This paper focuses on the fact that AI is predominantly portrayed as white—in colour, ethnicity, or both. We first illustrate the prevalent Whiteness of real and imagined intelligent machines in four categories: humanoid robots, chatbots and virtual assistants, stock images of AI, and portrayals of AI in film and television. We then offer three interpretations of the Whiteness of AI, drawing on critical race theory, particularly the idea of the White racial frame. First, we examine the extent to which this (...) Whiteness might simply reflect the predominantly White milieus from which these artefacts arise. Second, we argue that to imagine machines that are intelligent, professional, or powerful is to imagine White machines because the White racial frame ascribes these attributes predominantly to White people. Third, we argue that AI racialised as White allows for a full erasure of people of colour from the White utopian imaginary. Finally, we examine potential consequences of the racialisation of AI, arguing it could exacerbate bias and misdirect concern. (shrink)

Many authors have proposed constraining the behaviour of intelligent systems with ‘machine ethics’ to ensure positive social outcomes from the development of such systems. This paper critically analyses the prospects for machine ethics, identifying several inherent limitations. While machine ethics may increase the probability of ethical behaviour in some situations, it cannot guarantee it due to the nature of ethics, the computational limitations of computational agents and the complexity of the world. In addition, machine ethics, even if it were to (...) be ‘solved’ at a technical level, would be insufficient to ensure positive social outcomes from intelligent systems. (shrink)

Responsible AI (RAI) guidelines aim to ensure that AI systems respect democratic values. While a step in the right direction, they currently fail to impact practice. Our work discusses reasons for this lack of impact and clusters them into five areas: (1) the abstract nature of RAI guidelines, (2) the problem of selecting and reconciling values, (3) the difficulty of operationalising RAI success metrics, (4) the fragmentation of the AI pipeline, and (5) the lack of internal advocacy and accountability. Afterwards, (...) we introduce a number of approaches to RAI from a range of disciplines, exploring their potential as solutions to the identified challenges. We anchor these solutions in practice through concrete examples, bridging the gap between the theoretical considerations of RAI and on-the-ground processes that currently shape how AI systems are built. Our work considers the socio-technical nature of RAI limitations and the resulting necessity of producing socio-technical solutions. (shrink)

Background Non-adherence to medication is associated with increased risk of relapse in patients with bipolar disorder. Objectives To validate patient-evaluated adherence to medication measured via smartphones against validated adherence questionnaire; and investigate characteristics for adherence to medication measured via smartphones. Methods Patients with BD evaluated adherence to medication daily for 6–9 months via smartphones. The Medication Adherence Rating Scale and the Rogers’ Empowerment questionnaires were filled out. The 17-item Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, the Young Mania Rating Scale and the Functional (...) Assessment Short Test were clinically rated. Data were collected multiple times per patient. The present study represents exploratory pooled reanalyses of data collected as part of two randomised controlled trials. Findings During the study 90.50% of the days were evaluated as ‘medication taken’, 6.91% as ‘medication taken with changes’ and 2.59% as ‘medication not taken’. Adherence to medication measured via smartphones was valid compared with the MARS. Younger age and longer illness duration were significant predictors for non-adherence to medication. Decreased affective symptoms measured with smartphone-based patient-reported mood and clinical ratings as well as decreased empowerment were associated with non-adherence. Conclusions Smartphone-based monitoring of adherence to medication was valid compared with validated adherence questionnaire. Younger age and longer illness duration were predictors for non-adherence. Increased empowerment was associated with adherence. Clinical implications Using smartphones for empowerment of adherence using patient-reported measures may be helpful in everyday clinical settings. Trial registration number NCT01446406 and NCT02221336. (shrink)

The pace of change and, indeed, the sheer number of clinical ethics committees has accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Committees were formed to support healthcare professionals and to operationalise, interpret and compensate for gaps in national and professional guidance. But as the role of clinical ethics support becomes more prominent and visible, it becomes ever more important to address gaps in the support structure and misconceptions as to role and remit. The recent case of Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children (...) NHS Foundation Trust v MX, FX and X, [21]–[23] and [58]) has highlighted the importance of patient/family representation at clinical ethics committee meetings. The court viewed these meetings as making decisions about such treatment. We argue that this misunderstands the role of ethics support, with treatment decisions remaining with the clinical team and those providing their consent. The considered review by clinical ethics committees of the moral issues surrounding complex treatment decisions is not a matter of determining a single ethical course of action. In this article, we consider current legal understandings of clinical ethics committees, explore current concepts of ethics support and suggest how they may evolve, considering the various mechanisms of the inclusion of patients and their representatives in ethics meetings which is not standard in the UK. (shrink)

Professional control in the selection of treatment options for patients is changing. In light of social and legal developments emphasising patient choice and autonomy, and restricting medical paternalism and judicial deference, this article examines how far patients and families can demand NHS treatment in England and Wales. It considers situations where the patient is an adult with capacity, an adult lacking capacity and a child. In all three cases, there is judicial support for professional autonomy, but there are also inconsistencies (...) that have potential to elevate the importance of patient and family preferences. In combination, they may be perceived by healthcare professionals as an obligation to follow patient preferences, even where doing so conflicts with other professional obligations. It is argued that a more nuanced approach to shared decision-making could help clarify the boundaries of decision-making responsibility. (shrink)

When consent to medical treatment is described as ‘valid’, it might simply mean that it has a sound basis, or it could mean that it is legally valid. Where the two meanings are regularly interchanged, however, it can lead to aspects of the sound basis or the legal requirements being neglected. This article looks at how the term is used in a range of guidance on consent to treatment and argues for consistency.

Consider manipulation in which one agent, avoiding force, threat, or fraud mobilizes some non-concern motive of another so as to induce this other to behave or move differently than she would otherwise have behaved or moved, given her circumstances and her initial ranking of concerns. As an instance, imagine that I get us to miss the opening of a play that I have grudgingly agreed to attend by engaging your sublimated compulsive tendency to check the stove when we are halfway (...) to the theatre. Such motive manipulation is, I take it, widely regarded as morally worrisome. If it really is morally worrisome, then we should be able to explain adequately why it is so. But existing condemnations of manipulation come up short in this regard. In this paper, I develop and defend a more plausible account of the moral status of this phenomenon. (shrink)

Uncertainty around the role ‘super-spreaders’ play in the transmission and escalation of infectious disease is compounded by its broad and vague definition. It is a term that has been much used in relation to COVID-19, particularly in social media. On its widest definition, it refers to a propensity to infect a larger than average number of people. Given the biological, behavioural and environmental variables relevant to infectivity, this might be pertinent to almost any infected individual who is not physically isolated (...) from others. Nor is the term confined to individuals with a propensity to spread infectious disease: it can potentially be used to describe events, policies or settings. This article explores the use of the term and considers circumstances in which the wide definition can be problematic. One problem is that it can lead to undeserved apportionment of moral blame to alleged super-spreaders. Another is that it can detract from scientific investigation of the heterogeneity of COVID-19 transmission. The author calls for a clearer epidemiological definition. (shrink)

The attachment for download here merely references my 5,500-word final and extended article, criticising those who seek to justify Israeli attacks on Gaza. The article is published online by Daily Philosophy, 5th January 2024, link shown below. -/- After a background of facts (probably well-known by readers concerned about the matters), the article examines typical arguments much used in the media as attempts to justify Israel’s determined destruction of Gaza, involving well over twenty thousand Palestinians killed, hundreds of thousands suffering (...) appalling injuries and two million having their lives and livihoods shattered. -/- I expose inconsistencies, poor reasoning and immoralities of those who support Israeli actions. There is a final touch of Kant and Nietzsche - and use of the saying attributed to Jesus: For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? (shrink)

In his short life, Alan Turing (1912-1954) made foundational contributions to philosophy, mathematics, biology, artificial intelligence, and computer science. He, as much as anyone, invented and showed how to program the digital electronic computer. From September, 1939, his work on computation was war-driven and brutally practical. He developed high speed computing devices needed to decipher German Enigma Machine messages to and from U-boats, countering the most serious threat by far to Britain..

This paper examines the UK’s response to a recent European Clinical Trials Directive, namely the Department of Health, Central Office for Research Ethics Committee guidance, Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees. The revisions have been long awaited by researchers and research ethics committee members alike. They substantially reform the ethical review system in the UK. We examine the new arrangements and argue that though they go a long way toward addressing the uncertainty surrounding ethics committee function, the system favours (...) the facilitation of research over the protection of the dignity and welfare of research participants. (shrink)

Thinking with Literature offers a succinct introduction to a cognitive literary criticsm, broad in scope but focusing on a particular cluster of approaches, some of which have so far been little used. Explanatory chapters and sections alternate with close readings of literary texts from a wide range of different periods and genres. The literary readings are not mere 'examples' of cognitive topics, still less of hypotheses in cognitive science: the central argument is that cognitive criticism must draw its primary energies (...) from the complexities of literature itself. The main objective of the book is to induce a change of perspective in the reader: to see the point, and the extreme interest, of adopting a cognitive approach to literary criticism. (shrink)

This paper discusses the use of the Milgram obedience experiments and the Tuskegee syphilis study in the bioethical literature. The two studies are presented and a variety of uses of them identified and discussed. It is argued that the use of these studies as paradigms of problematic research relies on a reduction of their complexity. What is discussed is thus often constructions of these studies that are closer to hypothetical examples than to the real studies.

A brief history of affective responses to AI.

There is an international consensus that medical research involving humans should only be undertaken in accordance with ethical principles. Paradoxically though, there is no consensus over the kinds of activities that constitute research and should be subject to review. In the UK and elsewhere, research requiring review is distinguished from clinical audit. Unfortunately the two activities are not always easy to differentiate from one another. Moreover, as the volume of audit increases and becomes more formal in response to the demand (...) for evidence-based practice in medicine, the overlap between research and audit grows more acute. Arguably, similar ethical standards and systems for ensuring that those standards are met should be applied regardless of whether or not a project is classified as research or audit. At a time when the research ethics review system in the UK is undergoing significant reform it is important that the opportunity is not missed to address the longstanding research-audit problem. We discuss suggestions for further reform that addresses this issue. (shrink)

This is an accessible summary - online, The Well - 1st September 2023 - of concerns raised in my book 'The Myths We Live By' and my latest, 'How To Think Like a Philosopher: Scholars, Dreamers and Sages Who Can Teach Us How to Live'. -/- Herewith as PDF.

A brief review of my How To Think Like a Philosopher, drawing attention to the valuable thinking of David Hume and some Scottish connections.

The three puzzles here considered are shown to have a common structure. And in each, an agent is thrust into a cleverly contrived deliberatively unstable situation. The paper advocates a resolutely Pyrrhonian abandonment of the futile reasoning in which the agent is trapped and advocates an alternative strategy for escape.

Does which side of the fence we are on determine our perceptions of justice? Philosopher Eric M. Cave argues that rules of justice would benefit the members of a community little if individuals lacked an effective desire to comply with these rules. However, sometimes a sense of justice appears to do no more than to limit what individuals can do in pursuit of their own ends. Cave presents a provocative vehicle for self-examination.

Recently, the US has joined many European jurisdictions in extending civil marriage to same sex as well as different sex dyads. Many liberals regard this as a development worth entrenching. But a prominent recent liberal challenge to civil marriage claims otherwise. According to this challenge, by defining and conferring civil marriage, the state privileges some relationships over others that serve equally well the important liberal goal of fostering effective liberal citizenship, in violation of a prominent interpretation of the doctrine of (...) state neutrality. Theorists who press this challenge, such as Elizabeth Brake and Tamara Metz, argue that it can be met effectively only by dismantling civil marriage and replacing it with more inclusive state-maintained arrangements. So far, prominent responses to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage have focused on the special value of either the relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, or the special value of civil marriage itself. In this article, I develop an alternative reply to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage, one focusing instead on the special vulnerabilities of some of the liberally valuable relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, amorous caregiving dyads. (shrink)

Certain paradoxes set us reeling endlessly. In surprise examination paradoxes, pupils' reasonings lead them to reel between expecting an examination and expecting none. With Newcomb's puzzle, choosers reel between reasoning in favour of choosing just one box and choosing two. The paradoxes demand an answer to what it is rational to believe or do. Highlighting other reelings and puzzles, this paper shows that the paradoxes should come as no surprise. The paradoxes demand an end to our reasoning when the conditions (...) they set ensure no end. They equivocate between, so to speak, reasoning in heaven and reasoning on earth; and, on the conditions set, not even an infinite god could reach a conclusion. (shrink)

Let the marriage bond be the set of extralegal obligations to one another that individuals acquire in getting married. And let a conception of the marriage bond be an account of the nature and content of these. Here, I argue that the conception of this bond dominant among us is uncongenial to romantic love among individuals of a certain psychological type. Then, after articulating a conception more congenial to romantic love among such individuals, I argue that if we wish to (...) make marriage safer for love, we should make room in our thinking and practice for this conception, embracing a form of marital pluralism. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to provide overview of the punishment of war crimes. It considers first the rationale of the law of war, the identification and scope of war crimes, and proceeds to consider the justification of punishing war crimes, arguing for a consequentialist view with side-constraints. It then considers the alternative of reconciliation.

Quantitative utilitarianism demands equal treatment of human and nonhuman animals where there are no relevant differences between them. A difference is relevant only if it excludes the animal from suffering evil if it is treated differently. Quantitative utilitarianism cannot, however, resolve conflicts of interest nor prove that painless killing of animals is morally wrong. For this we need a higher qualitativegood. I suggest Care, as Heidegger understands it, is such a good, and that it is the essence not only of (...) human, but of nonhuman animaI Dasein as well. Because animals care, we are morally obliged to desist from killing them, even painlessly. (shrink)

Successful jokes involve incongruities, but not any incongruity will do—not, for example, one as blatantly bare as an explicit instance of the form p.~p. Substitution in such is no secure generator of fun; and stand-up comedians would be lucky to escape with their lives, if—at the Glasgow Empire on a Saturday night—they delivered one-liners such as “She came from Dungeness and not from Dungeness.” Build-up context, alcohol level, and delivery skills—and it is not impossible that any line, even the p.~p (...) instance, could secure some laughs; but laughs alone need indicate no joke. At a level virtually platitudinous, jokes require an incongruity—a tension—between expectations typically aroused by initial words and resultant sabotaging revelations. We could, no doubt, be a species that laughed at every expressed contradiction, yet one for which banana skins, sexual spasms, and implied inconsistencies raised no flicker. Which particular sayings generate incongruities and not mere laughter is no empirical matter, but one of logic, logic taken sufficiently widely to include semantics and pragmatics. These incongruities, with the masking, the movement and unmasking—the teasing, stripping, and exposed sabotage—are to be found within many philosophical paradoxes as well as within jokes. Laying bare the jokes’ mechanisms can help to resolve such paradoxes. Joking matter itself need be no joking matter; and as jokes and paradoxes rely upon veiled incongruities, an all-seeing god would see no joke and meet no paradox. (shrink)

This commentary is a response to ‘More than Skin Deep’ by Shelley M. Park, and a development of our own 2020 paper ‘The Whiteness of AI’. We aim to explain how representations of AI can be varied in one sense, whilst not being diverse. We argue that Whiteness’s claim to universal humanity permits a broad range of roles to White humans and White-presenting machines, whilst assigning a much narrower range of stereotypical roles to people of colour. Because the attributes of (...) AI in the popular imagination, such as intelligence, power and passing as human, are associated by the White racial frame with Whiteness, AI is cast predominantly as White. Following Sparrow, we suggest this presents a dilemma for those creating or representing AI. We discuss three possible solutions: avoiding anthropomorphisation, explicitly critiquing racial role-typing, and representing powerful AI as non-White. (shrink)

In cases where the best interests of the child are disputed or finely balanced, Clinical Ethics Committees (CECs) can provide a valuable source of advice to clinicians and trusts on the pertinent ethical dimensions. Recent judicial cases have criticised the lack of formalised guidance and inconsistency in the involvement of parents in CEC deliberations. In Manchester University NHS FT v Verden [2022], Arbuthnot J set out important procedural guidance as to how parental involvement in CEC deliberations might be managed. She (...) also confirmed substantive guidance on the role of parental views in determining the child’s best interests. We agree that it is good practice to ensure that the patient voice is heard in ethics processes, but how that is achieved is controversial. Surely it is best that what matters most to a patient and their family, whether facts or values, is conveyed directly to those considering the moral issues involved, rather than via a prism of another party. The approach suggested in theVerdencase has much in common with the process used by our CEC. In this article, we commend Arbuthnot J’s approach, provide an example of its effective operation and consider what it might mean for ethics processes. (shrink)

Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments.

Among human beings, sexual pursuit takes many forms. Some forms, like courtship, are morally innocuous. Other forms, like rape, are categorically immoral. Still other forms are provisionally immoral. Such forms of sexual pursuit involve a wrongful element sufficient to render them wrongful on balance provided that this wrongful element is not counterbalanced by even more important competing moral considerations. Here my focus is a particular form of provisionally immoral sexual pursuit, unsavory sexual seduction , or unsavory seduction for short.

Humanists acknowledge the absolute finality of death: it is annihilation. One may question whether sense can be made of life after death. Even if sense can be made, one may ask what evidence exists to justify belief that there is any such life. With the rejection of eternal life, and hence any risk of eternal damnation, humanists may argue that there is nothing to fear in death. One could argue against Lucretius that if there were to be the required similarity (...) between pre‐birth and post‐death non‐existence, then he/she should regret the lack of pre‐birth existence rather than overcome unhappiness at the lack of post‐death existence. There are numerous things that matter, and that mattering is not undermined by death as annihilation. Human mortality places a block on eternal life, but not on eternities that may yet give meaning to our lives. (shrink)

Peter Cave gets to grips with maths, God and the meaning of life.

Arguing about Judaism differs from other introductions to Judaism. It is unique, not solely in its engaging dialogues between a Reform rabbi and a humanist, atheist philosopher, but also in its presentation of and challenges to the fundamental religious beliefs of the Jewish heritage and their relevance to today's Jewish community. The dialogues contain both Jewish narratives and philosophical responses, with topics ranging from the nature of God to controversies over sexual relations, animal welfare and the environment -- from antisemitism (...) to the state of Israel and Zionism. Although the rabbi and philosopher argue strongly, clearly enjoying the cut and thrust of debate, they do so with sensitivity, charm and respect, revealing the rich intricacies of the Jewish religion and contemporary Jewish life. While essential reading for those studying Judaism and Jewish history, the book aims to stimulate debate more generally amongst Jews and non-Jews, the religious and the atheist -- all those with a general interest in religion and philosophy. (shrink)

Often we have coarsely grained knowledge: for example, we know about how many people are present. In possessing such knowledge, we also have finer grained knowledge of what is not: there certainly is nothing like that number of people here. The combination of such knowledge types, through sorites, generates contradiction and bafflement. This paper seeks to resolve the bafflement: it rejects a Timothy Williamson proposal, introduces muddle numbers and inference gaps, and shows how the different grains of knowledge do not (...) always meet. In so doing, the paper identifies a distinctive first‐person inferring. (shrink)