Michel Henry questions the opposition body - flesh as indebted to the opposition between what appears/the appearing, under the light of what he calls the reversal of phenomenology, i.e. the substitution of the phenomenology of the world for a phenomenology of life. This question raises another question: the constitution of intersubjectivity, which this article is trying to answer by developing a schema of intersubjectivity through a critical rereading of the theory of Nietzsche about active force and reactive force.

If, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes, “True philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world,” and if Merleau-Ponty is accordingly often described as a philosopher of the body or a philosopher of painting, how are we to understand the apparently new turn to music that Merleau Ponty makes toward the end of the final completed chapter, entitled “The Intertwining—The Chiasm,” of The Visible and the Invisible? I argue that the course of the “Chiasm” chapter moves from a concern for the (...) reciprocal intertwining of body and world to a concern for the Ineinander of temporality. Thus, there are two dimensions involved in forming Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic structure of the flesh: the fecundity of the sensible world in the dimension of simultaneity and the transcendence of the subject in the dimension of succession. The aim of this article is to explore the part of this structure that pertains to the temporal movement of transcendental intersubjectivity. Focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s adaptation of Husserl’s term, Ineinander, I trace the musical context of the term from Merleau-Ponty’s course notes, “Philosophie aujourd’hui” to the final passages from the “Chiasm” chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, understanding the Ineinander as it pertains to the relation of past and present. Contrary to the overflowing sense of presence experienced by the body in the world, the Ineinander is characterized by succession—by the écart—and finds its natural expression in the movement of music. Thus, the chiastic structure at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the flesh expresses not only the immersion of a body in the world that sees; it expresses also, as that which is no longer and that which is to come, a creative, melodic movement of time. (shrink)

This article explores the possibility of an ethical intersubjective relationship through the reconfiguration of the body. The violence of Western culture derives from a particular gendered fantasy of bodily organization. The Western body is constituted through a fear of lack and of loss, or, in psychoanalytic terms, of castration. The subject defined by castration attempts to defend itself against these dual threats by folding in upon itself, thereby precluding any relation with an other. The belief in lack and its partner, (...) scarcity, informs the socio-political structures that mark the current era. However, there are other ways of imagining the body. By re-imagining the body, it becomes possible, not to avoid loss, but rather to alter its meaning. This act allows for a nonappropriative intersubjective relation to come into being. (shrink)

In Levinas’s early works, the ‘body as subjectivity’ is the focus of research bearing significant implications for his later philosophy of the body. How this is achieved becomes the thrust of this article. We analyze how the existent, through hypostasis, emerges hic et nunc, and explores further its effort to exist is effected in its relation to existence. In delineating this, we argue that the existent does not emerge from the il y a as an idealistic subject, but rather is (...) born as a natural subject. This is arguably the most remarkable aspect of Levinas’s analysis of the dawn of the bodily subject. However, the subjectivity of the subject is to be found in the inescapable self-possession of its embodiment. The body, in turn, is a conditional possibility for being a corporeal subject. We argue that the subject as a being in the flesh is the meaning of the embodied human subject, and it bears fertile implications for the ethical signification of the body. In re-conceiving the meaning of the ‘body as subjectivity’ to ‘ethical signification of the body’ against the odds of the traditional dichotomies, we argue that Levinas tries to overcome the bio-political understanding of racist conception of the body subject. Given this ethical meaning beyond materiality we reconsider how the embodied subject is a radical passivity as a ‘here I am’. In suggesting the implication of this claim with Levinas we find how the ethical subjectivity is beyond dualistic assertions and racist conceptions. (shrink)

Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither does (...) my somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa. (shrink)

From the “psychoplasmic” offspring in The Brood (1979) to the tattooed encodings in Eastern Promises (2007), David Cronenberg presents a compelling vision of embodiment, which challenges traditional accounts of personal identity and obliges us to ask how human beings persist through different times, places, and bodily states while retaining their sameness. Traditionally, the response to this question has emphasised the importance of cognitive memory in securing the continuity of consciousness. But what has been underplayed in this debate is the question (...) of how the body can both reinforce and disrupt the grounds for our personal identity. Accordingly, by turning the notoriously “body conscious” work of Cronenberg, especially his seminal The Fly (1986), I intend to pursue the relation between identity and embodiment in the following way. First, by augmenting John Locke’s account of personal identity with a specific appeal to the body, I will explore how Cronenberg’s treatment of embodiment as a site of independent experience challenges the idea we have that cognitive memory is the guarantor of personal identity. Cronenberg’s treatment of the “New Flesh” posits an account of the body that undermines the Cartesian and Lockean account of personal identity as being centred on the mind. In its place, I will argue that Cronenberg shows us how the body establishes a personality independently of the mind. Second, through focusing explicitly on body memory, I will explore how we, as embodied subjects, relate to our bodies in a Cronenbergian world. Approaching this relation between memory and embodiment via the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, I will argue that memory is at the heart of Cronenberg’s vision of body horror. I will conclude by suggesting that far from generating unity, Cronenberg’s vision of embodiment and identity is diseased (often literally) by a memory that cannot be assimilated by cognition. The result of this failure to assimilate body memory, is that memory itself occupies the role of the monster within. (shrink)

This paper delves into the complex and conflicting relationship between the body-subject and body-object, as well as the self and the other, within the context of anorexia nervosa. Within the field of phenomenology of medicine and health, the emphasis tends to be on the dimension of the lived body, with limited attention given to the physical dimension of the body. Recognizing the work of scholars who have acknowledged this oversight and made progress in addressing it, this paper aims to further (...) unify the two bodily dimensions of the lived body and the physical body by drawing primarily on Husserl’s phenomenology of constitution and intersubjectivity. The central argument put forth is that in the case of anorexia nervosa, confronted with the inherent split between these dimensions and the conflicting relationship between the self and other, it is crucial to adhere to the constitutive principle of irreducibility of subjectivity. Moreover, there is a need to promote the constitutive interplay between the two dimensions and accentuate the constitutive dialectic structure of the self and other. Through these insights, the paper offers potential avenues for understanding and addressing the lived experiences of individuals battling anorexia nervosa. (shrink)

This article explores the formation of a tranimal, hippopotamus alter-ego. Confronting transgender with transpecies, the author claims that his hippopotamus “identity” allowed him to escape, all at once, several sets of categorization that govern human bodies. He starts with an account of how his metaphorical hippo-self is collectively produced and performed, distinguishing the subjective, the intersubjective and the social. The article then investigates the politics of equating transgender and transpecies, critically examining the question of the inclusion of “xenogenders” in the (...) trans political movement. Finally, the author returns to the magical power of metaphors, arguing that metaphors do materialize insofar as the flesh does not remain unchanged by them. Analogizing his hippo-self to a “cut” as theorized by Eva Hayward – a regeneration of the boundaries of the self – he offers a final crossing to the world of fiction by showing how the His Dark Materials trilogy outlines an aesthetics of porosity, which suggests that the self is, as much as a novel, a work of fiction. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging study of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, Roger Frie develops a critical account of recent conceptions of the subject in philosophy and pdychoanalytic theory. Using a line of analysis strongly grounded in the European tradition, Frie examines the complex relationship between the theories of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, language and love in the work of a diverse body of philosophers and psychoanalyists. He provides lucid interpretations of the work of Sartre, Binswanger, Lacan, Habermas, Heidegger, Freud and others. Because it (...) integrates perspectives from continental philosophy, analytical philosophy, and psychoanalytic theory, this book will appeal to a wide audience in the areas of philosophy, history of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and social theory. (shrink)

A phenomenological approach to questions of the body, ego, temporality and intersubjective relations with the 'other' by a leading French thinker and Husserl scholar.

The aim of this article is to flesh out gender by drawing connections between the experience of pain and the experience of womanhood. The article builds upon two themes in feminist work (the constitution of woman through her effacement, and the inscription of gender on the body) and proposes to analyse `effacement' in terms of an embodied sense of being `gutted out', or made `immaterial'. I use this imagery of `gutting out' to suggest that effacement is experienced through the body, (...) and in terms of the presence of pain rather than merely in terms of lack or absence (of voice or subjectivity). Thus I share the view that gender is performed through inscriptions on the body, but I argue that this work of gendering involves hurting and injuring women's bodies; and it is this pain that I attend to in the article. I draw upon Scarry's analysis of the body in pain as a symbolic framework to discuss the pain of womanhood in terms of the annihilation of the self as it is engulfed in a mass of hurting flesh. (shrink)

In this study, the author develops an original reading of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. This text, far from giving rise to a “transcendental solipsism”, as classical commentators claim, leads to a constitution of intersubjectivity on various levels . In its center, a “phenomenological construction” operates, i.e. a methodological piece that masters the genetic approach of intersubjectivity. Closely following the “almost mathematical” rigour of this crucial text of Husserl’s phenomenology, the author equally tackles the issue of the constitution of (...) the experience of the other and the truly intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity. The article concludes with the metaphysical results of the analysis of the experience of the other. (shrink)

Not all homo sapiens are human subjects. This paper explores the lived experience of homo sapiens but not human that I call “lived flesh.” A lived experience/distinction that shouldn’t be possible on Merleau-Ponty’s account of human subjectivity in Phenomenology of Perception and “The Intertwining – The Chiasm.” The use of flesh is deliberate and emerges from my engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and “The Intertwining – The Chiasm” through Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Hortense Spillers’ “Interstices: A Small Drama of Words” (...) and “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Amber Musser’s Sensual Excess: Queer Femininity and Brown Jouissance, and Audre Lorde’s Zami: A New Spelling of My Name. The affective, experiential, and ethical practices of american Blackwomxn in these texts problematize Merleau-Ponty’s account of human subjectivity and his account of the generality of Being (“The Intertwining – The Chiasm”). Merleau-Ponty’s effacement of raced, sexed, and gendered difference results in a construct of the human subject that cannot include all homo sapiens. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show that an expansive normative vision can be drawn from Hegel's texts, one whose scope significantly exceeds the anthropocentric model presented in the ‘objective spirit’ parts of his system. This expansion of normativity is linked to an expansive vision of relationality underpinning Hegel's model of ‘concrete freedom’. In order to put into sharper relief the links between expansive relationality and normativity, the late thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is mobilized as a heuristic contrasting point. In the ‘subjective (...) spirit’ sections of theEncyclopaediaare found insights that anticipate key features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’. Locating these insights allows us to detect the underlying thread this paper seeks to mine. Hegel's own ‘theory of flesh’ culminates in the notion of ‘constitutive attachments’, the idea that the content of subjectivity is made up of all the bonds linking the human subject to her surrounding worlds and objects. Since freedom for Hegel is ‘being with’, and since normative demands arise from the different ways in which freedom is concretely realized, it would seem that Hegel's relational conception of subjectivity should lead to an equally expansive conception of normativity. Against the objection that Hegel denied any normative status to non-human beings, the paper points to passages in his work, notably his account of aesthetic judgement and natural beauty, which appear to suggest the opposite. (shrink)

This is the first book to examine the Subtle Body- a model of subjectivity found in esoteric, eastern and western religious and philosophical traditions from a transdisciplinary and cross-cultural perspective. It considers this radical form of self as enabling an innovative reconsideration of the dualisms at the heart of western discourse: mind-body, divine-human, matter-spirit, reason-emotion, I-other. Emerging from this consideration is an interrelated aestheticethic that promotes an understanding of embodiment that is not exclusively tied to materiality. This perspective posits an (...) individual as inherently intersubjective, creative and open. It presents subjectivity as relation: a dynamic relation that does not erase individuality while being inclusive of relations with radical alterity. The text considers subtle bodies as found in various traditions including Yoga and Tantra traditions, The Theosophical Society, Renaissance Hermeticism, Sufism and even within the work of contemporary philosopher Luce Irigaray. Conceptual interrelations are traced across the disciplines of religion, philosophy and art history/theory, with a particular focus on its relevance to contemporary feminist religious studies/philosophy, mysticism and theories of desire. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to find out the possibility of overcoming the problem of modern philosophy which is represented by the identity philosophy by the problem of 'difference' in Merleau - Ponty 's ‘Body - Flesh Ontology’. In particular, we will note that although Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is still phenomenology, it is distinguished from Husserl's phenomenology and very important. So Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is the phenomenology of phenomenology and the ‘Body-Flesh Ontology’. Therefore, the problem of 'subject' arises here. Merleau-Ponty finds (...) subjectivity in the body rather than in reason. A body must have individuality, and subjectivity can also be established. The subject can not deny the relationship because it is the subject. The body has identity as a body - subject and communicates with the world. The world is a co-world of body-subjects. Merleau-Ponty therefore explains ontologically the flesh as an ontological foundation upon which body-subjects can have individuality. Flesh is the source of life and fundamental chapter. It is because these bodies are the world bodies that each body can directly contact. Therefore, each body is explained as ‘intercorporéité’, and eventually ‘intercorporéité’ will be confirmed as the foundation of ‘intersubjectivité’. This study suggests that Merleau - Ponty 's body phenomenology and flesh ontology are on a continuous line, and that Merleau - Ponty' s philosophy is ‘Body - Flesh Ontology’. (shrink)

What does Husserlian phenomenology have to offer feminist theory? More specifically, can we find resources within Husserl’s account of the living body ( Leib ) for the critical feminist project of rethinking embodiment beyond the dichotomies not only of mind/body but also of subject/object and activity/passivity? This essay begins by explicating the reasons for feminist hesitation with respect to Husserlian phenomenology. I then explore the resources that Husserl’s phenomenology of touch and his account of sensings hold for feminist theory. My (...) reading of Husserl proceeds by means of a comparison between his description of touch in Ideas II and Merleau-Ponty’s early appropriation of this account in the Phenomenology of Perception, as well as through an unlikely rapprochement between Husserl and Irigaray on the question of touch. Moreover, by revisiting the limitations in Husserl’s approach to the body—limitations of which any feminist appropriation must remain cognizant—I attempt to take Husserl’s phenomenology of touch beyond its initial methodologically solipsistic frame and to ask whether and how it can contribute to thinking gendered and racialized bodies. The phenomenology of touch, I argue, can allow us to understand the interplay between subjective, felt embodiment and social-historical context. In opening up Husserl’s account of touch to other dimensions—intersubjective and affective—sociality is revealed as residing within, and structuring of, touch. Such touch can allow us to think embodiment anew. (shrink)

This article provides a phenomenological description of aquatic rescue within the framework of interdisciplinary and reflective social phenom­enology in the Schutzian tradition. Aquatic rescue is a professional discipline involving the care of others, such as bathers, in various environments: beaches, swimming pools, rivers, lakes, lagoons and other water bodies. Care implies not only intervention before the emergency and the need for corresponding assis­tance, but the anticipation and prevention of possible and/or imminent danger as well. One of the central objectives of (...) this work is to clarify how the social relationship of care works from a Schutzian perspective, that is, the relationship involving the embodied intersubjectivity of a shared environment, as well as what is communicated and expressed between lifesavers and between lifesavers and bathers. This characterization requires paying attention to the internal perspective of the participants involved: bathers or victims and lifeguards, the extent of their knowledge and what they have experienced in time and space, along with their skills, subjective meanings involved, and the “because motives” and “in order to motives” of their actions in the context of their projects. (shrink)

Body and World is the definitive edition of a book that shouldnow take its place as a major contribution to contemporary existentialphenomenology. Samuel Todes goes beyond Martin Heidegger and MauriceMerleau-Ponty in his description of how independent physical natureand experience are united in our bodily action. His account allows himto preserve the authority of experience while avoiding the tendencytoward idealism that threatens both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.Todes emphasizes the complex structure of the human body ;front/back asymmetry, the need to balance in a (...) gravitational field, and so forth ;and the role that structure plays in producing the spatiotemporal field of experience and in making possible objective knowledge of the objects in it. He shows that perception involves nonconceptual, but nonetheless objective forms of judgment. One can think of Body and World as fleshing out Merleau-Ponty's project while presciently relating it to the current interest in embodiment, not only in philosophy but also in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology. Todes's work opens new ways of thinking about problems such as the relation of perception to thought and the possibility of knowing an independent reality ;problems that have occupied philosophers since Kant and still concern analytic and continental philosophy. (shrink)

I begin this paper with a survey of the textual evidence for a new Cartesian subject, a post-Cartesian Cartesian individual, for whom the life of the body, its passions, and its relationships are central. In the second section, I consider his remarks on hatred, which complicate his view embodied life. Even if Descartes’s study of the passions in his treatise as well as his correspondence calls for a more nuanced understanding of the Cartesian person, we will find in his attention (...) to embodiment a conflicted and wary human being for whom relationships can be nourishing and sweet just as easily as they can be noxious and bitter. (shrink)

This paper explores the phenomenon of being ill (in cases of serious, chronic and terminal illnesses) both in its subjective and intersubjective dimensions. My main contention is that the philosophical tools of phenomenology uncover the framework for understanding the lived experience of the ill person as they privilege the first-person account of illness. It is through this that the essence of things and phenomena surrounding the body-in-illness are unveiled, as opposed to the medical world’s perspective, a third-person account of diseases. (...) A phenomenology of illness underscores that illness is a substantial parcel of human existence that alters the ill person’s experience of the body, intersubjective relations with the other, and relation with the world entirely. This essay is constituted of four major sections dabbling with a phenomenological account of the experience of the lived body, the body-in-illness, the intersubjective dimension of the body-in-illness, and a note on health. (shrink)

One of the traditional metaphysical assumptions that Heidegger's Being and Time challenges is that the disembodied 'theoretical' standpoint has priority over the embodied 'practical' standpoint. Heidegger argues that any act of theoretical reflection is derivative of pre-reflective social practices that we are "always already" familiar with. Some contemporary critics insist they are continuing this project by exploring aspects of our concrete practices that Heidegger's analysis allegedly overlooks, particularly by focusing on the role that the body plays in everyday life. In (...) this dissertation, I address these criticisms and suggest that they contribute to Heidegger's project only on the ontic level and in no way diminish the original contribution of his philosophy. Heidegger is not overly concerned with regional investigations into the various ways that human beings meaningfully encounter things in the world. Heidegger is concerned with the being of beings , with fundamental ontology, which asks the question: "How come meaning?" Or, put in another way, "What are the conditions for the possibility of any meaning, any intelligibility whatsoever?" ;For Heidegger, human existence as Dasein is, ultimately, neither a body-subject with emotions, perceptions, instincts, or social habits nor a self-enclosed mind. Rather, Dasein is more like a 'mass' term, referring to a shared, unfolding background of cultural relations: norms, customs, institutions, historical events, and equipment. This public background is already "there," prior to the appearance of the body, and it is structured temporally, constituting a horizon, "clearing" , or "space of free play" in terms of which things can show up as meaning something to me. I argue that it is only by means of this prior clearing of intelligibility that I can make sense of my embodied practices and that bodies can initially emerge-into-presence as the kind of things that they are. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 209-214 [Access article in PDF] Body-Subjects Martin Wyllie Keywords embodied subjectivity, dialectical relationships, body-subject A complete description of melancholic ex-perience and the experience of suffering can only be given by considering the human being as an embodied subject (body-subject) that is already and always situated in the world (body-subject-in-the-world). A full understanding of the body-subject eliminates the mutual exclusivity of certain conceptual categories. (...) There is no need to preserve the dichotomies of subject/object, inner/outer, mind and body within the field of psychopathology because body and mind and world may be reconciled through the concept of the body-subject. The concept of the body-subject provides a means of evolving a common language that could unify many descriptive levels of explanation into a single integrative descriptive framework.Each of the four excellent commentaries moves the debate forward and I attempt to do the same by engaging in some of the issues raised. Without doubt there is more to lived time than outlined within my paper. For example, the useful "implicit/explicit" distinction of temporality (Fuchs 2005) and "cognitive temporal experience" (Kupke 2005) are important for any developing description of lived time. Kupke identifies that the processes and structures in relation to lived time, intersubjective time (subject–other) and cognitive temporal experience (subject–object) as articulated, in my paper, remain ambiguous. This short reply attempts to clarify some of this ambiguity by placing the concept of lived time within a wider "body-subject-in-the-world" framework (Wyllie 2003). This "body-subject-in-the-world" framework attempts to integrate the universal structures of embodiment, lived time, lived space, and intersubjectivity into a unified description of human experience. Concentrating on some of the problems with this framework, I attempt to clarify some of the ambiguity and show how this slowly developing framework can be of benefit in describing psychopathologic phenomena.One problem in articulating any developing conceptual framework, particularly within the domain of philosophical phenomenology, is attempting to find language that is neutral and does not carry with it a large theoretical payload. This "view from nowhere" approach is, however, doomed to failure as one has to inevitably build on and appropriate meanings, concepts and terms that are already given. Broome (2005) clearly demonstrates the importance of scientific models and outlines how scientific explanatory models are necessary and complementary companions to phenomenological models of melancholia. Matthews (2005) argues that "causal relationships" and causal terms are more appropriate to a scientific understand of melancholia and that the use of reductive subject/object, cause/effect language may be inappropriate because I attempt to holistically understand the phenomena of melancholia. Nonetheless, such a holistic approach ultimately includes the language of the molecular (scientific), the subjective [End Page 209] (intentional), and the communal (intersubjective). There flows from Matthews's point the rational for attempting to evolve a common language that could unify descriptive "phenomenological" and prescriptive "scientific" levels of "explanation" into a common integrated explanatory framework. This, however, is no easy task because one has in developing an inclusive description of melancholia to liberate both the "objective" and "subjective" without losing the force of either polarity. For this to occur something in addition to causal relationships needs to be considered when attempting to describe melancholia. A small part of this "something in addition" may be supplied by considering dialectical relationships.The concept of a causal relationship, as opposed to a dialectical relationship, attempts to understand processes in an atomistic fashion and this may be a wholly inadequate way of characterizing the phenomenology of melancholia or, for that matter, human experience. For example, the objects of my immediate experience only constitute a small minority of that which I can experience in that moment, and this is because I can have the experience of absent objects, impossible objects, future objects, past objects, and ideal objects. The directedness of my experience at those moments toward these objects is not brought about because I am causally influenced by the spatial world proximity of the objects in question. It maybe argued my relation to these... (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to examine the objective side of subjectivity formation through music. I attempt to show how music is a way to configure subjectivity in its interiority, but in a way that it can be shared between other individual subjectivities. Music has an objective structure, but this structure is the temporal and sonorous interiority of subjectivity. It has as its objective manifestation and consequence the feelings and emotions. These feelings are subjective, and in the level of (...) subjective Geist they are related to intuition. Hegel believes that such intuition cannot be properly communicated, due to its exclusive access to the individual subject himself. Despite that, music is an art, and it takes part in the level of absolute Geist. That means that music is the connection between the objective and subjective sides of Geist, being a product of social relations, including the sharing, experience and recognition of subjective operations by the participants in society as something in common. Art is related to intuition but it is not intuition itself, nor it is reduced to the capacity of intuition. All three capacities of the subjective Geist in the theoretical Geist (namely intuition, representation and thinking) can be part of the relationship between art and the individual perspective.However, the link between art and intuition is an analogy between the subjective Geist and the absolute Geist, considering that art is a level of manifestation of social self-consciousness where the people and the social group have not yet become conscious of its content in its manifestation. The exposition of the ideal content of social relations is manifested through absolute Geist, beginning with its sensible manifestation. After this process, it is signified through a practice related to representation, and finally it is related to a conceptually and linguistically mediated practice, philosophy. These products cannot be a consequence of a mere subjective connections, but must be (as part of absolute Geist) a consequence of the objective relation between individuals in its subjective manifestations. Furthermore, subjective capacities are a condition without which the development of the absolute Geist is not possible. At the same time, it is not possible that subjective Geist’s capacities can be fully realized without social relations. Science is not a product of an individual-solipsistic relationship with the environment, but a product of a social relations, including language, shared experiences and shared ways of comprehension, such as the common way to feel and receive the environment in a subjective level discussed below. I divide this exposition into three parts: (1) music and subjectivity, where I deal with the relation between body vibration, time, sound and the formal interiority of the listener/musical subject, analyzing the form of music in its subjective side (the relation to the listener); (2) music and content, where I examine the content generated by music as being the process of formation itself (i.e. the process of given form to the interiority of subjectivity through sounds becomes its own content, namely, the feelings); and (3) music and words, where I scrutinize the relationship between music and words’ capacities to make reference and to have content, considering the connection between pure music and lyrics, and between music and poetry as singular forms of art. I conclude with the idea that music has a specific role in Hegel’s system, which is to bring to light and develop absolute Geist’s (understood as the objectivation and formation of a social and cultural subjectivity) internal aesthetic form. (shrink)

Much work has been done, recently, on the harms and benefits of shaming. One may argue, for example, that feeling shamed inherently alienates and forecloses, and thus quite harmful to a compulsorily social and futurally oriented creature. This does not, however, preclude the argument that shame is ethically useful, providing, at a very basic, felt level, the absolute prohibitions such a social, futural, creature requires. This paper does not claim to finally evaluate shame itself. Instead I look to Merleau-Ponty, seeking (...) the fleshly and felt structures of the social world – of our innate proximity and intimacy, as well as our isolation and alienation – within the embodied phenomenon of being ashamed. From the contours of this spontaneous, yet admittedly dangerous, corporeo-social phenomenon, there is comes an intimation of an ethics of the flesh: one which compels us to at least attempt to heed the often opaque, even mysterious powers of our bodies, not only for the good of our intimate others, but for the good of entire peoples. (shrink)

The main idea of this book (in Arabic) is that the dichotomy of intention/behavior is about as viable as the mind/body dichotomy, which is to say it is not at all viable. An approach to the problem of knowledge of other minds and intersubjectivity via a discussion of the ontology of human action, which must be viewed as an original unity, not a combination of two really distinct things, namely, intention and bodily movement.

Eric Santner offers a radically new interpretation of Marx's labor theory of value as one concerned with the afterlife of political theology in secular modernity. What Marx characterized as the dual character of the labor embodied in the commodity, he argues, is the doctrine of the King's Two Bodies transferred from the political theology of sovereignty to the realm of political economy. This genealogy, leading from the fetishism of the royal body to the fetishism of the commodity, also suggests a (...) new understanding of the irrational core at the center of economic busyness today, its 24/7 pace. The frenetic negotiations of our busy-bodies continue and translate into the doxology of everyday life the liturgical labor that once sustained the sovereign's glory. Maintaining that an effective critique of capitalist political economy must engage this liturgical dimension, Santner proposes a counter-activity, which he calls "paradoxological." With commentaries by Bonnie Honig, Peter Gordon, and Hent de Vries, an introduction by Kevis Goodman, and a response from Santner, this important new book by a leading cultural theorist and scholar of German literature, cinema, and history will interest readers of political theory, literature and literary theory, and religious studies. (shrink)

In this article I critically re-examine Julia Kristeva's view that becoming a speaking subject requires psychical matricide: violent separation from the maternal body. I propose an alternative, non-matricidal conception of subjectivity, in part by drawing out anti-matricidal strands in Kristeva's own thought, including her view that early mother–child relations are triangular. Whereas she understands this triangle in terms of a first imaginary father, I re-interpret this triangle using Donald Winnicott's idea of potential space and Jessica Benjamin's idea of an intersubjective (...) space of thirdness. I argue that this space provides a maternal third term: a relation of connection and difference between two, a relation that inherits the affective, mobile, generative qualities of the maternal body as the infant (according to Kristeva) imagines it. This connecting space allows both mothers and children to emerge as subjects in their own right. I then suggest that potential-maternal space expands into language, so that language intrinsically allows the possibility of a speaking position of connection with the mother. Entrance into language need not entail separation or matricide: the problem is not language as such but the particular way that speech and logos have been defined historically. (shrink)

The concept of suture has long been an important and controversial concept in investigations of the relationships between narrative, diegesis, character, and spectator. The dominant understanding of suture has paid more attention to its Lacanian derivation – and to the account given by Daniel Dayan – than to the work of Jean-Pierre Oudart which first introduced suture into Film Studies. This article, however, follows the recent work of George Butte, who argues that the way Oudart understands suture is very illuminating (...) for the study of the complex forms of intersubjectivity that cinema so readily, and so richly, dramatises – famously by means of shot/reverse shot figures. It argues that certain key moments in Ridley Scott's Alien activate ideas of corporeality, desire, and intersubjectivity in ways that contribute to a wider thematic and figurative nexus at work in the film directed at the exploration of impossible intersubjectivities. The article also proposes that, via this nexus, the film offers an intriguing instantiation of Nietzsche's notion of the “human, all too human”, thereby demonstrating that there is much more in Nietzsche of relevance to Alien than the xenomorph's superhuman “will-to-power”. The android Ash's admiration for the alien's lack both of conscience and consciousness ironically indicates his own all-too-human recognition of the superfluity but inescapability of his own consciousness. The article concludes by drawing briefly on the work of Stanley Cavell on acknowledgment, proposing that much of the horror of Alien lies not only in how bodies are ruptured but in the fact that some subjectivities cannot even be sutured. (shrink)

I focus on empathy from an eidetic perspective, that provided by Edith Stein in her work On the Problem of Empathy and which I call eidetics of empathy. I suggest that the eidetics of empathy allows us to inquire efficaciously into the structure of empathy, and therefore into the relation between empathy on the one hand, and embodied personal identity and intersubjectivity on the other. I argue that the eidetics of empathy sheds light on the complexity, heterogeneity and also (...) fragility of the acts of empathy that we perform in our everyday life with respect to others, and provides us with the conceptual tools to address crucial questions such as: What is the specific and distinctive structure of empathy? What are the conditions of possibility of the performance of acts of empathy? Are there different fulfilment degrees of empathy? What role do living bodies play in the performance of acts of empathy? How is it possible to prevent and correct mistakes of empathy? I deal with these issues in making three points on the eidetics of empathy. My first point is that the eidetics of empathy allows us to understand empathy as one type of acts of perceiving others and their experiences directly and as a whole that is subject to variations of its parts – the limits of possible co-variations of its parts correspond to the essential structure of empathy. Secondly, I focus on the eidetic issue of the possible co-variations of parts of the empathy-type: the content and the degree of fulfilment and accomplishment of empathy acts, the layer of the person they address, the varieties of living beings with whom we can empathize. Thirdly, I argue that the eidetics of empathy exemplifies very well the ontologically qualitative issue of degrees of existence of any entity in relation to its eidetic paradigm, and it is a prime example of how phenomenological eidetics can be a qualitative ontology dealing with qualitative issues that are crucial in our everyday life. (shrink)

The foundational status that Edmund Husserl envisages for phenomenology in relation to the sciences would seem to suggest that the successful unfolding of contemporary debates in the field of social cognition will be conditioned by progress in resolving certain central controversies in the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, notably in long-standing questions pertaining to the priority of subjectivity in relation to intersubjectivity, and the priority of empathy in relation to other forms of intersubjectivity. That such controversies are long-standing is (...) in no small part attributable to the fact that the debate surrounding Husserl’s seminal attempts to elucidate these problems has placed his account, and certainly his published position, under a certain amount of pressure, pressure which stems from the suspicion that intentionality toward others may be more deeply embedded in subjectivity than the Husserl of Cartesian Meditations seems prepared to admit. Is the primordinally reduced solipsistic subject of the Fifth Meditation really capable of discovering intersubjectivity in the way that Husserl describes, or is such putative discovery (indeed, subjective transformation) already conditioned by a more primitive form of intersubjectivity? This paper investigates two ways in which this kind of “circularity” objection might arise. Firstly, it might be argued that Husserl presupposes an external perspective on one’s own body, a perspective which rationally would have to be correlated with an indeterminate foreign subjectivity. Secondly, the view has been advanced (Zahavi in Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity: a response to the linguistic-pragmatic critique. Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, 2001b) that horizonal perceptual awareness of another spatio-temporal entity turns out to be essentially intersubjective, on the grounds that awareness of some of an object’s averted aspects commits one to positing the possibility in principle of those averted aspects being available to an indeterminate foreign subjectivity. Objections such as these seem to place the phenomenological enquiry into the encounter with another person at something of a crossroads. On the one hand, they have led some to argue that basic empathy, as Husserl conceives it, must indeed be conditioned by the anonymous constituting influence of a more primitive form of intersubjectivity. On the other hand, the option remains open to seek to defend Husserl’s published position against the charges of circularity. This paper pursues the latter alternative, and argues that, with appropriate clarification, the objections from circularity can be convincingly answered. It will be argued that the key to understanding why the standard Husserlian position can be sustained lies in recognising the centrality of the activity of the imagination as a condition for the possibility of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

By critically analyzing the status and differentiation of bodies and their lives, the author expands the vision of governmentality beyond the West in order to define the body beyond the pacified techno-promises of their emancipation through fragmentation, calculability and programmability. By elaborating the nature, power, and promises of dominant digital technologies and technobodies, the author conceptualizes them in relation to the shift between bio- and necropolitics/power and in relation to violence, (digital) coloniality, and racialization to which bodies are exposed. It (...) is about the normality of violence against the Other, also in relation to the principle of separation of virtual bodies and “surplus flesh,” which increases exponentially with technological development. The author seeks to understand how we have come to the point where techno-objects are humanized, given agency, while the body and life of the Other are dehumanized, deprived of any rights. The article contextualizes and re-politicizes the shifting relations between subject and object, particularly within our forensic contemporaneity. (shrink)

This article examines the connection between actions, temporality, and media-based observation. Slow motion technology is currently being used especially in sports to examine and evaluate athletes’ actions more precisely in order to identify potential infringements of rules. Starting with a phenomenological perspective, this article engages in a critical assessment of the degree to which the intentions underlying athletes’ actions become clearer if their actions are slowed down using slow motion. It transpires that a more in-depth understanding is not possible because (...) the process of time-stretching using media technology tends to obscure intersubjective understanding. Nevertheless, the use of different playback speeds does increase observers’ sensitivity to the temporality of action and observation. This is particularly the case when greater emphasis is placed on the body and its role in the formation and carrying out of intentions. With the phenomenological view and in special consideration of the body and the subjective intentionality, the paper contributes to a discussion about the connection of time and action already led in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. These findings mark a contribution to empirical social research as well, which is increasingly using video material in action analysis and should take slow motion as a possible augmented but also manipulated access to actions into account adequately. To this end, this article suggests a method for identifying the merits and demerits of using slow motion to analyse actions, and discusses the methodological implications of temporality in observation. (shrink)

How is our experience of the world affected by our experience of others? Such is the question I will be exploring in this paper. I will do so via the agoraphobic condition. In agoraphobia, we are rewarded with an enriched glimpse into the intersubjective formation of the world, and in particular to our embodied experience of that social space. I will be making two key claims. First, intersubjectivity is essentially an issue of intercorporeality, a point I shall explore with (...) recourse to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the prepersonal body. The implication of this claim is that evading or withdrawing from the other remains structurally impossible so long as we remain bodily subjects. Second, the necessary relation with others defines our thematic and affective experience of the world. Far from a formal connection with others, the corporeal basis of intersubjectivity means that our lived experience of the world is mediated via our bodily relations with others. In this way, intercorporeality reveals the body as being dynamically receptive to social interactions with others. Each of these claims is demonstrated via a phenomenological analysis of the agoraphobe’s interaction with others. From this analysis, I conclude that our experience of the world is affected by our experience of others precisely because we are in a bodily relation with others. Such a relation is not causally linked, as though first there were a body, then a world, and then a subject that provided a thematic and affective context to that experience. Instead, body, other, and world are each intertwined in a single unity and cannot be considered apart. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Are Dead Bodies For?:An Augustinian ThanatologyPhilip PorterIntroductionSt. Augustine's De cura pro mortuis gerenda is one of the earliest sources for Christian thought on dead human bodies. In this work, he examines traditional Christian practices of care for the dead and provides a theological interpretation of those practices. In De cura, Augustine does not aim primarily to help the reader discern what are licit and illicit behaviors, but rather (...) to discover what is occurring in the context of the funerary practices of Christians with reference to the economy of salvation. It examines, in other words, how the bodies of the departed Christian faithful, both the saints and ordinary believers, affect and are affected by the prayers of the living and the dead. For this reason, De cura is an invaluable resource for reflection on Christian practices surrounding relics. Augustine maps some of the possible avenues of interchange between the living and the dead while ruling out others. In doing so he provides fodder for theological reflection upon the question of what Christians should think is happening when they view, pray before, kiss, or touch to their bodies the pieces of bone, flesh, blood, hair, clothing, jewelry, or footwear of the Church's saints.The following examination consists in two parts. The first is a close look at De cura in which I will argue that the conclusions of that work concerning the physical remains of Christian's are best considered in light of Augustine's ecclesiology. The second involves a speculative extension of the findings in the first part to show how relics work. This speculation is useful and warranted because the Catholic Church has had relatively little to say on this matter magisterially. While the Church teaches that the veneration [End Page 561] of relics is beneficial and provides some guidance as to what the practice ought to entail, the question of how the particular matter of saintly bodies functions remains ambiguous. In these two parts I will show that relics may be understood as a sacrament of the Church's unity. They are visible signs of the invisible unity of the Church across time and space.De cura pro mortuis gerendaProximityAugustine's De cura is a response to a question from his fellow bishop, Paulinus of Nola. Paulinus is interested in the question of ad sanctos burial, the Christian practice of interring the dead near the earthly remains of martyrs (ad sanctos). This practice was thought to give "some access to their intercessory powers or special assistance on Judgment Day."1 Paulinus wants a theological answer about the liceity and function of ad sanctos burial, for which he turns to Augustine. On the whole, Augustine is set against the idea that mere proximity to a martyr's remains aids in the salvation of the departed. But his words on the subject are nuanced, and he seeks to provide an orthodox explanation of the practice.2 He describes the benefit of ad sanctos burial primarily in terms of memoria. As Peter Brown has argued, memoria was not understood as a passive faculty by the citizens of the ancient world. Instead, memoria was an active tool to facilitate social cohesion, especially in the context of client–patron relations.3 This is how Augustine thinks of it, and explains the comforts provided by funerary arrangements with reference to it.I do not see what aid those [comforts] are to the dead, except this: that when they reflect upon where the bodies of those whom they love may be buried, they should entrust them by prayer to the same saints who have undertaken, like patrons, to aid them before the Lord.4The client–patron relationships of the late ancient world alluded to by Augustine in this passage involve the active bonds of intercession. Proximity to the saints might serve as an actuator of memoria, but not simply by virtue [End Page 562] of the physical closeness of the bodies. Instead, as Augustine goes on to claim, "When, therefore, the soul reflects upon where the body of a dearly beloved person has been buried, and it meets in that place the name of a venerable... (shrink)

Human action has generally appeared to the sociologist as instrumental action, movement conceptualized and valued in terms of its utility, with the actor defined in terms of agency within rationalized social systems . Dance provides a way of seeing that conditions for human existence cannot be reduced to socio-economic relations and forms. Drawing on my ethnographic study of a dance improvisation group, I explore some of the ways in which innovative action resists the productive and textual relations that turn bodies (...) into objects of social control in the capitalist world-order, and creates relations that enable ‘free’ action and liberated subjectivities. Innovations disrupt the pre-existing frames of reference, physical and linguistic, that position the subject in the world of work, and establish an unlimited and undetermined time-space for experiencing ‘something new’. In this case the something new is an opportunity to create oneself anew through choices that are made moving ‘free’ from the constraints of practical activity. Within the intersubjective life-world established through innovative action a space is created for individuation and empowerment. Although these conditions for existence are episodically produced and contingent, they begin and end with the dancing, the relations are self-affirming rather than self-alienating. Dance improvisation experience provides a sociological context for presenting human activity as a contested category in sociological theory, and it raises some important questions about what it means to be human in the world. (shrink)

Art makes its mark upon our flesh. It ravishes our eyes, invades our ears, and stirs our viscera; it commandeers our powers of attention and unsettles our body with its strangenesses. The event of art is thus an encounter both with a sensuous object and with ourselves, exposing us as subjects strangely susceptible to being moved. The 21st-century European thinkers elucidated here describe a theory of the aesthetic subject: Irigaray articulates the basic outlines of a subject ill at ease with (...) itself. Badiou, Nancy, and Perniola theorize art as an event of deformation that befalls an aesthetic subject fundamentally invested in form. Rancière and Sloterdijk explore the figuration of the body (and its limits) in contexts closer to everyday experience and our life within modern history and politics. This study brings together feminist, psychoanalytic, and phenomenological inheritances to describe the operations of the real in art and aesthetic life. (shrink)

This essay critically considers scientific and metaphorical understandings of the body and embodiment. It employs interrogates and employs the concepts of embodiment, ego, bodily intentionality, and anorexia from a phenomenological perspective. It considers the battery of concepts regarding embodiment: soma (the shape of the body), sarx (the flesh of the body) and pexis (the body and soul in unity). While Soma and sarx are the objective body, they are explained by the natural sciences. Pexis is the 'unobjective' body; it is (...) subjective, and it is to be studied as a subjective phenomenon. To understand pexis means to understand that the body does not finish with the skin but is connected to its surroundings. There is also a consideration of the possibilities of the body under Heidegger's idea of protention, which refers to the transformation of the body into an instrument. When the body is conceived of as an instrument or object anorexia is seen as an illness only of embodiment as soma . A richer alternative is the idea that anorexia is an illness of existence that can be explained by Heidegger's discussion of embodiment via the concept of dasein. (shrink)

Of all of the various forms of political dissent, the most dramatic as a form of expression is that which places lived bodies in tension with the prevailing social order. Bodies so presented—in marches, strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations and other mass assemblies—are just the opposite of Foucault’s docile bodies. They are a collective will concretized, an intersubjective mass animated by a common purpose that fills a public space and obstinately makes their shared demand. The presence of such dissenting bodies assembled in (...) various public spaces have at times been essential in dramatizing grievances and re-constituting the meaning of a political landscape. Though such dissenting bodies have often been met with the full force of the state, the political efficacy of such bodies has been seriously undermined in recent years due to more subtle strategies to suppress such dissent, and counterstrategies meant to circumscribe these efforts at suppression. The goal of this essay is to explore these developments through phenomenological analysis. Preliminary considerations of (1) different forms of political potency and (2) the lived body and its movement through space, will be followed by (3) an investigation of what it means to be a dissenting body witnessed within a public place, and (4) what happens when dissenting bodies are consigned to circumscribed spaces or retreat to the “virtual.” This analysis will show how these developments have rendered dissenting bodies far less politically effective than they have been in the past, which dangerously weakens the democratic traditions of free speech and open dissent. This, in turn, supports a call (5) for a re-assertion of the embodied subject into the practice of political dissent. (shrink)

Donna Haraway views being a cyborg rather than a ‘goddess’ desirable. This feminist slogan can be seen in terms of the democratising power of a hybrid identity facilitated by technology as a substantial alternative to traditional notions of gendered identity. This paper aims to study S. B. Divya’s 2021 novel Machinehood to analyse how technology and identity are tied up in the context of the novel. The paper benefits from the insights from critical posthumanism by analysing how the transformation into (...) a cyborg is problematised by the moral and ethical overtones facilitated by dakinis (mythological figures in Buddhism). While providing tactical advantage, cyborg may become the negation of one’s gender and flesh. The cyborg has been viewed as a capitalist desire. Thus, a cyborg society benefits from the transformative acts that resist such erasure and preserve one’s sense of identity rooted in their body. (shrink)

Donna Haraway views being a cyborg rather than a ‘goddess’ desirable. This feminist slogan can be seen in terms of the democratising power of a hybrid identity facilitated by technology as a substantial alternative to traditional notions of gendered identity. This paper aims to study S. B. Divya’s 2021 novel Machinehood to analyse how technology and identity are tied up in the context of the novel. The paper benefits from the insights from critical posthumanism by analysing how the transformation into (...) a cyborg is problematised by the moral and ethical overtones facilitated by dakinis (mythological figures in Buddhism). While providing tactical advantage, cyborg may become the negation of one’s gender and flesh. The cyborg has been viewed as a capitalist desire. Thus, a cyborg society benefits from the transformative acts that resist such erasure and preserve one’s sense of identity rooted in their body. (shrink)

It is a common experience that we talk to some animals, especially those with which we share our human lives, such as dogs or cats. From this communication, should one conclude that these animals participate in intersubjectivity? Though Husserl’s phenomenology has a “Cartesian” tendency, in his late reflections on the variations of “normal” consciousness and the “normal” body, he suggests that there are degrees of subjectivity, following a more “Leibnizian” path. Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas have also developed this thesis (...) of a “sympathy” with animals beyond the limits of the human species. (shrink)

Phenomenology provides a method for disability theorists to describe embodied subjectivity lacking within the social model of disability. Within the literature on body integrity identity disorder (BIID), dominant narratives of disability are influential, individual bodies are considered in isolation, and experiences of disabled people are omitted. Research on BIID tends to incorporate an individualist ontology. In this article, I argue that Merleau-Ponty's conceptualization of “being in the world,” which recognizes subjectivity as embodied and intersubjective, provides a better starting point for (...) research describing the experiences of those with BIID and amputees. (shrink)

When bodies are conceived as permeable fields our physical forms become inseparable from each other and the world from which they manifest. The extension of one’s subjectivity to include cosmological divinities emphasizes the many other bodies which, in some cultural contexts, may overlap and unite with the world. In this article I explore how narratives of a Tibetan Buddhist high-lama’s death and trajectory of lives contain complex formulations of Tibetan theories of embodiment. An ethnographic attendance to biographical writings and teachings (...) at the time of his funerary ceremonies reveals not only how trikaya, or the notion of three bodies, coheres in Tibetan conceptual frameworks, but also how the articulation of these bodies affects new ways to intersubjectively engage with the deceased. (shrink)

A central tenet of hermeneutics is the claim that dialogue is necessary for the full understanding of ourselves. It follows, then, that dialogue must be fruitful for understanding in a way in which no solitary activity can be. This dissertation provides a much needed defense of this claim by articulating and defending the essential parts of an account of intersubjectivity from which the claim follows. The dissertation is divided into three sections, each focusing on a specific part of the (...) account of intersubjectivity-- intersubjectivity and language, intersubjectivity and time-consciousness, and intersubjectivity and the body--through a careful consideration of the views of pairs of philosophers. I focus on J. G. Fichte and Wilhelm von Humboldt on the issue of intersubjectivity and language, on Edmund Husserl and Martin Buber on the issue of intersubjectivity and time-consciousness, and on Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the issue of intersubjectivity and embodied subjectivity. Through exposing the necessity of our intersubjective relations for the very possibility of language use, awareness of time, and embodied awareness of the world, I demonstrate the existence of a pre-reflective, intersubjective relation between embodied subjects. This intercoporeal intersubjectivity requires extending traditional hermeneutics through an account of the body and a broader account of both understanding and dialogue. (shrink)

In his later works, Merleau-Ponty proposes the notion of ‘the flesh’ (la chair) as a new ‘element’, as he put it, in his ontological monism designed to overcome the legacy of Cartesian dualism with its bifurcation of all things into matter or spirit. Most Merleau-Ponty commentators recognise that Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’ is inspired by Edmund Husserl's conceptions of ‘lived body’ (Leib) and ‘vivacity’ or ‘liveliness’ (Leiblichkeit). But it is not always recognised that, for Merleau-Ponty, the constitution of the world (...) of perception, the problem of embodiment or incarnation, is at the very same time one with the problem of the experience of others in what Husserl called Einfühlung or Fremderfahung and indeed one with the problem of the constitution of the commonly shared world ‘for all’. As Merleau-Ponty put it in his late essay ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’ in Signs, ‘the problem of Einfühlung, like that of my incarnation, opens on the meditation of sensible being, or, if you prefer, it betakes itself there’. In other words, the problem of the apprehension of the other is part of the overall apprehension of the transcendent world. In this paper I want to meditate on the relations between embodiment, experience of others, and experience of the world in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I will take particular note, as in the title of this presentation, of the claim made by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible that ‘there is no brute world, only an elaborated world’ (il n'y a pas de monde brut, il n'y a qu'un monde élaboré). (shrink)

In the prospectus for his later work pronounced in 1952, Merleau-Ponty announced that his move beyond the phenomenological to the ontological level of analysis is motivated by issues of sociality, notably communication with others.' I propose to interrogate this priority attributed by the author to this interpersonal bond in his reflections on corporeality in general, marking a departure from The Structure of Behavior and The Phenomenology of Perception, which privileged the starting point of consciousness and the body proper. My interest (...) lies particularly in exposing the psychological sources of Merleau-Ponty's thinking about the primacy of sociality. Referring to his lectures on Child Psychology and Pedagogy, which he delivered as Professor at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1949-52,2 I will develop the contention that the developmental psychology of child sociality significantly informed his understanding of relations between self and other laid out in the later texts, and henceforth informed also his conception of the flesh. Specifically, the psychological hypotheses about the anonymous and fusional form initially taken by human sociality appears to play a determining role in his conception of interpersonal life formulated on the ontological plane. I will then point to the internal tensions involved in the theory of sociality based on the thesis of anonymity and disclose an alternative theoretical account, which has the merit of preserving the advantages of the anonymity thesis while avoiding its drawbacks; it also facilitates continued dialogue between Merleau-Ponty's philosophy and recent developmental psychology. (shrink)

The main thesis of this article is that Arthur Schopenhauer was the first to formulate clearly the problem of corporeality as an essential problem of philosophical thought. Schopenhauer can be understood as a philosopher and even as a phenomenologist of corporeality. For the first time in the European thought he explicitly describes the relation between consciousness and the body and offers a phenomenological description of the experience of embodiment, bringing his thought closer to M. Merleau-Ponty’s future phenomenology. The article considers (...) the role of the body in the formation of subjectivity as well as the correlation between the concept of body and the concept of will in the structure of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Both Schopenhauer and Merleau-Ponty understood the body as a key to the experience of the world and to overcoming the object-subject dichotomy. Hence, while Merleau-Ponty welcomes this conclusion, Schopenhauer considers it is a source of pessimistic sarcasm: the will of which I am the materialization is completely indifferent to my individual existence and uses me as material for its meaningless reproduction. The emphasis on corporeality has important intersections with the development of aesthetics in the 18th century. T. Eagleton thus suggests that Schopenhauer’s philosophy makes a crucial contribution to the modernist project of aesthetics by its “implicit” aesthetics, presupposed by the development of the theme of embodiment, to which he attributes the unexpected “comicality” of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, well suited to the interpretation of absurdist art. The article also considers the influence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy on Beckett’s work, which S. Garner interprets through Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, proving that their reflections on body and flesh can be correlated with Beckett’s theater where the bodily presence of actors is emphasised. (shrink)

[In Czech] Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the pathology of perception show “objective” and “subjective” events have sense for the living body only in relation to its whole equilibrium, that is, to how it organises itself overall and how it thus “meets” those events. If we apply this conception to Husserl’s example of two mutually-touching hands of one body we must then state not that we perceive here a coincidence of certain subjective sensations with certain objective qualities, but rather that my body, (...) in the sense of an object, results from the restructuralisation of the whole field of the body accomplished by the the body as the performer of perceptual intentions. The body-object, and for the same reasons also the body-subject, is therefore the product of the analysis of the body in the sense of a field of structuralisation or polarisation, not its original phenomenological “stratum”, as in Husserl. If the body understands itself as perceptible only by a change of its own structure, inasmuch as it is a certain field of structuralisation, then the "external” thing, which is likewise a pole of such grasping, must belong to the same ontological “field” as the body. Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh”, that is the circularity between questioning of perception and answering of the perceived, is thus a phenomenon appearing beyond the boundary of the body as a singular being. This fact allows the concept of flesh to be extended and to be understood as an “element”, that is, as a dimension in which individual beings appear. [In Czech language.]. (shrink)