) on the effects of unresolved moral distress and poor ethical climate on nurse turnover. Articles were sought to answer the review question: Does unresolved moral distress and a poor organizational ethical climate increase nurse turnover? Nine articles met the criteria of the review process. Although the prevailing sentiment was that poor ethical climate and moral distress caused staff turnover, definitive answers to the review question remain elusive because there are limited data that confidently support this statement. (shrink)

Background: It is stated that high ethical sensitivity positively affects the quality of nursing care. However, the relationship between nursing care quality and ethical sensitivity has not been clearly demonstrated in researches. Aim: This study was carried out to determine the relationship between surgical nurses’ care behaviors and their ethical sensitivity. Method: The sample of this cross-sectional, descriptive-correlational study consists of 308 nurses who worked at the surgical departments in four Turkish hospitals. The data were collected using (...) the “Nurse Description Form” developed by the researcher, “Caring Behaviours Inventory-24” and “Ethical Sensitivity Questionnaire.” Data were evaluated by the Mann Whitney U test, Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of variance and Spearman correlation analysis. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the ethics committee. Verbal and written consent was received from the nurses. Results: It was found in the study that nurses’ Caring Behaviours Inventory-24 total score median was 5.25 (4.83–5.58), nurses’ perception level of caring quality was high, median of Ethical Sensitivity Questionnaire total score was 89.00 (75.00–101.00) and nurses’ ethical sensitivity was moderate. A negative significant relation was found between nurses’ Caring Behaviours Inventory-24 total score and Ethical Sensitivity Questionnaire total score (r = -0.162; p = 0.009). A negative relation was also detected between nurses’ working period at the current clinic and providing benefit (r = -0.147; p = 0.012), holistic approach (r = -0.139; p = 0.018) and orientation (r = -0.175; p = 0.003) scores of Ethical Sensitivity Questionnaire sub-scales. Conclusion: Nurses’ perception levels of caring quality were high and their ethical sensitivity levels were moderate. It was found out that nurses’ ethical sensitivity increased together with their perception of caring quality, and as their working period at the current clinic increased, the ethical sensitivity also increased in terms of the sub-scales of providing benefit, holistic approach, and orientation. The factors that adversely affect the quality of nursing care and ethical sensitivity should be examined and attempts should be made to improve the working environment. (shrink)