In this paper I argue that Kant’s political and juridical philosophy justifies a type of normative legal positivism that implies specific notions of law and legal freedom which determine and restrict the sphere of action of judges and jurists. Finally, I defend that, according to Kant’s practical philosophy, the normative connection between justice and law is not supposed to be carried out at the juridical level, as a meta-juridical theory, but at the political one, making it (...) a meta-political theory. (shrink)

A theme of growing importance in both the law and philosophy and socio-legal literature is how regulatory dynamics can be identified and normative expectations met in an age when transnational actors operate on a global plane and in increasingly fragmented and transformative contexts. A reconsideration of established theories and axiomatic findings on regulatory phenomena is an essential part of this discourse. There is indeed an urgent need for discontinuity regarding what we know about, among other things, law, legality, sovereignty and (...) political legitimacy, power relations, institutional design and development, and pluralist dynamics of ordering under processes of globalisation and transnationalism. Making an important contribution to the scholarly debate on the subject, this volume features original and much-needed essays of theoretical and applied legal philosophy as well as socio-legal accounts that reflect on whether legal positivism has anything to offer to this intellectual enterprise. This is done by discussing whether global and transnational cultural, socio-political, economic, and juridical challenges as well as processes of diversification, fragmentation, and transformation reinforce or weaken legal positivists’ assumptions, claims, and methods. The themes covered include, but are not limited to, absolute and limited state sovereignty; the ‘new international legal positivism’; Hartian legal positivism and the ‘normative positivist’ account; the relationship between modern secularisation, social conventionalism, and meta-ontological issues of temporality in postnational jurisprudence; the social positivisation of human rights; the formation and content of jus cogens norms; feminist critique; the global and transnational migration of principles of justice and morality; the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rule of interpretation; and the responsibility of transnational corporations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Natural Law and Thomistic Juridical Realism: Prospects for a Dialogue with Contemporary Legal Theory by Petar PopovicPius Pietrzyk O.P.Natural Law and Thomistic Juridical Realism: Prospects for a Dialogue with Contemporary Legal Theory. By Petar Popovic. Foreword by F. Russell Hittinger. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2022. Pp. xv + 307. $75.00 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3550-9.About a decade ago the former Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago, (...) H. E. Francis Cardinal George, one of the great theologian bishops of the American episcopate, issued a letter on a piece of pending legislation in the state of Illinois. The focus of the letter was on the teaching of the natural law, and why adherence to the natural law required opposition to the proposed legislation. In response, a well-known law professor at a prestigious secular [End Page 710] law school in the state wrote a public response for an online political website. The focus of his argument was to criticize the notion of natural law according to his understanding of the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. It is not necessary to describe the details of his argument, other than to say it tended to understand natural law as mere naturalism that evinced a fairly glaring misreading of the Angelic Doctor. That is, the secular legal scholar argued, in essence, that since the activity in question was observable by animals in nature, that it was therefore part of the natural law, and could be defended as a right. To this, a Thomistic sed contra is perhaps the most fitting response.As this story makes clear, there is a great ignorance of what constitutes the natural law in the secular consciousness, even among the most respected of secular legal scholars, to say nothing of the application of the natural law to the juridic world of law and politics. Perhaps the last hurrah of natural law, at least in the American public consciousness, was then Sen. Joseph Biden’s famous grilling of Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas on the subject in 1991. Since then, legal positivism has become nearly universal, divorcing legal norms from any realistic understanding of a common human nature. It has become the dominant ideology in America’s legal academies, even if some adherents of natural law remain in positions of authority in the judicial system.Although it has faded from the world of secular law in the United States, the tradition of natural law has retained a firm hold in Catholic thought, especially by that religious order dedicated to the teachings of its most brilliant adherent, St. Thomas. Not only Thomistic natural law, but proponents of the so-called new natural law continue to provide a vibrant source of debate and insight into the understanding of the natural law in evaluating the goodness of human action. Pope John Paul II’s famous encyclical Veritatis Splendor represents the magisterial commitment to the natural law approach in moral thinking, even if some might believe that commitment has weakened in recent years.To a lesser degree, there has remained a strong current of natural law thinking within the currents of legal philosophy in canon law, even if the precise connection between natural law and its juridic instantiation has not always been the focus. Among recent ecclesiastical legal theorists, arguably the most influential proponent of a robust natural law approach to legal philosophy was the Spanish canonist Javier Hervada Xiberta, and especially his Introducción crítica al derecho natural, currently in its tenth Spanish edition. A disciple of Jose Maria Escriva’s Opus Dei movement, Hervada was a long-serving and internationally respected dean of the School of Law in Navarre. Through his teaching and the various journals he founded, he insisted on the link between law and justice—lex and ius. Hervada was firmly convinced of the realism of law: law is nothing less than the ipsa res iusta. That notion of ius was not simply an idea, but recognized a real relationship of debt and obligation between persons. [End Page 711]In this, Hervada saw himself as the proponent not of some novel theory, but merely of one... (shrink)

My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively speaking, in “the (...) world taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context. (shrink)

This paper presents a specific concept of the legal system, bringing a contribution to the Theory of Law, from the line of analysis of the Semiotics of Law. The entire methodological approach of this concept is based on the contributions of the École de Paris, from a theoretical-semiotic perspective derived from the studies of Algirdas Julien Greimas. The analysis seeks to further and qualify previous studies and publications, and focuses on the task of presenting the concept of juridicity, deriving the (...) description of the concept of the legal system from it, understood as a set of connections between legal texts. Consequently, the paper presents a Mesh Model for the description of the legal system, replacing the positivist concept of the Pyramid Model, through restoring the relationship between Law and Moral, between Law and Society and Law and Justice. Throughout the theoretical explanation, the paper tries to trace, develop and qualify the main points with arguments that distinguish the operation of the legal system, such as the concentric movement, micro-universes of meaning, discursive practices, the task of legal actors, dynamic inter-textuality, the role of interpretation, the process of the production of legal meaning and the search for textual justice. (shrink)

Many scholars of Medieval Political Philosophy have suggested that Marisilius of Padua’s Defensor Pacis defends a «positivist» approach to law. In this article we try to show that such claim is wrong. We begin by sketching a brief summary of Marilius’ legal doctrine and then we turn to many scholarly pieces that have found it either in favor of or against «juridical positivism» in the Defensor Pacis. By reviewing the most recent theories on «juridical positivism» we (...) argue that there are no evidences of any coherent «positivist» view of Law in Marsilius’ work and, that if there are, they are irrelevant to Marsilius’ political philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze Carlos Cossio’s theory of law, and how his theory was a reaction to Kelsen’s juridical positivism. The most important aspect I highlight is the logical abstract normativism defended by Kelsen, and how it was overcome by a transcendental and existential theory of law, which Cossio develops in a close relationship to Husserl and Heidegger views.

The problem of the legal person is a central issue in legal philosophy and the theory of law. In this article I examine the semantic meaning of the concept of the person in Russian philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century, considered to be the "Golden Age" of Russian legal thought. This provides an overview of the conception of the personality in the context of different legal approaches (theory of natural law, legal positivism, the psychological legal doctrine, and (...) the sociological school of law). I indicate a polemic among the theories of the person and attempts to create an integral concept of the legal subject. In addition I present an analysis of the relation between the concepts of the legal subject and the moral person, which personify fundamental features of law and morality. In order to demarcate the notions of individual and the legal subject, I focus on doctrines of the artificial person or the juridical person. (shrink)

For more than two centuries the constitutional State and the principle of legality have constructed a rampart against the selfsufficiency of police power, but the events of Summer zoo1 have brutally unveiled the porosity of this limit. Suddenly, an entire history reappeared, preciously instructive, supposedly past and dedicated to erudition since the fateful date, 1789. Like the revolutionaries in the constituent and legislative Assembly , we are once again confronted by a dilemma barely modified by two centuries of juridical (...) positivism. Is it possible to subject the activities of the police to a system of legal control, or must we rather admit that that institution possesses its own standards and that any blunders are less the sign of a specific violation of the law than the confirmation of a structural specificity proper to the police? (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo es eminentemente didáctico y se centra en un abordaje descriptivo del debate adelantado en filosofía moral y política en torno a los derechos humanos. Se analizan unas siete concepciones acerca de cómo conciben la naturaleza y fundamentación racional de estos derechos, de cuya promulgación contenida en la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos de 1948, se cumplen en este 2008 sesenta años. Como parte de la celebración de esta efeméride por nuestra Facultad de Filosofía y Letras (...) de la Universidad de La Salle, se escribe este artículo con la intención adicional de que sirva a los estudiantes como iniciación a sus estudios y preocupaciones teóricas en materia de derechos humanos. (shrink)

The arguments put forward in this work are based on certain reflections about doctrinal aspects, theoretical meanings and focuses in some philosophical postures that have been the basis for juridical science. The jus-naturalistic, jus-positivist, formalistic, realistic and materialistic concept..

Hans Kelsen and Max Weber are conventionally understood as initiators not only of two distinct and opposing processes of concept formation, but also of two discrete and contrasting theoretical frameworks for the study of law. _The Foundation of the Juridical-Political: Concept Formation in Hans Kelsen and Max Weber _places the conventional understanding of the theoretical relationship between the work of Kelsen and Weber into question. Focusing on the theoretical foundations of Kelsen’s legal positivism and Weber’s sociology of law, (...) and guided by the conceptual frame of the juridico-political, the contributors to this interdisciplinary volume explore convergences and divergences in the approach and stance of Kelsen and Weber to law, the State, political science, modernity, legal rationality, legal theory, sociology of law, authority, legitimacy and legality. The chapters comprising _The Foundation of the Juridical-Political _uncover complexities within as well as between the theoretical and methodological principles of Kelsen and Weber and, thereby, challenge the enduring division between legal positivism and the sociology of law in contemporary discourse. (shrink)

In contrast to a positivist conception that considers the objective elements of its topographical location to be absolutely prevalent for the identification of a real estate, the Roman legal sources present a more articulated picture, in which the voluntas, affectio and constitutio of the dominus play a fundamental role in the subjective distinction between locus and fundus. In any case, a merely patrimo-nial perspective appears extraneous to Roman jurist’s thinking. On the contrary, emerges the full awareness of a special (...) class='Hi'>juridical relationship of man with the ter-ritory. (shrink)

Deconstruction both by its friends and enemies has come to be associated with a set of cliches that completely misunderstands its ethical aspiration. It is particularly within the field of law that we can see the ethical force of deconstruction, and also illuminate its concrete and practical importance. In The Philosophy of the Limit Drucilla Cornell examines the relationship of deconstruction to questions of ethics, justice and legal interpretation. She argues that renaming deconstruction "the philosophy of the limit" will allow (...) us to be more precise about what deconstruction actually is philosophically and hence to articulate more clearly its significance for law. Cornell explores the ethical and juridical significance of the so-called postmodern rebellion against metaphysics. A shared ethical rebellion links philosophers as different as Theodor Adorno, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Emmanuel Levinas. Together they present a new ethical configuration, new in its difference from both the critical social theory of J$u$urgen Habermas and the analytic jurisprudence of Nagel and Rawls. A key aspect of this newness is the centrality given to the relationship between questions of ethics and sexual difference. Cornell argues that the appeal of Lacan's analysis to feminists is that it helps to explain the profound hold the gender hierarchy has over Western culture, including its theories of political transformation. Under a Lacanian analysis the law of gender identity will be replicated in the laws of an existing legal system. This means that we cannot hope to sustain legal reforms unless the gender hierarchy is challenged. Cornell examines Derrida's position on the significance of the gender hierarchy in philosophy and explores its ethical and political importance. Derrida's intervention against legal positivism has important implications for the legal reforms necessary to protect marginalized groups. His emphasis on the limit, she argues, is crucial to thosewhose well-being and very lives may depend on legal transformation, women and homosexuals, for example. In an important contribution to legal philosophy, Cornell explores the affinities of Derrida's writings with recent liberal analytic jurisprudence. She also explores the differences. Comparing Rawls's and Derrida's accounts of justice, she argues that Derrida gives greater attention to the necessary utopian moment in his insistence on maintaining the divide between law, established norms, and justice. Cornell's focus on the importance of the limit and the centrality of the gender hierarchy allows her to offer a view of jurisprudence different from both critical social theory and analytic jurisprudence. As we watch the long-fought-for civil rights of women systematically overturned, we have reason to think about how the connections she makes shed light on an underlying truth of our social, political, and legal reality. (shrink)

This article pays special attention to the large number of references to political theology by Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, particularly in the interwar period, and seeks to interpret these references in a new way. While Schmitt's analogies between God and state are to be expected considering his strong Catholic roots, such comparisons are much more surprising for a positivist like Hans Kelsen, who always tried to relieve state and law from transcendental elements. The article concludes that, far from being (...) marginal in the doctrinal dispute between Schmitt and Kelsen, references to political theology express and summarize their major controversy about the relation between state and law, as well as about the sources of the state's unity. The heart of the disputatio between the two jurists concerned the ability of the political power to emancipate itself from the juridical order. The ‘legal miracle’—in this context meaning the occasional autonomization of the state from law—was for Schmitt the manifestation of sovereign power. However, for Kelsen it represented the negation of the state's essence, whose actions must be determined only by the legal order. (shrink)

The author maintains in this article that it is possible an approach between the positivistic legal theory, the one that follows the model of the analytical theory developed by Hart, and those others that apply a socio-legal method. Against what some defenders of both perspectives advocate, who view each others with some disdain, the author asserts the need to integrate legal theory with social sciences in the field of juridical ideas. This supposes opening spaces to develop a socio-legal theory (...) of law that lives equally from categories of conceptual analysis and of sociological research. The author rests specially, in order to defend this position, on authors like Roger Coterrell, Denis Galligan, Nicola Lacey and, above all, Brian Tamanaha and William Twinning, whose arguments are here object of special consideration. (shrink)

This paper examines and defends von Wright's view of moral value, put forward in his book The Varieties of Goodness (1963). He holds that moral value is not a primary value like instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, or hedonic value, but a secondary or second-level one which is based on a combination of primary values. Human actions and intentions are the only bearers of moral value, and they are morally valuable because they protect and promote some set of primary values. It (...) is argued that the same account (i) applies also to juridical value, and (ii) can be used to throw some light on the problem of defining the three competing schools of legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism, natural law theory, and legal constructivism. (shrink)

Axiological foundations of free speach. Belandria, Margarita y González R., Javier Voluntad, ausencias, y normas: el sustrato histórico del positivismo en el derecho. Will, absences and norms: the historical background of positivism in law. Carpintero Benítez, Francisco Nominalismo jurídico, escolástica española y tradición republicana. Juridical nominalism, spanish scholasticism and republican tradition. Casanova Guerra, Carlos El primer principio de la razón práctica en la teoría de la ley natural de John Finnis. The first principle of practical reason in John (...) Finnis´s natural law theory. Hocevar G., Mayda G. El derecho a una educación integral de calidad, ¿utopía o posibilidad?. The right to an integral education of quality: utopia or possibility?. López de Cordero, Mery La muerte de la imagen. The death of the image. Peña, Edilio Karl Jaspers: autorreflexión y "existenzerhellung". Karl jaspers: self-reflection and "existenzerhellung". Portuondo Pajón, Gladys L. Derechos humanos y positivismo moderado. Human rights and temperated positivism. Ramos Pascua, José Antonio De la libertad y sus apariencias. On liberty and its appearances. Ramis Muscato, Pompeyo Pensamiento y vida: la "guía" zambraniana. Thought and life: zambrano's "guide" Rivara Kamaji, Greta Interdisciplinares Las mujeres en la ciencia de la salud. Women in the health sciences. Alcaraz Ariza, María Ángeles Cultura arquitectónica y crisis de la contemporaneidad. Architectural culture and crisis of the contemporary. Arellano Spinetti, Leonardo Recensiones Homenaje al filósofo venezolano Alberto Rosales. Walton, Roberto Informaciones Índice acumulado. (shrink)

For centuries, natural law was the main philosophical legal paradigm. Now, it is a wonder when a court of law invokes it. Arthur Kaufmann already underlined a modern general "horror iuris naturalis". We also know, with Winfried Hassemer, that the succession of legal paradigms is a matter of fashion. But why did natural law become outdated? Are there any remnants of it still alive today? This book analyses a number of prejudices and myths that have created a general misconception of (...) natural law. As Jean-Marc Trigeaud put it: there is a natural law that positivists invented. Not the real one(s). It seeks to understand not only the usual adversaries of natural law (like legalists, positivists and historicists) but also its further enemies, the inner enemies of natural law, such as internal aporias, political and ideological manipulations, etc. The book puts forward a reasoned and balanced examination of this treasure of western political and juridical though. And, if we look at it another way, natural law is by no means a loser in our times: because it lives in modern human rights. (shrink)

Do our present circumstances allow us to defend a specific connection (that specific connection) between «legal rules», «moral claims» and «democratic principles» which we may say is granted by an unproblematic presupposition of universality or by an «acultural» experience of modernity? In order to discuss this question, this paper invokes the challenge-visée of a plausible reinvention of Law’s autonomous project (a reinvention which may be capable of critically re-thinking and re-experiencing Law’s constitutive cultural-civilizational originarium in a «limit-situation» such as our (...) own). The discussion is developed by recognising that the claim to universality is not only incompatible with a substantive conception of juridicalness as validity but also sustained with difficulty by a procedural representation of discourse and rationality (a representation which, against its own conclusion-claims, could also be said to be culturally and civilizationally bounded). Not forgetting some specific features of contemporary juridical pluralism—namely that which emerges from the counterpoint between semiotic groups or interpretative communities (and their differently assumed claims of intersemioticity concerning the signifier law)—this train of reflection diagnoses briefly a sequence of complementary main difficulties (as «obstacles» to recognising Law’s demand as an unmistakable cultural project), namely those arising from the formalistic normativistic inheritance (confounding legal autonomy with isolationism), from the challenges and seductions of practical holism (justifying a continuum in which Law’s project loses its sense and autonomy), and also from the familiar debate between exclusive and inclusive versions of positivism and non-positivism (a debate which establishes-consecrates an equivocal counterpoint between Law and Morality). (shrink)

In this paper I argue, from the point of view of a legal positivist conception of law and its associated approach to legal interpretation, that having a ‘democratic Bill of Rights’ as a basis for enacting ‘human rights legislation’ is more legitimate and likely to be more effective with respect to promoting human rights than the contemporary model of using ‘juridical Bills of Rights’ as a basis for modifying or overriding enacted legislation.Resumen:Desde una concepción positivista del derecho y su (...) respectivo enfoque hacia la interpretación jurídica, en este artículo se argumenta que el tener un “Bill of Rights democrático” como base para expedir una “legislación de derechos humanos” resulta ser más legítimo y más efectivo para la promoción de los derechos humanos, que el modelo contemporáneo de “Bill of Rights jurisdiccionales” que sirve para modificar o invalidar la legislación promulgada. (shrink)

Corruption cases that result in small state financial losses continue to end up in the Corruption Court without alternative solutions that are faster, simpler and cheaper, even though the Corruption Court is located in the provincial capital and the corruption trial process requires a lot of money. So that it is not commensurate between the costs of law enforcement incurred with the state financial losses incurred due to corruption. The method of this research approach is juridical sociological because the (...) problems studied concern the relationship between juridical factors and sociological factors. The urgency of discontinuing the prosecution of corruption crimes with small state financial losses is that the prosecution of corruption crimes with small state financial losses is inefficient and the Discontinuation of Prosecution of corruption crimes with small state financial losses does not have a legal umbrella This is because there are weaknesses in legal substance, legal structure and legal culture. The reconstruction model for the termination of prosecution of corruption crimes with small state financial losses based on Prosecutorial Discretion by the Public Prosecutor in a Progressive Legal Perspective is the Reconstruction of Legal Substance, namely adding Prosecutorial Discretion by the Public Prosecutor as a manifestation of the Dominus Litis Principle can stop the prosecution of corruption crimes with small state financial losses where this has not been regulated in Article 140 paragraph (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, Reconstruction of legal structure, namely the delegation of authority from the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia to the Head of the High Prosecutor's Office as the controller of the termination of prosecution of corruption crimes with small state financial losses, Reconstruction of legal culture, namely changing the patterns of thought of public prosecutors from positivistic to progressive in exercising their authority. The recommendations in this study encourage the reform of the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) related to the authority to discontinue prosecution by the Public Prosecutor and the need to make a regulation of the Attorney General related to the Discontinuation of Prosecution based on the Discretion of the Public Prosecutor. (shrink)

Axiological foundations of free speach. Belandria, Margarita y González R., Javier Voluntad, ausencias, y normas: el sustrato histórico del positivismo en el derecho. Will, absences and norms: the historical background of positivism in law. Carpintero Benítez, Francisco Nominalismo jurídico, escolástica española y tradición republicana. Juridical nominalism, spanish scholasticism and republican tradition. Casanova Guerra, Carlos El primer principio de la razón práctica en la teoría de la ley natural de John Finnis. The first principle of practical reason in John (...) Finnis´s natural law theory. Hocevar G., Mayda G. El derecho a una educación integral de calidad, ¿utopía o posibilidad?. The right to an integral education of quality: utopia or possibility?. López de Cordero, Mery La muerte de la imagen. The death of the image. Peña, Edilio Karl Jaspers: autorreflexión y "existenzerhellung". Karl jaspers: self-reflection and "existenzerhellung". Portuondo Pajón, Gladys L. Derechos humanos y positivismo moderado. Human rights and temperated positivism. Ramos Pascua, José Antonio De la libertad y sus apariencias. On liberty and its appearances. Ramis Muscato, Pompeyo Pensamiento y vida: la "guía" zambraniana. Thought and life: zambrano's "guide" Rivara Kamaji, Greta Interdisciplinares Las mujeres en la ciencia de la salud. Women in the health sciences. Alcaraz Ariza, María Ángeles Cultura arquitectónica y crisis de la contemporaneidad. Architectural culture and crisis of the contemporary. Arellano Spinetti, Leonardo Recensiones Homenaje al filósofo venezolano Alberto Rosales. Walton, Roberto Informaciones Índice acumulado. (shrink)

This address at the Hart Centenary Conference in Cambridge in July 2007 reflects on foundational elements in Hart's method in legal philosophy. It argues that his understanding of what it is to adopt an internal point of view was flawed by (a) inattention to the difference between descriptive history (or biography or detection) and descriptive general theory of human affairs, (b) inattention to practical reason as argument from premises, some factual but others normative (evaluative) in their content, and (c) relative (...) inattention to the deliberations of law-makers as distinct from subjects of the law. These flaws contributed to a concept or theory of law that so truncated its account of the juridical, and of the sources of legal reasoning, that it could provide little or no guidance in situations of legal difficulty. The paper suggests that these flaws result, to some significant extent, from the skeptical doubts about morality evident particularly in his later work. All this has implications for the kind of approach to law and legal theory often self-described as positivist. (shrink)

In, Kant defends a position that cannot be salvaged. The essay is nonetheless important because it helps us understand his philosophy of law and, more specifically, his interpretation of the social contract. Kant considers truthfulness a strict legal duty because it is the necessary condition for the juridical state. As attested by Kants arguments against the death penalty, not even the right to life has such strict unconditional status. Within the juridical state, established by the social contract, the (...) innate right to freedom is transformed into a bundle of merely positive rights, including the right to life. Understanding the reason for the rejection of thus helps us understand the, in a sense, character of Kant’s legal philosophy. In conclusion, some suggestions are made to bring his position closer to our common moral understanding. (shrink)

This essay discusses criminal law theories in late Imperial Russia. It argues that, although the political climate of Reform and Counter Reform effectively undermined attempts to implement new legislation premised on the idea of the 'rights-enabled person', paradoxically, it fostered the growth of juridical scholarship. Russian criminal law theorists engaged critically with Western juridical science, which, beginning in the 1870s, witnessed a shift away from absolutist theories inspired by the classics of philosophical idealism towards various strains of (...) class='Hi'>positivism arguing for the restoration of the person as a concrete, physiological being. However, while Russian scholars were drawn to these new trends of criminal anthropology and the sociology of crime, they were also obliged to take stock of an indigenous legal culture that scarcely differentiated between pravo and zakon, together with a long tradition of customary practices that equated crime and punishment with sin and redemption. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta profundizar en la doctrina de los derechos fundamentales del jurista italiano Luigi Ferrajoli. Ferrajoli es uno de los principales teóricos del garantismo iusfilosófio. Su teoría sobre los derechos quiere ser una vía de superación de la antinomia positivismo-iusnaturalismo. This paper tries to review the doctrine of fundamental rights of italian jurist Luigi Ferrajoli. Ferrajoli is one of the main theorists of garantism juridical-philosophical. His theory of rights is, in his opinion, an alternative to iusnaturalism and (...) legal positivism. (shrink)

1 A Versatile Mediator 2 Theory and Method in the Social Sciences 3 Kaufmann and Logical Empiricism 4 Kaufmann and the Liberal Wing of Viennese Late Enlightenment 5 Kaufmann and Popper 6 Kaufmann in the United States 7 Rediscovering Kaufmann's Methodology.

In 1948, A.J. Ayer was attacked on the pages of The New Statesman and Nation magazine where it was claimed that his views were partly responsible for increasingly Fascist attitudes at Oxford. Ayer...

On January 1, 1958, in the journal Democratic Critique, Zhang Junmai, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan published the "Manifesto on Chinese Culture for the World: Our Common Understanding of Chinese Scholarship Research and of the Future of Chinese Culture and World Culture."1 This manifesto is commonly seen as the founding statement of the New Confucianism movement. Section 2 of the manifesto, "Three Motives, Approaches, and their Shortcomings in the Study of Chinese Culture in World Scholarship," claimed that Chinese (...) culture had not been understood by three kinds of people who had approached it, namely, Christian missionaries, sinologists, and students of present world history. For the New Confucians, the... (shrink)

The number of available legal documents has presented an enormous growth in recent years, and the digital processing of such materials is prompting the necessity of systems that support the automatic relevant information extraction. This work presents a system for ontology-based information extraction from natural language texts, able to identify a set of legal events. The system is based on an innovative methodology based on domain ontology of legal events and a set of linguistic rules, integrated through inference mechanism, resulting (...) in a flexible approach and scalable approach. A case study with the use of documents from the Superior Court in Brazil is related, with satisfactory results in precision and recall. (shrink)

In Legality, Scott Shapiro builds his case for legal positivism on a simple premise: laws are plans. Recognition of that fact leads to legal positivism, Shapiro says, because the content of a plan is fixed by social facts. In this essay, I argue that Shapiro’s case for legal positivism fails. Moreover, I argue that we can learn important lessons about the prospects for positivism by attending to the ways in the argument fails. As I show, the (...) flaws in Shapiro’s argument reveal structural problems with a family of prominent positivist views, including the one defended by Joseph Raz. (shrink)