This paper aims to explore the relationship between the necessity predicate and the truth predicate by comparing two possible-world interpretations. The first interpretation, proposed by Halbach et al. (J Philos Log 32(2):179–223, 2003), is for the necessity predicate, and the second, proposed by Hsiung (Stud Log 91(2):239–271, 2009), is for the truth predicate. To achieve this goal, we examine the connections and differences between paradoxical sentences that involve either the necessity predicate or the truth predicate. A primary (...) connection is established through two translations that change only one of the predicates to the other while keeping everything else unchanged. We prove that in bijective frames, a set of sentences that contains one of the two semantic predicates has the same paradoxicality as the corresponding set of sentences that contains the other predicate obtained through translation. However, there are substantial differences as well. First, the necessity predicate and the truth predicate, under the two interpretations, cannot be defined by each other. Moreover, for sentences that involve only the truth predicate, their paradoxicality is preserved under the homomorphisms of frames. For sentences containing the necessity predicate, their paradoxicality is preserved under bounded morphisms, but none of these sentences can have their paradoxicality preserved under the extension of frames. Finally, we also show that paradoxical sentences involving the necessity predicate and those involving the truth predicate differ significantly in terms of mirror symmetry, circularity dependence, and frame compactness. (shrink)

The doctrine of proportionality has received sustained attention from comparative constitutional scholars. Yet it is an area where courts, and scholars, have made limited use of empirical or inter-disciplinary approaches to constitutional comparison. The article calls for a change in this practice as part of a broader call for greater dialogue between scholars and practitioners of conceptual and more empirical forms of constitutional comparison.

My topic in this paper is the relationships of metaphysical priority which might hold between the different alethic modal statuses—necessity, contingency, possibility and impossibility. In particular, I am interested in exploring the view that the necessity of necessities is ungrounded while the contingency of contingencies is grounded—a scenario I call ‘necessity first’. I will explicate and scrutinize the contrast between necessity first and its ‘contingency first’ contrary, and then compare both views with ‘multimodal’ and ‘amodal’ alternatives, (...) drawing on David Lewis’s modal realism and Barbara Vetter’s potentialism as example cases. I will then defend the necessity-first point of view from a reversed version of Blackburn’s classic dilemma against theories of the source of necessity. (shrink)

John Duns Scotus distinguished the ‘convertible’ transcendentals, from ‘disjunctive’ transcendental pairs The latter are mutually exclusive pairs that together cover all of being. This paper investigates the distinctive modal metaphysical account based on the necessary-contingent pair of disjunctive transcendentals, developed by Scotus in approaching the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents. Although Scotus commented several times on this problem, only in his Reportatio did he explicitly add a succinct exposition distinguishing between two kinds of contingency and two kinds of (...) necessity. This double understanding of the necessary-contingent pair is first of all systematically and schematically presented in the paper. Subsequently, instead of continuing with the problem of divine foreknowledge as such, the implications of this Scotist framework for an adequate metaphysical understanding of the human will and its freedom will be drawn out. Finally, these schemes are compared to recent literature on the central role of contingency in Scotus’s thought, especially to the research of A. Vos on synchronic contingency and J. Söder on operative contingency. (shrink)

Over the last several years, a number of philosophers have advanced formal versions of certain traditional arguments for the incompatibility of human freedom with causal determinism and for the incompatibility of human freedom with infallible divine foreknowledge. Common to all of these is some form of a principle governing the transfer of a species of alethic necessity (TPN). More recently, a few clear and compelling counterexamples to TNP (and a variant of it) have begun to surface in the literature. (...) These attacks on TNP are developed along somewhat different lines (and were apparently worked out independently of each other). I will show that despite the differences in presentation, however, all of the compelling counterexamples that have been offered turn on a common (and overlooked) basic feature. Once this feature is recognized, I suggest, one is naturally led to restrict the principle in a way that renders it immune to these counterexamples. (I further argue that the restriction I suggest has independent justification.) I then go on to consider two further attempts to show the invalidity of TNP for power necessity, ones that would not be forestalled by my restriction on TNP, and I argue that they are unsuccessful. In a final section, I compare my modified version of TNP for power necessity with a principle suggested in Ginet (1990). (shrink)

The ability to compare possibilities and designate some as ‘better’ than others is a fundamental aspect of our use of modals and propositional attitude verbs. This article aims to support a proposal by Sloman that certain modal expressions, in particular, ought, in fact have a more pronounced comparative backbone than others . The connection between ‘ought’ and ‘better’ is supported by linguistic data and a proposal is advanced for modeling ideals in a way that makes room for non-comparative, (...) strong, priority-type necessity. (shrink)

The world can be divided between atheism and theism, a division that also fuels its social conflicts, moral outlook, and social evolution. If not for the question of why God did not create everything in peace, harmony, and reconciliation, we might not have seen this division. Atheism thrives and lives on the consideration of a merciful God allowing suffering, hardship, and punishment while theism on the belief in divine tests practiced through higher values. However, the arguments for theism and atheism (...) are still ongoing while affecting humanity at large. Even though theism is not as strong globally as it was at some time in the past, it still has a considerable influence in many major areas of the world. Islamic theism is a major influence driving the politics and addressing social conflicts in the Middle East and many other parts of the world. This discussion analyses both Islamic theism and atheism comparatively arguing for Islamic theism and against atheism. As atheism has no authoritative sources like Islamic theism has in the Quran and Hadith the atheistic perspectives are largely dependent upon its leading proponents and history. The discussion finds atheism is great for those who have wealth, resources, and influence while theism is best suited to make positive changes for humanity as a whole. Atheism is then a luxury while theism is a necessity. The reader is strongly urged to consider the footnotes for greater understanding. (shrink)

Background In this study, we examined the ethical implications of Egypt’s new clinical trial law, employing the ethical framework proposed by Emanuel et al. and comparing it to various national and supranational laws. This analysis is crucial as Egypt, considered a high-growth pharmaceutical market, has become an attractive location for clinical trials, offering insights into the ethical implementation of bioethical regulations in a large population country with a robust healthcare infrastructure and predominantly treatment-naïve patients. Methods We conducted a comparative (...) analysis of Egyptian law with regulations from Sweden and France, including the EU Clinical Trials Regulation, considering ethical human subject research criteria, and used a directed approach to qualitative content analysis to examine the laws and regulations. This study involved extensive peer scrutiny, frequent debriefing sessions, and collaboration with legal experts with relevant international legal expertise to ensure rigorous analysis and interpretation of the laws. Results On the rating of the seven different principles (social and scientific values, scientific validity, fair selection of participants, risk-benefit ratio, independent review, informed consent and respect for participants) Egypt, France, and EU regulations had comparable scores. Specific principles (Social Value, Scientific Value, and Fair selection of participants) were challenging to directly identify due to certain regulations embodying 'implicit' principles more than explicitly stated ones. Conclusion The analysis underscores Egypt's alignment with internationally recognized ethical principles, as outlined by Emanuel et al., through its comparison with French, Swedish, and EU regulations, emphasizing the critical need for Egypt to continuously refine its ethical regulations to safeguard participant protection and research integrity. Key issues identified include the necessity to clarify and standardize the concept of social value in research, alongside concerns regarding the expertise and impartiality of ethical review boards, pointing towards a broader agenda for enhancing research ethics in Egypt and beyond. (shrink)

Temporal necessity and the subjunctive conditional appear to be related by the principle of Past Predominance, according to which past similarities and differences take priority over future similarities and differences in determining the comparative similarity of alternative possible histories with respect to the present moment. R. H. Thomason and Anil Gupta have formalized Past Predominance in a semantics that combines selection functions with branching time; in this paper I show that Past Predominance can be formalized and axiomatized using (...) ordinary possible worlds semantics (without branching time). (shrink)

The point of the present paper is to draw attention to some interesting similarities, as well as differences, between the approaches to the logic of noncontingency of Evgeni Zolin and of Claudio Pizzi. Though neither of them refers to the work of the other, each is concerned with the definability of a (normally behaving, though not in general truth-implying) notion of necessity in terms of noncontingency, standard boolean connectives and additional but non-modal expressive resources. The notion of definability involved (...) is different in the two cases (‘external’ for Zolin, ‘internal’ for Pizzi), as are the additional resources: infinitary conjunction in the case of Zolin, and for Pizzi, first, propositional quantification, and then, later, most ingeniously, the use of a propositional constant. As well as surveying and comparing of the work of these authors, the discussion includes some some novelties, such as the confirmation of a conjecture of Zolin’s (Theorem 2.7). (shrink)

This essay investigates the concluding myth of Plato’s Republic, as well as the section on anankē and the chōra in the Timaeus, to demonstrate that the maternal figure of Necessity (Anankē), appearing in the myth of Er as the ground of logos, serves as a fecund site for an engagement with the question of sexual difference in Plato’s works. Feminist thinkers have long noted that the image of the originary, powerful mother in ancient myth works as an ambivalent surface (...) for the projection of masculine desires and anxieties, fantasies and transferential projections. In this essay, I draw on both Platonic and feminist scholarship to examine the imaginal architectonics of the scene of Necessity in the myth of Er. By comparing this maternal figuration of anankē with its appearance in the Timaeus alongside the errant, maternal chōra, I argue that the conclusion of the Republic invites a feminist mythmaking that can generatively engage debates around language and sexual difference in the works of Plato. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBased on the case of Rosa, a nine‐year‐old girl who was denied a therapeutic abortion, this article analyzes the role played by the social in medical practice. For that purpose, it compares the different application of two similar pieces of legislation in Costa Rica, where both the practice of abortion and sterilization are restricted to the protection of health and life by the Penal Code. As a concept subject to interpretation, a broad conception of medical necessity could enable an (...) ample use of the therapeutic exception and a liberal use of both surgeries. The practice of therapeutic sterilization has been generalized in Costa Rica and has become the legitimate way to distribute contraceptive sterilization. In contrast, therapeutic abortion is very rarely practiced. The analysis carried out proposes that it is the difference in social acceptance of abortion and sterilization that explains the different use that doctors, as gatekeepers of social morality, make of medical necessity. (shrink)

Online data collection with infants raises special opportunities and challenges for developmental research. One of the most prevalent methods in infancy research is eye-tracking, which has been widely applied in laboratory settings to assess cognitive development. Technological advances now allow conducting eye-tracking online with various populations, including infants. However, the accuracy and reliability of online infant eye-tracking remain to be comprehensively evaluated. No research to date has directly compared webcam-based and in-lab eye-tracking data from infants, similarly to data from adults. (...) The present study provides a direct comparison of in-lab and webcam-based eye-tracking data from infants who completed an identical looking time paradigm in two different settings. We assessed 4-6-month-old infants in an eye-tracking task that measured the detection of audio-visual asynchrony. Webcam-based and in-lab eye-tracking data were compared on eye-tracking and video data quality, infants’ viewing behavior, and experimental effects. Results revealed no differences between the in-lab and online setting in the frequency of technical issues and participant attrition rates. Video data quality was comparable between settings in terms of completeness and brightness, despite lower frame rate and resolution online. Eye-tracking data quality was higher in the laboratory than online, except in case of relative sample loss. Gaze data quantity recorded by eye-tracking was significantly lower than by video in both settings. In valid trials, eye-tracking and video data captured infants’ viewing behavior uniformly, irrespective of setting. Despite the common challenges of infant eye-tracking across experimental settings, our results point toward the necessity to further improve the precision of online eye-tracking with infants. Taken together, online eye-tracking is a promising tool to assess infants’ gaze behavior but requires careful data quality control. The demographic composition of both samples differed from the generic population on caregiver education: our samples comprised caregivers with higher-than-average education levels, challenging the notion that online studies will per se reach more diverse populations. (shrink)

The use of placebo in clinical trials has been repeatedly challenged as being unacceptable from an ethical point of view. The present paper responds to this criticism by taking up the issue in the light of the pertinent provisions of the Helsinki Declaration. Examples from different therapeutic areas are given that highlight the importance of placebo in situations in which its use is acceptable according to the Declaration. Particular emphasis is given to the question of active control trials, which, under (...) conditions of low assay sensitivity, may become an ethically less acceptable approach than the use of a placebo control. (shrink)

The critics in this volume raise several important challenges to the modal normativist position developed in Norms and Necessity, including whether the relation I claim holds between semantic rules and necessity claims generates spurious claims of metaphysical necessity, whether the view is circular (implicitly relying on a more 'robust' form of modal realism), and whether it conflicts with truth-conditional semantics. They also raise probing questions about how it compares to other views of modality, including a Lewisian view (...) and an essentialist view. In these replies, I respond to these challenges in ways that precisify the relevant understanding of ‘semantic rules' and the forms they can take, that make clearer the direction of explanation in modal normativism in ways that show the view doesn't rely on a more ‘robust’ form of modal realism, and that give reason for thinking that there is actually no conflict between modal normativism and truth-conditional semantics. I also aim to give a fuller assessment of how it compares to other approaches to modality, including an essentialist approach. (shrink)

It seems to me that a more significant evaluation of the rationalists' work is possible if we focus attention on the differences in their treatments of the fundamental philosophical problems of reason and necessity. This is so, I believe, because we can find relevant connections between their treatment of these problems, their treatment of metaphysical problems, and current treatments of similar problems. Such an inquiry will reveal both a clearer notion of the rationalists' own conception of the proper structure (...) for philosophy, and of the limitations of the philosophic enterprise as they conceived it. This result can be compared significantly to the current conceptions of the limitations of philosophy. (shrink)

Comparative studies between Latin America and Asia can be productive if they reflect the structural necessities based on history and geopolitics that these regions have experienced in relation to the western countries since the nineteenth century. These non-western regions have developed themselves in a parallel way without direct communication with each other. Stephanie Rivera Berruz and Leah Kalmanson detect this parallelism precisely and sketch a possible productivity of this new area. This book serves as a starting point for further (...) studies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:47. Hausman on Certainty and Necessity in Hume Professor Hausman in the course of a painstaking and often illuminating examination of my paper "Hume on Intuitive and Demonstrative Inference" fortunately has occasion to make some positive suggestions of his own regarding the best way to interpret Hume's philosophy. One of the most interesting and provocative of these suggestions is that we should discount Hume's claim to have found (...) an impression of reflection which is at the same time one of necessity. Rather, we should regard the impression of reflection in question as one of certainty. Such a manner of proceeding would, moreover, in Hausman' s view have the advantage öf explaining why we all believe that causal connections are necessary when in fact they are not. For the same impression of certainty, as Hausman envisages it, will be generated by both the cognitive act of comparing two relata wherein genuine necessity is reflected and the determination of an idea by a preceding impression wherein causal inference consists and wherein genuine necessity plays no role. But how can Hausman be so sure that they will be the same? For he insists that the cognitive act of comparing two relata is radically different from the determination of an idea by a preceding impression. Why then should we expect that observation of the two should generate comparable feelings of certainty? And if they do not generate comparable feelings of certainty what is the purpose served by postulating them? Moreover, I use the term "postulating" advisedly: by Hausman' s own admission there is little or no textual evidence for their presence in Hume's theory of causal inference. Hausman' s purpose would be no worse served - at least incoherence would be avoided - by emphasizing what a cognitive act of comparing two relata and a determination of an idea by a preceding impression have in common as opposed to what distinguishes them. They have, moreover, more in 48. common than he seems to think. For, while the one requires reflection according to Hume and the other does not, they 2 both involve a determination of the mind. Nor is Hume's use of the concept of intuition in connection with the former incompatible with such a determination, as Hausman seems to think. On the contrary, it implies it. For intuition as Hume understands it seems to pertain to immediate inference. And such inferences consist as far as he is concerned in determinations of the mind to move from one 3 idea to a second one. Indeed, it is just the supposed infallibility of such determinations that allows him to distinguish them from the more haphazard principles of as4 sociation. A cognitive act of comparing two relata and a determination of an idea by a preceding impression are sufficiently alike, then, to explain why we all believe that causal connections are necessary when in fact they are not. This does not mean, of course, that necessity need reside in such a cognitive act of comparing. As a matter cf fact, as we shall see in a moment, this is not the view that Hume usually takes of the matter. But a cognitive act of comparing, as we shall also see in a moment, is close enough to the area in which necessity does reside to allow Hume to explain in the manner indicated how our mistaken belief about causal connections arises. Hausman' s comparable feelings of certainty are not required. Nor has Occam's razor finished cutting. More specifically, the idea of real necessity of which Hausman speaks could have, as far as I can see, no role to play in Hume's philosophy which is not already played by the cognitive act of comparing two relata. There is, moreover, no such idea anymore than there is any idea of causal necessity. The "idea of entities in a particular sort of relation" presumably like resemblance will not do. For resemblance is not necessity. And to say as Hausman does that "it is because we can read off a resemblance, say, that we pronounce the relationship necessary" is to state a problem, not to 49.??. 6 solve it. What then is the solution? It seems... (shrink)

This research suggests a comparison between two tasks to evaluate oral communication strategies (CSs) through storytelling and interview and to compare the use of CSs between high and low proficient students. The results of the storytelling and oral interview are compared to check if CSs vary with the task and what tasks are better for each of the selected CSs. A number of 60 Spanish learners of English participated in this investigation, and a total of 232 protocols were analysed to (...) obtain the results. The main results are that CSs vary to adapt to task demands and that the frequency and type of CSs used by the students are affected by the level of proficiency of the students. This highlights the importance of selecting the appropriate task for the evaluation to be significant and the necessity to adapt the syllabus to include elements that introduce some productive CSs. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of John Buridan's (c.1300-c.1361) conception of modalities. Modal concepts - concepts of necessity, possibility, impossibility, and contingency - describe the ways in which things could and could not be otherwise. These concepts became notoriously central for philosophical discourse in the late Middle Ages. In recent years, Buridan's philosophy and modal theory have received sophisticated scholarly attention. The main contribution of the dissertation is to show new ways in which Buridan's modal theory is embedded in (...) its contextual practical aims, as providing methods for argumentation schemes and analysis used in his natural philosophy and metaphysics. The dissertation is divided into two parts. In Part I, I conduct a detailed analysis of Buridan's account of varieties of modality in logical contexts. In Chapter 2, I show that Buridan distinguishes between broad and restricted forms of necessity in his treatment of logical consequence. Moreover, I show how the distinction between these forms of necessity underpins his modal syllogistics. I argue in Chapter 3 that Buridan acknowledged a variety of modal concepts that are distinguished as a matter of degree. I identify the main modal concepts Buridan's theory reckons with, show how he motivates the distinctions among them, and clarify how they are logically related. Part II turns to applications of Buridan's modal analyses to natural philosophy. In Chapter 4, I address the relationship between necessity with sempiternal truth in Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo and compare Buridan's treatment of a key passage in that commentary with the treatment by John of Jandun (c. 1285-1328), a near-contemporary master of arts at Paris. Chapter 5 focuses on Buridan's account of the relationship between power-based concepts of modality and his modal semantics. Chapter 6 describes Buridan's account of contingency in the Physics, and sets Buridan's account of the relationship between forms of contingency and chance against the background of a received debate between Avicenna's and Averroes' views on the subject. Finally, in Chapter 7, I analyse some important applications of Buridan's distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility in physical contexts. I conclude this section by showing how Buridan considered merely conceivable possibilities useful in natural philosophy, and draw further conclusions for investigating the connections between logic and natural philosophy in the later Middle Ages. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Comparative Analysis of Shinran's Shinjin and Calvin's FaithKenneth D. LeeAlthough in Shinran: An Introduction to His Thought, Ueda and Hirota prefer the translation of the term "Shinjin" as "entrusting" over the meaning"faith," the concept of Shinjin in Shinran still seems to echo some similar concepts that are reflected in the Christian notion of faith. In both traditions, the concept of Shinjin and faith is central in the salvific (...) and redemptive process of Amida and Jesus Christ, respectively. By advancing the teaching of the Absolute Reliance on Other-power (tariki) for salvation, Shinran brings to focus the importance of the practitioner's realization of Shinjin in order attain birth into the Pure Land. However, as we will discover from our comparative analysis, we will see that Shinran's Shinjin, though it may share some similar ideas with the Christian faith, particularly in the idea of the utter futility of beings to become saved by self-power (jiriki), is a concept that remains faithful to the Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness and the transcendence of duality. But interestingly, Shinran seems to de-emphasize the notion of emptiness in order to emphasize the necessity of dichotomous mental activity to bring the practitioner to realize his incapacity of attaining enlightenment by self-power and dependence on Other-power.Understanding the underlying process of Shinjin and faith involves understanding the tension between being and becoming vis-à-vis the state between the realization and the actualization of Shinjin or faith. For Shinran, the realization of Shinjin is just the beginning of one's birth into the Pure Land where one's evil karma becomes absorbed and purified in the ocean of Amida's purity. But the actualization of Shinjin, which begins upon the realization of Shinjin, involves a continual purification process of the practitioner's karmic evil until the practitioner reaches enlightenment. That is, through the realization of shinjin, the practitioner attains birth in the Pure Land, which begins the actualization process toward guaranteed enlightenment, but that realization of shinjin is not to be equated with enlightenment itself. Hence, throughout the whole process of realization and actualization, it seems important that the relationship between the practitioner and Amida Buddha be maintained by shinjin on the basis that the practitioner is totally dependent on the Other-power for the actualization of enlightenment since this is impossible through self-power by relying on Amida's compassion and fulfillment of the Vow. Hence, shinjin serves as the practitioner's vehicle for attaining "complete" enlightenment, since enlightenment [End Page 171] involves not an instantaneous but rather a continual process in which the process of purification of the practitioner's karmic residue is made complete as Amida's Vow becomes actualized.Similarly, faith also involves the simultaneous process of being and becoming. In Christian terms, this process can be explained in the notion of justification and sanctification. Justification is the act of divine forgiveness whereby, because of the sacrifice of Christ, an unworthy being no longer has his guilt reckoned against him. Accepting that pardon by faith, the sinner is renewed in his heart and reckoned as righteously justified. Whereas justification by faith is at once made complete at the very moment of the individual's realization, sanctification is a continual process in which the Holy Spirit imparts new life to the believer and he is released from the compulsive power of sin and guilt and is enabled to love God and to serve his neighbor. Furthermore, sanctification ("to make holy";cf. "to purify") is made complete at the Parousia, the second coming of Christ.The reason why this salvific process is at once complete and yet not complete is due to inherent sin or "evil karma" in humans. By the fact that one possesses a human body, not yet transformed in the Buddha body nor yet received an imperishable heavenly body, indicates that there remains an inherent "residue" of evil karma or original sin that needs to be accounted for. Consequently, this purification process is activated solely by the Other-power, which begins at the realization of shinjin or faith after the practitioner or believer surrenders his self-effort and relies upon the Other... (shrink)

Operators can be compared in at least two respects: expressive strength and deductive strength. Inspired by Hintikka’s treatment of question embedding verbs, the variations of noncontingency operator, and also the various combinations of modal operators and Boolean connectives, we propose a logic with strong noncontingency operator as the only primitive modality. The novel operator is deductively but not expressively stronger than both noncontingency operator and essence operator, and expressively but not deductively weaker than the necessity operator. The frame-definability power (...) of this new logic is in between standard modal logic and noncontingency logic. A notion of bisimulation is proposed to characterize this logic within standard modal logic and first-order logic. Axiomatizations over various frame classes are presented, among which the minimal logic is related to the treatment of an alternative semantics of the agreement operator proposed by Lloyd Humberstone. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a comparative evaluation of two types of “fundamental hope”, drawn from the writing of Rebecca Solnit and Rowan Williams respectively. Arguments can be found in both, I argue, for the foundations of a dispositional existential hope. Examining and comparing the differences between these accounts, I focus on the consequences implied for hope’s freedom and stability. I focus specifically on how these two accounts differ in their claims about the relationship between hope and necessity. (...) I argue that both Solnit and Williams base their claims for warranted fundamental hope on a sense of how reality is structured, taking this structure to provide grounds for a basic existential orientation that absolute despair is never the final word. For Solnit this structure is one of unpredictability; for Williams it is one of excess. While this investigation finds both accounts of fundamental hope to be plausible and insightful, I argue that Williams’s account is ultimately more satisfying on the grounds that it offers a realistic way of thinking about a hope necessitated by what it is responsive to, and more substantial in responding to what is necessary. (shrink)

This paper contrasts two views of the necessity to manifest the rational adequacy of argumentation. The view advanced by Ralph Johnson’s program for informal logic will be compared to one based on an account of obligations incurred in speech acts. Both views hold that arguers are commonly obliged to make it apparent that they are offering adequate support for their positions, but they differ in their accounts of the nature and scope of those obligations.

We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency, as originally proposed in van Benthem :36–41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of “obligation as weakest permission” from Anglberger et al. :807–827, 2015).

We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency, as originally proposed in van Benthem :36–41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of “obligation as weakest permission” from Anglberger et al. :807–827, 2015).

Weak ontic necessity is the ontic necessity expressed by “should” or “ought to”. An example of it is “I should be dead by now”. A feature of this necessity is that whether it holds is irrelevant to whether its underlying proposition holds. This necessity essentially involves time. This paper presents a logic for conditional weak ontic necessity in branching time. The logic’s language includes the next instant operator, the last instant operator, and the operator for (...) conditional weak ontic necessity. Formulas are evaluated at tuples consisting of a tree-based model, a context, a timeline, and an instant. A context is a set of ordered ontic laws determining expected timelines. When evaluating conditional weak ontic necessity, we first update the context with the antecedent, then check whether the consequent holds with respect to the updated context. We discuss some consequences of the formalization and compare it to some related work. We study the logic’s expressivity and axiomatize a special validity of it. (shrink)

This issue considers the ethics of a healthcare provider intervening into a patient’s genitalia, whether by means of cutting or surgery or by ‘mere’ touching/examination. Authors argue that the permissibility of such actions in the absence of a relevant medical emergency does not primarily turn on third-party judgments of expected levels of physical harm versus benefit, or on related notions such as extensiveness or invasiveness; rather, it turns on the patient’s own consent. To bolster this argument, attention is drawn to (...) the status of the genitals as ‘intimate’ anatomy—a status that is not fully erased by being in a medical context. In this editorial, we draw on the work of Talia Mae Bettcher on ‘intimate agency’ to explore why unconsented interventions into the genitalia may constitute a distinctive sort of personal violation compared to unconsented contact with various other parts of the human body. In their feature article, Marit van der Pijl and colleagues1 argue it is unethical for healthcare providers to perform unconsented episiotomies on persons in labour. In particular, they suggest that, outside of certain rare emergencies in which, for example, the person giving birth is incapacitated1 and the procedure cannot be delayed until consent becomes possible without introducing a significant risk of serious harm (call these ‘medically necessary’2 procedures), ‘presumed consent’ is the incorrect standard to apply. Instead, they stress that, especially when a proposed intervention involves a person’s genital, sexual or reproductive organs, the need to obtain their explicit consent in advance of proceeding must be honoured. As the authors note, the broader social significance of our genitalia—widely regarded as ‘private’ anatomy—is not erased by being in a medical context (see also 2–4). Boundaries must still be observed. Ethically, this ‘leaves a very small margin for error because invasion of these body parts …. (shrink)

Miguel de Unamuno’s theory of tragic sentiment is central to understanding his unique contributions to religious existential thought, which centers on the production of perhaps the most unavoidable and distinctive kind of human feeling. His theory is rightly attributed with being influenced by the gestational thought of, inter alios, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, but within these pages I should like to suggest a peculiar kinship between seemingly strange bedfellows, namely, between Unamuno and Immanuel Kant. Although the relationship between Unamuno and (...) Kant is conflicted, ranging from clear indications of influence to expressions of antipathy, there has been relatively little comparative research done on these two thinkers. Moreover, this scant literature has mainly explored connections between Unamuno’s existential thought and Kant’s first two Critiques. In these works, however, feelings are regarded as inclinations and thus receive no serious consideration. In what follows, I therefore juxtapose Unamuno’s analysis of tragic feeling in The Tragic Sense of Life with Kant’s discussion of the feelings of beauty and the sublime in the Critique of Judgment. (shrink)

Wittgenstein characterises ‘necessary truths’ as rules of representation that do not answer to reality. The invocation of rules of representation has led many to compare his work with Kant's. This comparison is illuminating, but it can also be misleading. Some go as far as casting Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a specie of transcendental idealism, an interpretation that continues to gather support despite scholars pointing to its limitations. To understand the temptation of this interpretation, attention must be paid to a distinction (...) Bernard Williams (1981) makes, echoing Kant, between empirical and transcendental idealism. Williams claims that the move to transcendental idealism is an effort to block empirical idealism. The latter, in this context, amounts to a scepticism regarding necessity and a denial of its objectivity. To show what is wrong with the transcendental interpretation, it is important to challenge the mistaken presumption that Wittgenstein's philosophy would otherwise lead to empirical idealism. The fundamental mistake common to both attributions is that they misunderstand the relation that obtains between our rules of representation and the contingent facts that condition those rules of representation. Once this relation has been clarified, Wittgenstein's philosophy can be understood as providing a genuine alternative to realism and idealism. (shrink)

Currently, many women who are expecting to give birth have no option but to attempt vaginal delivery, since access to elective planned caesarean sections (PCS) in the absence of what is deemed to constitute ‘clinical need’ is variable. In this paper, we argue that PCS should be routinely offered to women who are expecting to give birth, and that the risks and benefits of PCS as compared with planned vaginal delivery should be discussed with them. Currently, discussions of elective PCS (...) arise in the context of what are called ‘Maternal Request Caesarean Sections’ (MRCS) and there is a good deal of support for the position that women who request PCS without clinical indication should be provided with them. Our argument goes further than support for acceding to requests for MRCS: we submit that healthcare practitioners caring for women with uncomplicated pregnancies have a positive duty to inform them of the option of PCS as opposed to assuming vaginal delivery as a default, and to provide (or arrange for the provision of) PCS if that is the woman's preferred manner of delivery. (shrink)

In a previous issue of this journal, Professor R. A. Oakes compared Blanshard’s version of the entailment view of causality with Professor E. H. Madden’s version of the natural necessity view of causality [5]. Professor Oakes, after considering their alleged differences, asserted that these two views were the same. In the same issue, Professor Madden replied to Oakes’ remarks with a list of characteristics which allegedly distinguished his natural necessity view from the entailment view [3]. In what follows (...) I propose that Madden’s list of differentiating characteristics contains no essential, irreconcilable element which separates his view from Blanshard’s. Additionally, I will consider several features of the Madden and Blanshard views not considered by either Madden or Oakes in their articles which do in fact irreconcilably distinguish them. (shrink)

This paper combines various structures representing degrees of belief, degrees of disbelief, and degrees of non-belief (degrees of expectations) into a unified whole. The representation uses relations of comparative necessity and possibility, as well as non-probabilistic functions assigning numerical values of necessity and possibility. We define all-encompassing necessity structures which have weak expectations (mere hypotheses, guesses, conjectures, etc.) occupying the lowest ranks and very strong, ineradicable ('a priori') beliefs occupying the highest ranks. Structurally, there are no (...) differences from the top to the bottom. I argue that belief is a vague notion, and that thresholds for belief, if there are any, are context-dependent. (shrink)

Philosophers from anselm and scotus to hartshorne and malcolm have argued that the true claim that God is a necessary being implies that theism is a-Priori demonstrable. Philosophers such as hick, Penelhum, And geach have denied this, Contending 1) that god's necessity is factual, Indicating his eternal independence, Rather than logical, Indicating his existence in all possible worlds, And 2) that from the former nothing follows a-Priori about the truth or falsity of theism. I argue that factual and logical (...) necessity are conceptually inseparable, That God can be demonstrated to exist in all possible worlds. I take statements about the modalities of existence of things to be equivalent to statements about the modalities of instantiation of concepts, And argue that the concept God is necessarily instantiated, I.E., That God necessarily exists. The argument is compared and contrasted to a similar argument of hartshorne's. (shrink)

In this paper, I first address two facets that can play a role in initiating a paradigm shift in comparative studies of Heidegger and Chinese philosophy: One is the necessity of renovating methodology in studies of Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. The other is an adequate understanding of Heidegger’s own comportment toward East-West dialogue. In this connection I briefly respond to some criticisms of my book Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event. Then I stake out three (...) directions of re-configuration or reorientation entailed in such a paradigm shift. The first direction is concerned with a deconstruction of the notion of philosophy. The second direction is related to a critical and intercultural approach to Heidegger’s thinking. The third direction is connected with the overcoming of the unilateral direction in comparative studies. (shrink)

Medicine and astronomy were both scientific disciplines to which visual demonstration proved helpful, were taught in the universities, and were deeply influenced by humanism and by the development of print culture, but they did not use printed images in the same way. Thus, all the aspects of astronomical activity benefited from the accompaniment of printed images, whereas, even for anatomy, illustration does not seem to have been seen as a necessity in Renaissance medical books. To explore such a difference, (...) the chronology of the development of illustration in both fields (from the first illustrated incunabula to the mid-sixteenth century) is compared, and some explanations (economical, epistemological, cultural) are proposed and questioned. -/- . (shrink)

This chapter discusses how a comparative philosophical model can contribute to both substantive and procedural values in energy policy. We discuss the substantive values in the mainstream light-emitting diodes debate and Taylor Stone’s alternative plea for darkness. We also explore Value Sensitive Design as a procedural approach. We conclude that the comparative philosophical model of Ulrich Libbrecht can appropriately broaden the set of substantive values used in VSD. We discuss the values of ‘by-itself-so’ and ‘alter-intentionality’, which come with (...) the unforeseen necessity of accepting elements from other worldviews and of normativity in the procedural VSD approach. (shrink)

We present the system SUBSEXPL used for simulating and comparing explicit substitutions calculi. The system allows the manipulation of expressions of the λ-calculus and of three different styles of explicit substitutions: the λσ, the λse and the suspension calculus. A variation of the suspension calculus, which allows for combination of steps of β-contraction is included too. Implementations of the η-reduction are provided for each style. Other explicit substitutions calculi can be easily incorporated into the system due to its modular structure. (...) The uses of the system include: the visualization of the contractions of the λ-calculus in de Bruijn notation, and of guided one-step reductions as well as normalization via each of the associated substitution calculi. Many useful facilities are included: reductions can be easily recorded as text files, LATEX outputs can be generated and several examples for dealing with arithmetic operations and computational operators such as conditionals and repetitions in the λ-calculus are available. The system can be executed over Emacs using the x-symbol mode in such a way that λ-terms and terms of the explicit substitutions calculi are represented in its natural syntax avoiding the necessity of repeatedly generating LATEX outputs. The system has been of great help for systematically comparing explicit substitutions calculi, as well as for understanding properties of explicit substitutions such as the Preservation of Strong Normalization. In addition, it has been used for teaching basic properties of the λ-calculus such as: computational adequacy, the usefulness of de Bruijn's notation and of making explicit substitutions in real implementations. (shrink)

Weak ontic necessity is the ontic necessity expressed by “should/ought to” in English. An example of it is “I should be dead by now”. A feature of this necessity is that whether it holds at the present world is irrelevant to whether its prejacent holds at the present world. In this paper, by combining premise semantics and update semantics for conditionals, we present a logical theory for conditional weak ontic necessity based on context update. A context (...) is a set of ordered defaults, determining expected possible states of the present world. Sentences are evaluated with respect to contexts. When evaluating the conditional weak ontic necessity with respect to a context, we first update the context with the antecedent, then check whether the consequent holds with respect to the updated context. We compare this theory to some related works. The logic’s expressivity is studied. (shrink)

This paper draws attention to a proof of the necessity of identity given by Arthur Prior. In its simplicity, it is comparable to a proof of Quine's, popularised by Kripke, but it is slightly different. Prior's Polish notation is transcribed into a more familiar idiom. Prior's proof is followed by a proof of the necessity of difference, possibly the first such proof in the literature, which is also repeated here and transcribed. The paper concludes with a brief discussion (...) of Prior's views on identity and difference over time. (shrink)

Background In an increasingly globalized world, legal protocols related to health care that are both effective and culturally sensitive are paramount in providing excellent quality of care as well as protection for physicians tasked with decision making. Here, we analyze the current medicolegal status of brain death diagnosis with regard to end-of-life care in Japan, China, and South Korea from the perspectives of front-line health care workers. Main body Japan has legally wrestled with the concept of brain death for decades. (...) An inability to declare brain death without consent from family coupled with cultural expectations of family involvement in medical care is mirrored in other Confucian-based cultures and may complicate care for patients from these countries when traveling or working overseas. Within Japan, China, and South Korea, medicolegal shortcomings in the diagnosis of brain death act as a great source of stress for physicians and expose them to potential public and legal scorn. Here, we detail the medicolegal status of brain death diagnosis within Japan and compare it to China and South Korea to find common ground and elucidate the impact of legal ambiguity on health care workers. Conclusion The Confucian cultural foundation of multiple Asian countries raises common issues of family involvement with diagnosis and cultural considerations that must be met. Leveraging public education systems may increase awareness of brain death issues and lead to evolving laws that clarify such end-of-life issues while protecting physicians from sociocultural backlash. (shrink)

The luxury-versus-necessity controversy is primarily concerned with the importance of civil and political rights vis-à-vis economic and social rights. The viewpoint of political leaders of many developing and newly industrialized countries, especially China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia is that civil and political rights are luxuries that only rich nations can afford. The United Nations, transnational civil society and the Western advanced countries oppose this viewpoint on normative and empirical grounds. While this controversy is far from over, new (...) challenges of “evidence” and “marketization” are emerging. The first calls for a narrative on the history of civil and political rights in the West in the comparative context of the Industrial Revolution and the East Asian Miracle and China’s economic growth. The effects of the recent financial crisis and insulation of China from the Arab Spring further deepen this challenge. The marketization challenge looks at this controversy from the social exclusion angle. It argues that the basic needs covered by the minimum human rights agenda are becoming luxuries in a real sense for those who do not have the power to purchase these needs from the market. (shrink)

Genetic testing has familial implications. Counsellors find themselves in (moral) conflict between medical confidentiality (towards the patient) and a potential right or even duty to warn at-risk relatives. Legal regulations vary between countries. English literature about German law is scarce. We reviewed the literature of relevant legal cases, focussing on German law, according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines. This article aims to familiarise counsellors with their responsibilities, compare the situation between countries and point out (...) legally unresolved areas.According to the German Genetic Diagnostics Act (Gendiagnostikgesetz) in case of an ‘avoidable or treatable’ genetic disorder, geneticists ought to confine themselves to the obligated advice to the patient. Whether a breach of the duty of confidentiality can be justified in exceptional cases by ‘necessity as justification’ for actively informing relatives at risk remains legally unclear. In case of a ‘neither avoidable nor treatable’ genetic disease, geneticists should also refrain from actively informing relatives as the justifiable state of emergency does not permit to break the duty of confidentiality. (shrink)

In 1902, eight northern European nations formed the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). A turn-of-the-century international movement created opportunities, funding, and political support for marine science. This paper uses ICES as a lens for examining international cooperation, and shows how its sponsors benefited from the intersection of internationalist ideals, national interest, and the characteristics of the marine environment. Marine science is then compared to other field sciences to explore how these three factors promoted internationalism in science (...) more generally. (shrink)

If we want to talk about the philosophy of religion with an Islamic approach, we must clarify what are its differences and similarities with the conventional philosophy of religion in the West. For this purpose, in this paper, the meaning of comparative philosophy and its obstacles, possibilities, necessities, and benefits will first be investigated. After that, it will be shown what considerations should be taken into account in order to have a comparative philosophy. Then, we will show how (...) to have a philosophy of religion with an Islamic approach and what differences and similarities this type of philosophy of religion has with the Western philosophy of religion. Following that, some hermeneutic considerations for this philosophical comparison will be mentioned, and afterward, it will be shown how the Christian background of Western philosophy of religion has affected it. Finally, we will review some of the main subjects of the philosophy of religion if it is to be rationally evaluated with the foundations of Islamic thought to show what differences it has with the conventional Western philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant attempts to derive the principle of causality from our observation of events’ temporal succession. His argument, however, faces difficult objections. These objections show that his argument is unable to draw the strong necessity of causation out of the weaker necessity of temporal succession. Thomists generally offer a different sort of argument from Kant. They seek to derive the principle of causality from the concept of actual contingent being. I compare the Kantian and Thomistic arguments, and I (...) show that the Thomistic argument is successful where the Kantian argument fails. I also defend the Thomistic argument from possible Kantian objections. (shrink)

In the theory and history of ecology, Frederic Clements’s theory of plant communities is usually presented as the historical prototype and a paradigmatic example of synecological organicism, characterised by the assumption that ecological communities are functionally integrated units of mutually dependent species. In this paper, I will object to this standard interpretation of Clements’s theory. Undoubtedly, Clements compares plant communities with organisms and calls them “complex organisms” and “superorganisms”. Further, he can indeed be regarded as a proponent of ecological organicism—provided (...) that one defines ecological organicism as the interpretation of synecological units according to the model of the individual organism. However, Clements’s theory does not include the assumption that mutual dependence is a principle of the organisation of plant communities. Rather, he interprets plant communities as top-down control-hierarchical entities, in which subordinate species depend on dominant species—but not the other way around. Therefore, his theory represents what may be called ‘control-hierarchical organicism’ as against ‘mutualistic organicism’. The erroneous attribution to Clements of ‘mutualistic organicism’ might be due to an unawareness of the existence of different concepts of the organism. This unawareness results in the projection on Clements’s theory of a seemingly self-evident mutualistic concept of organism that Clements himself did not use as a basis for his theory of plant communities. (shrink)

One important element of globalization is the dissemination of western educational ideals and organizational frameworks through educational development projects. While postcolonial theory has long offered a useful critique of this expansion, it is less clear about how educational development that eschews neo-imperialist tendencies might proceed. This problem poses a question that requires philosophical reflection. However, much of comparative and international development education ignores philosophical modes of inquiry. Moreover, as Libbrecht (2007) argues, philosophy all too often sees itself as synonymous (...) with the Euro-American intellectual tradition, thus ignoring indigenous educational thought that might more appropriately guide local educational development. Drawing on John Dewey's (1938) call for deeper and more inclusive plans of operations in response to social conflicts and Jurgen Habermas (2008) call for ?reciprocal learning processes? and ?cooperative acts of translation,? we will attempt to reach beyond our individual philosophical borders to explore the necessity and possibilities of comparative philosophy of education by sharing three examples of our current efforts to apply philosophical analysis to international educational development. These examples will articulate and embody the necessity and the challenges of applying philosophical analysis to educational development work. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Brandom's definition of necessity, which is part of the incompatibility sematnics he develops in his fifth John Locke Lecture. By comparing incompatibility semantics to standard Kripkean possible worlds semantics for modality, we motivate an alternative definition of necessity in Brandom's own terms. Our investigation of this alternative necessity will show that - contra to Brandom's own results - incompatibility semantics does not necessarily lead to the notion of necessity of the modal (...) logic S5. (shrink)

Can humans flourish without destroying the earth? In this book, experts on many of the world's major and minor religious traditions address the question of human and earth flourishing. Each chapter considers specific religious ideas and specific environmental harms. Chapters are paired and the authors work in dialogue with one another. Taken together, the chapters reveal that the question of flourishing is deceptively simple. Most would agree that humans should flourish without destroying the earth. But not all humans have equal (...) opportunities to flourish. Additionally, on a basic physical level any human flourishing must, of necessity, cause some harm. These considerations of the price and distribution of flourishing raise unique questions about the status of humans and nature. This book represents a step toward reconciliation: that people and their ecosystems may live in peace, that people from different religious worldviews may engage in productive dialogue; in short, that all may flourish. (shrink)