Background: Suicidality is a life-and-death struggle in deep loneliness and psychological pain. There is a lack of knowledge about what could help the suicidal patients’ struggle for continued life. The aim of this study was to develop a deeper understanding of suicidal patients in the aftermath of suicidal attempts. The research question was ‘What resources in the person himself or herself and his or her surroundings are crucial in a suicidal crisis to maintaining the will to live and hope (...) for life’? Methodology: The study has a hermeneutic approach and an explorative design. Data were collected using semi-structured interviews with 10 participants: men and women 21–52 years of age. The context was two emergency psychiatric units and one crisis resolution team. Ethical considerations: The participants signed an informed consent before the interviews were conducted. Findings: This article presents three themes: (a) becoming aware of the desire to live, (b) an experience of connectedness and (c) someone who cares. Discussion: The suicidal person’s awareness of wishes, dreams, hopes and will, but also of their feelings in the aftermath of the suicide attempt, seemed to play a crucial role in a suicidal crisis. Experiences of connectedness remind the person of the responsibility in his or her own life and in the lives of others and seemed to strengthen the urge to go on. Private and professional relationships seem to be crucial in stimulating the desire and hope to go on living. Conclusion: Becoming aware of the desire to live, being connected to others and experiencing someone who cares is necessary for life. Both private and professional networks seemed to be important resources that could remind the suicidal person of his or her own dignity as part of being human. (shrink)

This essay revisits the topic of how we should measure the things that matter, at a time when we continue to mismeasure our lives, as we hold fast to outworn myths of usefulness, popularity, and the desire to influence others. /// Three central, unquestioned presumptions have come to govern much of contemporary society, education, and the professions. They are: the high value placed on usefulness, on the passion to achieve popularity, and on the desire to influence others. In (...) this essay, the psychologist-philosopher author makes the case against these presumptions, presumptions which lead to exclusionary commitments that stand in the way of human cultural development. (shrink)

Many economists and social theorists hypothesize that most societies could soon face a ‘post-work’ future, one in which employment and productive labor have a dramatically reduced place in human affairs. Given the centrality of employment to individual identity and its pivotal role as the primary provider of economic and other goods, transitioning to a ‘post-work’ future could prove traumatic and disorienting to many. Policymakers are thus likely to face the difficult choice of the extent to which they ought to satisfy (...) individual citizens’ desires to work in a socioeconomic environment in which work is in permanent decline. Here I argue that policymakers confronting a post-work economy should discount, or at least consider problematic, the desire to work because it is very likely that this desire is an adaptive preference. An adaptive preference is a preference for some state of affairs within a limited set of options formed under unjust conditions. The widespread desire for work has been formed under unjust labor conditions to which individuals are compelled to submit in order to meet material and ethical needs. Furthermore, the prevalence of the ‘work dogma’ in contemporary societies precludes nearly all individuals from seeing alternatives to work as live options. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to identify how older Korean people seek information and their desire to participate in decision making about their health care. A total of 165 elderly people living in Seoul, South Korea, participated in the study. Data were collected during individual interviews using the Autonomy Preference Index. The mean information-seeking score was high. The mean score for their desire to participate with a physician in decision making was lower, but this was higher when (...) family members were involved. The study indicates that many older people want to receive information about their health care. Families (or guardians), as well as older people themselves, should be included in the decision-making process. Nurses can encourage older people to express their wishes, while treating each individual with respect. (shrink)

Discover simple ways to live a more purposeful, peaceful, and enjoyable life with this empowering guidebook to intentional and mindful living. It’s time to put intention behind all of your actions and live a focused and fearless life! In this accessible guide, you’ll learn easy ways to infuse everyday activities—from waking and bathing to eating and walking—with a sense of purpose. Each act is designed to improve your sense of health, peace, prosperity, gratitude, and renewal. Examples include: —Eliminate (...) thoughts of what is lacking —Move past perfection —Fire up your authentic voice —Strengthen love bonds —Learn to be precise Each chapter contains ritual sequences to help you carry your intentions throughout your day. With a wide and varied range of activities, you’ll be able to create a unique routine to fit every mood, need, interest, and desire. With How to Live with Intention, you’ll transform ordinary tasks into purposeful ways to relish each moment, live your best life, and experience true happiness. (shrink)

Is there a best way to live? If so, is this a form of ethical life? The answer, I believe, turns on what we can say about the nature and place of the passions – emotions and desires – in our lives, including in particular, our ability to be truthful about our passions and our relations with other people. I approach the question through the work of Bernard Williams. I consider first what it might be for a way of (...) life to be ‘objectively’ best, before looking more closely at the psychological conditions of such a life, using ideas from psychoanalysis on the way we hide our true passions from ourselves and the effect this can have on our understanding of both ourselves and others. I end by considering whether we can say that a truthful life is the best life, and whether it places universal and material constraints on how best to live. (shrink)

In the Phaedo, Socrates offers recommendations for living a philosophical life. We argue that those recommendations can be properly understood only in light of Socrates’ account of the soul’s true nature, considered separately from the body. Embodiment causes the soul to diverge from its proper end, the pursuit of knowledge. Bodily pleasures, pains, and desires divert the soul to other ends, distract its attention away from knowledge, and deceive it about what is true. Socrates’ recommended solutions to these obstacles are (...) diverse, reflecting the complexities of human psychology. He recommends avoidance of bodily experiences in many cases as well as reevaluation of the importance of the body, but he doesn’t recommend either the wholesale rejection or embrace of the bodily. We are our souls but, like it or not, we are temporarily embodied, and what happens to the body is thereby experienced by us. Socrates thus exhorts us to live in a way that recognizes both our temporary humanity and our lasting, true nature. Only so can we best pursue knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 593-610 [Access article in PDF] The Desire to Know the Secrets of the World Edward Peters I. The letter to Ferdinand and Isabella that Christopher Columbus intended to serve as the preface to the Libro de las profecías began with a remarkable observation about his own career and the particular temperament it had shaped in him: From a very young (...) age I began to navigate the seas, and I have continued to do so until today. This art inclines those who follow it to desire to know the secrets of this world. 1Although Columbus was certainly not unlearned, there is an artlessness and directness about his remark that suggest that whatever Columbus may have meant by "the secrets of the world" and the desire of navigators to know them, he was probably not speaking reconditely or mystically. 2 [End Page 593]Nor was Columbus the only early sixteenth-century practical man who spoke this way. The letters of Hernán Cortés, hardly a philosopher or a navigator, pointed out to correspondents that it was "a universal condition of man to want to know," and that he was first of all desirous of knowledge "of the secrets of these parts"; that "many new secrets" had been learned from the discoveries; of a volcano, "I wished to know the secret of this, which seemed something of a miracle." 3If practical folk could speak thus at the turn of the sixteenth century, it is not surprising that in the course of that century their rulers should appropriate the language of secrets, including the secrets of distant places, and the desire to know them and in doing so to transform their realms into information-gathering states, using detailed questionaires to assemble and organize new data just as they assembled cabinets of curiosities, libraries, zoos, observatories, and botanical gardens. As J. H. Elliott put it: But curiosity also had its due place within a wider Christian framework. At the end of the century, José de Acosta, in his great Natural and Moral History of the Indies, likened men to ants in their refusal to let themselves be deterred, once they had set out on their quest for facts. "And the high and eternal wisdom of the Creator uses this natural curiosity of men to communicate the light of His holy gospel to peoples who still live in the darkness of their errors." This assumption, that all knowledge was subordinated to a higher purpose and fitted into a providential design, was crucial for the assimilation of the New World of America by sixteenth-century Christendom. 4Elliott's characterization of an honorific Christian intellectual curiosity represented a very small part of a very complex semantic universe that centered on the Latin term curiositas and its vernacular cognates, not all of whose meanings were neutral or honorific. Just three years before Acosta wrote there had, after all, appeared the first printed history of Doctor Faustus, another sixteenth-century practical man who was also interested in the secrets of the world. 5 And not [End Page 594] too many years after Acosta wrote, another practical being, Milton's Lucifer, also went forth boldly to seek new worlds. 6 Only in a restricted sense could the desire to know the secrets of the world be understood in the way that Columbus, Cortés, Philip II, and Acosta celebrated it. In many cases it had to be extricated from a semantic universe in which it had long been identified with less honorable motives and more dangerous or ephemeral objects.The most influential exploration of part of that semantic universe appeared in Hans Blumenberg's long essay entitled, "The 'Trial' of Theoretical Curiosity," first published as part of a larger work in 1966, later slightly revised and separately reprinted, and translated into English in 1983. 7 Blumenberg's particular understanding of the history of philosophy, however, and his narrow focus on the natural sciences as the arena of "theoretical" curiosity limited both his conceptualization and his argument. In... (shrink)

Bering's analysis is inadequate because it fails to consider past and present adult soul beliefs and the psychological functions they serve. We suggest that a valid folk psychology of souls must consider features of adult soul beliefs, the unique problem engendered by awareness of death, and terror management findings, in addition to cognitive inclinations toward dualistic and teleological thinking.

Pierre Hadot is famous for his work on ancient philosophy, and the notion that ancient philosophia was conceived in the Greek schools as a way of life, including existential practices to reshape students’ beliefs, desires, and actions. Yet his last published book before his death in 2010 was the study N’Oublie Pas de Vivre, on the oeuvre of the modern German thinker and litterateur, Goethe. Hadot’s work throughout refuses to make a sharp distinction between ancients and moderns, interested rather, as (...) in this last book on Goethe, on the way the notion of philosophy as a bios has been carried over into modern thought in figures like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Montaigne, and even Kant. The paper is a critical reflection on Hadot’s conception of philosophy, suggesting he was as much ‘modern’ as ‘ancient’. Hadot’s final work on Goethe, we will argue, revealingly recasts his larger work on the ancients, and the singularity of his interpretation of classical Hellenistic and Roman thought. (shrink)

In this book, Stephen Cave and John Martin Fischer debate whether or not we should choose to live forever. This ancient question is as topical as ever: while billions of people believe they will live forever in an otherworldly realm, billions of dollars are currently being poured into anti-ageing research in the hope that we will be able to radically extend our lives on earth. But are we wise to wish for immortality? What would it mean for each (...) of us as individuals, for society, and for the planet? -/- In this lively and accessible debate, the authors introduce the main arguments for and against living forever, along with some new ones. They draw on examples from myth and literature as well as new thought experiments in order to bring the arguments to life. Cave contends that the aspiring immortalist is stuck on the horns of a series of dilemmas, such as boredom and meaninglessness, or overpopulation and social injustice. Fischer argues that there is a vision of radically longer lives that is both recognizably human and desirable. This book offers both students and experienced philosophers a provocative new guide to a topic of perennial importance. (shrink)

Is it virtuous for someone to try to live to 100? Casting aside questions of intergenerational justice and internal obligations in families, what about the basic desire itself? Discussions of longevity and aging in bioethics are skewed to controversial end‐of‐life decisions, largely avoiding questions of how to age well before such decisions arise. Respected writers such as Atul Gawande, Daniel Callahan, and Ezekiel Emanuel champion accepting a natural life span and not trying to live beyond it. The (...) Stoic Seneca says a desire to live to 100 is foolish because, however long people live, they waste most of their lives, so if they lived a thousand years, they would still waste most of it. Against Seneca and Emanuel, we argue that a functional, not a chronological, view of aging should guide us and that for some seniors, hoping to be centenarians may be neither foolish nor misguided. Using Cicero, we argue that the pleasures of seniors are not necessarily inferior to those of youth and may even surpass them. Finally, we agree with Emanuel that the “symptom burden” of some lives makes living to 100 unpalatable and with Seneca that, given life’s vicissitudes, we should not plan on living to 100, but heeding his wisdom, try to make the most of the time given to us. (shrink)

Terminally ill people might want to discuss the options they have of hastening their deaths with their psychologists who should therefore know the law that regulates euthanasia in the jurisdictions where they practice. The legal, and therefore ethical, situation that influences psychologists’ position and terminally ill people’s options, however, differs notably across jurisdictions. Our aim is to provide a brief moral-legal historical context that explains how the law reform processes in different jurisdictions created these different legal contexts and options that, (...) in turn, influence psychologists’ ethical position. We conclude by considering 8 specific ethical issues at a conceptual level that might confront psychologists irrespective of where they practice. (shrink)

Bernard Williams (1973) famously argued that if given the choice to relinquish our mortality we should refuse. We should not choose to always live. His piece provoked an entire literature on the desirability of immortality. Intending to contradict Williams, Thomas Nagel claimed that if given the choice between living for a week and dying in five minutes he would always choose to live. I argue that (1) Nagel’s iterating scenario is closer to the original Makropulos case (Čapek’s) that (...) inspired Williams’s piece; (2) iterating versions of the choice given in the Makropulos case might well be less desirable than a one-time choice; and (3) Nagel’s mathematical induction premise is implausible. I discuss some useful implications of (1)-(3) for the broader discussion of Williams’s arguments and, more generally, for our understanding of the value of mortality and the possibility of mutually consistent but necessarily incompatible wants in ordinary human psychology. (shrink)

Reason's capacity to take us where we did not expect to go could also lead to a curious diversion from what one might expect to be the straight line of evolution. We have evolved a capacity to reason because it helps us to survive and reproduce. But if reason is an escalator, then although the first part of the journey may help us to survive and reproduce, we may go further than we needed to go for this purpose alone. We (...) may even end up somewhere that creates tension with other aspects of our nature. In this respect, there may after all be some validity in Kant 's picture of tension between our capacity to reason, and what it may lead us to see as the right thing to do, and our more basic desires. We can live with the contradictions only up to a point. (shrink)

‘We have the strong ground of common hatreds, though perhaps we hate on different or even opposite grounds’. Thus wrote Tocqueville the liberal of Montalembert the liberal Catholic. What lay in common was a desire for an extension of personal liberties, freedom of association, decentralisation, separation of Church and state; but, in recognizing the differences, Tocqueville tacitly acknowledges the areligious nature of his own plea for religion in modern society and asserts the aliberal nature of Montalembert’s dedication to liberal (...) programmes. Both claimed to unite what the French had set asunder, religion and liberalism; both in fact degraded one end by using it as a tool of the other. (shrink)

Different from the commonly used moralistic perspective, this article articulates and evaluates major ideas about human desire within the Confucian tradition through a gongfu perspective, and shows that, although there are historical reasons for blaming Confucianism for suppressing human desires and suffocating humanity, what classic Confucianism advocates is ultimately about how to cultivate humanity, transform human desires, and live artistically, and not imposing a rigid normative moral system externally to constrain human life, making it unsatisfying.

Return to Warden's Grove: Science, Desire, and the Lives of Sparrows Christopher Norment Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2008, xiv + 215 pp., cloth, $26.00 Return to Warden's Grove: Science, D...

The question of how to lead a happy and meaningful life has been at the heart of philosophical debate since time immemorial. Today, however, these questions seem to be addressed not by philosophers but self–help gurus, who frantically champion the individual′s quest for self–expression and self–realization; the desire to become authentic. Against these new age sophistries, How to Stop Living and Start Worrying tackles the question of ′how to live′ by forcing us to explore our troubling relationship with (...) death. For Critchley, philosophy begins with the question of finitude and with his understanding of a key classical theme – that to philosophize is to learn how to die. Learning how to accept both our own and others′ mortality as a part of life also raises the question of how to love. Critchley argues that the act of love requires us to give up something of ourselves, to lose control so as to be open to the demands of love. We will never be equal to this demand and so we are brought face to face with our own limitations – one form of which is what Critchley calls our ′originary inauthenticity′. By scrutinizing the very nature of humour, Critchley explores what we need to laugh at ourselves and presents the need to confront the inescapable ridiculousness of life. Reflecting on the work of over 20 years, this book provides a unique, witty and erudite introduction to the thought of Simon Critchley. It includes a revealing biographical conversation with Critchley and a fascinating debate with the critically acclaimed novelist Tom McCarthy about the nature of authenticity. Taken together the conversations give an intimate portrait of one of the most lucid, provocative and engaging philosophers writing today. (shrink)

Background: Psychiatric nurses are regularly confronted with the uses and effects of control interventions such as mechanical restraints. Although there are evident tensions in the literature regarding the use of mechanical restraints, very little research has focused on the lived and embodied experience of their use, whether from the patient’s perspective or the perspective of nursing staff responsible for their application. Research aims: (1) to gain access to the bodily phenomenon of being placed in mechanical restraints; (2) to give voice (...) to the intimate experiential understanding of this experience; and (3) through phenomenological interpretation, to understand the subjective processes and meaning-making of this experience. Research design: For this research, we adopted a distinctly ethics-oriented application of the methodology known as interpretative phenomenological analysis, that is, the interpretive dimension of the research focused on ethical practice in mental healthcare – one that is informed by experiential accounts of the lived body. Participants and research context: A total of 40 in-depth semi-structured, nondirected interviews with both nurses (n = 21) and patients (n = 19) we conducted to meet the aims of this article. Participants were recruited from an inpatient psychiatric unit of a Canadian general hospital. Ethical considerations: The research received research ethics board clearance from both the hospital where the study took place and the University of Ottawa. Findings: The comparative analysis is presented under the following headings: (1) context of care, (2) meaning of quality of care, (3) emotional reactions and nurse–patient relationship, (4) meeting the needs and (5) need for alternatives. Discussion/conclusions: The research findings are discussed in light of current literature and implications for practice. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill has often been charged with inconsistency in his social thinking. The reason given is usually that he tries to combine too many different traditions of thought into an ideological whole. Too deeply affected by his father and his severely purposeful early education ever to repudiate utilitarianism, he was yet too sensitive to disregard criticism of his inherited creed, and too open-minded to ignore areas of thought and experience generally allen to the utilitarian mind. Professor Robson, whose editing (...) of Mill’s works has already put social theorists and historians of ideas in his debt, disputes this view. He argues that, beneath Mill’s eclecticism, beneath his perhaps over-generous acknow-ledgements of his obligations to others, there is a basic unity of ideas. His discussion of the influences on Mill’s thought covers some fairly well-trodden ground but he brings a good deal of common sense to bear on an area where the excitement of the academic chase for sources has sometimes obscured the obvious. On the whole, he claims, the influence of Coleridge, the Suint-Simonians, Carlyle and Comte was limited; some of their specific ideas Mill accepted and used, but he was clearly aware of the differences of emphasis and context that did exist. Harriet Taylor and Tocqueville contributed more, the first by extending Mill’s vision of desirable social ends and by emphasising the difficulties of applying social theory in the world of practice, the second by his insights into democratic society and his demonstration of a proper sociological method. The deepest influence was, however, his early Benthamite upbringing and it is this life-long commitment to a utilitarian ethic that constitutes, for Professor Robson, the still, calm centre of his mind. There are other unifying ideas—his bias towards practicality and his constant concern with evolving a satisfactory methodology for the social sciences—but even these centred on a continual examination of the adequacies and inadequacies of his father’s doctrine. (shrink)

The author asks about the conceptual tools which would enable a critique of contemporary capitalism without falling back to Utopianism and its historically-discredited theses. With the help of paired categories like community–society, human dignity–self-awareness, need–desire, Gernot Böhme portrays the deficiencies of contemporary Western social reality, e.g. the steadily exhausting reserves of the highly-bureaucratised welfare state system, the rapidly mounting differences in income, or the negative moral and psychological effects of unemployment and the so-called precariat. Böhme presents his critique of (...) “aesthetic capitalism,” which does not satisfy human needs in the Marxist sense but rather the aesthetically-refined consumer desires of today’s affluent societies, in reference to the views of contemporary critical theory authorities. (shrink)

It has been argued that the explanation of self-control requires positing special motivational powers. Some think that we need will-power as an irreducible mental faculty; others that we need to think of the active self as a dedicated and depletable pool of psychic energy or – in today more respectable terminology – mental resources; finally, there is the idea that self-control requires postulating a deep division between reason and passion – a deliberative and an emotional motivational system. This essay argues (...) that no such special motivational powers are necessary. Yet, at the same time, self-control does powerfully illustrate the importance of a feature of the mind. What it illustrates, I argue, is the importance of the mental activity of attention in the control of all action. It is by appeal to this mental activity that we can dispense with special motivational powers. If we think of Humeanism as the view that there is fundamentally only one kind of motivational system and that all action is based in that system, then this essay contributes to a defense of Humeanism. On the other hand, the essay also shows that any model of agency in terms of only beliefs and desires, motivational and representational states, or preferences and credences is incomplete. A different conception of Humeanism as the view that every mental state is either motivational, representational, or a combination of them, is false. (shrink)

To see some of the ways of changing desires begin with a comparison with the rather different case of belief. In the case of belief there are 'rational' ways of changing the opinions, by considering arguments and evidence, and 'non‐rational' ones, such as being hypnotized or joining a religious sect. This chapter discusses cases in which someone wants to change their desires. There is then a conflict between their second order desires and their simple, first order, desires. The chapter also (...) describes how to resolve a conflict between first and second order desires. In evaluating the lives that would follow from possible changes in one's desires one can take account of the pattern as well as the amount or variety of desires that are satisfied. This is inevitable, really, since one's second order as well as one's first order desires have to come under the scope of the shift. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"To make a difference...":Narrative Desire in Global MedicineByron J. Good and Mary-Jo DelVecchio GoodIf, as Arthur Frank (2002) writes, "moral life, for better and worse, takes place in storytelling," this collection of narratives written by physicians working in field settings in global medicine gives us a glimpse of some aspects of moral experience, practice, and dilemmas in settings of poverty and low health care resources. These essays are (...) written from the midst of practice, in diverse settings in Africa, South Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. The majority of the writers are practitioners of contemporary 'global medicine'—physicians from North America or Europe who spend part of their lives flying into settings of poverty or special need to practice medicine and work with on-going collaborative clinical and public health systems—while a smaller number are working in the societies in which they were born. Although a few work for classic humanitarian organizations or have developed their own local NGO's, the great majority are engaged in the 'hybrid life' described by Robert Riviello and noted by Renée Fox, moving between academic medical centers and distant health care systems that are supported by local governments, major international organizations and funding agencies, and international NGO's like Partners in Health. These diverse forms of practice have become a common model for contemporary clinicians engaged in what has emerged as a new discipline of global health or global medicine, and these narratives give us a glimpse of some of the enduring, as well as newly emerging, forms of moral practice and ethical dilemmas characteristic of today's global medicine.Many of these stories are filled with the tension and pathos that makes clinical narratives powerful to read. Physicians are forced to make unfathomable decisions about whether to resuscitate and keep a baby alive, using all means available, or to let the infant die, whether to carry out a procedure that will save an infant in birth but would put the mother at risk, about how to deal with a cancer found in a very advanced state. However, virtually all of the stories transcend these classical stories of the decisions physicians are forced to make by being placed in settings of great scarcity of resources, which stand in particular contrast to the academic medical settings in North America or Europe where many of these global medicine specialists have trained and many continue to practice. The unspeakable inequality of resources emerges throughout these narratives as a kind of master theme, as the underlying moral, as opposed to plot, which gives meaning and sense to the stories. For those who practice medicine in such settings, global inequalities and scarcity of medical resources are deeply felt. They produce the rage that Jeffrey Deal describes. ("I learned to despise American churches during that time, a time when my world encompassed a dying newborn in Sudan, as well as the air conditioned padded seats [End Page 121] of our affluent suburban church.") They produce the distinctive experiences of helplessness and pain felt by clinicians who cannot separate how they would be able to treat such a patient at home from how they have to practice in these settings. For those clinicians working in their own societies, scarcity of resources often produces deep anger at the corrupt governments that fail to support basic human services for the great majority of their population. ("We were temporary actors performing in the cynical play of scarcity on permanent display in Port-au-Prince," writes Haitian physician Paul Pierre about his experience prior to joining Partners in Health.)But for those who regularly travel back and forth across the divide between rich and poor, whether across national boundaries or within their own society, the challenge to live a moral life is unendingly complicated. While becoming a part of a struggle for global justice with colleagues and advocates from both sides of the divide, few of the narrators can avoid personal feelings of ambivalence and guilt at being able to easily move from one side of that divide to the other back home. Many fantasize about giving up their lives in the north to devote themselves... (shrink)

Vogt puts forward a novel version of the Guise of the Good: the desire to have one's life go well shapes and sustains mid- and small-scale motivations. Her book lays out a non-relativist version of Protagoras's Measure Doctrine and defends a new realism about good human lives.

Introduction -- Evidence for the work: the excerpts preserved in Stobaeus -- Title and nature of the work -- Format and style of the work -- Fragments of the Pythagorean precepts preserved in Iamblichus' On the Pythagorean way of life -- A comparison of Stobaeus' and Iamblichus' evidence for the Pythagorean precepts -- Relationship of the Pythagorean precepts to Aristoxenus' other works on the Pythagoreans -- The influence of the Pythagorean precepts on the later Pythagorean tradition -- History of scholarship (...) on the Pythagorean precepts -- The standard view of the Pythagorean precepts -- The ethical system of the Pythagorean precepts -- Fragments with translation and commentary -- The Pythagorean precepts: a reconstructed text in English -- Fragment 1: obedience to parents and the laws (fr. 34 Wehrli = Stobaeus 4.25.45) -- Fragment 2: the importance of order and supervision for every age of life (fr. 35 Wehrli = Stobaeus, 4.1.49) -- Fragment 3: desire (fr. 37 Wehrli = Stobaeus, 3.10.66) -- Fragment 4: the generation of children (fr. 39 Wehrli = Stobaeus, 4.37.4) -- Fragment 5: the love of what is beautiful and fine (fr. 40 Wehrli = Stobaeus 3.1.101) -- Fragment 6: learning must be willing (fr. 36 Wehrli = Stobaeus, 2.31.119) -- Fragment 7: luck (fr. 41 Wehrli = Stobaeus, 1.6.18) -- Fragment 8: human nature is prone to excess and needs the supervision of the gods, parents and laws (fr. 33 Wehrli, Iamblichus, vp 174-6) -- Fragment 9: opinion, the training of children and young people, pleasure, desire, diet, and the generation of children (fr. 38 Wehrli, Iamblichus, vp 200-13) -- Fragment 10: the appropriate and the inappropriate in human interaction on starting points and rulers (Iamblichus, vp 180-3) -- Fragment 11: friendship (Iamblichus, vp 101-2, 230-3) -- Appendices -- Subsidiary precepts 1: avoid crowds in the morning, and 2: avoid hunting (Iamblichus, vp 96-100) -- Subsidiary precept 3: memory (Iamblichus, vp 164) -- Subsidiary precept 4: all sex is harmful (Diodorus Siculus, library of history 10.9.3), Stobaeus, Eclogae 3.1.71: divination, medicine, and music -- Concordance with the fragment numbers in Wehrli's edition. (shrink)

This essay explores the theme of sexual difference in relation to sacrifice by contrasting Girard's account of mimetic desire and cultural violence with Kristeva's extensive reflections on allied themes. Inspired by Reineke's critique of Girard the object of the paper is to generate discussion concerning the ethical implications of recognizing the play of sexual difference in any theory of sacrifice. Specifically it aims to contribute towards a subversion of the sexually specific violence of patriarchy.

Despite our deep desire to live in the freedom that Christ offers, we are acutely aware of the gap between a transformed life and our reality. While behavioral changes can bear good results, true transformation requires a change in paradigm. Pastors Matt Tebbe and Ben Sternke share eight axioms that help us open ourselves to the transformational change that God wants for our lives.

Desire Lines are grassy pathways formed when many people walk the same way over and over again – exploring or shortcutting through city space. Thus, they display an urban history while shaping a space’s present as well. From May to August 2012, I mapped and documented Desire Lines in Edmonton. This paper chronicles my methods and findings, and situates the concept of Desire Lines in a larger theoretical context.

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 88-90.

This paper explores the epistemology and methodology for describing sexual/erotic desire in women. Culture provides a variety of discourses which create possibilities for individual agents to think, experience and act. This paper outlines the dominant discourses of sexuality. The main focus is on the emerging psychodynamic understanding of erotic desire as a cultivated way of experiencing and expressing intersubjective embodied desire. The story of a female research participant has been selected to illustrate the journey from undifferentiated physical (...) and mental experiences of desire to the peculiar integration of both aspects in her lived experience. A combination of interpretive methods is employed. (shrink)

If Spinoza is a thinker very present in the Faculties of Philosophy, on the other hand, he is presented as one of the great forgotten of the humanist programs of secondary education. Contrary to what happened with other philosophers, who had more chance of spreading in non-specialized contexts (we can cite Nietzsche, Pascal, Plato or Schopenhauer as obvious examples), Spinoza is generally considered a excessively systematic author, and complex, whose works would have been written for a small group of scholars. (...) Nothing could be further from the truth. Spinoza’s life was full of completely surprising events, from his estrangement from the Jewish community (which repudiated him in a strict and disagreeable way), through his dalliances with heterodox currents which gradually grew in power, until his meeting with Leibniz and his intrepid travels. from one part of his native Holland to another. In this article, we examine the concept of desire in Spinoza's philosophy and its connection to the philosopher's decision to find the greater good. Since the greatest good, in turn, is nothing but its own enjoyment, we conclude that ignoring its existence, seeking it, and living it are, respectively, the conditions of the vulgar, the philosopher, and the wise, as what happened in the Garden of Epicurus. (shrink)

Recently the General Synod of the Church of England agreed to approve liturgical resources— Prayers of Love and Faith—for blessing same-sex couples. This decision was the result of a long process of discernment concerning matters of sexuality and identity called Living in Love and Faith. This article aims to critique some of the background ethical and theological assumptions at work in the Living in Love and Faith resources, specifically the way the role of asceticism is conceived in them. I argue (...) that while there are promising references to formation of desire through discipline and restraint in the LLF resources, their ascetic intuitions remain limited to world-related goods, neglecting the significance of bodily practices for God-related goods and for our final flourishing. Paying attention to the theological dimensions of Christian ascetic practice will also reveal the importance of concrete limitations for ascetic formation of desire. I argue that such limits are required for unravelling the transcendent capacities of human desire. At the end of the article, I make some suggestions as to how the revitalisation of not just ethical but theological ascetic praxis can be helpful in navigating the Church of England's current disagreement with respect to same-sex unions. (shrink)

The world’s first living donor liver transplant from an HIV-positive mother to her HIV-negative child, performed by our team in Johannesburg, South Africa (SA) in 2017, was necessitated by disease profile and health system challenges. In our country, we have a major shortage of donor organs, which compels us to consider innovative solutions to save lives. Simultaneously, the transition of the HIV pandemic, from a death sentence to a chronic illness with excellent survival on treatment required us to rethink our (...) policies regarding HIV infection and living donor liver transplantation. Although HIV infection in the donor is internationally considered an absolute contraindication for transplant to an HIV-negative recipient, there have been a very small number of unintentional transplants from HIV-positive deceased donors to HIV-negative recipients. These transplant recipients do well on antiretroviral medication and their graft survival is not compromised. We have had a number of HIV-positive parents in our setting express a desire to be living liver donors for their critically ill children. Declining these parents as living donors has become increasingly unjustifiable given the very small deceased donor pool in SA; and because many of these parents are virally suppressed and would otherwise fulfil our eligibility criteria as living donors. This paper discusses the evolution of HIV and transplantation in SA, highlights some of the primary ethical considerations for us when embarking on this case and considers the new ethical issues that have arisen since we undertook this transplant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Our Living SocietyJames CampbellIWhen I was working on my history of the early years of the American Philosophical Association (A Thoughtful Profession), I spent a great deal of time immersed in the unhappy genre of the presidential address. Three divisions, each with its own annual president, make for a lot of presidential addresses. One of the things that I learned from this effort was that these addresses can be (...) sorted quite easily into two types. The first reflects some philosophical interest of the individual president; the second considers the ongoing life of the association. My presidential address will be of the latter sort.I thought that I would speak with you today about the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (SAAP) as a living society. To do so means, of course, that I will be speaking about us. "We" are the members of SAAP—or better, we are SAAP. I will address my remarks primarily to the younger members of the audience: to those who cannot recall a time before SAAP existed. As our Society moves forward, and as the members of the founding generation inevitably pass on, there has been a natural change of focus. Our Society was established nearly forty years ago, at a time when the founders felt great alienation from the American Philosophical Association. The issues that brought them together in the early-1970s, however, are not the issues that we are facing at present. Our issues—your issues as the future of the Society—have fundamentally changed. It is no longer possible, if it ever really was, to define ourselves simply as "not them." We need to articulate, better than we have, not so much who we are as who we desire to become. While our pluralistic ways may no longer stick out in the broader philosophical profession, as Walt Whitman would in a Wall Street brokerage house, we [End Page 128] continue to feel isolation from much of what goes on in the profession. In many ways, SAAP's initial phase has been a tremendous success; but where does SAAP, where do we, go from here?III thought that I might also speak a bit about myself, not because my story is so special, but because it is a small piece of our collective past. Others of you may remember these times differently and may have taken away different lessons. If you will allow me, I will begin my story after I left the Army in 1969 and enrolled at Temple University in Philadelphia, where I had grown up. I was at that time a bit older, and more serious, than most of my fellow students. I enrolled as a philosophy major because, after a number of years entrapped within the military system of blind obedience to unquestioned authority, I wanted to find better justifications for my own, and for society's, practices. Philosophy appealed to me as the place where I might find the answers to my life questions.Unfortunately, philosophy in those days—at Temple and at most other American universities—was not the sort of field in which students found many answers to the questions that puzzled me. We learned a great deal about duck-rabbits and the uncertain location of someone named Brown; we wondered whether a person might know how to sex chickens, and how he or she might know; we explored the apparent menace of female impersonators' conventions for the inherited notion of truth. Overall, philosophy seemed to be a branch of epistemology, rather than vice versa. After several years of this sort of philosophical study, I managed to become very clever. I had a counter-example for any statement more daring than "hello," and I thought that I knew a great deal because I had learned how to avoid all consideration of context or history.Still, through my cleverness, I realized that something was not right. I was not developing answers for my puzzlements about life or the improvement of society. Since I was not doing what I wanted to do in philosophy, the fact that I was doing it quite well mattered little. As I look back now through the eyes... (shrink)

In the United States, people are deeply divided along lines of race, class, political party, gender, sexuality, and religion. Many believe that historical grievances must eventually be left behind in the interest of progress toward a more just and unified society. But too much in American history is unforgivable and cannot be forgotten. How then can we imagine a way to live together that does not expect people to let go of their entrenched resentments? Living with Hate in American (...) Politics and Religion offers an innovative argument for the power of playfulness in popular culture to make our capacity for coexistence imaginable. Jeffrey Israel explores how people from different backgrounds can pursue justice together, even as they play with their divisive grudges, prejudices, and desires in their cultural lives. Israel calls on us to distinguish between what belongs in a raucous “domain of play” and what belongs in the domain of the political. He builds on the thought of John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum to defend the liberal tradition against challenges posed by Frantz Fanon from the left and Leo Strauss from the right. In provocative readings of Lenny Bruce’s stand-up comedy, Philip Roth’s Portnoy’s Complaint, and Norman Lear’s All in the Family, Israel argues that postwar Jewish American popular culture offers potent and fruitful examples of playing with fraught emotions. Living with Hate in American Politics and Religion is a powerful vision of what it means to live with others without forgiving or forgetting. (shrink)

The first important question which confronts the teacher of an introductory course in philosophy is likely to be the question as to how he may best approach the subject of what philosophy is, how to approach it in such a way as to pique the curiosity and excite the interest of the student from the beginning. After considering this question many times, it has recently occurred to the present writer that it might be helpful to make this approach by way (...) of a parable, an allegorical account of what seem to be the three basic human desires—the desire to live, the desire to enjoy life, and the desire to understand life. He accordingly offers this suggestion for whatever it may be worth, and presents the following little tale as at least one possible working-out of that suggestion. (shrink)

During the eighteenth century, the discovery of sexual reproduction in insect species prompted the demise of spontaneous generation and new developments in natural history, theology, and political economy. The sexual lives of insects prompted debates on whether insects were governed by desire, free will, and even marital tendency. Fuelled by the democratisation of microscopy, early modern entomology took a new turn and breadth: the study of insects and of their sexual lives provided unexpected new insights into human sexuality, reproduction, (...) and Malthusian fears of overpopulation. This article surveys the intellectual culture of entomology and natural history during the crucial decades when entomologists worked to quantify the reproductive capacities of insect species. Assessing the influences these entomological works had within political economy and theology, we argue that the sexual lives of insects − once analysed and delineated − influenced familiar ideological features of the intellectual landscape of the late Enlightenment, particularly in the theological philosophies of northern Europe and in the political economy of population in Britain. (shrink)

How have human cultures engaged with and thought about animals, plants, rocks, clouds, and other elements in their natural surroundings? Do animals and other natural objects have a spirit or soul? What is their relationship to humans? In this new study, Graham Harvey explores current and past animistic beliefs and practices of Native Americans, Maori, Aboriginal Australians, and eco-pagans. He considers the varieties of animism found in these cultures as well as their shared desire to live respectfully within (...) larger natural communities. Drawing on his extensive casework, Harvey also considers the linguistic, performative, ecological, and activist implications of these different animisms. (shrink)

This book challenges the widespread assumption that the ethical life and society must be moral in any objective sense. In his previous works, Marks has rejected both the existence of such a morality and the need to maintain verbal, attitudinal, practical, and institutional remnants of belief in it. This book develops these ideas further, with emphasis on constructing a positive alternative. Calling it “desirism”, Marks illustrates what life and the world would be like if we lived in accordance with our (...) rational desires rather than the dictates of any actual or pretend morality, neither overlaying our desires with moral sanction nor attempting to override them with moral strictures. Hard Atheism and the Ethics of Desire also argues that atheism thereby becomes more plausible than the so-called New Atheism that attempts to give up God and yet retain morality. (shrink)

In French, the verb "to live" designates both being alive and the experience of something. This ambiguity has a philosophical meaning. The task of a phenomenology of life is to describe an originary sense of living from which the very distinction between life in the intransitive sense and life in the transitive, or intentional, sense proceeds. Hans Jonas is one of those rare authors who has tried to give an account of the specificity of life instead of reducing life (...) to categories that are foreign to it. However, the concept of metabolism, by which Jonas characterizes vital activity, attests to a presupposition as to life: life is conceived as self-preservation, that is, as negation of death, in such a way that life is, in the end, not thought on the basis of itself. The aim of this article is to show that life as such must be understood as movement in a radicalized sense, in which the living being is no more the subject than the product. All living beings are in effect characterized by a movement, which nothing can cause to cease, a movement that largely exceeds what is required by the satisfaction of needs and that, because of this, bears witness to an essential incompleteness. This incompleteness reveals that life is originarily bound to a world. Because the world to which the living being relates is essentially non-totalizable and unpresentable, living movement can not essentially complete itself. Thus, in the final analysis, life must be defined as desire, and in virtue of this view, life does not tend toward self-preservation, as we have almost always thought, but toward the manifestation of the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Professor’s DesireAnca Parvulescu (bio)Roland Barthes. THE NEUTRAL. Trans. Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier. New York: Columbia UP, 2005. Trans. of Le Neutre. Paris: Seuil, 2002.I add: a reflection on the Neutral, for me: a manner—a free manner—to be looking for my own style of being present to the struggles of my time.—Roland Barthes, The NeutralWhat I am looking for, during the preparation of this course, is an (...) introduction to living, a guide to life (ethical project): I want to live according to nuance.—Roland Barthes, The NeutralLe Neutre reaches us late. Like an echo, it needed time, and it took its time to come. The second of the three courses Roland Barthes gave at the Collège de France between 1977 and 1980, Le Neutre was published in 2002 by Éditions du Seuil, following the editorial work of Thomas Clerc, under the direction of Éric Marty.1 Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier’s translation as The Neutral brought it to life in English in 2005. After thirty years, Le Neutre comes indeed late, but perhaps its lateness, the time of the echo, is part of its very scene.Barthes did not conceive of Le Neutre as a book. It was a course, to happen as a onetime affair and then be put aside: “We’ll have to hold on to the unsustainable for thirteen weeks: after that, it will fade” [13]; “This course is made to die on the spot” [250]. As such, the course is not only an attempt to do justice to a “subject,” to which, Barthes insists, we should not hold on once the course is over, but also to meditate on the very situation of teaching.2 The course on the neutral offers the occasion to ask, What is it to teach? And teaching, we soon find out, is a matter of desire: the course should have been called The Desire for the Neutral. The teacher follows his desire and, in doing so—Barthes is reminded by a student—inflects and curbs the student’s desire. What is it, then, that one desires when one desires the neutral? The teacher is pressed to offer something by way of definition:I define the Neutral as that which outplays [déjoue] the paradigm, or rather I call Neutral everything that baffles the paradigm. For I am not trying to define a word; I am trying to name a thing: I gather under a name, which here is the Neutral.[6]The neutral is a “thing” (no qualifying adjective) that outplays, baffles, or dodges the “implacable binarism” of language as seen through Saussurian linguistics: in order to [End Page 32]produce meaning, one is in the same breath choosing A and refusing B. The search here is for a ”thing” that might suspend, thwart, or elude the paradigm, what Barthes calls its arrogance. Indeed, what would it mean to escape the necessity of choosing, say—this is Barthes’s first example—between je ris (I laugh) and je lis (I read)?A problem for the teaching theater unfolds: the moment one names the “thing,” one brings it into the paradigm, constructing an opposition between the neutral and arrogance. The scene of teaching performs an aporia: “Neutral = impossible; to speak it is to defeat it but not to speak it is to miss its ‘setting up’ [...] to speak this cacophony, I need a course” [29]. There is an obvious tension between teaching, its demands for clear and transparent meaning-making and inherent institutional arrogance, and the neutral. “Arrogance”: “the taking of too much upon oneself as one’s right; the assertion of unwarrantable claims in respect of one’s own importance; undue assumption of dignity, authority, or knowledge” [OED]. The teacher is inevitably occupying the place of arrogance. Indeed, foregrounding its righteousness and authority, arrogance is standing, a position Barthes associates with a certain kind of fascism. The neutral teacher struggles to dodge the arrogance inherent to the teaching scene. Sitting, he stammers, cacophonizes. One speaks, but one accompanies speaking with a continuous performance of an apology for speaking.3 The teacher does not offer an anchor in... (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, we argued that living organ donation from a parent to a child should be described as a beneficent rather than an altruistic act. Emotional relationships can generate an obligation of beneficence to help those with whom we have these relationships. This may involve an obligation for a parent to donate an organ to a child, even though it entails some risk to the parent. The parent's donation is not altruistic because altruistic acts are (...) not obligatory but optional, and they are motivated solely or primarily by other-regarding concerns. In contrast, donor parents' other-regarding concerns are inseparable from their own self-regarding concerns. An individual who donates to a stranger is acting altruistically. She may choose to help others to whom she is not emotionally related for a variety of reasons—sympathy, compassion, generosity, or a desire to give something back to humanity. But she does not have an obligation to do so. Although she may benefit as a consequence of donating, this is not her reason for donating. Instead, her action is motivated by a concern for the recipient's own sake. This is what makes the donation altruistic, and it can be justified without any expectation of benefit to the donor. However, although the potential competent donor decides whether the donation is in her best interests, physicians have the right to refuse to perform a transplant if the risks to the donor are too great or the potential benefits to the recipient are too small. (shrink)

The steady stream of books on medieval manuscripts addressed to a popular audience over the past two decades coincides with the advent of tablets such as Amazon's Kindle. As the flatlands of the digital realm encompass more of life, nostalgia for a tactile realm of reading, whether in the making or the perception of artifacts, asserts itself, as does the desire to immerse oneself in the real space of the conventional book, as opposed to the virtual yet denatured spaces (...) of the metaverse. No accident, then, that, following an introduction that gestures toward medieval subjects and to readers other than Christian, Wellesley's engaging, if episodic, account of medieval manuscripts (published in the United States by Basic Books as The Gilded Page: The Secret Lives of Medieval Manuscripts) opens with a prologue in which she recounts her hands-on visit to a parchment maker, during which she tried to slough the hair off a hide using an implement known as a scudder.Manuscripts permit one to come into contact with the past, or at least to harbor the illusion that one can. Wellesley's book repeatedly evokes the contingency of landmarks and masterworks that make up the history of culture. Pendant chapters treat “Discoveries,” medieval as well as modern, of books that, when first encountered, had been lost to view for the better part of a millennium, as well as the “Near-Disasters” by which famous works such as Beowulf (or indeed entire libraries) made it down to modernity by only a hair's breadth—despite the devil's assurance in Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita that “manuscripts don't burn.” Within a binding held tight by clasps, parchment—even when exposed to fire—can survive, if it is not then reduced to a mess by the water used to douse the flames. Having been rescued from the ruins of Ashburnham House, which burned in 1731, the detached pages of the Cotton Genesis at the British Library—one of a handful of illustrated biblical manuscripts from late antiquity—now look like soggy, burned toast pressed between glass sheets to conserve what little is left.Other chapters in this book make things personal, matching brief biographies of celebrated manuscripts with famous (or not so famous) persons, whether patrons, scribes, or artists—a sequence that reflects their order of importance in the Middle Ages. To have included an afterword as well as an epilogue seems indulgent: one, too brief, on the impact of printing (focused on the English printer Caxton), the other on “The Use and Misuse of the Past,” which dwells on the dispersal of monastic libraries after the English Reformation. The focus on the British Isles, to the neglect of the continent, risks being too narrow for a book so general in scope. The book's very British flavor, however, is also part of what lends it a familiar, chatty tone. A pleasant, companionable read, this extended essay does not advance our knowledge of medieval manuscripts, but it does help diffuse it to a larger audience in a way that makes old books seem companionable. Rather than Hidden Hands, the book might well have been called Comites latentes: hidden friends. (shrink)

According to Glannon and Ross, for an act to be considered altruistic, it cannot be obligatory nor motivated by expectation of self-reward. Given that parents are obligated to help their children and stand to benefit greatly from donating, the authors conclude that parent to child organ donation is not altruistic. Are they correct? I am not sure. In my view, this is a semantic question and the answer depends upon how one defines altruism. Altruism is a complex subject that means (...) different things to different people. If we say that an altruistic act is one that is performed voluntarily, is risky or costly to the actor, and is designed only to benefit others with no expectation of self-reward, then it may be difficult or impossible to identify any such acts. When one risks her own life to save a stranger, others may ask: “Did she really act solely to benefit another or was she motivated, at least in part, by a need to satisfy her conscience or a desire to feel good about herself?” This question is relevant to the motivation of living organ donors. In contrast to the authors' answer that strangers who donate organs do so only out of concern for other people, Carl Fellner argued that many living organ donors, even those who are not related to their recipients, act to benefit themselves. If Fellner is correct, and if organ donation by parents is not altruistic because of the possibility of self-reward, perhaps the same is true of organ donation by strangers. (shrink)

The first part of this essay describes a symbiological approach to gender and sexuality; the second, a symbiological approach to world literatures and some examples of gender and sexuality in symbiological literatures. Both are intended to provide more intimate accounts of the Anthropocene than the typical big pictures of global warming and climate change. While grand and world-historical, to be sure, the Anthropocene also affects the most intimate aspects of our lives. Both sex and gender should be understood as the (...) outcomes of developmental processes more or less stabilized by a wide variety of more or less variable factors in the loop of nature, culture, and technology. Understanding the nature of these processes and their social, biological, and technological causes is essential for comprehending the nature of gender, sex, and sexuality, and the extent to which these are mutable. The essay concludes with some reflections on love in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

While most people believe the best possible life they could lead would be an immortal one, so‐called “immortality curmudgeons” disagree. Following Bernard Williams, they argue that, at best, we have no prudential reason to live an immortal life, and at worst, an immortal life would necessarily be bad for creatures like us. In this article, we examine Bernard Williams' seminal argument against the desirability of immortality and the subsequent literature it spawned. We first reconstruct and motivate Williams' somewhat cryptic (...) argument in three parts. After that, we elucidate and motivate the three best (and most influential) counterarguments to Williams' seminal argument. Finally, we review, and critically examine, two further distinct arguments in favor of the anti‐immortality position. (shrink)

Bernard Williams argues that human mortality is a good thing because living forever would necessarily be intolerably boring. His argument is often attacked for unfoundedly proposing asymmetrical requirements on the desirability of living for mortal and immortal lives. My first aim in this paper is to advance a new interpretation of Williams' argument that avoids these objections, drawing in part on some of his other writings to contextualize it. My second aim is to show how even the best version of (...) his argument only supports a somewhat weaker thesis: it may be possible for some people with certain special psychological features to enjoy an immortal life, but no one has good reason to bet on being such a person. (shrink)