Is voting a duty of democratic citizenship? This article advances a new argument for the existence of a duty to vote. It argues that every normative account of electoral representation requires universal turnout to function in line with its own internal normative logic. This generates a special obligation for citizens to vote in electoral representative contexts as a function of the role morality of democratic citizenship. Because voting uniquely authorizes office holding in representative democracies, and because universal turnout contributes powerfully (...) to representation being fair, to be a good citizen of such democracies requires one to vote. Whereas previous arguments for a duty to vote have invoked basic moral principles like fairness or a Samaritan duty of rescue, this account is based on citizens occupying a vital functional role within electoral representative institutions. This institutional duty solves the “specificity problem” of justifying a duty to vote better than competing accounts and also immunizes the duty to objections that there is no duty to vote when there are only bad choices and that there is a no duty to vote but rather duty to vote well. By emphasizing the tight connection between institutions and individual conduct, the role morality approach used here supplies a less abstract and more realistic framework than much previous research on the ethics of democratic citizenship and brings the debate closer to constitutive features of democratic politics. (shrink)

It is rather natural to suppose that what we mean when we say that an institutional organization has a moral duty is parallel to whatever it is that we mean when we say that an individual has a duty. I challenge this interpretation on the grounds that it assumes that institutional organizations possess those characteristics or abilities requisite for moral agency—an assumption which I argue is highly suspicious. Against such an interpretation, I argue that we have very good (...) reasons to suppose that the term 'has a duty' is used equivocally across individual and institutional contexts. In other words, the meaning of an institutional duty-claim is quite different than that of an individual duty-claim, so much so that we ought to recognize that institutional duty-claims are not really duty-claims at all. (shrink)

Arguments for a duty to vote face the particularity problem—that is, they must show that voting in particular is the only way for citizens to achieve the relevant moral goal (e.g., promote the common good or avoid complicity in injustice), such that the goal cannot be achieved by activities other than voting. Kevin Elliott attempts to overcome the particularity problem by defending a universal duty to vote on the grounds that universal voter turnout is needed to ensure that democratic institutions (...) function properly. We argue that Elliott’s attempt is unsuccessful. It is unable to explain why citizens may not promote turnout without voting; moreover, it does not establish that democratic institutions are morally special, such that citizens are obligated to contribute to them but not to other valuable institutions. (shrink)

Seasonal influenza poses a significant public health risk in many countries worldwide. Lower immunity and less influenza virus circulating during the pandemic has resulted in a significant increase in cases since the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions in 2022. The seasonal influenza vaccine offers effective protection and is safe for use in large numbers of the population. This article asserts that a moral obligation to vaccinate against influenza can be understood as an Institutional Duty of Rescue. The traditional understanding of (...) the Duty of Rescue encounters issues with force and scope, making it difficult to apply to rescue cases in general, as well as being overdemanding for the individual agent. An Institutional view of the Duty of Rescue addresses these difficulties, looks at the wider context of rescue and leaves room for discussion on collective, preventative rescue measures. This makes the concept well suited to supporting a moral obligation to vaccinate against influenza as part of a collective effort on the part of institutional organisations. (shrink)

Clinicians and researchers can often rescue patients or research participants from serious harms. Indeed, they often have a duty to do so—a duty to rescue. Duties to rescue are frequently discussed in the medical ethics literature, but according to Tina Rulli and Joseph Millum they are under-theorised and more problematic than is normally acknowledged. Rulli and Millum outline two widely discussed conceptions of rescue duties: a so-called duty of easy rescue, applying to all moral agents (including healthcare professionals), (...) and the rule of rescue, applying specifically to institutions. They raise concerns about both. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. But are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals – the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the ‘Simple View’, the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective project. The (...) simple view appears to work well with regard to – you guessed it – ‘simple’ scenarios but it is riddled with further questions and problems. In this chapter, we raise five problems for the Simple View: (a) We suggest that one cannot develop a view concerning the citizenry’s duty to promote just institutions in isolation from a conception of the ontological relationship between the state and its citizens; (b) We argue that it is not obvious that the citizenry is the right entity to be attributed duties in the first place; (c) We show that a plausible account of collective duties to promote just institutions must not remain silent on the complexities and difficulties amorphous, unorganized group face in vis-à-vis collective action; (d) We contend that without allocation principles for contributory duties amongst the citizenry, or – alternatively – a method for practical deliberation that is action-guiding in collective action contexts, the claim that the citizens have a collective duty to promote just institutions remains moot; and, finally, (e) We demonstrate that the problem of reasonable disagreement is a serious threat to a collective duty to promote or create just institutions – it potentially undermines such a duty altogether and allows for conflicting contributory duties amongst the citizenry. We hope that our discussion will ultimately help improve existing theories and conceptual frameworks with a view to better understanding citizens’ obligations to promote justice under non-ideal conditions. (shrink)

Because there are governments, societies, and laws we have various obligations we otherwise would not have. This is at best trivial. But what is not trivial is how it is that we have these obligations. In this paper, I shall sketch an answer to this question.

Do we violate human rights when we cooperate with and impose a global institutional order that engenders extreme poverty? Thomas Pogge argues that by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and avoidably cause global poverty we are violating the negative duty not to cooperate in the imposition of a coercive institutional order that avoidably leaves human rights unfulfilled. This article argues that Pogge's argument fails to distinguish between harms caused by the global institutions themselves and harms (...) caused by the domestic policies of particular states and collective action problems for which collective responsibility cannot be assigned. The article also argues that his position relies on questionable factual and theoretical claims about the impact of global institutions on poverty, and about the benefits and harms of certain features of these institutions. Participation in, and benefit from, global institutions is unlikely to constitute a violation of our negative duties towards the poor. Key Words: justice • international regimes • institutions • human rights • trade. (shrink)

In order to at least begin addressing the extensive the problem of moral clarity in aiding the deprived to some degree, I first argue that the duty to aid the deprived is not merely a charitable one, dependent on the discretion, or the arbitrary will, of the giver (1). Then, before further analysing the individual duty to aid, I critically examine whether deprivation is better alleviated or remedied through the duties of corrective justice. I argue that the perspective of (...) corrective justice is important, but not sufficient when it comes to dealing with deprivation (2). I then argue that non-domination cannot serve as a first-order principle of justice. It is too minimalistic, since it would not require duties of justice where deprivation exists, but dominating relations and institutions do not. (3). Going back to the individual duty to help, I argue that the duties to aid the needy must be assessed according to the situation at hand (4). In order to avoid meaninglessness and morality’s excessive demands, one should be able to identify the responsible agents by constructing a shared and, in the last resort, institution-based duty to help (5). The institutional approach in this paper argues that we should create and reform institutions in order to realize the pre-existing requirement to alleviate global deprivation. This is a form of “global political justice” that does not start with politics, but ends with global political institutions. (shrink)

Principles of distributive justice bind macro-level institutional agents, like the state. But what does justice require in non-ideal circumstances, where institutional agents are unjust or do not e...

Apology is arguably the central act of the reparative work required after wrongdoing. The analysis by Claudia Card of complicity in collectively perpetrated evils moves one to ask whether apology ought to be requested of persons culpably complicit in institutional evils. To better appreciate the benefits of and barriers to apologies offered by culpably complicit wrongdoers, this article examines doctors’ complicity in a practice that meets Card's definition of an evil, namely, the non-medically necessary, nonconsensual “normalizing” interventions performed on (...) babies born with intersex anatomies. It argues that in this instance the complicity of doctors is culpable on Card's terms, and that their culpable complicity grounds rightful demands for them to apologize. (shrink)

El texto ofrece dos propuestas: el cosmopolitismo institucional y el cosmopolitismo de la responsabilidad. El primero, como sugiere el término, confía en el mantenimiento de las instituciones jurídicas y políticas, pero éstas deben reestructurarse para responder a las nuevas exigencias de la sociedad contemporánea. El cosmopolitismo de la responsabilidad subraya la importancia de construir efectivamente deberes y espacios de rendición de cuentas para todos los actores nacionales e internacionales. Como resultado, se vislumbran propuestas como la diligencia debida en el contexto (...) de los desastres climáticos o incluso las violaciones estructurales de los derechos humanos. Además, el concepto de rendición de cuentas se alinea con los estudiosos de las teorías decoloniales, en las que los conflictos raciales y religiosos plantean importantes desafíos al cosmopolitismo crítico. La cuestión central es descubrir si el cosmopolitismo -unido por neologismos que surgen para expandir el campo lingüístico hacia nuevos conceptos para nuevas realidades- puede encontrar alternativas a la falta de efectividad de los derechos y deberes humanos a nivel nacional e internacional. El método utilizado fue la hermenéutica fenomenológica porque no hay interpretación sin comprensión. (shrink)

While Baatz provides an interesting account of individual climate duties, his account does not give much guidance with regard to particular acts, such as taking a flight. While everyone in the debate agrees that institution-oriented duties are important, the relevant question concerns the relation these have with lifestyle-oriented duties. In this comment, it is argued that the relation between institutions and duties is insufficiently examined and that Baatz therefore cannot deal with the following questions. First, what (...) about the conflict between institution-oriented and lifestyle-oriented duties and what kind of actions do both types include? Second, Baatz includes the criterion ‘no moral weight’ in the answer to what can be reasonable demanded, but what will count as morally weighty? This comment will look at these questions by contrasting Baatz’ account with a more Rawlsian one. (shrink)

While corporate fiduciary duties in many jurisdictions are generally understood to be owed to shareholders, recent Canadian Supreme Court cases have held that directors owe their duties to the corporation, period, not to shareholders or any other stakeholders. This development has introduced significant indeterminacy to the law since it is not clear what such a conception of the duty requires. The Supreme Court did, however, make one clear statement: it held that directors owe a fiduciary duty to ensure (...) that their corporations obey statutory law. Such a duty encourages compliance with law, but may over-encourage compliance: individual directors do not necessarily gain personally from legal breaches, but may lose personally from them because of fiduciary liability, so they will have excessively strong incentives to avoid such breaches. The Article connects the fiduciary duty to obey law with recent developments in financial regulation that have increased the obligations on directors of financial institutions to oversee risk. By requiring directors to be engaged with risk at a governance level, regulators have enhanced the probability that directors will face liability under their fiduciary duties if their institutions do not comply with financial regulations. As the Article explains, the policy tradeoff between enhanced compliance benefits and over-compliance costs of fiduciary liability is different in the context of financial regulation from that in other settings. For example, significant corporate penalties, as opposed to penalties borne by individual directors, may be inconsistent with the prudential goals of regulation, perhaps because of toobig- to-fail concerns. The fiduciary duty to cause the corporation to obey financial regulation, and a stricter application of this duty than the highly deferential standard that exists in Delaware law, has advantages that do not exist in other legal and regulatory contexts. (shrink)

The question may be asked why many workers are still being paid below subsistence wages and I believe the answer can be found in the confusion over what exactly constitutes a “living wage” and who has the duty to pay these wages. This article therefore clarifies what a living wage is and gives a concrete example of how a living wage can be calculated. To understand who has the obligation to pay living wages I look to the theory of Alan (...) Gewirth on individual and institutional responsibility and the account of Robert Mayer on structural exploitation to argue that all parts of the supply chain have the duty. The final part of this paper willoutline the inclusion of a living wage calculation into corporate codes of conduct to ensure that workers at the end of the supply chain receive living wages. (shrink)

Clinicians and health researchers frequently encounter opportunities to rescue people. Rescue cases can generate a moral duty to aid those in peril. As such, bioethicists have leveraged a duty to rescue for a variety of purposes. Yet, despite its broad application, the duty to rescue is under-analyzed. In this paper, we assess the state of theorizing about the duty to rescue. There are large gaps in bioethicists’ understanding of the force, scope, and justification of the two most cited duties (...) to rescue—the individual duty of easy rescue and the institutional rule of rescue. We argue that the duty of easy rescue faces unresolved challenges regarding its force and scope, and the rule of rescue is indefensible. If the duty to rescue is to help solve ethical problems, these theoretical gaps must be addressed. We identify two further conceptions of the duty to rescue that have received less attention—an institutional duty of easy rescue and the professional duty to rescue. Both provide guidance in addressing force and scope concerns and, thereby, traction in answering the outstanding problems with the duty to rescue. We conclude by proposing and propose research priorities for developing accounts of duties to rescue in bioethics. (shrink)

On what we may call the institutional approach to justice, the most important duty of justice that individuals have is the duty to establish just institutions when they are absent. How should we understand this institutional duty in relation to more personal moral actions, such as taking direct personal action to mitigate institutional failures? Is this institutional duty a necessary responsibility of justice? Is it sufficient? I will discuss this question in the context of climate change: (...) what responsibilities of justice do individual actors have when their state is not complying with an ideal of just emissions? Do they have the duty to do what they reasonably can to reduce their personal direct emissions, perhaps even picking up the slack of non-compliers? Or is their duty of justice primarily that of doing their part to establish a just regulatory framework? I will examine some options of personal responsibility in response to climate change and argue that the most important duty is that of working to bring about better institutions. Taking direct personal action can be helpful, but not when they distract us from working towards institutional reform. (shrink)

This paper challenges the conventional view that pre-Qin Confucianism represents kingly virtue politics that lacks institutional duty. By interpreting Xunzi’s notion of yi 義, particularly gong-yi 公義, as a form of public obligation, I show that Xunzi exposes yi to state institutions to oblige people to serve public ends. While institutional duty is often associated with post-Enlightenment political philosophy, this paper argues that Xunzi’s philosophy offers a comparable framework of public–private exchange. Xunzi’s gong-yi may be a public-servicing sense (...) of duty that combines moral and civic dimensions, compelling individuals to cooperate for the collective good. Unlike social contract theories that trade private rights with public duties, Xunzi’s system relies on moral compulsion and normative reciprocity. This system posits a sensible exchange between individual duties from inner compulsion for the public good. By contrasting gong 公 (the public) with si 私 (the private), Xunzi envisions the public as an entity that is serviced through public duties and a place for human flourishing. Positioning the role of gong-yi in Xunzi’s broader institutional project crystalizes this nascent concept of a “public” and its relationships with civic duties. (shrink)

Either a person's claim to subsistence goods is held against institutions equipped to distribute social benefits and burdens fairly or it is made regardless of such a social scheme. If the former, then one's claim is not best understood as based on principles setting out a subsistence goods entitlement, but rather on principles of equitable social distribution — a fair share. If, however, the claim is not against a given social scheme, no plausible principle exists defining what counts as a (...) reasonable burden for any of the available agents to secure subsistence. No justifiable principle exists implying generalised perfect duties any agent could clearly follow or clearly breach that secure subsistence conditions for others. At best we can justify rescue duties under very specific conditions, or general but imperfect duties to improve arrangements. Neither of these obviously correlates with human rights standards. Attempts in the literature to overcome the dilemma by claiming basic rights can correlate with imperfect duties or can generate duties to work towards institutions that ‘perfect’ our imperfect duties, are faulty. I then show how the dilemma can be avoided by accounts of human rights focusing on minimum respectful treatment rather than goods or interests. (shrink)

Thomas Pogge has argued that typical citizens of affluent nations participate in an unjust global order that harms the global poor. This supports his conclusion that there are widespread negative institutional duties to reform the global order. I defend Pogge’s negative duty approach, but argue that his formulation of these duties is ambiguous between two possible readings, only one of which is properly confined to genuinely negative duties. I argue that this ambiguity leads him to shift (...) illicitly between negative and positive duties, and ultimately to overstate the extent of the negative ones. I also argue that recognition of this ambiguity makes it possible to draw a meaningful distinction between the relevant positive and negative duties, and that Pogge’s analysis can therefore be revised in a way that reveals substantial negative institutional duties to the global poor, albeit less extensive ones than Pogge asserts. In order to demonstrate this, I discuss two aspects of the global order that Pogge has criticized: the system of intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals and the rights of de facto rulers to dispose of a nation’s natural resources. In each case, although I do not specify the relevant negative institutional duties precisely, I try to identify intelligible questions whose answers would reveal genuinely negative duties and show that their likely answers are distinct from the conclusions asserted by Pogge and suggested by his analysis. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page 44-46.

Healthcare workers carry a substantial risk of harm from infectious disease, particularly, but not exclusively, during outbreaks. More can be done by healthcare institutions to identify risks, quantify the current burden of preventable infectious disease amongst HCWs and identify opportunities for prevention. We suggest that institutional obligations should be clarified with respect to the mitigation of infectious disease risks to staff, and question the duty of HCWs to care while healthcare institutions persist with a reactive rather than proactive attitude (...) to infectious disease threats. (shrink)

The Sharī‘ah ‘Committee is a board which is independent in directing, reviewing and supervising an Islamic Financial Institution. It consists of those who are specialised in Fiqh Mu‛āmalāt or those who know it with expertise in other fields. In conjunction with IFIs emergence, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions was established and has issued numerous standards on accounting, auditing and also governance for IFIs. The researchers intend to review the duties and decision-making guidelines of the Sharī‘ah (...) Committee prescribed by the AAOIFI in 2010. The review undergoes a thorough search and critical analysis of any related content about the topic throughout the whole standard. Some important results are: AAOIFI mentions directly the duties of the Sharī‘ah Committee along with the definition of this Sharī‘ah Committee. These duties are directing, reviewing and supervising. On the other hand, decision-making guidelines are indicated indirectly and they are scattered throughout the AAOIFI governance standards. (shrink)

While mitigation and adaptation will help to protect us from climate change, there are harms that are beyond our ability to adapt. Some of these harms, which may have been instigated from historical emissions, plausibly give rise to duties of compensation. This chapter discusses several principles that have been discussed about how to divide climate duties—the polluter pays principle, the beneficiary pays principle, the ability to pay principle, and a new one, the polluter pays, then receives principle. The (...) chapter introduces several challenges to these principles from the literature, before discussing which policies and institutions might be relevant to compensation, whether internationally (e.g. the Green Climate Fund) or intergenerationally (e.g. Broome and Foley’s World Climate Bank). It also describes some recent successful climate cases which require both the Dutch government and a private firm to act in accordance with climate targets to avoid potential rights-violations. Finally, it discusses one of the most important international concepts with respect to compensation: the Loss & Damage pillar of climate policy. (shrink)

While mitigation and adaptation will help to protect us from climate change, there are harms that are beyond our ability to adapt. Some of these harms, which may have been instigated from historical emissions, plausibly give rise to duties of compensation. This chapter discusses several principles that have been discussed about how to divide climate duties – the polluter pays principle, the beneficiary pays principle, the ability to pay principle, and a new one, the polluter pays, then receives (...) principle. The chapter introduces several challenges to these principles from the literature, before discussing which policies and institutions might be relevant to compensation, whether internationally (e.g., the Green Climate Fund) or intergenerationally (e.g., Broome and Foley’s World Climate Bank). It also describes some recent successful climate cases that require both the Dutch government and a private firm to act in accordance with climate targets to avoid potential rights violations. Finally, it discusses one of the most important international concepts with respect to compensation: the Loss & Damage pillar of climate policy. (shrink)

This paper offers an imminent interpretation of Kant's political teleology in the context of his response to Moses Mendelssohn in Theory and Practice III concerning prospects of humankind's moral progress. The paper assesses the nature of Kant's response against his mature political philosophy in the Doctrine of Right . In `Theory and Practice III' Kant's response to Mendelssohn remains incomplete: whilst insisting that individuals have a duty to contribute towards humankind's moral progress, Kant has no conclusive answer as to how (...) individuals might act on that duty. `Theory and Practice III' lacks a clear conception of the distinctness of political morality from the domain of virtue; Kant's resort to teleological argumentation is indicative of his lack of an account of instituting Right. The latter can be found in the Doctrine of Right —yet Kant's earlier teleological arguments contribute crucially to the development of his mature morality of Right. Key Words: inborn duty • moral progress • political teleology • principles of Right. (shrink)

This essay considers the nature of duties incumbent on legislators in virtue of the office itself. I argue that there is no duty for a legislator to enact a criminal law based on morality; there is no duty to incorporate substantive moral conditions into the criminal law; and there is therefore no duty derivable from the nature of the legislative office itself to make conditions of culpability depend on those of moral responsibility. Finally, I argue that the relation between (...) morality and the criminal law is therefore much less direct than assumed in most theories of the criminal law. (shrink)

The medical profession is observing a rising number of calls to action considering the threat that climate change poses to global human health. Theory-led bioethical analyses of the scope and weight of physicians’ normative duty towards climate protection and its conflict with individual patient care are currently scarce. This article offers an analysis of the normative issues at stake by using Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian moral account of practical identities. We begin by showing the case of physicians’ duty to climate protection, before (...) we succinctly introduce Korsgaard’s account. We subsequently show how the duty to climate protection can follow from physicians’ identity of being a healthcare professional. We structure conflicts between individual patient care and climate protection, and show how a transformation in physicians’ professional ethos is possible and what mechanisms could be used for doing so. An important limit of our analysis is that we mainly address the level of individual physicians and their practical identities, leaving out important measures to respond to climate change at the mesolevels and macrolevels of healthcare institutions and systems, respectively. (shrink)

Background: The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic is impacting the delivery of healthcare worldwide, creating dilemmas related to the duty to care. Although understanding the ethical dilemmas about the duty to care among nurses is necessary to allow effective preparation, few studies have explored these concerns. Aim: This study aimed to identify the ethical dilemmas among clinical nurses in Spain and Chile. It primarily aimed to (1) identify nurses’ agreement with the duty to care despite high risks for themselves and/or their (...) families, (2) describe nurses’ well-being and (3) describe the associations between well-being and the duty to care. Research design: Cross-sectional self-reported anonymous data were collected between May and June 2020 via electronic survey distribution (snowball sampling). Ethical considerations: The Institutional Ethical Review Committees in both countries approved the study (CHUC_2020_33 and 27/2020). Findings: In total, 345 clinical nurses answered the primary question about the duty to care for the sick. Although in the total sample 77.4% agreed they have a duty to care for the sick, significant differences were found between the Spanish and Chilean samples. Overall, 53.6% of the nurses reported low levels of well-being; however, among those reporting low well-being, statistically significant differences were found between Spanish and Chilean nurses as 19.4% and 37.8%, respectively, disagreed with the statement regarding the duty to care. Discussion: Participants in both countries reported several ethical dilemmas, safety fears, consequent stress and low well-being. These results suggest that prompt actions are required to address nurses’ ethical concerns, as they might affect their willingness to work and psychological well-being. Conclusion: Our findings shed light on the ethical dilemmas nurses are facing related to the duty to care. Not only has the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic given rise to ethical challenges, but it has also affected nurses’ well-being and willingness to work during a pandemic. (shrink)

Kevin J. Elliott has recently defended an institutional duty to vote. This duty is based on (i) the role obligation of citizens to do what is necessary for well-functioning representative institutions and (ii) the claim that universal voting is ordinarily necessary for fair representation. This critical response takes issue with the second of these claims. I argue that neither the informational nor motivational problems that Elliott identifies require universal voting. Representatives have other ways of identifying citizens’ wants and interests (...) and other incentives to respond to them. Indeed, some of Elliott’s own suggestions, for instance that representatives will respond to uncertain threats, seem to presuppose that these difficulties can be overcome. Thus, I argue that universal voting is not necessary for effective representation. (shrink)

The agency objection to applying distributive justice globally is that principles of distributive justice need to apply to the behaviour of a special kind of institutional agent of distributive justice because of the special powers of that agent. No such agent exists capable of configuring cooperative arrangements between all persons globally, and so distributive justice does not apply globally. One response to institutional views of this kind is that they do not rule out Natural Duties of Justice (...) that fall on all of us to bring about institutional agencies capable of global distributive justice. In this article I argue that this move presupposes a particular, teleological, conception of justice whilst institutional accounts most plausibly rest on a non-teleological one. I provide an argument for favouring the non-teleological conception. I also show why alternative ways of arguing for global Natural Duties of Justice do not get around this controversy. The debate is at the level of presuppositions about justice, and relying on a partisan conception is question begging. (shrink)

Many social practices treat citizens with cognitive disabilities differently from their nondisabled peers. Does John Rawls's theory of justice imply that we have different duties of justice to citizens whenever they are labeled with cognitive disabilities? Some theorists have claimed that the needs of the cognitively disabled do not raise issues of justice for Rawls. I claim that it is premature to reject Rawlsian contractualism. Rawlsians should regard all citizens as moral persons provided they have the potential for developing (...) the two moral powers. I claim that every citizen requires specific Enabling Conditions to develop and exercise the two moral powers. Structuring basic social institutions to deny some citizens the Enabling Conditions is unjust because it blocks their developmental pathways toward becoming fully cooperating members of society. Hence, we have a duty of justice to provide citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities with the Enabling Conditions they require until they become fully cooperating members of society. (shrink)

This article explores the personal responsibility of soldiers for fighting in unjust wars. Its reference point is the position developed by Jeff McMahan in his recent Killing in War. I claim that McMahan fails to give sufficient importance to institutional justifications on this matter. I argue for this by developing what I call the argument to democratic duty, which I claim embodies much current thinking about the obligations of soldiers in a democratic culture. The upshot of my argument is (...) that soldiers are placed in a contradictory position, between personal and institutional obligations. This is one sense in which soldiers can be victimized by the institution of war itself. (shrink)

On normative order -- On institutional order-- Law and the constitutional state -- A problem : rules or habits? -- On persons -- Wrongs and duties -- Legal positions and relations : rights and obligations -- Legal relations and things : property -- Legal powers and validity -- Powers and public law : law and politics -- Constraints on power : fundamental rights -- Criminal law and civil society : law and morality -- Private law and civil society (...) : law and economy -- Positive law and moral autonomy -- On law and justice -- Law and values : reflections on method. (shrink)

Just war theorists who argue that war is morally justified under certain circumstances infer implicitly that establishing the military institutions needed to wage war is also morally justified. In this paper, I mount a case in favor of a standing military establishment: to the extent that going to war is a way to discharge duties to protect fellow citizens and distant strangers from grievous harms, we have a duty to set up the institutions that enable us to discharge that (...) duty. I then respond to four objections drawn from Ned Dobos's recent book Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine. (shrink)

The duty to rescue is a highly plausible and powerful ethical principle. It requires agents to assist others in extreme need in cases where doing so does not conflict with some weighty moral aim; requires little personal sacrifice; and is likely to significantly benefit the recipients.1 As a general obligation, it binds all persons simply qua persons, and it is owed to all persons simply qua persons. Clinical investigators working in low-income countries frequently encounter sick or destitute people to whom (...) they might possess a duty to rescue. Investigators may often ask themselves, what can I do, what should I do, to help? Such investigators often help people in the future by carrying out their... (shrink)

A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for these rights and their (...) correlative duties, while remaining neutral on substantive moral debates. I argue that socioeconomic-consideration human rights are satisfactorily claimable and sufficiently practical. (shrink)

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially (...) including the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions. (shrink)

What is the significance of asserting that certain agents, be they individual or collective ones, have a duty to create just institutions at a global level? It might appear none. For many agree that there is no global authority to coordinate compliance with the duty. Hence, it is up to individual agents to decide how to comply. If this is the correct account of the duty to create just institutions, then one can say that significant global justice projects depend on (...) insignificant duty to realize them. The state’s duty is indeterminate, however, only on the supposition that authoritative institutions are necessary to secure coordination among different agents. The dissertation challenges this fundamental assumption in two steps. First, I investigate the practical relevance of conventions for solving coordination problems. By building on the works of Hume and Lewis, I show how individuals in the state of nature could have coordinated their actions by conventions up until a point when a government could have emerged. I argue that similar considerations apply to relations among states. I identify relevant similarities between conventions creating a government and international customary law. Moreover, I argue that international customary law is a global governing convention since it prescribes how rules that bind all states are to be made. The second step in my argument concerns the normative assessment of conventions. I argue that conventions are essential for the demands of justice as long as they enable compliance with the demands. Not all conventions, however, do so. I put forward the principle of salience to identify those practices that play such a role. The salient practices determine the state’s duty to create a just world order. Ceteris paribus, the duty is not indeterminate after all. Consequently, current coordination problems that arise among states should not be seen as a normal consequence of states’ rational and self-interested behavior in the absence of a global authority; instead, the coordination problems amount to the violation of the duty to create a just world order. The major implication of the argument is that we should replace the Hobbesian framework for thinking about the nature of states as well as how they relate to one another by the Humean one. Thus, instead of insisting on states’ consent and necessity of a centralized authority to coordinate actions, we should pay more attention to the habitual behavior of states as well as the role conventions play in solving coordination problems among them. Importantly, the relevance of conventions to compliance with moral demands does not make authoritative institutions obsolete. The argument of this dissertation is modest – it only asserts that conventions can coordinate actions in the process of transitioning toward more centralized forms of global authority. As opposed to the pessimistic outlook of the Hobbesian framework, the Humean one makes room for hope that the change of the present unjust conditions is possible. (shrink)

There is a need for all industries, including healthcare, to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In anaesthetic practice, this not only requires a reduction in resource use and waste, but also a shift away from inhaled anaesthetic gases and towards alternatives with a lower carbon footprint. As inhalational anaesthesia produces greenhouse gas emissions at the point of use, achieving sustainable anaesthetic practice involves individual practitioner behaviour change. However, changing the practice of healthcare professionals raises potential ethical issues. The purpose of (...) this paper is twofold. First, we discuss what moral duties anaesthetic practitioners have when it comes to practices that impact the environment. We argue that behaviour change among practitioners to align with certain moral responsibilities must be supplemented with an account of institutional duties to support this. In other words, we argue that institutions and those in power have second-order responsibilities to ensure that practitioners can fulfil their first-order responsibilities to practice more sustainably. The second goal of the paper is to consider not just the nature of second-order responsibilities but the content. We assess four different ways that second-order responsibilities might be fulfilled within healthcare systems: removing certain anaesthetic agents, seeking consensus, education and methods from behavioural economics. We argue that, while each of these are a necessary part of the picture, some interventions like nudges have considerable advantages. (shrink)

Joshua Parker’s article on green inhaler prescribing is important and timely. I agree with much of it, specifically regarding the institutional duty to make climate-friendly changes (from environmentally expensive prescriptions to ‘greener,’ similarly effective ones). The challenge, however, comes in determining how that institutional obligation impacts the rights and duties of patients. In this commentary, I want to offer a friendly alternative to Parker’s view of individual patient obligation, which I suggest is important for reasons that go (...) beyond this one case. Parker’s broad view is that, because metered-dose inhalers (MDIs) emit far more greenhouse gases (GHG) than do dry powder inhalers (DPIs), and the two are equally effective for most patients, the healthcare system should switch most patients on MDIs to DPIs, and the patients have a pro tanto duty to accept this change.1 The problem is that no individual inhaler use causes harmful climate change, and so it is difficult to explain a duty not to use MDIs. It seems that my individual behaviour ‘makes no difference’ to climate change, so familiar more principles have a difficult time justifying a prohibition of such behaviour. Parker’s response to this worry fits into the consequentialist tradition,2 3 as he argues that each individual contribution to climate change causes some amount of ‘expected harm,’ because it contributes a little bit to future climate changes which will cause harm. And since we have a duty to minimise expected harm, we have a duty not to make such small contributions to climate change. I think we should be sceptical of this sort of argument. It makes the most sense if we endorse a bathtub metaphor, in which the atmosphere is like a bathtub, and once it is full, every …. (shrink)

Institutions to address short-termism in public policymaking and to more suitably discharge our duties toward future generations have elicited much recent normative research, which this chapter surveys. It focuses on two prominent institutions: insulating devices, which seek to mitigate short-termist electoral pressures by transferring authority away to independent bodies, and constraining devices, which seek to bind elected officials to intergenerationally fair rules from which deviation is costly. The chapter first discusses sufficientarian, egalitarian, and prioritarian theories of our duties (...) toward future generations, and how an excessive focus on the short term in policymaking may hinder that such duties be fulfilled. It then surveys constraining and insulating devices, and inspects their effectiveness to address the epistemic, motivational, and institutional drivers of political short-termism as well as their intra- and intergenerational legitimacy. (shrink)