One central tenet of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis , and the consensus view among biologists until now, is that all genetic mutations occur by “chance” or at “random” with respect to adaptation. However, the discovery of some molecular mechanisms enhancing mutation rate in response to environmental conditions has given rise to discussions among biologists, historians and philosophers of biology about the “chance” vs “directed” character of mutations . In fact, some argue that mutations due to a particular kind (...) of mutator mechanisms challenge the Modern Synthesis because they are produced when and where needed by the organisms concerned. This paper provides a defense of the Modern Synthesis’ consensus view about the chance nature of all genetic mutations by reacting to Jablonka and Lamb’s analysis of genetic mutations and the explicit Lamarckian flavor of their arguments. I argue that biologists can continue to talk about chance mutations according to what I call and define as the notion of “evolutionary chance,” which I claim is the Modern Synthesis’ consensus view and a reformulation of Darwin’s most influential idea of “chance” variation. Advances in molecular genetics are therefore significant but not revolutionary with respect to the Modern Synthesis’ paradigm. (shrink)

Timely effective regulation of genetic advances presents a challenge for justice systems. We used a 51-item battery to examine views on major genetics-related issues of those at the forefront of regulating this area – Supreme Court judges (N = 73). We also compared their views with those of other justice stakeholders (N = 210) from the same country (Romania). Judges showed greater endorsement and less variability in views on the use of genetic data and technologies than the other groups. The (...) agreement among the judges was strikingly strong for some controversial issues, including gene editing; patenting of genetic findings; and the State using genetic information for crime prevention. Judges and other lawyers recognized the need for amending the relevant laws. Without appropriate regulation, genetic science has a risk of propelling inequality rather than fulfilling its promise to improve people’s lives. (shrink)

A polity is grounded in a modus vivendi (MV) when its main features can be presented as the outcome of a virtually unrestricted bargaining process. Is MV compatible with the consensus-based account of liberal legitimacy, i.e. the view that political authority is well grounded only if the citizenry have in some sense freely consented to its exercise? I show that the attraction of MV for consensus theorists lies mainly in the thought that a MV can be presented (...) as legitimated through a realist account of public justification. Yet I argue that, because of persistent ethical diversity, that realism problematically conflicts with the liberal commitments that underpin the very ideas of consensus and public justification. Thus, despite the interest it has recently attracted from critics of political liberalism and deliberative democracy, MV is not an option for those wishing to ground liberal political authority in some form of consensus. So if realist and agonistic critiques are on target, then the fact that modus vivendi is not an option casts some serious doubt on the viability of the consensus view of liberal legitimacy. (shrink)

This paper is a rejoinder to Alan Irwin's constructive response "Agreeing to Differ?" to our (2017) paper. We zoom in on the three main issues Irwin raises, namely (a) How to understand consensus? (b) Why are so many public participation activities consensus-driven? (c) Should we not value the art of closure, of finding ways to make agreements, particularly in view of the dire state of world politics today? We use this opportunity to highlight and further develop some (...) of our ideas. (shrink)

Around 97% of climate scientists endorse anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory that human activities are partly responsible for recent increases in global average temperatures. Clearly, this widespread endorsement of AGW is a reason for non-experts to believe in AGW. But what is the epistemic significance of the fact that some climate scientists do not endorse AGW? This paper contrasts expert unanimity, in which virtually no expert disagrees with some theory, with expert consensus, in which some non-negligible proportion either (...) rejects or is uncertain about the theory. It is argued that, from a layperson’s point of view, an expert consensus is often stronger evidence for a theory’s truth than unanimity. Several lessons are drawn from this conclusion, e.g. concerning what laypeople should infer from expert pronouncements, how journalists should report on scientific theories, and how working scientists should communicate with the public. (shrink)

This essay critically assesses the central claim of Kevin Vallier’s Liberal Politics and Public Faith: that public religious faith and public reason liberalism can be reconciled, because the values underlying public reason liberalism should lead us to endorse the ‘convergence view’, rather than the mainstream consensus view. The convergence view is friendlier to religious faith, because it jettisons the consensus view’s much-criticised ‘duty of restraint’. I present several challenges to Vallier’s claim. Firstly, if Vallier (...) is right to reject the duty of restraint then consensus theorists can also do so, and on the same grounds. Secondly, the independent force of the objections to the duty of restraint is unclear. Thirdly, Vallier has not successfully identified desiderata that unite all public reason liberals and favour convergence over consensus. Finally, even if convergence is in some ways friendlier to religious faith, this does not show that it will be attractive to religious citizens. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with the character of scientific disputes tend to divide into two camps. On the one side there are those who hold that scientists can always settle their differences by appealing to shared assumptions; on the other side there are those who maintain that in many cases scientists must resort to (nonrational ) persuasion to establish their views. The trouble is that for all their strong points both approaches labour under enormous difficulties. Scientific disagreement is often much deeper than (...) the first conception allows while persuasion, propaganda and the like are far less prevalent than the second one requires. On examining scientific practice is becomes clear that philosophers on both sides err in supposing that scientists can resolve their differences in a purely scientific fashion just to the extent that they can single out one of their views on the basis of assumptions that they hold in common. For one thing scientists make progress even though they rarely employ the strategy of reversion to neutral territory. And for another the strategy of reversion to neutral territory is at odds with the important methodological requirement that all relevant information be taken into account. Instead of thinking of scientists as resolving their differences by reviewing their respective positions in the light of their shared assumptions, we should think of them as fashioning positions on which they can agree, as arguing to shared conclusions rather than from shared premises. The relevant picture is one of scientists gradually narrowing the distance that separates them, of their converging on a mutually acceptable viewpoint. Far from being prerequisites for scientists' resolving their disputes, shared assumptions are what result from their managing to resolve them. How scientists who disagree deeply make progress is thus much less of a problem than is usually supposed. What determines whether scientists' conclusions constitute advances is not wether they were obtained by the expedient of reversion to neutral territory but whether each of the available options was fully ventilated. When scientists take into account all the relevant considerations (including those introduced into the discussion by their opponents and those that they can reasonably be expected to know), the question of whether they can be said to have made progress no longer arises. More generally, we misconstrue the manner in which scientists resolve their differences because we allow ourselves to be guided by our philosophical preconceptions about scientific knowledge and we devote insufficient attention to what happens in practice. Instead of exploring how scientists reason to mutually acceptable conclusions, we wrongly assume that they cannot but proceed by reverting to neutral territory. What is needed is not a general account of consensus formation but rather a fresh look at the multitude of ways in which scientists make progress by dint of argument and debate. Considered as a phenomenon in its own right scientific disagreement poses no special problem; it is puzzling only when it is considered within the framework of traditional epistemology. (shrink)

Because the idea of consensus in contemporary philosophy of science is typically seen as the locus of progress, rationality, and, often, truth, Mill’s views on the undesirability of consensus have been largely dismissed. The historical data, however, shows that there are many examples of scientific progress without consensus, thus refuting the notion that consensus in science has any special epistemic status for rationality, scientific progress (success), or truth. What needs to be developed instead is an epistemology (...) of dissent. I suggest that normative accounts of dissent be used as prototypes for theories of scientific rationality that can also be applied to episodes of consensus. Consensus in this case is to be treated as a special case of dissent, when the amount of dissent approaches zero. My main goal in this paper is to sketch how a normative account of dissent that aims to capture the idea of epistemic fairness can apply to situations of consensus. (shrink)

Given the role consensus is supposed to play in the social aspects of inquiry and deliberation, it is important that we may always identify a consensus as the basis of joint inquiry and deliberation. However, it turns out that if we think of an agent revising her beliefs to reach a consensus, then, on the received view of belief revision, AGM belief revision theory, certain simple and compelling consensus positions are not always available.

The model of clinical ethics consultation (CEC) defended in the ASBH Core Competencies report has gained significant traction among scholars and healthcare providers. On this model, the aim of CEC is to facilitate deliberative reflection and thereby resolve conflicts and clarify value uncertainty by invoking and pursuing a process of consensus building. It is central to the model that the facilitated consensus falls within a range of allowable options, defined by societal values: prevailing legal requirements, widely endorsed organizational (...) policies, and professional standards of practice and codes of conduct. Moreover, the model stipulates that ethics consultants must refrain from giving substantive recommendations regarding how parties to a moral disagreement in the clinic should evaluate their options. We argue that this model of CEC is incomplete, because it wrongly assumes that what counts as the proper set of allowable options among which the parties are to deliberate will itself always be clearly discernible. We illustrate this problem with a recent case on which one of us consulted—a neonate born with trisomy 18 (T18). We try to show that law, policy, and standards of practice reveal no clear answer to the question posed by the case: namely, whether forgoing gastrostomy tube feedings for a baby with T18 is allowable. We suggest there may be other kinds of cases in which it may simply be unsettled whether a given choice falls within the set of allowable options within which consensus is to be facilitated. What should an ethicist do when confronting such unsettled cases? We agree with the facilitation model that an ethicist should remain neutral among the allowable options, when it is clear what the allowable options are. But, in unsettled cases, the role of a consultant should be expanded to include a process of moral inquiry into what the allowable options should be. We end by raising the issue of whether this means an ethicist should share his or her own conclusions or views about the allowability of a given clinical option. (shrink)

Could the notion of compromise help us overcoming – or at least negotiating – the frequent tension, in normative political theory, between the realistic desideratum of peaceful coexistence and the idealistic desideratum of justice? That is to say, an analysis of compromise may help us moving beyond the contrast between two widespread contrasting attitudes in contemporary political philosophy: ‘fiat iustitia, pereat mundus’ on the one side, ‘salus populi suprema lex’ on the other side. More specifically, compromise may provide the backbone (...) of a conception of legitimacy that mediates between idealistic (or moralistic) and realistic (or pragmatic) desiderata of political theory, i.e. between the aspiration to peace and the aspiration to justice. In other words, this paper considers whether an account of compromise could feature in a viable realistic conception of political legitimacy, in much the same way in which consensus features in more idealistic conceptions of legitimacy (a move that may be attributed to some realist theorists, especially Bernard Williams). My conclusions, however, are largely sceptical: I argue that grounding legitimacy in any kind of normatively salient agreement does require the trappings of idealistic political philosophy, for better or – in my view – worse. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to show that democratic consensus – one of the more prominent ideals in recent political thought – is an essential byproduct of epistemically warranted beliefs about political action and organization, at least in those cases where the issues under dispute are epistemic in nature. An essential byproduct (to borrow Jon Elster’s term) is a goal that can only be intentionally achieved by aiming at some other objective. In my usage, a political issue is epistemic (...) when there is some right (or at least best) answer concerning how it ought to be resolved that is independent of people’s beliefs or desires about how it ought to be resolved. An important secondary claim, then, is that it is difficult to explain the presumptive value of political deliberation unless we understand a very large share of political issues as epistemic in nature. This view implies a considerably more contentious model of political deliberation but is not incompatible with familiar forms of conciliatory behavior in our public disputes. (shrink)

A weak and a strong version of discourse theory can be distinguished. In the strong version the only source of normative validity in the nonspecific sense is rational consensus, where all parties concerned accept a norm for the same reasons, which are rationally convincing in the same way for all. In the weak version both rational and overlapping consensus can be sources of validity in the nonspecific sense. It is argued that the weak version is the more adequate, (...) since it can accommodate cases which the strong version cannot, and which it is unreasonable to view as cases of compromise. Discourse theory needs a weaker general discourse principle and a more flexible notion of normative consensus than is found in Habermas's Between Facts and Norms. (shrink)

The last several decades have witnessed a vibrant discussion about the proper political role of religion in pluralistic liberal democracies. An important part of that discussion has been a dispute about the role that religious and secular reasons properly play in the justification of state coercion. Most of the theorists who have participated in that discussion have endorsed a restrictive understanding of the justificatory role available to religious reasons. Most importantly, advocates of that restrictive understanding deny that state coercion that (...) depends for its justification on religious considerations is morally legitimate. This standard, restrictive view can be formulated in various importantly different ways. All versions affirm certain core claims—that we ought to respect each human being and that proper respect for each human being requires that state coercion be justified to the coerced. But thereafter advocates of the standard view disagree about how to fill in the details. In this paper, I will focus on one "detail" that is both central to the standard view and also a source of much disagreement among its advocates, viz., what makes it the case that state coercion is justified to the coerced? (shrink)

Objectives: To examine the perspectives of journal editors and authors on overlapping and redundant publications in clinical research.Design: Pretested cross-sectional survey, containing both forced choice and open ended questions, administered by mail to the senior editors and one randomly selected author from all journals in the Abridged Index Medicus that published clinical research.Main measurements: The views of editors and authors about the extent of redundant publications, why they occur, how to prevent and respond to cases, and when the publication of (...) overlapping manuscripts is justified.Results: Seventy two per cent of editors and 65% of authors completed the survey. There was consensus between both groups that redundant publications occur because authors feel the pressure to publish and journals do not do enough to publicise, criticise, and punish cases, and that the publication of most types of overlapping articles is unacceptable. Sixty seven per cent of authors but only 31% of editors felt, however, that it was justified to publish an overlapping article in a non-peer reviewed symposium supplement, and 68% of editors but 39% of authors supported imposing restrictions on guilty authors’ future submissions. In written comments, 15% to 30% of both groups emphasised that it was justified to publish overlapping articles when there were different or non-English-speaking audiences, new data, strengthened methods, or disputed findings.Conclusions: Editors, authors, and other academic leaders should together develop explicit guidelines that clarify points of contention and ambiguity regarding overlapping manuscripts. (shrink)

The relationship between representative democracy and conflict in John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy has been interpreted in very different ways. While some scholars claim that Millian democracy is incompatible with political conflict, others identify in Mill a radical agonism that would offer a non-consensual model of deliberative democracy. This paper argues that neither of these views is accurate: although he highlights the centrality of conflict in political life, Mill believes that democratic deliberation presupposes a minimal level of consensus regarding (...) the formal value of the basic principles of democracy. Initially, I reconstruct the relationship between conflict and consensus in Mill’s conception of representative democracy. I then investigate his association of representation and advocacy and show that Mill’s encomium on political conflict was influenced by Guizot's work. Finally, I explain how a democratic debate riven with conflict is conducive to individual freedom. (shrink)

This paper is predicated on the understanding that clinical encounters between clinicians and patients should be seen primarily as inter-relations among persons and, as such, are necessarily moral encounters. It aims to relocate the discussion to be had in challenging medical decision-making situations, including, for example, as the end of life comes into view, onto a more robust moral philosophical footing than is currently commonplace. In our contemporary era, those making moral decisions must be cognizant of the existence of (...) perspectives other than their own, and be attuned to the demands of inter-subjectivity. Applicable to clinical practice, we propose and justify a Habermasian approach as one useful means of achieving what can be described as dialogic consensus. The Habermasian approach builds around, first, his discourse theory of morality as universalizable to all and, second, communicative action as a cooperative search for truth. It is a concrete way to ground the discourse which must be held in complex medical decision-making situations, in its actual reality. Considerations about the theoretical underpinnings of the application of dialogic consensus to clinical practice, and potential difficulties, are explored. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the claim that Rawls’s overlapping consensus is too narrow to allow most mainstream religions’ participation in political discourse. I do so by asking whether religious exclusion is a consequence of belief or action, using conversion as a paradigm case. After concluding that this objection to Rawls is, in fact, defensible, and that the overlapping consensus excludes both religious belief and action, I examine an alternative approach to managing religious pluralism as presented by Adam (...) Smith. I show that Smith’s so-called “marketplace of religions” assumes and encourages religious conversion. I then offer objections to Smith’s approach from Rawls’s point of view, concluding that, while Rawls cannot adequately respond to the Smithian challenge, in the end the two positions are complimentary. (shrink)

This paper examines the drive for consensus from the perspective of the good government framework for federal advisory commissions in the United States. Specifically, the paper examines the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) – the statute, its regulations, and case law. It shows that the FACA was intended to be an antidote to abuses in consensus‐making processes, including the failure to fully include competing views on commissions. The index of suspicion in the FACA scheme rises when a group (...) work product – including a consensus report – is to be the basis of recommendations to federal officials. Once FACA's requirements regarding committee composition are satisfied, the index of suspicion drops and FACA is indifferent to consensus‐making; but the conditions for informed, meaningful participation apply to members who dissent from, as well as those who participate in, consensus. In negotiated rulemaking, the push for consensus and closure creates unacceptable tension with the good government goals of openness and accountability. Proponents of consensus‐only bioethics commissions can learn from FACA‐related legislative, agency, and judicial insights that consensus‐seeking is not always desired by government officials; is rarely cost free; and that diversity and dissent enhance openness, accountability, and fairness. The burden of proof is therefore on proponents of a consensus‐only standard for bioethics commissions to demonstrate that a drive for consensus furthers sound decision‐making by government officials more than it sets back openness and accountability to a diverse public. (shrink)

When clinical ethicists are called upon to give a recommendation regarding patient care, they may be faced with a dilemma of their own. If their own personal opinion is not widely shared, the ethicist will have three options. These include: (1) giving their own opinion; (2) giving the widely shared opinion; and (3) giving both opinions, leaving the physician to select which opinion to accept. The intentions of this article are to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of these three alternatives and (...) to suggest that ethics consultants recognize and deal with this issue. Two cases are presented to explore the limitations of each option. The author suggests that when the views of ethics consultants differ from the consensus view, the consultant should give the consensus view, their own dissenting view and the arguments in support of each position. (shrink)

It is commonly recognized that the justified beliefs of an individual subject can be supported or undermined by a consensus on the proposition in the subject’s community. A more controversial view is that justified belief turns on consensus in a deeper respect: justified beliefs are correlated with consensual beliefs in a way to which we must attend when we evaluate or theoretically describe justified belief. Call this a consensus account of justified belief. C. S. Peirce proposed (...) such an account, deriving from a more basic fixation theory of justified belief. I regard Peirce’s proposal as the most plausible consensus account now available, and his fixation basis for the account as the strongest available basis for a consensus account. In this paper, I describe Peirce’s fixation account in detail, and I elaborate his argument for the account. I defend the argument up to a point. In the end, however, the argument rests on an implausible empirical psychological assumption about belief-fixation. I list reasons for rejecting this assumption. The result should discourage enthusiasm about a consensus account of justified belief. (shrink)

A book for nurses, doctors and all who provide end of life care, this essential volume guides readers through the ethical complexities of such care, including current policy initiatives, and encourages debate and discussion on their controversial aspects. dived into two parts, it introduces and explains clinical decision making-processes about which there is broad consensus, in line with guidance documents issued by WHO, BMA, GMC, and similar bodies. The changing political and social context where 'patient choice' has become a (...) central idea, and the broadened scope of potients' best interests, have added to the complexity of decision-making in end of life care. The authors discuss issues widely encountered by GPs, nurses, and hospital clinicians. These include patient choice, consent, life-prolonging treatment, and symptom relief including sedation. Part rwo explores the more controversial current end of life care initiatives, such as advance care planning preferred place of care and death, euthanais and assited suicide, extended ideas of 'best interests', and the view that there are therapeutic duties to the relatives of Throughout their discussion the authors draw attention to loose ends and contradictions in some of the proposals. Examining the current policy of comsumerist choice, they reject its place in the health service, proposing a a realistic, fair, humane and widely adoptable system of end of life care. As knowledge of ethical theories is required in training courses, and the vocabulary of ethical theory is widespread in current discussions a substantial appendix on ethical theories and terms is available online. Written by the same authors as The Philosophy of Palliative Care: Critique and Reconstruction, which won the Medical Journalists' Association Specialits Book Award 2007, this new book for non-specialists is essential reading for all health care professionals involved in providing end of life care. (shrink)

For years analysts have recognized the error of assuming that experts in medical science are also experts in deciding the clinically correct course for patients. This paper extends the analysis of the use of the consensus of experts to their use in public policy groups such as NIH Consensus Development panels. After arguing that technical experts cannot be expected to be expert on public policy decisions, the author extends the criticism to the use of the consensus of (...) experts in estimating facts to provide a basis for policy decisions. It is argued that to the extent that (a) experts' views regarding a body of facts can be expected to correlate with their values relevant to those facts; and (b) the values of experts differ from the values of lay people, even the estimates of the facts given by the consensus of expert panels can be expected to differ from the estimates lay people would have given had they had the relevant scientific expertise. Keywords: consensus, expertise, fact/value distinction, NIH Consensus Development Panels CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Since the beginning of the late modern era, modern constitutions have been trying to keep both group rights as minority rights and individual rights. But, in some cases, it is still ambiguous if an action or a phenomenon must refer to individual rights or group rights. Abortion discussions, with regard to political rights, are one example of these ambiguous cases. In this context, whereas Liberal view tends to regard abortion as individual rights of a woman, Communitarian view can (...) be against it by pointing out the right to life and this case may lead to a kind of liberal constitutional crises. This article gains importance as such constitutional crises still emerge even nowadays. John Rawls’s theory of overlapping consensus in Political Liberalism tries to solve these political conflicts that emerged in liberal constitutions by prioritizing public reason. This article conceptionally aims to examine Rawls’s theory in terms of prioritization and value relativity in abortion discussions. The method of article is hermeneutics. In order to extend the universe of the discussion, some important thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Isaiah Berlin and John Gray, who have related studies on the topic, were included. In conclusion, it is asserted that Rawl’s theory is weak both practically and theoretically as to the principle of utilitarianism violates the rights of communitarians. (shrink)

This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations ‎between ‎knowledge ‎and consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their ‎own, but ‎also have ‎practical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant ‎role in ‎informing public ‎decision making. The paper addresses the following questions. ‎When is a ‎consensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may ‎we ‎legitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise ‎epistemically ‎justified? Should consensus be the (...) aim of scientific inquiry, and if so, what ‎kind of ‎consensus? How should dissent be handled? It is argued that a legitimate inference ‎that a ‎theory is correct from the fact that there is a scientific consensus on it requires taking ‎into ‎consideration both cognitive properties of the theory as well as social properties of ‎the ‎consensus. The last section of the paper reviews computational models of ‎consensus ‎formation.‎. (shrink)

This paper focuses on experiences from a case study dealing with the Swiss type of a consensus conference called “PubliForum” concerning “Genetic Technology and Nutrition” (1999). Societal and ethical aspects of genetically modified food meanwhile can be seen as prototypes of topics depending on the involvement of the public through a participatory process. The important role of the lay perspective in this field seems to be accepted in practice. Nevertheless, there is still some theoretical controversy about the necessity and (...) democratic legitimacy of participatory processes in general, and especially about those dealing with technological or environmental problems (sustainable development) concerning society. From an ethical point of view, a lot of heterogeneous problems concerning contents and procedures of public participation can be pointed out, not only on the theoretical level but also in practice, e.g., concerning the communication process between laypersons and experts. The intention of our paper is to give hints and to clarify criteria that support the communication process leading to a dialog of autonomous citizens and which especially consider ethical aspects in the field. One important result is that there must be an orientation for all members of a consensus conference having clear rules and knowing their different roles that support transparency, credibility, and fairness of the whole procedure and a “good product”: a substantial final document or citizens’ report. (shrink)

“Justice as fairness” understood as a political conception of justice is, according to Rawls, objective. It is claimed to be objective by being autonomous from any of the conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by the citizens, and by, at the same time, being consistent with all such doctrines. There is the need to look for an object of such overlapping consensus because, according to Rawls, reasonable disagreement is inevitable in modern democratic society. And the permanence of reasonable disagreement itself (...) is caused by what Rawls describes as the burdens of judgement.In this article, I demonstrate, against the background of Rawls’ burdens of judgement, how it could be argued that reasonable agreement is impossible. In this respect, I explore what I consider to be the resources available to Rawls to show how his point could be made. But I subsequently argue that his position in this respect can be coherent only against a background of an epistemic conception which is defective, and which goes beyond the political idea of freedom and equality which Rawls claims to be the basis of Justice as fairness. It is my contention that Rawls’ suggestion of how to handle so-called reasonable disagreement is itself no more than a contentious viewpoint which silences other contending reasonable views. (shrink)

John Rawls and Simone Weil presented two distinct conceptions of political justice, aimed at articulating a common ethos in an inherently heterogeneous society. The terms of the former, chiefly concerned with the distribution of primary goods, underwrite much of today's Western democracies political liberalism. The terms of the latter, chiefly concerned with the way interaction is organised in social activities in view of the body and soul's balancing pairs of needs, are less well known. We explain the sense in (...) which the overlapping consensus in Weil's notion of political justice is “thicker”, and may thus deserve more attention – alongside that of Rawls – for substantiating a democratic ethos within political liberalism. (shrink)

At the moment in Britain and elsewhere the debate inside and outside of Parliament on various medical issues which are essentially moral never ends. Everybody has his own point of view--or principles. But what emerges for society to adopt can often be called in lay terminology 'compromise'. Professor Mitchell argues in this paper that a moral consensus is possible and indeed ought to be achieved, as today the medical practitioner can no longer make his decision only in accordance (...) with the strict code of ethics of the medical profession. The task of the philosopher, says Professor Mitchell, is to interpret the actions and attitudes demanded by modern medical practice. (shrink)

The World Medical Association’s revised Declaration of Helsinki endorses the view that all trial participants in every country are entitled to the worldwide best standard of care. In this paper the authors show that this requirement has been rejected by every national and international committee that has examined this issue. They argue that the consensus view now holds that it is ethically permissible, in some circumstances, to provide research participants less than the worldwide best care. Finally, the (...) authors show that there is also consensus regarding the broad conditions under which this is acceptable. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a great deal of controversy in the philosophy of mind, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience both about how to conceptualize empathy and about the connections between empathy and interpersonal understanding. Ideally, we would first establish a consensus about how to conceptualize empathy, and then analyze the potential contribution of empathy to interpersonal understanding. However, it is not at all clear that such a consensus will soon be forthcoming, given that different people have (...) fundamentally conflicting intuitions about the concept of empathy. Thus, instead of trying to resolve this controversy, I will try to show that a fair amount of consensus is within reach about how empathy can be a source of interpersonal understanding even in the absence of a consensus about how to conceptualize empathy. As we shall see, the main controversy concerns a few phenomena that some researchers view as necessary conditions of empathy, but which others view either as merely characteristic features or as consequences of empathy. My strategy will be to try to show how empathy can generate interpersonal understanding by virtue of these phenomena—regardless of whether one chooses to conceptualize them as necessary conditions of empathy. (shrink)

This article considers imperial Roman and German forms of liberal elite consensus on “proper religious diversity” to set the stage for an examination of the contemporary form of liberal consensus discernible in a recent public talk given by Charles Taylor and Rowan Williams. In each case, attention is drawn to the ways in which “proper religious diversity” is defined to serve ideological and theological agendas. Romanitas, Germanentum, and the Taylor–Williams consensus are cannibalistic theological systems: each uses a (...) public stance of reasonable openmindedness regarding “proper religious diversity” to build and police a theological position that arrogates the perceived value of selected “religious” traditions by re-making them in its own image. Imperial Romanitas and Germanentum served in this way to absorb a diversity of traditions deemed palatable and digestible into overarching theological visions which were convenient to those in power. When Taylor and Williams use the platform of Religious Studies to promote the modern liberal view of “diversity in religion” as a source of pro-social order, their efforts serve a similar crypto-theological and imperialist project. (shrink)

In this thought-provoking book, David Hart challenges the creation myth of post--World War II federal science and technology policy. According to this myth, the postwar policy sprang full-blown from the mind of Vannevar Bush in the form of Science, the Endless Frontier. Hart puts Bush's efforts in a larger historical and political context, demonstrating in the process that Bush was but one of many contributors to this complex policy and not necessarily the most successful one. Herbert Hoover, Karl Compton, Thurman (...) Arnold, Henry Wallace, Robert Taft, and Curtis LeMay--along with more familiar figures like Bush--are among those whose endeavors he traces.Hart places these policy entrepreneurs in the broad scheme of American political development, connecting each one's vision of the state in this apparently esoteric policy area to the central issues, events, and figures of mid-century America and to key theoretical debates. Hart's work reveals the wide range of ideas, often in conflict with one another, that underlay what later observers interpreted as a "postwar consensus." In Hart's view, these visions--and the interests and institutions that shape their translation into public policy--form the enduring basis of American politics in this important area. Policymakers today are still grappling with the legacies of the forged consensus. (shrink)

Voluntary Consensus Standards are commerce-related documents developed by interested volunteers under due-process procedures which ensure that the concerns of all parties are fairly taken into account. Standards are beneficial to society because they promote commerce and lower the costs of and barriers to doing business. Because of this, conformance to a standard can confer significant competitive advantage.Vigorous, democratic competition between ideas leads to a high- quality standard. Some participants in the standards-development process will, against the general interest, attempt to (...) skew a standard to favor a specific product, service, or practice. In order prevent this sort of abuse, rules are written to prevent any common-interest block from overwhelming the general interest. Unfettered debate is fostered by having no rules defining volunteer-member misconduct, eliminating any possibility that a majority will improperly use such rules to silence a minority. This unfortunately permits the rare but not-hypothetical situation where those unscrupulous and determined, or those out of control, are able to engage in obstructionism and misconduct without any possibility of penalty. (shrink)

The introductory essay to this collection correctly observes that there are many “challenges for rapprochement” between anthropology and (the rest of) cognitive science. Still, the possibilities of fruitful interchanges provide some hope for the parties getting back together, at least on an intermittent basis. This response offers some views concerning the “incompatibility” of psychology and anthropology, reviews why cognitive anthropology drifted away from cognitive science, and notes two areas of contemporary interest within cognitive anthropology that may lead to a re-engagement.

In this paper I employ the analysis of play to clarify the distinction between an agreement and a consensus, and I argue that it is the conditions supplied by the playful process that enable us to partake in the recognition and creation of truth. Gadamer's hermeneutical truth, unlike propositional truth, speaks of the interpretive act whereby meaning is recognized. This interpretive recognition of meaning is described by Gadamer as an occurrence of interpretive play orgenuine understanding. Regarding Gadamer's conception of (...) truth as modelled on agreement rather than consensus, I demonstrate that it is in the process of play that we achieve the making and maintaining of the conditions that are necessary for agreement, and that the nature of understanding is most clearly revealed by viewing it as a playful process. (shrink)

A central discussion in the theory of deliberative democracy in recent decades has focused on whether democratic deliberation, and consequently those participating in it, should aim, at least ideally, for political consensus. Thus, pluralist deliberative democrats have criticized the consensualist approach to deliberative democracy for neglecting the moral importance of political disagreement because of their fixation with reaching consensus. The debate between these two positions, initiated in the 1990s, has evolved in recent years toward more precision and sophistication. (...) However, some vagueness and ambiguities remain in many of the contributions and prevent us from getting an exact idea of the object of discussion. This article starts making further distinctions about several types of agreement and disagreement in order to clarify much more precisely the exact niche of dispute between these two views. They do not need to disagree on the value of many forms of disagreement and consensus. Their dispute consists only in a controversy about the relative value of post-deliberative, operative, substantive, legislative, regulatory, or adjudicative reason-based consensus as opposed to the corresponding reason-based disagreement. Finally, the article argues that this relatively small niche is made smaller by certain considerations. The most important of them is that this controversy remains at a high theoretical level and lacks practical importance: it only affects the kind of personal ideal commitment or aspiration that virtuous deliberators should have when entering into a deliberative process, and has no concrete consequent institutional implications. (shrink)

This essay offers a critical review of Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani’s article ‘On agreed action without agreed notions.’ Ani’s paper makes a critique of Kwasi Wiredu’s consensual democracy to the conclusion that though desirable, left the way it is, the model of consensus on which the idea of Wiredu’s non-party democracy was founded is itself admirable but defective and, therefore, calls for further enhancements. While not suggesting that Wiredu’s idea is perfect, this paper provides some objections to Ani’s view (...) without necessarily aiming to make an apologetic defence of Wiredu. In the process, this paper, employing a critical conversation method, examines the most salient criticisms of Ani against Wiredu to the conclusion that Ani’s suggestion, by which he has opened up a new horizon in understanding human nature and assisting in making scholarly post-deliberation analysis, is impracticable. That is, it is still practically incapable of necessarily impacting any significant value to the process involved in attaining consensus itself. Keywords: Africa, Philosophy, Consensus, Democracy, Values. (shrink)

Many have argued that allowing and encouraging public avenues for dissent and critical evaluation of scientific research is a necessary condition for promoting the objectivity of scientific communities and advancing scientific knowledge . The history of science reveals many cases where an existing scientific consensus was later shown to be wrong . Dissent plays a crucial role in uncovering potential problems and limitations of consensus views. Thus, many have argued that scientific communities ought to increase opportunities for dissenting (...) views to be heard and taken seriously. Such opportunities are necessary for both limiting the influence .. (shrink)

Lyotard’s diagnosis of a ‘postmodern condition’ has been repeatedly interpreted as a disavowal of the universal aspiration of political action and judgment. This article challenges this interpretation by showing that postmodernity involves an attempt to reconsider universality in such a way that it involves dissensus rather than consensus. I proceed by reconstructing Lyotard’s critique of the idea of consensus as a ground of political action and judgment, which in his view is based on a certain model of (...) production of scientific knowledge. Then, I analyse Lyotard’s turn to Kant’s judgment of the sublime as an alternative to a consensus-based conception of universal judgments. In the judgment of the sublime, universality stems from the disagreement between the faculties, which arouses respect for universal ideas. Analogously, political judgments stem from the disagreement between heterogeneous discourses, which produces a universal call to invent new languages that make communication possible. (shrink)

Consensus conferences, also known as citizens’ panels—a collection of lay citizens akin to a jury but charged with deliberating on policy issues with a high technical content—are a potentially important way to conduct technology assessments, inform policy makers about public views of new technologies, and improve public understanding of and participation in technological decision making. The first citizens’ panel in the United States occurred in April 1997 on the issue of “Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy.” This article evaluates (...) the impact of this citizens’ panel. The standard criteria to evaluate the impact of analyses focus on the “actual impact” and on the “impact on general thinking.” To these standard criteria, this article introduces the evaluation of two impacts related to learning: impact on the training of knowledgeable personnel and the interaction with lay knowledge. The impact evaluation is based on a nearly comprehensive set of semistructured telephone interviews with the participants in the panel. (shrink)

Prompted by recent comments on the moral authority of dialogic consensus, we argue that consensus, specifically dialogic consensus, possesses a unique form of moral authority. Given our multicultural era and its plurality of values, we contend that traditional ethical frameworks or principles derived from them cannot be viewed substantively. Both philosophers and clinicians prioritize the need for a decision to be morally justifiable, and also for the decision to be action-guiding. We argue that, especially against the background (...) of our pluralistic society, it is only via unforced dialogue and properly founded argumentation, aiming for consensus, that we can ascribe rightness or wrongness in a normative fashion to dilemmatic situations. We argue that both the process of dialogue, properly constituted, and the consensual outcome itself have moral authority vested within them. Finally, we argue that the consensual decision made is able to withstand moral scrutiny and is action-guiding, without claiming absolute moral authority in other contexts. (shrink)

Schumpeter took a dim view of the deliberative capacities of the average voter who, he believed, could not be relied upon to make responsible judgements about distant and rather abstract matters of...

Xavier Landes | : In this article, consensus, defined as the consent of all citizens, is argued to be the first best for part of the liberal tradition on political legitimacy. Consensus would be the foundation of the liberal society that, when out of reach, needs to be approximated through, for instance, voting. I build on the timid attempts in political theory at using the theorem of the second best as a tool to settle difficult decision making in (...) applied political theory. More precisely, I defend the view that consensus would be the first best for part of the liberal tradition on political legitimacy. Furthermore, I illustrate how moral, factual, disagreements may create second-best problems, especially in terms of stability. Finally, I spell out some reasons why such problems directly affect a liberal order, on pragmatic grounds. The final purpose is to contribute to the literatures on legitimacy and on the application of the theorem of the second best outside economics. The key idea is to stress that much more work has to be done for “importing” the theorem of the second best into political theory. | : Dans cet article, le consensus, défini comme le consentement de tous les citoyens, est présenté comme remplissant la fonction d’optimum de premier rang [first best] pour une partie de la tradition libérale quant à la légitimité politique. Le consensus fonderait la société libérale qui, lorsque hors d’atteinte, nécessiterait d’être approximer au travers, par exemple, du vote. Je m’appuie sur les timides tentatives en théorie politique d’utiliser le théorème de l’optimum de second rang [second best] comme outil pour résoudre des prises de décision difficiles en théorie politique appliquée. Plus précisément, je défends l’idée que le consensus serait l’optimum de premier rang pour une partie de la tradition libérale quant à la légitimité politique. De plus, j’illustre comment les désaccords moraux, factuels peuvent créer des problèmes d’optimum de second rang, en particulier en termes de stabilité. Enfin, j’expose quelques raisons pour lesquelles de tels problèmes affectent directement un ordre libéral, d’un point de vue pragmatique. Le but final est de contribuer aux littératures sur la légitimité et sur l’application du théorème d’optimum de second rang à l’extérieur des sciences économiques. L’idée principale est de souligner qu’il reste beaucoup de travail afin d’« importer » le théorème d’optimum de second rang en théorie politique. (shrink)

It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled (...) out in three distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning: namely, Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential Robustness Analysis. (shrink)

Jinul (1158-1210) is one of the most important scholar monks in Korean history. His view on the awakening in Zen Buddhism, called 'sudden awakening and gradual practice,' has recently been criticized by Seongcheol (1912-1993), one of the representative monks in Modern Korea. Seongcheol's criticism isbased upon the fact that Jinul's argument on sudden awakening and gradual practice cannot be allowed in authentic Zen Buddhism according to his own observation. Instead, Seongcheol argues that real awakening need no further practice. The (...) choice between Jinul and Seongcheol might become a serious concern among Zen practitioners. We should, however, be concerned rather with what their arguments can signify to their own contemporary humanbeings. We should understand their arguments against their historical backgrounds and social contexts. Especially, Seongcheol also argues that we should practice strenuously in order to achieve Zen awakening. This argument does not accord properly with Chinese traditional Zen Buddhism in that Huineng, the founder of Chinese Zen Buddhism, bases his own argument on the thesis that true awakening needs no prior practice. Jinul and Seongcheol, though commonly understanding the power of such thesis, recognized the peril of no practice. So there is their emphasis on practice, though there is the difference of before or after the awakening between them. The two Korean Zen monks can contribute commonly to us in that they caution the perils of easily misunderstanding authentic Zen awakening and wrongly conceiting themselves over their own awakening. (shrink)

It has been a pleasure to read these papers and to contemplate their importance for what I believe to be a useful and provocative prism though which to view the field of bioethics: the nature of moral consensus. In my own most extended contribution to this literature, DecidingTogether, I did not attempt to prescribe so much as to understand the role of moral consensus in the practice of bioethics. At the end of the book, I expressed the (...) hope that it might help trigger an examination of bioethics and moral consensus. Though a few others shared my interest at that time (in particular Tris Engelhardt, for whose early encouragement I remain deeply grateful), with this set of stimulating papers the conversation has finally begun in earnest. (shrink)