Liberal-contractarian philosophies of justice see the unjust systems of slavery and autocracy in the past as being based on coercion—whereas the social order in modern democratic market societies is based on consent and contract. However, the ‘best’ case for slavery and autocracy in the past were consent-based contractarian arguments. Hence, our first task is to recover those ‘forgotten’ apologia for slavery and autocracy. To counter those consent-based arguments, the historical anti-slavery and democratic movements developed a theory of inalienable rights. (...) Our second task is to recover that theory and to consider several other applications of the theory. Finally, the liberal theories of justice expounded by John Rawls and by Robert Nozick are briefly examined from this perspective. (shrink)

The aims of this book are to “explain the concept of an inalienable right,” “show why it is morally justifiable to ascribe inalienability to some legal rights,” and “examine in more detail some selected rights”. Inalienability of rights is said to be particularly pertinent in bioethics since, for example, if the right to life is inalienable, it would seem that euthanasia and assisted suicide would be impermissible. I will limit my comments to McConnell’s discussions of the (...) first two aims and his discussions on euthanasia and assisted suicide. Given the highly contentious nature of the debate over euthanasia and assisted suicide, the possibility of illuminating that debate through a study of inalienable rights is quite attractive. (shrink)

Some rights are so important for human autonomy and well-being that many scholars insist they should not be waived, traded, or abandoned. Privacy is a recent addition to this list. At the other end of the spectrum is the belief that privacy is a mere unimportant interest or preference. This paper defends a middle path between viewing privacy as an inalienable, non-waivable, non-transferrable right and the view of privacy as a mere subjective interest. First, an account of privacy (...) is offered that clarifies the concept and demonstrates how privacy is directly related to human health and well-being. Second, along with considering and rejecting several accounts for why privacy might be considered an inalienable right, an argument is offered for why it is morally permissible to waive, transfer, abandon, or alienate privacy. (shrink)

McConnell presents the unusual and distinctive argument that inalienable rights differ from other types of rights in that, rather than restraining the behaviour of others, inalienable rights seem to put limits on the possessors themselves, because even the possessor's consent does not justify others in encroaching on them. He offers a full account of what it means for a right to be inalienable, distinguishing them from other kinds of rights in the contexts of moral and political (...) issues in medicine and law: for example, the right to life, the right of conscience, and, in particular, the right of informed consent. McConnell's book is intended as a distinctive conception and persuasive defence of inalienable rights, which ties into current discussions of informed consent. It should appeal to applied ethicists and philosophers of law among others. (shrink)

This book explains what inalienable rights are and how they restrict the behavior of their possessors. McConnell develops compelling arguments to support the inalienability of the right to life, the right of conscience, and a competent person's right not to have medical treatment administered without consent. Yet, surprisingly, he argues that the inalienability of the right to life does not entail that voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide are wrong. This distinctive defense of inalienable rights (...) will appeal to medical ethicists and other applied ethicists, political theorists, and philosophers of law. (shrink)

Recent criticism of inalienable-Rights doctrine is shown to be based upon the erroneous assumption that, In calling certain rights inalienable, Eighteenth-Century constitution-Writers implied that they are unconditional. S.M. Brown, Jr., D.G. Ritchie, And e.F. Carritt all reject the doctrine because the exercise or enjoyment of these rights can sometimes be justifiably denied. Provisions of bills of rights and other writings are cited to establish that their authors did not consider these rights unlimited. What they meant in declaring them (...) inalienable is that no man can voluntarily relinquish them. Consequently, The distinction frankena proposes is not needed to save traditional theory from the adverse verdict of its critics. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, against the current consensus, that the right to withdraw from research is sometimes alienable. In other words, research subjects are sometimes morally permitted to waive their right to withdraw. The argument proceeds in three major steps. In the first step, I argue that rights typically should be presumed alienable, both because that is not illegitimately coercive and because the general paternalistic motivation for keeping them inalienable is untenable. In the second step of (...) the argument, I consider three special characteristics of the right to withdraw, first that its waiver might be exploitative, second that research involves intimate bodily access, and third that it is irreversible. I argue that none of these characteristics justify an inalienable right to withdraw. In the third step, I examine four considerations often taken to justify various other allegedly inalienable rights: concerns about treating yourself merely as a means as might be the case in suicide, concerns about revoking all your future freedoms in slavery contracts, the resolution of coordination problems, and public interest. I argue that the motivations involved in these four types of situations do not apply to the right to withdraw from research. (shrink)

Consent forms given to potential subjects in research protocols typically contain a sentence like this: “You have a right to withdraw from this study at any time without penalty.” If you have ever served on an institutional review board or a research ethics committee, you have no doubt read such a sentence often. Moreover, codes of ethics governing medical research endorse such a right. For example, paragraph 24 of the Declaration of Helsinki says, “The subject should be informed (...) of the right… to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal.” Similarly, section C of the Belmont Report says that subjects must be informed that they have the right “to withdraw at any time from the research.” And in section 46.116 of the Common Rule, it says that one of the elements of informed consent must include a statement that “the subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefit to which the subject is otherwise entitled.”. (shrink)

This essay advances and defends two claims: (a) that rights cannot be inalienable and (b) that even if they could be, this would not be morally justifiable.

I. Introduction Two kinds of remedies have traditionally been employed for breach of contract: legal relief and equitable relief. Legal relief normally takes the form of money damages. Equitable relief normally consists either of specific performance or an injunction – that is, the party in breach may be ordered to perform an act or to refrain from performing an act. In this article I will use a “consent theory of contract” to assess the choice between money damages and specific performance. (...) According to such a theory, contractual obligation is dependent on more fundamental entitlements of the parties and arises as a result of the parties' consent to transfer alienable rights. My thesis will be that the normal rule favoring money damages should be replaced with one that presumptively favors specific performance unless the parties have consented to money damages instead. The principal obstacle to such an approach is the reluctance of courts to specifically enforce contracts for personal services. The philosophical distinction between alienable and inalienable rights bolsters this historical reticence, since a right to personal services may be seen as inalienable. I will then explain why, if the subject matter of a contract for personal services is properly confined to an alienable right to money damages for failure to perform, specific enforcement of such contracts is no longer problematic. Finally, I shall consider whether the subject matter of contracts for corporate services is properly confined to money damages like contracts for personal services, or whether performance of corporate services can be made the subject of a valid rights transfer and judicially compelled in the same manner as contracts for external resources. (shrink)

In the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights a quite large number of things are said to be ‘human rights’ and though in that Declaration the term ‘inalienable’ is not used to describe the rights in question it has been so used by commentators—at least with respect to some of the rights enumerated. I shall forgo asking the prior question as to whether any such thing as a human right exists and ask simply whether any such thing (...) as an inalienable right exists. My intention will be to show that it does not. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Declaration of Independence:Inalienable Rights, the Creator, and the Political OrderChristopher KaczorPierre Manent puts his finger on numerous problems that arise from an emphasis on human rights that is detached from any consideration of human nature, the Creator, or the traditions that inform human practice. In his book Natural Law and Human Rights: Towards a Recovery of Practical Wisdom, Manent writes: "Let us dwell a moment on the (...) proposition in which so much passion is invested today: man is the being who possesses rights. It resonates as our self-definition and our perspective on humanity, one that we take to have fortunately replaced other definitions and perspectives, such as that man is God's creature or that man is a political animal."1 Contemporary political discourse has arrived, so he thinks, at an impasse of contradiction, incoherence, and self-defeating beliefs.Manent finds a vital help for thinking through these issues in Thomas Aquinas,2 but perhaps also a useful resource is the work of Thomas Jefferson. In Natural Law and Human Rights, Manent cites the first article of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: "Human beings are born and remain free and equal in rights."3 But Manent does not cite the Declaration of Independence drafted by Jefferson. The 1776 Declaration provides a way of addressing many of Manent's concerns about human rights, human nature, and equality because it combines an appeal to the Creator [End Page 249] with the establishment of rights grounded in human nature and defended by limited government. In order to approach some of the important political, religious, and philosophical questions raised in Natural Law and Human Rights, we can reconsider the famous "American proposition": "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." What exactly does this famous American proposition mean? Can it help us to address some of the concerns about incoherent political discourse that Manent highlights?We Hold These Truths to Be Self-EvidentWhat does "we hold these truths to be self-evident" mean? The interpretation of this phrase has generated no small amount of speculation.4 As Manent notes, appeals to self-evidence arise also today in disputes about same-sex marriage.5 Even if we cannot perfectly trace the remote or proximate historical origins of the phrase in 1776, we might still examine some possible meanings.For John Locke, a self-evident truth is akin to what later philosophers called an analytically true proposition.6 Such propositions are true in virtue of the agreement of the ideas that make up the proposition. "A bachelor is an unmarried man of marriageable age" is self-evidently true, since the idea of "bachelor" agrees with the idea "an unmarried man of marriageable age." It does not seem plausible that the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence were meant in this sense. The assertions of the Declaration are not true simply by agreement of ideas or by definition in a way that is obvious to anyone who is a native speaker.Thomas Reid suggests a different sense of self-evidence. On his view, [End Page 250] self-evidence does not mean obviousness to everyone, but rather clear to those with the requisite education and maturity: "Moral truths... are self-evident to every man whose understanding and moral faculty are ripe."7 If a person is conscious of no moral obligation whatsoever, then reasoning with such a person will not bring the person to understand his or her obligations. Just as mathematical calculations cannot begin without acceptance of basic axioms of mathematics, so too ethical reflection presupposes but does not establish its first principles. As Reid says, "the man who does not by the light of his own mind, perceive some things in conduct to be right, and others to be wrong, is as incapable of reasoning about morals as a blind man is about colours."8 Just as there are people who cannot see colors, so too there are people lacking the requisite moral... (shrink)

The central purpose of the paper is to elucidate the inalienable rights thesis, I.E. That there is at least one inalienable right. Various senses of 'natural right' and 'inalienable' are analyzed so as to further clarify what is or could be the meaning and the truth of that thesis. A widespread confusion between the meaning of the terms 'inalienable natural right' and 'indefeasible natural right' is dispelled. It is concluded that present thinking (...) about inalienable natural rights does not reveal precisely why and in what sense there is such a right. A successful defense of the inalienable rights thesis is suggested. (shrink)

Intelligent machines (IMs), which have demonstrated remarkable innovations over time, require adequate attention concerning the issue of their duty–rights split in our current society. Although we can remain optimistic about IMs’ societal role, we must still determine their legal-philosophical sense of accountability, as living data bits have begun to pervade our lives. At the heart of IMs are human characteristics used to self-optimize their practical abilities and broaden their societal impact. We used Kant’s philosophical requirements to investigate IMs’ moral dispositions, (...) as the merging of humans with technology has overwhelmingly shaped psychological and corporeal agential capacities. In recognizing the continuous burden of human needs, important features regarding the inalienability of rights have increased the individuality of intelligent, nonliving beings, leading them to transition from questioning to defending their own rights. This issue has been recognized by paying attention to the rational capacities of humans and IMs, which have been connected in order to achieve a common goal. Through this teleological scheme, we formulate the concept of virtual dignity to determine the transition of inalienable rights from humans to machines, wherein the evolution of IMs is essentially imbued through consensuses and virtuous traits associated with human dignity. (shrink)

Some have argued that Locke's failure to condemn contemporary slavery is best viewed as a personal moral lapse which does not reflect on his political theory. I argue to the contrary.

This paper has two purposes. One is primarily (but not exclusively) conceptual and the other is normative. The first aim is to say what inalienable rights are. To explain this, inalienable rights are contrasted with the notions of forfeitable rights and absolute rights. A recent novel analysis of inalienable rights by Feinberg is explained and criticized. The first task is concluded by discussing what duties inalienable rights imply. The second aim is to see what moral principles, (...) if any, justify designating some rights as inalienable. The claim of Nozick and others that inalienable rights must be paternalistically grounded is examined and rejected. After a brief critical discussion of the Lockean and Hobbesean accounts of the basis of inalienable rights, it is argued that the harm principle can serve as an adequate ground for categorizing at least the right to life (and perhaps other rights) as inalienable. (shrink)

In his article “Directed Duties and Inalienable Rights,” Hillel Steiner advances an argument to show that there cannot be inalienable rights. This “impossibility theorem,” as well as providing an interesting result by itself, could break the theoretical deadlock in the debate between proponents of interest theory, on the one hand, and proponents of will theory, on the other. In this article, I comment on Steiner’s argument, and I try to show why it does not work. I then expound (...) a paradoxical outcome of the Hohfeldian analytical framework and examine how it might be amended to avoid this outcome. (shrink)

There is a particular moral theory in which human rights are conceived as indestructible rights. Using Dworkin’s words we could say this is a good way of taking rights seriously. However, we may also ask whether there is another way of taking rights as seriously as Dworkin says without being a supporter of that theory. From this point of view, perhaps human rights cannot be considered neither as absolute ; nor universally valid ; and not even inalienable. Can this (...) proposal be seen as another way of taking rights seriously? (shrink)

ExcerptMany people assume that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was an exclusively or primarily Western project, imposed on the rest of the world by the European and American powers that emerged victorious from World War II. Harvard Law professor Mary Ann Glendon’s 2001 book, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, suggests otherwise. It was not the great powers but small powers that pushed hardest for a declaration of rights. And it (...) was often great powers—and one must acknowledge, great powers dominated by people of European ancestry—that did not like the idea of being pushed around by politically and economically weaker inhabitants of the Global South, who were just beginning to emerge from centuries of Western colonialism and other forms of oppression.1. (shrink)

The Declaration of Rights -- I mean the paper published under that name by the French National Assembly in 1791 -- assumes for its subject-matter a field of disquisition as unbounded in point of extent as it is important in its nature. But the more ample the extent given to any proposition or string of propositions, the more difficult it is to keep the import of it confined without deviation, within the bounds of truth and reason. If in the smallest (...) corners of the field it ranges over, it fail of coinciding with the line of rigid rectitude, no sooner is the aberration pointed out, than (inasmuch as there is no medium between truth and falsehood) its pretensions to the appellation of truism are gone, and whoever looks upon it must recognise it to be false and erroneous, -- and if, as here, political conduct be the theme, so far as the error extends and fails of being detected, pernicious. (shrink)

From a pre-publication review by the late Austrian economist, Don Lavoie, of George Mason University: -/- "The book's radical re-interpretation of property and contract is, I think, among the most powerful critiques of mainstream economics ever developed. It undermines the neoclassical way of thinking about property by articulating a theory of inalienable rights, and constructs out of this perspective a "labor theory of property" which is as different from Marx's labor theory of value as it is from neoclassicism. It (...) traces roots of such ideas in some fascinating and largely forgotten strands of the history of economics. It draws attention to the question of "responsibility" which neoclassicism has utterly lost sight of. It is startlingly fresh in its overall approach, and unusually well written in its presentation. ... It constitutes a better case for its economic democracy viewpoint than anything else in the literature." . (shrink)

There is a fault line running through classical liberalism as to whether or not democratic self-governance is a necessary part of a liberal social order. The democratic and non-democratic strains of classical liberalism are both present today—particularly in America. Many contemporary libertarians and neo-Austrian economists represent the non-democratic strain in their promotion of non-democratic sovereign city-states (startup cities or charter cities). We will take the late James M. Buchanan as a representative of the democratic strain of classical liberalism. Since the (...) fundamental norm of classical liberalism is consent, we must start with the intellectual history of the voluntary slavery contract, the coverture marriage contract, and the voluntary non-democratic constitution (or pactum subjectionis). Next we recover the theory of inalienable rights that descends from the Reformation doctrine of the inalienability of conscience through the Enlightenment (e.g., Spinoza and Hutcheson) in the abolitionist and democratic movements. Consent-based governments divide into those based on the subjects' alienation of power to a sovereign and those based on the citizens' delegation of power to representatives. Inalienable rights theory rules out that alienation in favor of delegation, so the citizens remain the ultimate principals and the form of government is democratic. Thus the argument concludes in agreement with Buchanan that the classical liberal endorsement of sovereign individuals acting in the marketplace generalizes to the joint action of individuals as the principals in their own organizations. (shrink)

Nancy MacLean’s book, Democracy in Chains, raised questions about James M. Buchanan’s commitment to democracy. This paper investigates the relationship of classical liberalism in general and of Buchanan in particular to democratic theory. Contrary to the simplistic classical liberal juxtaposition of “coercion vs. consent,” there have been from Antiquity onwards voluntary contractarian defenses of non-democratic government and even slavery—all little noticed by classical liberal scholars who prefer to think of democracy as just “government by the consent of the governed” and (...) slavery as being inherently coercive. Historically, democratic theory had to go beyond that simplistic notion of democracy to develop a critique of consent-based non-democratic government, e.g., the Hobbesian pactum subjectionis. That critique was based firstly on the distinction between contracts or constitutions of alienation (translatio) versus delegation (concessio). Then the contracts of alienation were ruled out based on the theory of inalienable rights that descends from the Reformation doctrine of inalienability of conscience down through the Enlightenment to modern times in the abolitionist and democratic movements. While he developed no theory of inalienability, the mature Buchanan explicitly allowed only a constitution of delegation, contrary to many modern classical liberals or libertarians who consider the choice between consent-based democratic or non-democratic governments (e.g., private cities or shareholder states) to be a pragmatic one. But Buchanan seems to not even realize that his at-most-delegation dictum would also rule out the employer-employee or human rental contract which is a contract of alienation “within the scope of the employment.”. (shrink)

This essay shows that the principles of classical liberalism (e.g., James Buchanan) do not apply to the firm based on the employer-employee relationship. However, there is a deeper democratic classical liberalism tradition based on inalienable rights, but it rules out the employment or human rental relation.

This paper presents an argument for the democratic (or 'labor-managed') firm based on ordinary jurisprudence. The standard principle of responsibility in jurisprudence ('Assign legal responsibility in accordance with de facto responsibility') implies that the people working in a firm should legally appropriate the assets and liabilities produced in the firm (the positive and negative fruits of their labor). This appropriation is normally violated due to the employment or self-rental contract. However, we present an inalienable rights argument that descends from (...) the Reformation and Enlightenment which argues that the self-rental contract, like the self-sale or voluntary slavery contract, is inherently invalid. The key intuition of the inalienable rights theory is that one cannot in fact voluntarily transfer de facto responsibility for one's actions to another person. One can only voluntarily co-operate with another person, but then one is de facto jointly responsible for the results. Just as the legal authorities legally reconstruct the criminous employer and employee as a partnership with shared responsibility, so justice demands that every firm be legally reconstructed as a partnership of all who work (working employers and employees) in the enterprise, i.e., as a democratic firm. (shrink)

Among the more significant developments of the twentieth century, the widespread attention given to 'rights issues' must surely justify ranking it somewhere near the top. Never before has the issue of rights attracted such a wide audience or stirred so much controversy. Until very recently 'rights' were traditionally recognized as attributable only to humans. Today, we increasingly are hearing a call to extend 'rights' to the nonhuman animal and, on occasion, to the environment. In this book, James B. Reichmann, S.J., (...) undertakes an investigation of the metaethical grounds of 'rights' theory, with special focus on the controversial issue of whether creatures other than humans can and should be considered true subjects of 'rights.' He contends that before assigning rights to this or that individual or group, whether human or not, we need to be very clear about what it is we are assigning, to whom, and why. The book argues forcefully that the various recent efforts to build a case supporting animal and environmental 'rights' fail in their quest, and that any such effort resting on a Darwinian evolutionary base is likewise condemned to fail. In furtherance of this claim the author first investigates life phenomena, followed by a detailed comparative study of knowing, communicating and doing, as these are observed in the human and the nonhuman animal. This in turn is followed by an overview of diverse views advanced by contemporary environmental ethicists and animal 'rights' advocates, including Peter Singer, Tom Regan, J. Baird Callicott, Laura Westra, and Don E. Marietta, Jr. Representative though doubtless provocative conclusions drawn from this study include the claims that: (1) Classic Darwinian theory provides no admissable premise from which to derive a theory of inherent, inalienable rights. (2) No satisfactory explanation of the origin of rights and obligation can derive save from within the context of natural law theory. (3) The human person alone unqualifiedly possesses rights. (4) The view that vegetarianism is an ethical mandate is neither compatible with the Christian world view, nor philosophically sound. ABOUT THE AUTHOR: James B. Reichmann, S.J., is professor emeritus of philosophy at Seattle University where he continues to teach. (shrink)

Five leading thinkers on the concept of 'rights' in an era of rightlessness Sixty years ago, the political theorist Hannah Arendt, deprived of her German citizenship as a Jew and in exile from her country, observed that before people can enjoy any of the 'inalienable' Rights of Man--before there can be any specific rights to education, work, voting, and so on--there must first be such a thing as 'the right to have rights.' The concept received little attention at (...) the time, but in our age of refugee crises and extra-state war, the phrase has become the center of a crucial and lively debate. Here five leading thinkers from varied disciplines, including history, law, and politics, discuss the critical issue of the basis of rights and the meaning of radical democratic politics today. (shrink)

A widespread Western conception about the sanctity of the human body and its parts prevents from any morally acceptable disposition of these objects. However, this entails nothing but a dualistic conception of the human being as a composite of detachable parts — namely, body and mind. Understood as the antechamber of legal rights, moral rights perform an important — yet frequently overlooked — justifying function that permeates the political discourse. Although the connection among moral, political and legal discourses should be (...) properly acknowledged, certain boundaries are to mediate among each scope for the sake of certainty and accuracy. Intermediate realities, as the so-called human rights, serve to connect the moral and legal domains, still they also blur the lines along which the discourse is deployed. Moral entities are essentially inalienable, to the extent that they demarcate the moral status of the subject. By contrast, legal rights are essentially negotiable and, thus, alienable. The controversial instance of bodily rights will serve to test the assertions above. (shrink)

: Many people have lamented the proliferation of human rights claims. The cure for this problem, it may be thought, would be to develop a theory that can distinguish ‘real’ from ‘supposed’ human rights. I argue, however, that the proliferation of human rights mirrors a deep problem in human rights theory itself. Contemporary theories of natural rights to welfare are historical descendants from a theory of rights to subsistence which was developed in twelfth-century Europe. According to this theory, each human (...) being has a special role to fulfil in God's plan and therefore has inalienable rights to subsist. Later theories have secularized this idea by claiming that human beings are purposive agents. Secularization, however, comes at a price. In the case of these theories, the price is a failure to provide satisfactory answers to the most basic questions we would expect of a theory of natural rights to answer. They have failed to provide a basis for ascribing these rights to all and only to human beings. They have not been able to generate a clear and viable criterion for ascribing duties correlative to these rights. And they cannot limit rights-claims in a non-arbitrary way. Hence we should abandon these theories. (shrink)

Just below the surface of public life in the United States, a biblically based theory of rights vies with a theory that first appeared in the work of Bentham and Mill, and the latter is gaining increasing dominance. The resolution of this conflict has implications for a host of legal matters and public policy decisions, including life and death issues like physician-assisted suicide. Though the ascendancy of the Millian tradition reflects widespread skepticism concerning the possibility of developing a basis for (...) a common morality or defending a conception of natural inalienable rights, the author argues that a plausible account of common human morality can be developed from attention to the relationships that are requisite for sustaining the communities that are the condition of moral agency. (shrink)

If one has a right merely in virtue of being a person, she cannot lose that right as long as she remained a person – or so I argue. After sketching out what I mean by “natural rights,” “inalienable rights,” and “nonforfeitable rights,” I give some reasons to think any instance of the first would also have to be an instance of the latter two. I then respond to critiques of inalienability by A. John Simmons and Andrew (...) Jason Cohen. After which, I apply the argument given for why natural rights would have to be inalienable as a reason to think they would also have to be nonforfeitable. Then I respond to the idea that the nonforfeitability of natural rights would conflict with self-defense by outlining an alternate account of self-defense. In closing, I consider some potential implications of the inalienability and nonforfeitability of natural rights, should such natural rights exist. (shrink)

ExcerptThe University of Notre Dame Kellogg Institute’s 2021 conference on “Inalienable Rights and the Traditions of Constitutionalism” was, for me, a breath of oxygen because it brought together many who understand that human rights are more than simply reflections of particular political preferences of some societies at particular times, and that to understand human rights that way reduces them to the level of arbitrary positive law. Human rights are based in human nature, and in nature itself, not simply in (...) international legislation. Today, the idea of human rights serves many masters: utilitarianism, consequentialism, communitarianism, socialism, postmodernism, intersectionality—not to mention numerous regimes that defend human rights violations with human rights rhetoric. But the conferees seemed to generally agree that human rights are principles, rooted in human nature, that can protect our moral and political freedom. (shrink)

All efforts undertaken so far to establish peace between Israel and the Palestinians have failed to seriously address the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. This failure stemmed from a conviction that the question of historical justice in general had to be avoided. Since justice is a subjective construct, it was argued, allowing it to become a subject of negotiation would only perpetuate the conflict. However, the experience of these peace efforts has shown that without solving the problem (...) of the Palestinian refugees an agreement cannot be reached. And the problem cannot possibly be solved without addressing the key Palestinian demand on this issue — the right of return. For both sides, the right of return, more than any other issue, touches on the essence of their history since the beginning of the conflict between them, and on their future. The national narrative of each side thus centers on its version of the history of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, in the course of which the Palestinian refugee problem was created. And each side maintains the fundamental belief that its future national existence hinges on whether, and how, the issue of the right of return is resolved. For the Palestinians, the right of return is an inalienable right that defines their national identity and their struggle for liberation. For Israeli Jews, the right of return is perceived as an existential threat to the Jewish character of their society, if not to its very existence. It is not surprising, therefore, that within each of the two societies a national consensus has been built around this issue and that the position of each society seems to stand in complete opposition to that of the other. However, we argue that a morally and politically sound basis could and should be established for a workable solution and that such a basis can be provided by the notion of "transitional justice." Transitional justice stresses two major steps as necessary for reconciliation between parties involved in an historic conflict: recognition and restitution. Recognition entails revealing the historical truth about the injustices committed and according their victims dignity and respect as rights-bearing human beings. Restitution is meant to alleviate some of the material deprivation suffered by the victims and is also a form of recognition. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, recognition by Israel of the right of return would entail its assumption of responsibility for the uprooting of the majority of Palestinian society in 1948. This would satisfy a demand that has become a fundamental element in Palestinian national identity. Recognition would then enable the two parties to enter negotiations over restitution, in particular the implementation of the right of return. In these negotiations, as many Palestinian political leaders have indicated, the concerns of Israeli Jews with their national identity would be taken into account. Only if the fundamental concerns of the two parties, which center on the issue of the right of return, are met can the road towards reconciliation between them be opened. (shrink)

In this article, the logical implications of a right to life are examined. It is first argued that the prohibition of Termination of life on request confers an inalienable right to life. A right is inalienable if it cannot legitimately be waived or transferred. Since voluntary euthanasia entails waiver of the right to life, the inalienability yields that it cannot be justified. Therefore, any ethical position that is in favor of voluntary euthanasia has to (...) argue that the right to life is an inalienable right and accept the conclusion that killing on request is justified. (shrink)